ISSN: 0920-1297 (print) • ISSN: 1558-5263 (online) • 3 issues per year
Published Open Access as part of the Berghahn Open Anthro collection.
In the 1950s, teams of Chinese government ethnologists helped liberate
“slaves” whom they identified among the Wa people in the course of China’s military
annexation and pacification of the formerly autonomous Wa lands, between
China and Burma. For the Chinese, the “discovery” of these “slaves” proved the
Engels-Morganian evolutionist theory that the supposedly primitive and therefore
predominantly egalitarian Wa society was teetering on the threshold between Ur-
Communism and ancient slavery. A closer examination of the historical and cultural
context of slavery in China and in the Wa lands reveals a different dynamics
of commodification, which also sheds light on slavery more generally. In this article
I discuss the rejection of slavery under Wa kinship ideology, the adoption of
child war captives, and the anomalous Chinese mine slaves in the Wa lands. I also
discuss the trade in people emerging with the opium export economy of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century which helped sustain, yet also threatened,
autonomous Wa society. I suggest that past Wa “slave” trade was spurred by the
same processes of commodification that historically drove the Chinese trade in
people, and in recent decades have produced the large-scale human trafficking
across Asia, which UN officials have labeled “the largest slave trade in history” and
which often hides slavery under the cover of kinship. This article explores histories of social separation, impermanent encounters,
and lasting political alliances between Dalit (“untouchable”) Chamar
male youth and members of the upper-caste Brahman community in a village in
eastern Uttar Pradesh, North India. The entry of young Chamar people into educational
institutions followed by political mobilization and, for some, the transition
into employment, has led them to appropriate spaces often beyond the
purview of previous generations. Against the backdrop of Chamar histories as
agricultural laborers, powerless political subjects, and actors of religious marginality,
new forms of masculinity, sociality, and class formation have come into being.
The article focuses on young Chamar men’s involvement in village politics,
particularly during the 2005 local elections. It is argued that village politics—rather than inter-caste friendships, which remain short-lived as a result of caste
discrimination—has engendered an arena of sociality where caste-driven interest
produce more durable social links between young low-caste men and members of
the upper-caste community. As India’s political history illustrates, the episode of
electoral politics analyzed in this article brings together differently situated communities
within the nation, highlighting how the unresolved question of caste discrimination
conflates with the compulsion to political power. If young Chamar
men are the new protagonists in this history, their role is the outcome of broader
changes in the consciousness around political participation and the opening up of
democratic possibilities for minority populations in a postcolonial setting. This article analyzes the politics of memory around the Estonian government’s
decision to relocate Tallinn’s World War II memorial of a Soviet soldier.
It shows why and how legitimizing national discourses resonated with and influenced
personal narratives among ordinary Estonians. It also discusses discourses
of Estonians who took a more critical stance on the relocation. The article argues
that the dominant discourse in Estonia has been characterized by a notion of suffering
and a search for recognition from the West, while turning its back to the
East (Estonian Russians and Russia). In a similar vein, the relocation aimed at a
breakaway from the Soviet past and its discourse, while at the same time reinforcing
its perceived continuity. As such, the Estonian case gives insight into processes
of remembering, amnesia, and the quest for recognition at the new border of the
European Union, within a context of highly contentious minority politics. This article analyzes the public discourse on the riots of 16 January
2009, in Vilnius, when protest against economic shock therapy ended in violent
clashes with the police. Politicians and the media were quick to ethnicize the riots,
claiming an “involvement of foreign influences” and noting that the rioters had
been predominantly “Russian-speaking.” Analyzing electronic and print media, the
article identifies a wider tendency, particularly among middle-class Lithuanian
youth, of portraying the social class consisting of “losers of the post-soviet transition”
as aggressive and primitive Others. A pseudo-ethnicity that combines Rus sian
language and culture with lower-class background into a notion of homo sovieticus
comes to stand for what is hindering the “clean up” of Lithuania and middleclass
aspirations to form a new European identity. As such, the riots serve as a lens
that illuminates the way ethnicity is flexibly utilized to shift political loyalties. This article aims to reinvigorate analytical debates on conspiracy theories.
It argues that definitional attempts to set conspiracy theories apart from other
theories are flawed. Blinded by the “irrational” reputation of conspiracy theories
and deluded by the workings of institutionalized power such approaches fail to
recognize that there are no inherent differences between the two categories. We
argue that assessments of conspiracy theories should focus not on the epistemological
qualities of these theories but on their interactions with the socio-political
fields through which they travel. Because “conspiracy theory” is not a neutral term
but a powerful label, attention to processes of labeling highlights these larger fields
of power, while the theories’ trajectories illuminate the mechanisms by which
truth and untruth are created. As such, this article offers a way forward for assessing
both the truth and use value of conspiracy theories in the contemporary world. In Europe today, the most heated identity politics revolve around matters
of sexuality and religion. In the context of “integration” debates that occur in
different forms in various countries, sexuality has gained a new form of normativity,
and new sexual sensitivities have replaced former ones. So far, scholarly discussions
deal with these sensitivities in a deconstructivist and critical manner,
denaturalizing discourses on culture, identity, and religion. However, these debates
do not consider the experiences of people implicated in these debates, and
their often emotional and political engagement in matters where sexuality and religion
intersect. Joan Scott’s coinage of the term “sexularism” denotes a particular
form of embodiment that is part of secularism in Europe today. Rather than studying
the discourse of secularism, this article focuses on the practice of secularization;
how do people fashion their daily lives concerning sexuality, religion and its
intimate intersection? Terms of a Western discourse of homosexuality shape conflicts surrounding
sexual identity that are faced by many Muslims, especially those who
live in diasporic communities. Many use essentialized categories to articulate their
sexual orientations and express incommensurabilities between their sexuality and
their identities as Muslims. This article argues that discursive constructions of the
Muslim as traditional other to the secular sexual subject of a modern democracy
generate an uninhabitable subject position that sharply dichotomizes sexual orientations
and Muslim family/religious orientations, a dichotomization that is reinforced
by well-publicized backlashes against open homosexuality in several
Muslim countries. Yet observations made during ethnographic field research in
Pakistan, as well as scholarly evidence from other Muslim countries, suggest that
many Muslims are less troubled by sex and desire in all their possible forms than
they are by the peculiar modern practice of naming our sexualities as the basis for
secular public identities. Dutch discourse on “integration” is currently characterized by a strong
focus on the “culture” of especially Turks and Moroccans, two minority populations
in Dutch society mostly of Muslim orientation. This article discusses the issue
of the “import bride” as a case study of contemporary culturist discourse. It
argues that this issue is problematized because transnational marriage is construed
as circumventing loyalty to Dutch society and nation-state. Anand Pandian, Crooked stalks: Cultivating virtue in South India. Durham: Duke University Press,
2009, pp. 325, ISBN 978-0-8223-4531-2 (paperback). Vinay Gidwani, Capital, interrupted: Agrarian development and the politics of work in India. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2008, pp. 336, ISBN 978-0-8166-4959-4 (paperback).Volume 2011 Issue 59