Theoria

This issue is the third in an ongoing series examining the political, social and economic implications of war in the contemporary world. Previous issues on this theme (Theoria 109, April 2006, and 110, August 2006) touched on debates about ‘old’ and ‘new’wars, militant American neoconservatism and the war on terror, the ramifications of humanitarian intervention and conscientious objection, and prospects for global justice and peace. The implications of current U.S. foreign policy continue to loom large in this issue, but the focus falls in addition on the personal and moral effects of war and its consequences for the individual: the moral claims behind the Bush Doctrine, and its effects on domestic issues and personal life, the question of targeted killings of individual terrorists, the continued relevance and utility of Clausewitz’s theory of war, and the use of foreign health aid as a deterrent to bioterrorism.

In the ongoing war on terror both the American and Israeli governments have resorted to a policy of ‘targeting terrorists’. In essence, both governments authorize their military or intelligence services to kill specific ‘terrorists’ who they believe mortally threaten citizens and cannot otherwise be neutralized. President Bush calls this ‘sudden justice’ and the Israeli government ‘targeted killing’ but their critics speak of ‘assassination’, ‘liquidation’ or ‘extra-judicial killing’. Since 11 September 2001, America is reported to have killed at least 44 people without warning or trial under the guidance of this policy, at least 18 of whom were civilians; the Israelis have killed at least 348, including 120 unintended targets (B’tselem 2006; Byman 2006b; Meyer 2006).

What has come to be known as ‘the Bush Doctrine’ is an idealistic approach to international relations that imagines a world transformed by the promise of democracy and that sees military force as an appropriate means to utilize in pursuit of this goal. The Bush Doctrine has been described in various ways. It has been called ‘democratic realism,’ ‘national security liberalism,’ ‘democratic globalism,’ and ‘messianic universalism’.1 Another common claim is that this view is ‘neoconservative’.2 In what follows I will employ the term ‘neoconservative’ as a convenient and commonly accepted name for the ideas that underlie the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine has been expressed in numerous speeches by President Bush and members of his administration.3 It is stated in the policy of the National Security Strategy of the United States.4 And it was employed in the invasion of Iraq. The hopeful aspiration of the Bush Doctrine is that democratization will result in peace.

Since the 1990s various influential authors have argued that Clausewitz’s theory is no longer applicable, not only in relation to contemporary conflicts, but also in general (see the discussion in de Nooy 1997). Some have suggested that it is harmful (van Creveld 1991, 1998) and even self-destructive (Keegan 1993, 1995) to continue to use this theory as the basis for understanding and as a guide to political action, given the revolutionary changes in war and violence occurring in the world’s communities.2 Clausewitz, it is proposed, was only concerned with war between states employing regular armies, whereas conflict today mainly involves non-state actors.

Why is it that one feels as though they have to say that 9/11 was a ‘tragic’, ‘terrible’ or ‘horrific’ event? Why is this inclination intensified if one seeks to comment critically on U.S. politics? Is it not clear that death on that scale and in that manner is without exception horrific, terrible and tragic? Or, is it that as a critical scholar I feel compelled to clarify that I am not with the terrorists simply because I intend to critique aspects of U.S. foreign policy? The point of this is not to argue that one should stop referring to 9/11 as ‘horrific’, ‘terrible’ or ‘tragic’, but rather to examine what causes individuals to monitor the way in which they act when they engage with a powerful foreign policy consensus.

Arguments for the provision of foreign aid to help relieve the blight of developing countries have traditionally centred on obligations of benevolence and a duty to help those less fortunate.1 However, the War on Terror has resulted in a significant shift in how foreign aid is perceived. International prosperity and stability are now recognized as key elements in a fight to ameliorate the conditions that give rise to terrorism. Public support for foreign aid in general, normally unpopular, has increased since 11 September 2001 due to greater public understanding of its role in combating terrorism.2 In particular, the need to address attitudes of foreign civilians toward the United States has become more widely recognized as a key component of efforts to reduce the ferment of the terrorist mindset. These strategies have assumed particular importance in light of the non-traditional nature of the threat posed by contemporary terrorism: a threat posed not by states or armies, but by individuals and groups who blend into, garner both the implicit and explicit support of, and are recruited from general civilian populations.

Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Expanded Edition) by Sheldon S. Wolin Andrew Nash

Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa by Lungisile Ntsebeza Keith Breckenridge

Sociology, Religion and Grace: A Quest for the Renaissance by Arpad Szakolczai Roger Deacon