Sartre Studies International

In this article, I reconsider the philosophical significance of Jacques Lacan’s reading of Freud in light of Jean-Paul Sartre’s early critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. Since direct comparisons between the work of Sartre and Lacan are sparse in the English literature, Betty Cannon’s comprehensive treatment proves to be an invaluable resource in opening up this line of inquiry. I claim that one reason for the limited attention given to comparisons of their work is the continued strength of the polemics between humanism and structuralism. Lacan’s structuralism is regularly indicted by humanists for failing to provide a conception of subjective responsibility in the way that Sartre’s humanism does. Taking Cannon’s ­critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis on this issue as a point of departure, I argue that a conception of subjective responsibility can be found throughout Lacan’s work, serving as a point of common ground upon which further inquiry—particularly of Sartre’s later work—might begin.

This article is a reply to Blake Scott’s discussion of the Sartrean critique of Lacan that I present in three chapters of Sartre and Psychoanalysis. Here I revisit those chapters, written 25 years ago, with questions about how I might approach Lacan today. I also discuss how I might approach recent developments in psychoanalysis, some of which are influenced by both Lacan and postmodernism. While I still think Lacan does not give an adequate account of agency and responsibility, there are definitely parallels between Sartre and Lacan and even a significant, though ambiguous, debt that Lacan owes to Sartre, similar to the often-neglected influence of Sartre on postmodern philosophy. The rest of the article considers the influence of postmodernism and existential phenomenology on contemporary psychoanalysis. Despite certain theoretical difficulties, the relational and intersubjective emphasis in much of contemporary psychoanalysis, combined with a rejection of drive theory, is in some ways surprisingly compatible with Sartre’s requirements for an existential psychoanalysis.

Beaucoup de philosophes et d’écrivains décrivent aujourd’hui la complexité de la relation homme/animal. Elle repose sur « l’imposture » et « l’hallucination » selon certains, et sur l’échange et le partage selon d’autres. Pour Sartre, le problème se pose surtout en termes de liberté. Même si le chien vit auprès de l’homme, et trouve dans son milieu socio-culturel ses aliments et son abri, il ne s’y intègre qu’à moitié. Le chien ne se fond pas complètement dans le monde humain, sa situation particulière l’oblige aussi à s’en tenir à l’écart. Cet article veut montrer un Sartre qui révèle les « pièges de la domestication ». L’animal possédé est privé de sa liberté. Le maître veut rendre sa vie meilleure, en s’appuyant sur tout ce que le chien peut lui procurer comme joie, et qui le protège de son « obscène » et « fade » existence.

Sartre’s theory of mental imagery is often criticized for succumbing to the very “illusion of immanence” that he decries in both The Imagination and The Imaginary. I challenge Edward S. Casey’s defense of this criticism in light of Cam Clayton’s recent effort to do the same. Clayton tries to meet Casey’s arguments by focusing on what he, Clayton, believes to be Sartre’s development of the role and ontological status of the “psychical analogon” in his theory of mental imagery. I argue against Clayton’s account of the psychical analogon, showing how both he and Casey miss what for Sartre is its essential role and positive status as bodily movement. Thus Sartre adequately provides for the materiality, or positivity, of the psychical analogon, and a closer look at Sartre’s arguments about bodily movement and mental imagery—not Clayton’s interpretation—meets Casey’s objections and dispels Sartre’s theory of the alleged illusion.

The present article provides an account of the chapter of volume one of the Critique of Dialectical Reason entitled “The Organization.” It is guided by the following questions: In what ways is the organization an advancement over the group in fusion and the statutory group? How does the organization contribute to the progressive dimension of Sartre’s progressive-regressive method? What is the status of the future within organized groups? It develops Sartre’s theory of power, rights, and duties, and shows that these concepts exist independently of the Polis. This makes possible a contrast with Plato and allows us to develop the implicit Sartrean concepts of moderation and justice in this chapter. I further show the internal structures and functioning of the organized group, Sartre’s concept of personal identity in such action, and the manner in which the future becomes concrete in such articulated action orientated toward an ultimate, collective aim.