The Balkan Wars of 1912/13 and their outcomes have shaped much of the military and political thinking of the Balkan elites during the last century. At the same time, these wars were intimations of what was to become the bloodiest, most violent century in Europe’s and indeed humankind’s history. Wars often lead to other wars. Yet this process of contagion happened in a particularly gruesome manner during the twentieth century. In Europe, the Balkan Wars marked the beginning of the twentieth century’s history of warfare.

In the First Balkan War (October 1912–May 1913), Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria declared war on the Ottoman Empire; in the Second Balkan War (June–August 1913), Bulgaria fought Serbia, Montenegro and Greece over the Ottoman territories they had each just gained. From July onwards, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece were supported by Romania, who entered the war hoping to seize the southern Dobruja from Bulgaria. These hopes were realized. Albania, declared an independent state in November 1912, was thus a product of the First Balkan War. The borders of other territories were changed and obtained features that partially remain valid up to the present: the historical region of Macedonia, a main theatre of the wars, was divided among Greece (Aegean Macedonia), Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) and Serbia (Vardar Macedonia, corresponding largely to today’s Republic of Macedonia, established in 1991). The Ottoman Empire’s loss of most of its European territories in the conflict was one more warning sign of its inner weakness; it ceased to exist in the aftermath of the First World War, and was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
As this enumeration of territorial and political changes makes plain, the states existing today in the area can hardly offer a satisfactory framework for exploring the history of the two Balkan Wars, which in many ways exerted a more profound impact on the region than even the Great War. And yet, in Southeastern Europe, scholars addressing and researching these first European wars of the twentieth century have long adopted a traditional military and/or political history perspective, firmly rooted in the respective national master narratives of the former belligerents. Among the tasks of our volume is to challenge these master narratives.

The second war was not succeeded by much of a postwar period, for only slightly more than a year after the fighting ended, the First World War broke out. Once more, the Balkan countries engaged in war to pursue territorial claims that had remained unsatisfied. Territorial aspirations continued to be at stake in both the Second World War and, in yet another manner, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. As a result, the local populations in the region faced unstable living conditions, in both a social and a political sense, throughout nearly the full span of the twentieth century, interspersed with only a few decades that lacked violent conflict. All the wars caused destruction, displacement and death. State borders remained contested, and all too often the region’s political regimes ignored the rights of ethnic minorities.

These conflicts happened in the shadow of global events. Western scholars in particular have tended to interpret the two Balkan Wars of 1912/13 as a mere prelude to the Great War, a marginal event in the context of great power politics, hardly worth mentioning. Labelled ‘regional wars’, they quickly faded into the background as the echo of the shots fired in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 rippled across the globe. Unsurprisingly, the attention directed to the centennials of these events followed the same pattern. Remarkably, recent histories of the origins of the First World War that do include the Balkan crises and even grant that they are worth focusing on in the narrative offer no comprehensive interpretation of the events. The Balkan peninsula, and Serbia in particular, retain the attributes that have invariably been ascribed to the region and have been used with greater frequency since the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s: the region is a powder keg, an accumulation of rogue states, a stage for melodramatic, squalid and bloody sequences. On the other hand, scholars in Southeastern Europe have built upon their respective national master narratives, in which the Balkan Wars are firmly rooted.

Thus, the Balkan Wars, the conflicts that intimated so many features of future wars, have yet to find their appropriate interpretative
place within the European historiography of twentieth-century warfare. Christopher Clark, in his book *The Sleepwalkers*, has effected a remarkable integration of the diplomatic efforts of the European powers during the Balkan Wars into the immediate prehistory of the Great War. Referring to the political and psychological culture of the leading European politicians and to the question of how war entered their backroom discussions, Clark has transcended the European historiographies that have centred on the nation-state, adding to them a multilateral, comparative approach. And yet, among the responses he received were critical assessments, especially by scholars from Serbia, who noticed how, for example, his description of the gruesome details of the assassination of the Serbian King Aleksandar in 1903 reiterated many negative stereotypes about the Balkans. To be sure, the centenary in 2012/13 brought forth several noteworthy efforts to adopt comprehensive and comparative historical perspectives; these have given some fresh impetus to the few previous studies on the Balkan Wars.

To achieve an open scholarly dialogue on the issues connected to the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, several of which remain quite sensitive, collaboration among historians from Southeastern Europe and Turkey as well as other countries needs to intensify. Such dialogue can transcend the boundaries of nation-state-centred historiographies and can place the wars in a genuinely European and global perspective. To foster such dialogue is one central aim of this volume. Its roots lie in the lively discussions at Yıldız Technical University İstanbul during the October 2012 centennial of the outbreak of war, generously supported by the Volkswagen Foundation (*VolkswagenStiftung*). The common methodological reference for all the authors in this volume is the field of New Military History, which, over the last two decades, has produced considerable discussion on how to study war and societies at war in a way that goes beyond the military and political spheres and aims at making war an integral part of social and cultural history. In this vein, going beyond the historical tropes that have long characterized the historiography of the Balkan Wars, the authors in this volume explore these wars in their sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts, placing societal, political and military actors at the centre of attention. In so doing, our book is of interest to academic fields beyond war history and military history. The core subject is social and political history, surveyed from varying angles that make for a comprehensive whole, though one that is rooted in the specific. Not least, our book is highly relevant to anyone interested in the First World War and its prehistory.
Equally importantly, the authors move beyond the national frameworks within which these wars have largely been researched; they entangle events and use microhistorical tools to examine local contexts. Given the traditional historiographic tropes related to the Balkan Wars, this methodological renewal can be achieved only through the collective framework offered in this volume, which overcomes the nationally organized settings of the writing of war history.

The volume is divided into four parts. Following Wolfgang Höpken’s vigorous demonstration of how the Balkan Wars should be placed within the broader framework of the European history of wars in the twentieth century, in Part II, Alma Hannig, Gül Tokay and Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen set the frame of diplomacy, international relations and domestic politics in the face of war breaking out on the Southeastern European periphery. They apply the tools of new diplomatic and geopolitical history to explore sources pertaining to Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the periphery ‘at the other end’, the Nordic countries.

Part III focuses on the social history of military life, of the ‘Armies, Soldiers, Irregulars’. Mehmet Beşikçi discusses Ottoman recruitment practices and pays particular attention to the lessons the Empire learned from failures in the Balkan Wars, which were applied in the subsequent world war. Richard Hall gives a vivid account of one of the central battlefields of the First Balkan War, the Thracian war theatre, in today’s Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis provides in-depth insights into how Greek soldiers experienced war and violence. Claudiu-Lucian Topor focuses on the hubris with which the victorious Romanian army exited the Second Balkan War, which led to its all-too-confident conduct in the First World War, with catastrophic consequences. Alexey Timofeev recapitulates the traditions of Serbian guerrilla warfare and investigates how these practices were effectively used during the Balkan Wars.

In the fourth part, the authors turn to civilian lives during wartime (‘Civilians, Wounded, Invalids’). Sabine Rutar assesses the increased fear of rank-and-file soldiers-to-be in the multinational Austrian port city of Trieste in the face of war breaking out in the city’s ‘backyard’. Hers is a vivid microhistorical example of the final phase of what would soon become Stefan Zweig’s ‘world of yesterday’, a milieu ridden by feelings of existential threat and difficult loyalties. Vera Goseva and Natasha Kotlar-Trajkova trace the sufferings of the Muslim population in Salonica and its hinterland; and Iakovos Michailidis examines the effects of forced population transfers and displacement on the local population in one of the key disputed areas of the wars, Macedonia. Eyal
Ginio considers Jewish philanthropy and assistance, focusing on aspects of loyalty to both Ottomanism and communal identities. Oya Dağlar Macar discusses the support provided by the British Red Cross to the Ottoman Empire. Heike Karge concludes the volume with a pioneering study on war neuroses suffered by participants in the Balkan Wars.

Recently, Raymond Detrez maintained that the ‘feeling of commonality and solidarity it [the Orthodox Christian or Romaic community] created was irreparably damaged during the Second Balkan War; what has remained of it is a masked unanimity vis-à-vis the real or imagined threat of Islam’. Nation-centred historiographies have contributed to such divisiveness by continuously re-digging the imaginary trenches between the belligerents after the fact. Thus, a major task of the authors in the present volume has been to engage with the military and civilian agency of all belligerents and make visible their parallel experiences: conscripted soldiers and their commanders as well as irregular fighters on the one hand; and on the other the civilian population, which was involved in the war to an extent previously unacknowledged. Violence in the form of mass expulsions and atrocities, as well as the demonization of the ‘other’, are among the miseries the war brought to civilians living in the contested regions. Methodologically, Reinhart Koselleck’s ‘spaces of experience’ and ‘horizons of expectation’ have paved the way for the collective exploring of such commonalities in this volume.

So what makes these wars the Balkan Wars? And what makes them an integral part of the history of twentieth-century warfare in Europe? The authors look at a complex set of features to establish answers to these questions, such as the military procedures, the military technology, the equipment of the armies and of their irregular allies, the efforts of territorial ethnic homogenization, and the abounding propaganda intended to legitimize territorial conquest. Authors examine the utterances of specialists and intermediaries who were on location, along with local and international non-military observers such as medical and auxiliary personnel, among others. Astonishingly, observers from elsewhere in Europe and even further abroad reported from the region while the war was being waged: French aid workers for the Greek army and Dutch aid workers for the Bulgarian and Serbian armies, as well as Indian medical staff serving with British aid personnel for the Ottoman troops. As Oya Dağlar Macar and Wolfgang Höpken conclude in exploring sources of different parties involved, the medical knowledge about war injuries they brought back home proved to be highly useful during the First World War.
A special feature of the Balkan Wars were the guerrilla troops whose actions were much more dependent on those of the regular forces – and vice versa – than has been assumed. Their traditional arena was Macedonia, bringing a particularly tragic fate to this region’s population, as Natasha Kotlar-Trajkova and Vera Goseva as well as Iakovos Michailidis elaborate, studying several locations and focusing on different angles of (forced) demographic changes in their respective chapters.

Here, partisan groups from all the future war parties were already active ahead of the outbreak of war. The weapons they used, such as the _makedonka_, were later exported to the Russian battlefields in the First World War, as Alexey Timofeev points out. His chapter proves how guerrilla troops are emblematic for weak states, especially in regions without effective state government, lacking administrative and institutional capacities. During the Balkan Wars, this connection between the political weakness of states and their military actions was conspicuous. After losing the First Balkan War, the Ottoman state proved capable of learning from that defeat and the loss of territories. According to Mehmet Beşikçi, it introduced a new and, as would soon become clear, more effective military law by May 1914. On the other side, the Balkan states drew no military lessons from their victory over the Ottoman Empire, forfeiting any advantage by going to war against one another. By 1914, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro were exhausted, and the newly belligerent Romania would prove to be blinded by feelings of heroic glory, as Richard Hall and Claudiu-Lucian Topor point out in their respective chapters.

The ethnic composition of the belligerent armies mattered. While the Balkan armies were ethnically rather homogeneous, the rank and file of the imperial Ottoman army included ethnic Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks, who confronted their co-nationals in the trenches. In an attempt to control them, these men were mobilized in so-called labour battalions – special units to support the fighting squads. And, as Mehmet Beşikçi shows, these potentially unreliable groups helped to weaken the seemingly overwhelming Ottoman military force from within.

The wars stirred up the international political scene in a substantially different way than the local European wars of earlier decades, such as the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877/78 or the Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885/86. By the early twentieth century, Europe was gripped by fears of a more general conflagration. On the basis of little-explored Ottoman sources, Gül Tokay assesses how the triangular relationship of the Balkan states, the foreign powers and the Ottoman administration reached a deadlock in the summer of 1912, making war seem the only alternative for all parties.
When the First Balkan War broke out in October 1912, the Western European powers, signatories of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), hoped for an Ottoman victory and the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. Diplomatic meetings, such as the Ambassadors’ Conferences in London and Saint Petersburg, were organized with the aim of arranging a peaceful solution to the issue of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans. Alma Hannig shows how the war’s outbreak led to important turning points in the diplomatic efforts of both Austria-Hungary and Germany, which changed their positions within the system of European great powers and deeply affected their future cooperation and reputations. The great powers refrained from any kind of military engagement in favour of the Ottomans, however. Little known is the fact that the military conflict in the Balkan peninsula considerably reinforced the war preparations undertaken by the European states. Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen provides empirical evidence of how societies as far away from the battlefields as the Nordic countries became strongly militarized as a reaction to the outbreak of war on the southeastern periphery, without knowing, of course, what would happen in the summer of 1914.

Sentiments ranged from nationalist enthusiasm to bleak fear and the desperate wish to maintain peace. More than ever, the publics of various European countries sensed the imminent danger of a broader conflagration. Sabine Rutar exemplifies this sense of dread as it took hold in the Austrian port city of Trieste, where, perhaps more intensely than elsewhere, the outbreak of war in the Balkans caused fears of a huge war – even an imminent ‘world war’ – to spread to the common people. The anti-war gathering of Europe’s socialists in Basel in November 1912, mere weeks after the outbreak of war in the Balkans, was a political expression of this widespread European fear. The Balkan Wars thus acutely intensified both the perceptions of a general European crisis and the hopes that peace would ultimately prevail throughout the continent. This, again, testifies to the larger European dimension of the Balkan Wars.

On the battlefields, the physical and psychological distress was immense. The permanent sense of insecurity, the rumours, the growing gap between war propaganda and real warfare fed anxieties and ultimately triggered atrocities not only against the military enemy but also against allegedly dangerous co-nationals. Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis vividly assesses this process among Greek soldiers. The result was no different from what happens in other wars: stricken individuals were affected not only physically, but also psychologically by post-traumatic stress disorders ante litteram. Because this is a thoroughly underresearched topic, Heike Karge’s chapter is a pioneering effort.
Religiosity and religious practice, as a means of coming to terms with the war, found new ways of expression among both the soldiers on the fronts and civilians. As Eyal Ginio shows, in the political arena, religious bonds were often instrumentalized: Jews prayed for an Ottoman victory in Antwerp; Orthodox Christians – for example in the Russian Empire – celebrated masses for the victory of the Christian allies in the Balkans; Balkan monarchs legitimized the war against the Ottoman Empire as a ‘crusade’ against non-Christians. Analysing communicative networks has revealed that religious minorities showed not only a high degree of loyalty to their countries of residence but also an effective connection to their co-religious communities in neighbouring states – even if these were opponents in the wars – in more distant European countries and even in Africa and the Americas.

To be sure, classical military histories, concerned with military units – their strategies and moves, their victories and defeats – and diplomatic correspondence, retain their value. Yet they need to be enhanced via the integration of a cluster of archival materials representing perspectives drawn from regional and local contexts. Probably the best example in this regard is one of the most frequently cited documents concerning the Balkan Wars, the famous report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. While it reveals atrocities committed by all belligerent parties, the legal effects of this first international initiative undertaken shortly before the Great War have nearly gone unnoticed, as has the report’s influence on the development of international law and the punishment of war crimes.

To achieve a comprehensive knowledge of the Balkan Wars that would effectively entangle them with the huge field of research on the history of twentieth-century European warfare, much remains to be explored in the archives; nevertheless, the authors in this volume together have taken a significant step towards this goal. They examine recollections of former soldiers and former members of irregular units as well as those of politicians and other public figures; in their sources, they go beyond the mainstream media and scrutinize, for example, medical journals as a source that reflects the great interest medical doctors took in the war and specifically in the effects of the new weapons on the human body. In doing so, the authors reveal the conflicts’ entangled web of international significance and, at the same time, advance the social history of local war experiences. In this way, the wars are seen no longer as a mere prelude to world war but rather as an intimation of that war – and, in fact, of what was to become one of the most violent centuries in the history of humankind. They were the wars that signalled the demise of the world as it was known, the world
that Stefan Zweig, in his ‘memories of a European’, so aptly referred to as the ‘world of yesterday’.20

No longer exclusively national stories of victories and defeats, the wars become an emblem of lives torn by violence, displacement, political destabilization and imperial demise. No longer cast as an event relevant within the heroic stories of national master narratives, the wars become the guideposts of a horrific European twentieth century. They have shaped mental maps until today, and not only in the societies that are the legacies of the belligerents. The Balkan Wars gave root to the forceful image of the Balkans as a powder keg, last revitalized during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. In fact, it has been with a symbolic if not political consideration that these have frequently, and wrongly, been labelled ‘Balkan Wars’, even by scholars.21

The descriptions of the atrocities committed during the Balkan Wars, as compiled and disseminated forcefully but not only by the Carnegie Report, turned ‘the Balkans’ into a symbol for savagery, barbarism and terror. Such symbolism lives on, as became obvious during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. While the descriptions of mass expulsions and violence in the international press and by the belligerents themselves draw an unequivocal picture, it takes a specific communicative dynamic to turn this depiction into a persistent negative stereotype and suspicion of ‘inborn’ cruelty – a dynamic that aims at ‘othering’, at outsourcing evil, as it were, to divert attention away from the atrocities of one’s own country.22 After all, it is well known that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed on a large scale by the belligerents in both world wars and various colonial conflicts.23

To reject national master narratives is to enable the weaving together of many impressively analogous war histories. Writing their histoire croisée leads to a complex perspective that, at the very least, displays the parallel experiences of loyalty crises and antagonistic constructions of the enemy and the self.24 Such a perspective increases the understanding of both the idiosyncrasies of Balkan nationalization patterns and the course of de-imperialization in the region, comprehensible only if framed as part of a wider, global scenario.

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Notes

1 Cf. the otherwise convincing narratives of William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jürgen Angelow, Der Weg in die Urkatastrophe: Der Zerfall des alten Europas 1900–1914 (Berlin: be.bra, 2010).

2 On the Balkans as a ‘negative alter ego’ of ‘the West’, see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 [updated version of the original edition of 1997]).


6 Cf. Egidio Ivetic, Le guerre balcaniche (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War (London:


9 As a more immediate reference, see the pioneering work on the First World War by Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914–1923* (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2007) (German original *Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923* [Essen: Klartext, 1997]); cf. also Sönke Neitzel, *Blut und Eisen: Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Zürich: Pendo, 2003); and Bernd Ulrich and Benjamin Ziemann (eds), *German Soldiers in the Great War: Letters and Eyewitness Accounts* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2010). With a focus on the region at stake here, Southeastern Europe, the Second World War has also drawn renewed attention recently. Hannes Grandits (Berlin), Xavier Bougarel (Berlin/Paris) and Nathalie Clayer (Paris) in 2015 and 2016 led an international network project of senior and junior researchers that, precisely, transcended nation-state frameworks and fostered (comparative) local approaches in the vein of the New Military History. Cf. the network’s gatherings in Berlin (October 2015) and Athens (March 2016), https://www.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/i65/Veranstaltungen/2015/10/Humbold_Folder_-_FINAL.pdf; http://www.ciera.fr/de/node/13086; and http://www.resese.fr/node/51.


Cf. Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, 1–2; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, depicts the ‘road to war’ in a slightly more ‘belligerent’ manner.


Zweig, The World of Yesterday. In the German original, the subtitle is ‘Memories of a European’: Stefan Zweig, Die Welt von gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers (Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer, 1942).


In the sense of Todorova, Imagining the Balkans.

an analytically convincing assessment of the practices and the meaning of violence in the Great War.


**Bibliography**


