

The construction of identities: introduction and overview

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This book looks at the several ways in which museums face the challenges that are part of representing cultural diversity, and at the circumstances that promote particular forms of representation and particular forms of change. Museums face several tasks: the tasks of representing both similarities and differences among several groups, both national identities and indigenous and minority voices, both material and intangible heritage, both current status and past history. Those tasks are not faced in isolation. They occur always within a complex set of interests that are not always easily compatible: their own, those of the groups that are represented or wish to be represented, and those of the groups that are their main audiences or sources of support and control.

¹ Gilroy, P. (2006) "Colonial crimes and convivial cultures". Video lecture given at the public hearing: *Debating independence: Autonomy or voluntary colonialism?* In Nuuk, Greenland, 21 April –14 May 2006. Available at: www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org

The series – *Museums and Diversity* – focuses on the challenges that museums face and the ways in which they represent diversity. It seeks also to build a conceptual picture of how representations come to take particular forms and to change. This book takes up the same issues and adds to them.

"Scandinavia" is a term used by most of the world to cover the five nations that make up "Norden" or the "Nordic" countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Included also are large semi-autonomous territories linked to Denmark: the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

Why Scandinavia?

At first glance, Scandinavia may seem – especially to those outside the area – an unlikely site for analysing how museums represent cultural diversity. In fact, here there is a very active concern with how to consider several forms of cultural diversity and to ask how they are inter-related: indigenous people, minority groups and recent immigrants. We need, in Gilroy's terms, to ask how the "discourse" on any of these groups is related to the ways in which we speak about or represent others, and to "unpack" the links and differences among those several ways.¹ Scandinavia offers a particular opportunity to do so.

Here also are countries grappling with some particular aspects of the way they are themselves represented by others. The Scandinavian countries are often thought of as united by harmony, but their history is one of many tensions between them. They are often thought of as prime examples of egalitarianism, inclusiveness, tolerance and justice but they are now coming to terms with a colonial and excluding past and a history of silence on the less positive aspects of that history.

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Here as well are challenges to the way many of us think about cultural diversity and its forms. The pattern often expected, for example, is a pattern of one indigenous group per nation. Australia, for instance, has its Aboriginals, Canada its First Nations, New Zealand its Maoris. In Scandinavia, however, the Sámi appear as an indigenous group within several countries: Finland, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, the Sámi see themselves as coming from, or belonging to, a region that cuts across all of these and includes as well parts of Russia (a region they refer to as *Sápmi*).²

One last feature has particular relevance to the title phrase “The Construction of Identities”. Identities are not one-way inventions. Neither are they static. All countries use categorical terms to mark forms of diversity and status. An area is named, for example, as a province, a state, a territory, a duchy, a “Home County”, a “reservation”. A group is named as “indigenous”, as “immigrant”, or as having some double base to its identity (Latin-American, for example). These terms are seldom empty. They often carry with them simplifications of status, together with restrictions on opportunities and, on occasion, particular rights. Terms and categories, however, are not simply

provided or imposed and passively accepted. They may also be resisted, negotiated, or on occasion chosen as the best option for oneself or one’s group.

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Scandinavia offers a special base for exploring how forms of diversity are marked, how they come to carry particular implications, and how they come to be accepted or negotiated as representations. The term “national minorities” provides an example. The term “national minority groups” appears in the terms of a convention agreed upon by the large quartet –

Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The term is both a comment on place within the nation and also an expression of policy. The 1995 Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities called for countries to promote conditions that enabled particular minority groups to “maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage”.³

To be defined as a “national minority”, a group needed to be recognised as having lengthy experience within the national borders and attachment to the country they lived in. Where the Scandinavian nations differed, however, was in the groups they recognised as “national minorities”. In Denmark, ratifying the convention in 1995, only one group was recognised. This was a German group living in southern Denmark, close to the border with Germany. Sweden, ratifying the convention in 2000, recognised the Sámi, Jews, Roma, Swedish Finns and Tornedalers (sometimes called the Torn Valley Finns). Finland recognised the Sámi, Swedish speakers, the Rom, Jews, the Old Russians and the Tartars.⁴ Norway, ratifying in 1989, did not include the Sámi as a national minority. The choice of the Sámi in Norway was to maintain their status as an indigenous group: a status seen as giving them stronger rights and more independent funding for the maintenance of cultural heritage.⁵ The recognised minorities then were the Kven (Finnish in origin), Forest Finns, Jews, Roma (Gypsies) and Romany (Travellers).

² Sámi Instituhtta: www.sami-statistics.info

³ The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) Article 5. Available amongst other sites at: conventions.coe.it

⁴ See, for example, www.finland.fi and www.humanrights.coe.it

⁵ See, for example, Einar Niemi in this volume – Chapter 1.

Those several groups are in themselves an indication of the historical background to some forms of diversity recognised within Scandinavia. Some of that historical background will be mentioned in the course of several chapters. For the benefit especially of readers from outside Scandinavia, however, we offer in this chapter a minimal background, focusing on the links across countries and on aspects relevant to particular distinctions among forms of diversity and particular aspects of museum development. That quick walk through time is then followed by an outline of the division of chapters into three sections and summaries of what each chapter covers.

Some Historical Events Relevant to Diversity and Representation

That history matters is not an issue: “To live as if our history has not marked our culture and our ways of thinking is illusionary, even if it is one of the strongest illusions today.”⁶

That the interpretation of history changes from time to time is also not at issue. The critical questions have to do with the way interpretations change or are challenged, and with how challenges are expressed. It is especially by way of an exhibition project organised by a group of artists, curators and academics in 2006, for example, that “rethinking” on the history of Nordic colonialism was expressed: rethinking seen as increasingly necessary in the face of there being little recognition within textbooks or permanent museum installations of a colonial past for countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden.⁷

The events selected below as landmark events will seem to Scandinavians a minimal and perhaps unnecessary account. Even a heavily reduced account, however, will provide a background to the categories used for the description of cultural diversity (e.g., for the several “national minorities”); the rise of movements towards affirming colonial and regional identities and establishing museums to make those affirmations concrete; the emphasis in several places on museums that underline ethnic differences and cultural heritage; and the several circumstances – local and international, economic and cultural – that influence distinctions and representations.

The format chosen is one of *interwoven history*. Focusing on links among the Scandinavian states over time is a necessary counterpart to any perception of them as a simple unit with a single “Nordic” identity. The term “Nordic” also may make it seem as if there has always been an easy flow of people across agreed-upon borders and a common perspective. The historical reality is more complex.

The interweaving highlighted is in the form of four loops. *Loop 1* links Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the Faroes, Greenland and Iceland also drawn in. *Loop 2* primarily links Finland and Sweden, with Norway drawn in largely by virtue of its having been at one point ceded by Denmark to Sweden. *Loop 3* has the Sámi as its main thread, indigenous to Finland, Norway and Sweden and the northern part of Russia. *Loop 4* looks at all the countries and regions with a focus on migration post-1945.

⁶ Kemp, P. (2005) *Världsmédborgaren: politisk och pedagogisk filosofi för det 21 århundradet*, trans. J. Retzlaff. Göteborg: Daidalos, p. 19. Cited by Mikela Lundahl: “Nordic complicity? Some aspects of Nordic identity as ‘non-colonial’ and non-participatory in the European colonial event”. At www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org/files/index.htm

⁷ www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org

8 Gilroy (2006) op. cit.

9 Smith, A. (1998) *The ethnic origins of nations*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

10 Jónsson, Í.(2006) "From colonialism to institutional dependency". At: www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org/files/index.htm

The focus on Scandinavian loops may seem to minimise the influence of other countries. That influence was certainly not absent. Germany, for example, enters the frame at several points: in the form, for example, of tentacles that linked coastal towns further and further north in a trading network (the Hanseatic League), and movement into the north and into Russia during the war of 1939–1944 (a movement accompanied in the north of Norway by a widespread destruction of buildings that was one prompt toward the rebuilding of some tangible forms of cultural heritage in the area). Britain also entered the picture at several points, from the sale of Shetland and the Orkney Islands to Scotland in the 1400s to its involvement in the Napoleonic Wars (Denmark unfortunately on the losing side) and its military bases in the Faroes, Greenland and Iceland during Germany's occupation of Denmark in the 1940s. And multiple countries, as we shall see later, were part of the labour recruitment drives in the 1960s and the intake of refugees.

Those several players cannot be ignored, especially since they contributed to the nature of diversity, the rise of various kinds of national fervour, the concern with borders and the need to avoid any "nation within a nation". As a core for this introduction, however, we keep the emphasis on loops across the Scandinavian states.

The emphasis in these four loops is also on the background to diversity in the form of the categories labelled "indigenous people" and "national minorities". I shall defer until the end the movement of "new immigrants", predominantly into Denmark, Norway and Sweden. National minorities are essentially "old immigrants". As Niemi (Chapter 1) makes especially clear, the language of "migration" is applied to both, even though their length of time in a country is vastly different. Both also raise questions about the time it may take to feel that one fully "belongs" or to be regarded as no longer an "immigrant", and about the criteria that governments and others use to define terms such as "immigrant" or "foreign". The discourse, Gilroy and others have argued, is in both cases one of exclusion rather than inclusion, of placement in a marginal position rather than at the core or equivalent places at points in any social hierarchy.⁸

Cutting across all three loops is the recognition that moves towards a union may be influenced or supported by at least two kinds of circumstances. One consists of the sense of a shared past, a common set of historical memories, a historic territory. In that sense, there is some sense of cultural collectivity or an "ethnie", in Smith's terms.⁹ Emphasising that heritage may then become a major feature to the presentation of oneself and of history.

The other kind of circumstance consists of pragmatic interests: interests related, for example, to the distribution of resources and to economic needs. The two are not independent, Jónsson has argued.¹⁰ Both affect the sense of solidarity among people. That sense of solidarity is not static. It may be weakened or undone by the sense of economic dependence and the sense that resources or status are being unjustly distributed. Like the social categories used to mark diversity, the sense of solidarity on the basis of a shared heritage or reciprocal concerns is always being constructed and altered as circumstances change.

Loop 1: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, together with the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Iceland

To simplify this loop, 1397 is the chosen starting point. Denmark, Norway and Sweden formed a union, with the Danish king recognised as the reigning monarch (the Union of Kalmar). Into that union came several areas that were at the time Norwegian holdings: the 18 islands that make up the Faroes, Greenland, Iceland, Shetland and the Orkney Islands.

For the union of 1397, the push was more economic than it was a sense of a shared past or a shared culture. The three countries needed to counter the control over shipping and trade exercised by the Hanseatic League (based in Lübeck). The League was increasingly a major player, marking its presence even by the construction of towns along the coastline.

The restive player was Sweden. After a series of skirmishes and battles, it formally withdrew from the Union in 1523. Wars, however, continued, with territory and control over shared areas of water usually at stake. A war ending in the late 1700s provides an example. Given an intriguing title – The Great Nordic War – it was aimed at Denmark’s regaining the southern part of Sweden.

Norway and Denmark stayed in the Union, with Denmark as the dominant partner. Its dominance is especially signalled by a “Coronation Charter” in 1536. Under that charter, Denmark declared Norway to be a province of Denmark.¹¹ The several areas that had been affiliated with Norway were declared as under Danish sovereignty (the Faroes, Greenland, Iceland).¹² That linking of Denmark and Norway remained in place until after the Napoleonic Wars: Denmark had aligned itself with Napoleon, Britain’s navy had shelled Copenhagen, and the Peace of Kiel in 1814 forced Denmark to cede Norway to Sweden. It was allowed, however, to retain the several island areas.

The formal union of Norway and Sweden remained in place until 1905. Over the 1800s, Norway had increasingly insisted on its own identity and independence. Sweden resisted but a plebiscite organised by the Swedish King was in favour. In a separate throw of the loop, Norway then offered its throne to a Danish prince (Christian).

There has been a great deal written about the large players – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. They are also well represented within the chapters of this volume. We shall also come back to them in this chapter, picking up Norway and Sweden, for example, in the course of examining Loops 2 and 3.

The situation is different for the Faroes, Greenland and Iceland. Each warrants, then, some further reference here. Briefly, they differ considerably. Each, however, regards itself as having its own history and its own cultural base, warranting political recognition as a separate identity and the concrete representation in museums of at least its unique heritage, its unique past. Each illustrates

¹¹ See, for example, the description offered by The Royal Danish Foreign Ministry: www.um.dk/publikationer/um/english/denmark/kap6/6-4.asp

¹² Shetland and the Orkney Islands had been sold to Scotland in 1468/1469 by the Danish King Christian I to provide a dowry for his daughter Margaret at the time of her engagement to the King of Scotland, James III.

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13 www.iceland.is/history-and-culture/History/

14 www.natmus.is/english

also how the ongoing construction of belonging and of identity (shared or separate) is influenced by both cultural and pragmatic circumstances.

Of the three, *Iceland* is in the best position to describe itself as a nation and to have its museum represent “the making of a nation” (see, for example, Chapter 22). The other two areas have not yet achieved full independence. Their museums focus on the uniqueness of their heritage, and their history more readily attracts the label of their having been “colonised”. Cutting across all three areas, however, is the significance of trading rights and trading control, with fish often at the centre of concerns.

Iceland’s union with Norway starts with settlement by Norse Vikings, a treaty with Norway (1022), and war and then submission to Norway (1220–1262). Its separateness is marked by the Icelandic sagas (thirteenth century), and the presence of its own parliament (Althingi) with some executive powers.¹³

After Kalmar (1397), the Danes repeated Norway’s colonial pressure. Conversion to Lutheranism was insisted upon, despite resistance from Catholics (1550s). The powers of the Icelandic parliament were reduced (1662). Trade with the English and the Hanseatic League was replaced by a Danish monopoly (1602) and not opened to all Danish nations until the late 1700s. (The results of restrictions had been disastrous for the Icelandic economy.)

Over the 1800s, separate status was increasingly argued for and recognised. The parliament was re-established and its powers increased (1845). Foreign trade was further liberalised (1855) and Iceland celebrated in 1874 both the Millennial Anniversary of original Norse settlement and control over its own finances. Home Rule was established in 1904 and independence increased further in 1918. The King of Denmark, however, was still recognised as a sovereign and Denmark remained in control of foreign policy.

The next big shift came with the occupation of Denmark by Germany during the war of 1939–1944. The island was occupied by British troops and, later, U.S. troops, at the invitation of the Icelandic government.

The year 1944 then saw the declaration of independence and status as a republic, followed over the years by becoming a member of NATO and, in 2006, by reclaiming an area (Keflavik) that had been a major U.S. air base and declaring itself “demilitarised”, with the phasing out of U.S. military personnel. The current population is estimated as around 300 000 with more than half concentrated around the capital in the south (Reykjavik). People who identify themselves as Icelandic occupy the top positions in government and in education. The country has developed major expertise in the technology of fishing, with most of its experts being Icelandic (many of those have studied abroad and returned).

All told, the country’s history provides a base that allows its major museum to highlight “the making of a nation”.¹⁴ Representations can highlight shared origins that are “truly Norse”, together with an

early national identity, a struggle to maintain that identity in the face of restrictions and suppression, and both economic achievement and political progression: a narrative that can easily be felt to be worth presenting to oneself and to others.

Greenland provides a contrast to Iceland. To start with, the majority of the population is Inuit. The early Norse settlements seem to have disappeared, replaced in the 1200s by Inuits moving in from the north-west. The population is smaller than that of Iceland (around 57 000 in 2006) and, in contrast to the concentration of Icelanders around Reykjavik, it is spread along the fjords of the south-west of the main island. Fish again remain a major resource.

Greenland had at one time accepted the control of Norway (1261) but after the Union of Kalmar in 1397, Denmark claimed the territory, sent missionaries to put in place the conversion to Lutheranism (1721 and 1733), and developed trading colonies along the coast.¹⁵

Greenland has been described as “the best colony in the world”,¹⁶ well managed and progressing towards self-management. In 1953 Greenlanders received Danish citizenship. Home Rule was granted in 1979, and all the members of the Home Rule Government are Greenlanders. Danes, however, hold many of the top positions in the management of services and education (almost all the academic staff at the University of Greenland, for example, are Danish and most of the courses offered are in Danish). What has not occurred, Lyngø argues, is “mental de-colonisation”. Moving into modern economic society and achieving equality in the labour market are at the cost of increasing adaptation to Danish cultural norms and institutions and of increasing distance from the language of the country and of the occupations – fishing and hunting – associated with being Inuit.

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The result has been described as one of continuing concerns with identity, self-confidence, dependency on Denmark, the position of people with mixed parentage (one Danish, the other Greenlandic), and the images of Greenland in both the Danish and the international mirror.

At the museum level, we find then both an emphasis on the past – on cultural heritage and traditional ways – and moves towards the re-examination of Greenlandic identity and status. An exhibition held in 2006 at the Greenland National Museum as part of the project *Rethinking Nordic Colonialism*, for example, was aimed at addressing “questions of dependency and marginalisation ... and ways out of subordination”.¹⁷ Related to that re-examination is also debate about the possibility that Greenlandic art might be an emerging form of distinctiveness, drawing on “cultural roots” and inspired by the “landscape or the mythology” but not simply reproducing traditional forms.¹⁸

Where, then, do the 18 islands that make up *the Faroes* fit in? The population is small (in 2006, about 48 000 within the Faroes, with another 12 000 in Denmark). Economically, there is marked dependence on Denmark, with oil and gas explorations so far not offering enough success to

15 For a short description of this history in English, see, for example: www.nuuk-tourism.gl/database

16 Lyngø, A. E. (2006) “The best colony in the world”. At: www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org/files/index.htm

17 Act 2: “Contested territories: Representing postcolonial interests”. At: www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org/files/index.htm

18 A description offered in Act 1: “Past colonies – How post is postcolonialism?” as part of the *Rethinking Nordic Colonialism* project.

19 Jóan Pauli Joensen (Chapter 21) offers a full description of the development of national identity and its relationship to language.

20 www.finland.fi. This is a website maintained by the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.

overcome that dependency. Ethnically, the base is Norse, with little immigration. Linguistically, there is a local language (Faroese) and changes in its status have been marked.¹⁹

Politically, support for independence has been mixed. Full independence gained a majority in a public plebiscite in 1946 but not in the votes of the Løgting (the parliament of the time). Home Rule, however, followed (1948). A further referendum, planned for 2001, was shelved, prompted by the prospect of losing Danish grants and subsidies. One carried out in 2004 ended in equal support for both independence and non-independence: insufficient support for any further change.

Interest remains strong, however, in the early history of the Faroes: a history likely to highlight a distinctive cultural heritage. The early history before 1035, when the islands became part of the Kingdom of Norway, seems especially unclear. In addition, the achievement of full recognition of the language – Faroese – has been a focus for efforts for change.

In the course of bringing the Reformation to the Islands, the Danes had replaced Catholicism with Lutheranism, confiscated church property, and forbidden the use of Faroese in schools and churches. For the next 300 years, there was no written Faroese. By the late 1800s, however, Danish control began to relax. In addition to giving the Faroe Islanders the right to fish in Danish waters and restoring the parliament it had abolished, Denmark allowed Faroese to become an established official language. Marking increasing recognition was the replacement of Danish by Faroese as the official school language (1937 – Danish is now a required second language from grade 3 on), as a church language (1938), as a national language (1948, accompanying the Home Rule Act) and, over time, its common use in the media (1980s). In effect, the language seems to have become an identity that might have disappeared but was successfully maintained, is distinctive and is widely shared.

Loop 2: Finland, Sweden and Norway

Noted earlier was the recognition of some particular “national minorities” in these three countries. In Finland, these were the Sámi, the Swedish-speaking Finns, the Old Russians, the Tartars, Jews and the Romany. In Sweden, they were the Sámi, Torn Valley Finns, the Swedish Finns, the Jews and the Roma. In Norway, they included the Kven, the Forest Finns, the Roma and the Romany (the Sámi were recognised as a separate indigenous population).

The presence and recognition of those groups reflects several political changes, border shifts and population movements. Landmark dates in relation to Finland and Sweden are 1155 (Finland became in effect a province of Sweden and a number of Swedish crusades into the territory began) and 1293, when a dividing line was drawn between the Catholic West and Orthodox East.²⁰ (Some small coastal towns remained predominantly German, at least in language).

This provincial status remained in place for close to 700 years, supporting a common policy towards some forms of diversity (e.g., a largely closed door to the entry of non-Christians, Jews especially). It also prompted a recognition of two languages. Over the 700 years, Swedish became

the dominant language for administration and education, with Finnish regarded as more the language of the peasantry. Swedish still remains one of two official languages in Finland (Finnish and Swedish) and Finnish is one of the four minority languages recognised in Sweden.²¹ Also prompted was movement across the two areas. Not surprisingly, Finns make up two of Sweden's five minority groups (these are the Swedish Finns and the Torne Valley Finns). And Swedes make up one of Finland's six (the Swedish Finns).

After 1809, and Russia's victory over Sweden, Finland became a semi-autonomous duchy within the Russian empire. That increased the representations of Russians within the area. Russian Jews, if they were a part of the Russian Army and discharged in the area, could stay. As in other countries, however, the 1800s saw the rise of interest in "nationhood". The epic poem known as the *Kalevala*, based on Finnish and Karelian folklore, was published in 1835. By 1892, Finnish as a language had equal legal status with Russian.

Independence, however, came only after the Communist Revolution in 1917. That did not lead to an easy peace. Within Finland, for example, the "Whites" (supported by Germany) and the "Reds" (supported by Bolshevik Russians) fought what was referred to as "a civil war".²² Finnish/Russian borders were redrawn in 1920 (the Treaty of Tartu) and then redrawn at the end of the "Continuation War" in 1944. At that time, Finland had to cede a large area to Finland to the Soviet Union, with approximately 450 000 Finns then moving from the area into the rest of Finland.²³ Its estimated population (5.27 million in 2006) was at that time about 3.4 million. Not surprisingly, the recognised Russian minority groups are named "Old Russians" and "Tartars".

Norway's first entry into this Swedish–Finnish loop is by way of also being part of Sweden for some time (Norway-Sweden from 1814 to 1905; Finland-Sweden from 1155 to the end of the 1800s). Not surprisingly then, Norwegians make up no recognised minority group in Finland. The reverse holds, however. Two of the five national minority groups that Norway recognises are of Finnish origin. One is the Kven, the other is the Forest Finns, with one basis of differentiation being place or area: the Kven on the northern coastal regions, the Forest Finns further inland.²⁴

The Kven are central to the chapter in this volume by Lene Aarekol (Chapter 8). They have attracted particular interest on several grounds. They began to arrive in what is now Norway in the 1500s, moving first into Sweden and then across to Norway, with the largest waves occurring between 1720 and 1800. They are, then, truly "old immigrants", well placed to ask the question noted by Einar Niemi (Chapter 1): How long does it take before one ceases to be called "immigrant" or "foreign"? They are present in significant numbers. In some counties, they account for close to a quarter of the population. The language (Kvensk) also became increasingly different from Finnish (it is now taught as a language in its own right at the University of Tromsø). And they were the target of some suspicion by Norwegians in the south. As nationalism became more strongly felt in Finland, the southern concern was that there could develop a collaboration with Finnish groups,

21 For an explanation in English of the history of the national minorities in Finland, including the Swedish-speaking Finns, see, for example: "National minorities in Finland, the Swedish-speaking Finns" at: www.finland.fi.

22 www.finland.fi

23 *Ibid.*

24 Supporting the movement of people in the North was the fact that there were no clear borders in the North until the border was drawn between Norway and Sweden in 1751 and between Norway and Russia in 1826. For a further history of the Kven, see, for example, museumsnett.no/vadsomuseet/kven.

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25 www.samediggi.no/ (the website of the Sámi Parliament).

26 There is also a large population of Sámi in the capital – Oslo.

27 For descriptions in English of the Sámi in Sweden see www.samer.se and www.sametinget.se

creating a “state within a state” that would run counter to Norway’s interest in retaining its territorial size, arguing for independence from Sweden and developing a sense of national rather than regional identity. The North was already marked by another sizeable group seen as “different” – the Sámi – and thought needed to be given as to how to keep them both within the nation but at the same time to hold to the image of a nationhood based on a common history and heritage.

Loop 3: The Sámi

The Sámi are present in several Nordic countries, in unequal numbers. The estimated numbers (these are affected by the extent to which people register themselves as Sámi for election purposes or declare themselves as Sámi at times of census-taking) were in 2006 around 40 000 in Norway, 20 000 in Sweden, 7 000 in Finland and 2 000 in Russia. The presence in these several countries is a first indication of origin. The Sámi stem from the northern areas of the Scandinavian peninsula, residing particularly in an area that covers the top layer of what are now four separate countries but which was not marked by a national border until the first border was drawn (between Norway and Sweden) in 1751.²⁵

Within countries, the distribution is also uneven. In Norway, for example, the Sámi are most strongly represented in some northern counties (Finnmark and Northern Troms).²⁶ In Finnmark they make up the majority of the population. This is where the Norwegian Sámi parliament (Sámediggi) is sited and this is where the Sámi now have particular land rights.

What makes the Sámi especially significant when it comes to questions about diversity and representation? That question comes up in several chapters (see especially Chapter 1 by Einar Niemi, Chapter 3 by Vuokko Hirvonen, Chapter 2 by Eva Silvén as well as the final chapter).

One aspect of significance has to do with their *variable status as a category*. As noted earlier, the Sámi are categorised as an “indigenous” group in Norway, but as a “national minority” in Sweden and Finland. That variable status is one instance of the construction processes noted at the start

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of this chapter. The choice of that status in Norway was an initiative taken by the Sámi, opting for a status that offered a stronger marking of difference and of control over sources for funding heritage projects. It is also an instance of the need to ask: What are the criteria for any designation, whether officially written down or used for self-identification?

The question of criteria comes up in many parts of the world and in relation to many categories. (In this volume, for example, it is central to the chapter by Janne Laursen on the Jewish museum in Copenhagen – Chapter 6). It is central also to representations of the Sámi (see Vuokko Hirvonen, Chapter 3).

A second aspect of significance has to do with the ways in which *some particular representations can mask heterogeneity*. The world image is one of the Sámi as reindeer herders, united by their occupation and by the name of “Lapps” or “Laplanders”. That “reindeer” image may be worth

protecting or even promoting. It can be used by the Sámi as a claim to distinctiveness and by a country as a way of encouraging them to remain in particular areas. For Sweden, for example, the “reindeer herders” were a way of marking Swedish presence in the far North, and there was little encouragement for them to move south and enter industrial occupations.²⁷

Historically, however, the nomadic following of reindeer across the northern parts of the world no longer applies and many of the Sámi no longer raise reindeer or hunt except as recreation. Occupationally, there are at least three large groups, the Reindeer Sámi, the Forest Sámi and the Sea Sámi, with the latter groups turning mainly to fishing and small-scale farming particularly as borders made reindeer herding and winter pastures difficult to access. The interests of these different groups are not always identical.

A third aspect has to do with *language as a political marker of distinctiveness*. Nine languages (or nine “variants”) have been identified, with “Northern Sámi” spoken by the largest number. Language as a representational feature, however, has had a checkered history. Norway provides an example. Over the course of the 1800s, there was a strong push towards making Norwegian language and culture “universal”. That push became all the stronger when interest strengthened in the development of the North. From 1902 to around 1940, for example, competence in Norwegian was a requirement for buying land.²⁸ The supply of Marshall Aid after the war also required agreement that the children of Sámi families would be Norwegian and would not speak Sámi.²⁹ That agreement was easier to enforce with the Sea Sámi who lived in areas with higher levels of ethnic Norwegians, creating divisions within the Sámi group and weakening the extent to which people readily identified themselves as Sámi or could use their language as a way of identifying their status as Sámi to themselves or others.³⁰

A fourth indicator of significance and of diversity has to do with *land rights*: with who can buy land, and who has hunting, fishing or reindeer-raising rights. Norway, for example, has moved towards granting a number of exclusive rights within particular areas, notably Finnmark county. In contrast, the Sámis in Sweden brought the issue of land rights to court in 1966 and 1996 and lost both times, reinforcing a history of promoting general settlement in rural areas. Land, then, and a sense of territory, becomes a weak marker for distinctiveness, prompting the need to reinforce other signs.

The last indicator has to do with signs not only of exclusion or of assignment to the margins of a society but of *assignment to a lower level on some racial or evolutionary hierarchy*. The category systems used in many countries are marked by motifs of exclusion on the basis of “foreign-ness”. Sweden, however, has been noted as having at one time singled out the Sámi as a group to include in their exploration of “racial biology”: a group to be anthropometrically measured, mapped and compared with other “racial” groups. The Institute of Racial Biology was established in 1922 and was active until 1935.³¹ Memories of those explorations, however, are still in place (Chapters 2 and 3) and they remain one further basis to the interpretation of categories as often extensions of a bias towards interpreting “difference” in negative rather than positive terms and of thinking more in terms of exclusion rather than acceptance: one further feature of the contexts in which museums operate.

28 The legislation was not officially removed until 1962 but not practised to any great degree after the Second World War: www.samediggi.no

29 Ronald Sagatun, interviewed by Ebba Moi. At: www.rethinking-nordic-colonialism.org/files/index.htm

30 Sámi is an official language in six municipalities in Norway, four municipalities in Finland and one of five minority languages in Sweden.

31 The Institute changed its name in 1958 as part of a merger with the Department of Genetics at Uppsala University. See, for example, the description of the Institute by Lennart Lundmark, "Sami policy in the shadow of racism". Dubois University: scandinavian.wisc.edu/dubois/Courses_folder/Sami_readings

32 Statistics Sweden: www.scb.se

33 Statistics Finland: www.finland

Loop 4: New Migrants

The national minorities have been deemed "old migrants", a term that reflects movement across the present borders of Scandinavia for many centuries. The term "migrants" in most Nordic countries, however, is most often considered a reference to post-Second World War migration. As was the case with "old migrants", the size of the "new" arrivals varied by country. Norway, Sweden and Denmark received the largest percentage of migrants, with Iceland and Finland (with the exception of receiving their "own" after ceding large areas to Russia) seeing more recent increases.

The first wave of migration after the Second World War, as in many countries in the world, was made up of refugees. Finland, as mentioned above, received almost 450 000 Finns when parts of its lands were ceded to the Soviet Union. Denmark, Norway and Sweden all received Hungarian refugees in the 1950s.

The 1950s and early 1960s were also a period of post-war rebuilding for some of the countries (Sweden had remained neutral during the war and had enjoyed a period of growth during the war). A general upturn in economic markets led to large industries in the Nordic countries turning to countries such as Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey in active recruitment drives to fill factories. At the same time, the Nordic countries became an open labour market between themselves, leading to another wave of Finnish migration to Sweden.

The economic boom, however, did not last. From the early 1970s, the need for unskilled labour decreased at the same time as concerns regarding the permanence of the new migrants increased. (In Germany they were guest workers; in the Nordic countries they remained foreign workers – "fremmedarbeidere").

Denmark introduced stricter immigration laws in 1970, Sweden followed soon after – 1972 – and Norway in 1975. After the early 1970s most non-Western migration (the common term used in the Nordic countries in statistics and government policy for people outside countries such as the U.S.A., Canada, Australia and Europe) was made up of refugees. Asian-Ugandans and Vietnamese arrived, for example, in the 1970s. The Balkan War also led to large increases. Sweden alone took 84 000 from ex-Yugoslavia in 1992.³² Somalians and Iraqis are the most recent large waves of refugees.

Historically, and at present, however, most immigrants in the Scandinavian countries come from other Nordic or European Union countries as a result of open labour markets. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are all members of the European Union; Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Union and are therefore open to other EEU and EU citizens.

Finland has also seen an increase in migration in recent years (it now has 121 700 foreign citizens – or immigrants of a total population of 5.14 million). Finland, unlike the other Nordic countries, however, still presents its statistics with levels of emigration lined up against levels of immigration.³³ Finland is also marked by a high level of Russian and Estonian migrants.

Iceland has historically seen few immigrants (if one does not include U.S. marines stationed at Keflavik) but has also seen recent increases through marriage and the opening of markets to the EEU. It now has approximately 23 000 immigrants of a population of 311 000.³⁴ In 2006 alone over 7 000 foreigners applied for resident permits of which over 5 000 were from Poland (many of these are working on a major dam project – the Karahnjúkar Dam).

34 Statistics Iceland:
www.statice.is

35 Statistics Norway:
www.ssb.no

36 Ibid.

37 Ministry of Refugee,
Immigration and Integration
Affairs: www.Denmark.dk

38 Cited, amongst others, at:
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4
276963.stm on 19 February
2005.

39 Statistics Denmark.

40 Statistiskrapport 2007
"Uppdatering av aktuelle
siffror, relevanta nyckeltal och
indikatorer om integration":
SSB statistics.

41 Kunnskapsdepartementet:
regjeringen.no.

Norway describes itself as having 8.9% of its population of 4.6 million as "immigrants". "Immigrants", in these statistics, are people who were born overseas or have both parents foreign born. Of these, the largest group is from Pakistan as part of the recruitment drives and later family reunions. Of these, 16 000 are described as first generation and 12 000 as second generation.³⁵ This high level of second-generation migrants stands in contrast to the next largest group – the Swedes – of whom approximately 24 000 are first generation and only 1 000 second generation. This balance reflects the fact that many of the Nordic citizens are more temporary than the "non-Western" groups. Iraqis follow Swedes (21 000), then Somalians (19 000), followed by Danes and Poles and Vietnamese (all approximately 18 000 in 2006).³⁶

Denmark has 452 095 "first and second generation migrants" who make up 8.4% of the total population of just over 5.2 million.³⁷ Denmark also held recruitment drives and received a large percentage of refugees post-1970. Denmark has received a high level of attention recently, however, for its changes in immigration legislation. In response to Swedish criticism of Denmark's changes in immigration legislation in 2005, for example, the leader of the Danish People's Party, Pia Kjaersgaard, responded: "If they want to turn Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malmoe into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honour killings and gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Øresund Bridge."³⁸ Amongst recent legislative changes are requirements that Danish citizens, to be allowed to marry and bring in a foreign spouse, must be over 24 years of age, have not received social security in 12 months, and lodge a sizeable bond of 53 000 kroner. The shift led to many mixed couples moving across the Øresund Bridge to the more liberal Sweden but retaining their jobs in Copenhagen. Approval of asylum applications have also dropped from 3 893 in 2001 to only 680 in 2005.³⁹

The Faroe Islands and Greenland, if one does not include Danes and U.S. marines, have had little immigration, largely because of restrictive legislation. There has been a certain level of seasonal work in the fishing industries and shipyards, which has resulted in some more permanent residents.

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Sweden has the largest numbers of immigrants amongst the Nordic countries.⁴⁰ Again, it depends on how "immigrants" are defined but approximately 1.8 million of a population of just over 9 million are considered as having an immigrant or partly immigrant background (one or more foreign-born parent).⁴¹ The largest non-Nordic groups come from ex-Yugoslavia (125 000), Iran (70 000), Iraq (50 000) and Chile (28 000).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ St.meld. no. 17, p. 5.

Integration of these “non-Western” immigrants is a concern for all the Nordic countries as they are highly under-represented in the civil service and professional private sector.⁴² A variety of “minority policies” have therefore been formulated to increase representation in general – including equal opportunity clauses in employment. The challenge is often seen as similar to that of previous waves of inequality – of the working class, of women and now new migrants.

Cultural policies and state funding are often tied to social policies (see Chapter 9) and the representation of new migrants within the established arts institutions is a strong concern.⁴³ Museums are expected to work also towards achieving a country’s social and cultural goals. The question then raised in this book is how they perceive this challenge and rise to it.

Chapter Outline

Each chapter in this volume highlights one or more of the following concerns: particular features of museums and their histories; particular forms of cultural diversity; particular circumstances that promote or sustain the various forms and shifts; and particular conceptual concerns.

The book is divided into three sections. The first section has a focus on national minorities and the region’s indigenous communities (the Sámi and the Inuit). The second section focuses on newer immigrants and the variety of inclusion practices that have emerged within museums. The third section takes a step back and looks more closely at some particular conceptual concerns regarding cultural heritage and nation. It offers also a set of historical reviews of the formation of national museums and emerging and contested perceptions of national identity.

Section I: Museums, National Minorities and the Indigenous

In this section the primary concern is with the ways in which historical political changes have affected the treatment and representation of the indigenous peoples of the region (the Inuit and the Sámi) and the national minorities. The regions in the North – Northern Finland, Sweden and Norway – as well as Greenland – have undergone major political changes due to the Second World War, the Cold War, the development of regional identity and the mobilisation of minorities. These political changes have had an effect on funding and cultural policy with, in general, an increase in decentralisation and autonomy. This section therefore looks at how these political changes have affected exhibitions in the national and regional museums and the creation of new, dedicated minority museums.

Einar Niemi opens this first section with an historical overview of how the three groups (indigenous, national minorities and new immigrants) have been categorised. His focus is on Norway but the terms and the international agreements that have helped define the categories are relevant for all the Nordic countries. While Niemi does not focus primarily on museums, he highlights how the representation and categorisation of these groups shift over time depending on wider political circumstances such as contest over the northern regions as well as ratification of Pan-European agreements. Change, he argues, has come about particularly through the increased

mobilisation of some of the community groups themselves: firstly, in the form of demands for increased representation by the Sámi and, later, in part through the Sámi example, by national minorities such as the Kven. This background of political and representational change opens the way to asking how museums have related or responded to these categorisations and changing expectations.

Eva Silvén furthers this historical background with a focus on two Swedish museums in the nineteenth century – a national museum (Nordiska Museet) and a folk heritage museum (Skansen) that were influential in the creation of similar museums in the other Nordic countries. Silvén outlines the changes that have occurred in the way that the Sámi have been represented: from their presentation as *exotica* with live performances at the Folk Museum and at World Expos to their gradual involvement in the creation of the representations. In a new exhibition at the Nordiska Museum, curated by Silvén, the museum acknowledges its own role in creating limited and biased representations of the indigenous population. While these are changes within the museum they have not, as Silvén notes, come independently of a wider museum- and discipline-based debate, political activity by the community, and government initiatives including declaring 2006 a Year of Diversity. As Silvén notes, Sweden has only recently recognised itself as a colonial nation and is currently dealing with the “post-colonial debate”.

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Vuokko Hirvonen also begins with early Swedish – and Finnish – representations of the Sámi. Her concern is with the removal of Sámi artefacts and human remains and their only partial repatriation to Sámi communities. Hirvonen traces the development of Sámi museums in the northern regions of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden and notes how this development comes in parallel to Sámi political mobilisation in the 1970s. As she notes, museums, along with other forms of art and media, had an important role in writing and showing “the history of the Sámi people from their own point of view: the museums were seen as symbols of self-representation”. The museums that she describes are managed and curated by Sámi representatives themselves, often under the various Sámi parliaments.

Peter Pentz continues the concern with relations between governments, museums and indigenous people but the focus shifts from the Sámi to the Inuit. Pentz offers an historical account of the relationship between Denmark and Greenland and notes how changes to the relationship over time have taken place also within museums, in parallel with political changes and increased demands for self-representation. Pentz gives a detailed description of the main themes and representations of Inuit Greenlanders in museums in Denmark and Copenhagen and recent demands for repatriation – particularly of human remains.

Julie Edel Hardenberg and Iben Mondrop Salto offer a description of current debates on national identity and the arts in Greenland. Their concern is what they see as a narrow understanding of identity politics that has limited representation. Artworks within the new national gallery in

Greenland, they argue, are not representative of the work being produced in Greenland. The selection represents instead some particular interests of a variety of stakeholders. A concentration on landscape painting, they suggest, is part of government interest in easy and safe forms of marking difference, as well as in line with particular collectors – again because landscape art is in general not provocative. They argue for the need for further debate on identity politics, not least the picking up of issues of transnationalism and hybrid identities.

Janne Laursen and Søren Kjølrup both deal with the Danish Jewish minority and the Danish Jewish museum in Copenhagen. *Janne Laursen's* focus is on the decisions made by the museum curators and designers in the search for a balance between difference and similarity – between Jews globally and between Danish Jews and Danes in general. This balance between separation and inclusion, similarity and difference, is a concern that is faced by all museums, governments and individual communities dealing with diversity and as such the chapter speaks beyond the individual case. *Søren Kjølrup* places the Danish Museum within the background of general Danish politics towards minorities. He notes the lack of museums dealing with diversity in Denmark – whether it be the indigenous, the national minorities or new immigrants. Kjølrup offers an in-depth analysis of the museum's architecture, content design and use of voice and narrative.

Lena Aarekol closes this section by following up the relationship between changing politics, national minorities and museum representations. Her focus is on the Kven – the group that migrated from Finland and Finnish-speaking Northern Sweden to Norway in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Aarekol offers an historical account of policies in the northern region – policies that affected all migrants as well as the indigenous Sámi – and changing government acceptance and treatment of the Kven minority. In part inspired by Sámi mobilisation, descendents of the Kven pushed for representation within dedicated museums in the North. As Aarekol explains, however, this community push also came at the time of general moves towards a strengthened regional identity.

Section II: Museums and "New Migrants"

Section Two maintains the previous concern with the forms of exhibitions as well as the circumstances that bring about change. Now, however, the focus shifts from the representation of indigenous peoples and national minorities to those of new migrants. Within this section a variety of approaches to including minorities and new migrants in the creation of exhibitions are explored. Changes in representations of new migrants have come about through museum reform, through the creation of new cultural centres combining research, social activities and exhibition, and through the practices of new migrants themselves as they enter artistic and exhibition spaces as artists and co-curators themselves.

Cajsa Lagerkvist opens this section with a presentation of the recent changes that have occurred in the organisation of museums in Sweden. Within this reorganisation, the major ethnographic museum was renamed "The Museum of World Culture", signalling a move away from its colonial foundation. Lagerkvist explains how this push for change came from three sources. One consisted

of government sources who desired a better reflection of contemporary diversity in Sweden. A second came from within the museum as a response to general museum debates, particularly debates about the practices of ethnographic museums and the representation of “others”. A third consisted of new migrant communities who expected greater participation and representation. Lagerkvist offers two exhibition case studies to outline the themes of participation and the search for ways of representing multiculturalism and transnationalism – including the inclusion of difficult contemporary issues such as migrant access to the labour market. Finally, she notes the challenges and inherent conflicts in museum planning with regard to “professionalism” and community “expertise”.

In the chapter that follows, the debate regarding multiculturalism, nation and museums is moved to Finland. Here again, as *Lily Diaz* notes, pushes for greater representation came from all three sources: government initiatives, a few select museums and galleries, and individual artists and communities. Diaz comments on the tendency to ghettoise “ethnic” culture into separate spaces while innovative majority practitioners are represented in national galleries. Within new practices, she is particularly concerned with artistic expressions and examples in which the definitions of “minority” and “culture” are debated as well as moving away from seeing multiculturalism and cultural democracy as a “pie chart”. Instead, Diaz argues, we need to seek out new forms of participation and shift the focus to hybridity and transnationalism. She offers in this chapter examples of such practice.

...the tendency to ghettoise “ethnic” culture into separate spaces while innovative majority practitioners are represented in national galleries.

Liv Hilde Bøe offers an historical account of the creation of Norsk Folkemuseum (the National Folk Museum in Norway), created at a time of national sentiment and demands for independence. More broadly, Bøe links the 1894 founding principles – the museum was to reflect Norwegian regional diversity – to recent moves within the museum to expand diversity to include new immigrants. These initiatives include attempts to address contemporary issues and involve communities in the creation of exhibitions. As a result of the gathering of migrant oral histories, Bøe notes the need to rethink concepts of identity and the particular position of second- and third-generation migrants and how this might be reflected in the museum in the future.

Lise Poulsen and *Mette Skougaard* also describe a major cultural history museum – in this case a traditional cultural heritage site – the Kronborg Castle in Denmark. They argue that large cultural museums such as theirs need to become involved with stories and issues related to new migrants. This is not always an easy task for defined heritage museums and sites such as theirs, contributing to the general lack of projects and initiatives in Denmark. This challenge was met at Kronborg through a major tapestry project with refugees and local artists involved as well as the museum curators. This project offers a new perspective on the debate regarding preferred forms of participation and highlights the ways in which such projects are often tied to issues of integration – in this case skill development with the aim of inclusion in the labour market.

In the next chapter, *Janne Mellingen* continues the focus on refugees through a description of the development of the Kurdish Virtual Museum in Norway. Mellingen’s focus is on the needs of the

diaspora communities to create a site of cultural heritage that binds them. New technologies, such as virtual museums, are seen as a possible way forward, creating a site for remembrance and expressions of difference through cultural heritage. Beyond simple participation in a project initiated elsewhere, this example highlights community control and voice in the face of a lack of involvement by national or regional museums.

Hans Philip Einarsen and *Bente Møller* from the International Cultural Centre and Museum (IKM) in Oslo follow up the concerns opened in the chapter by Niemi with categorisation – in this case categories such as “immigrant”, “us” and “others”. They are also concerned with museums as sites that allow immigrants voice and some control over their representations and offer a set of examples outlining collaborative projects. The International Cultural Centre and Botkyrka Multicultural Centre in Sweden, described by *Leif Magnusson* in the following chapter, have both been created in areas with a high level of immigrants. Neither of these are solely exhibition spaces or museums in their strict sense but combine these activities with social events and research. They have been supported by government interest in aiding integration in these areas. Their content and goals, however, have developed in conjunction with changing museum and community interests to also include expressions of mobility and transnationalism. Common spaces and issues of identity are thus the defining elements of these newer institutions in moves away from multiculturalism as a “pie chart”.

Section III: Nation and Heritage

The third section in this book further develops the conceptual concerns of cultural heritage and diversity and looks at the ways in which definitions of “nation” have affected the forms and contents of national and regional museums. The first half of the section has a focus on heritage – material and intangible – and the effect of international agreements and changes in discourse (from ethnography to folklore studies to heritage studies). Heritage is then linked back to concepts of nation and how museums must reconsider their understandings of heritage and nation in order to become more inclusive. The section ends with a return to the creation of Nordic nations and ensuing museums with a particular focus on new or emerging nations and regions – Iceland and the Faroes.

Barbro Klein opens this section with a broad look at the concept of “heritage”. Heritage, she argues, is now considered a “right” that all should have access to and be represented within. Heritage as diverse (beyond regional diversity) was also a central part of debates during Sweden’s Year of Diversity in 2006. As Klein notes, diverse heritage is not limited to national minorities or the indigenous but has come to cover a variety of groups including gender diversity, sexual preferences, the handicapped etc. For museums in Sweden, multicultural heritage has been perhaps the most difficult “diversity” to deal with as they have been caught between fears of creating an exotic other or being too assimilative. Klein suggests ways forward and calls for the need for exhibitions that look at the ways in which people adapt to a new setting – an adaptation that is creative and dynamic.

Inger Sjørsløv continues the concern with cultural heritage but shifts from material heritage to immaterial heritage and the ratification and implications of the UNESCO 2003 convention for the safeguarding of intangible cultural property. Sjørsløv, drawing on the anthropologist Sue Wright, raises the question as to whether the convention may lead to further appropriation of minority cultures “in a simultaneous folklorization and legitimization of state hegemonic power”. Sjørsløv offers an overview of the differences among Nordic countries in their attitudes and processes of ratification of the convention, and of how the debates surrounding the ratification may offer new insight into discourses surrounding multiculturalism. The challenge for ethnographic museums in particular, Sjørsløv argues, is the general breaking down of dichotomies between the global and the local, things and people, and material and immaterial heritage. [p]*Knut Kjeldstadli* also picks up also broader debates regarding the term “multiculturalism” and places them in relation to concepts and understanding of “nation”.

Governments, he argues, must work from the idea of a collective and develop policies accordingly. Traditional conceptions of nation, however, Kjeldstadli argues, are not sufficient in our transnational societies. There is a need to get past concepts of nation as political or ethnic entities. National museums in many of the Nordic countries, however, as noted also in other chapters, were developed as part of the nation-building process with ethnicity as a founding principle. Kjeldstadli argues for the need for more open notions of nation. He considers especially “process-oriented” interpretations of nation where the creation of nationhood itself is revealed, thereby breaking down the presumed bond between a current “us” and an ancient past and encouraging the contemporary majority to be more open to seeing their similarities to newer arrivals rather than to a Viking or Norse past.

Haci Akman ties together concerns with multiculturalism and nation to recent debates regarding memory and Diaspora communities. He argues for the need to see nations and nation-states as dynamic and temporary structures. National identity therefore must be seen in the light of change and renewal rather than stasis. To be avoided are further attempts to create static histories that serve to justify and immobilise present boundaries and identities. With this background, Akman furthers the discussion surrounding the representation of the Kurdish Diaspora and Norwegian exhibitions on minorities.

The development of nationalism, its effect on minorities, and the creation and further development of museums in the Nordic countries are the focus of *Peter Aronsson's* chapter. Aronsson outlines similarities and differences in the development of the Nordic nations and their museums and the variety of integrative strategies. Regional differences, Aronsson argues, have been dealt with “as a national cultural orchestration” with cultural heritage and personal sentiment at the forefront rather than power and divisive identities. Cultural institutions have played an important role in this form of depoliticising difference. Aronsson suggests that the integration of new migrant groups will follow a similar path with a focus on heritage and personal sentiment rather than on political differences, identity, and power issues.

Jóan Pauli Joensen picks up the concern with the development of regional identity and the development of museums but shifts the focus to the Faroe Islands – a region less well documented than the large Nordic nations and their capitals. As described earlier in this introduction, moves towards independence and the creation of a separate national identity were made during the second half of the nineteenth century, in large part based on language and cultural difference. These moves included the gradual creation of museums and Joensen describes the focus of these museums, their political base, and gradual changes in representations.

The chapter that follows by *Katla Kjartansdóttir* and *Kristinn Schram* adds to the history of national development and museums, with a focus on Iceland. Their primary case is the newly reopened exhibition “The Becoming of a Nation” at the National Museum of Iceland. The reworking of the exhibition, they argue, has led to a more “dynamic” representation of Icelandic history and national identity – one that sees the movement of people as an historical continuum rather than as a new phenomenon.

In the final chapter of this volume *Katherine Goodnow* looks at some of the main forms that diversity exhibitions take and the circumstances and interests that supported them – state, museum and community interests, policies and responses.

By bringing together debates and discussions of diversity in its various forms across nations with a similar and intertwined history, we hope that this volume in the *Museums and Diversity* series offers insight into these regions and their diverse peoples, furthers the general debate on representations of diversity and museums, and offers museum curators and other producers of images and stories of diversity possible ways forward.