In March 1946, Rudolf Frauenfeld published an article titled “Wir Illegalen” (“We Illegals”) concerning those German Jews who had survived the Holocaust in hiding. Frauenfeld's article in a Berlin journal reminded readers that a considerable number of Berlin’s 8,300 Jewish survivors were U-boats. Indeed, approximately 1,700 men, women, and children who survived by hiding in and around Berlin comprised 20.5 percent of the surviving Berlin Jewish population, along with survivors of the camps (22.9 percent), those who had an “Aryan” spouses (Mischehen), or those of Mischling (mixed-race) status (56.6 percent). Those in mixed marriages and those considered Mischlinge were threatened but were not generally deported.

For decades, those scholars who commented on U-boats rarely went beyond assertions that approximately 5,000 Berlin Jews tried to hide and that perhaps 1,400 succeeded. More recent estimates suggest that approximately 1,700 Berlin Jews survived in hiding, but there is much discussion of the total number who made the attempt. Estimates continue to range from 5,000 to 7,000; this book, however, argues for a figure of approximately 6,500. It does this by looking at current historical estimates of the percentage of Berlin Jews who survived submerged (25–28 percent) and when Jews dived. Studying the number of Jews who submerged at particular moments (especially during the notorious Große Fabrik-Aktion—the Large Factory Operation, or roundup of Jews still at Berlin plants at the end of February 1943) will show that estimates of 5,000 Berlin Jews who attempted to flee their deportations is improbably low. A second category
of analysis is the gender and age of the U-boats, including the prevalence of family groups among them. The data from these two categories will both confirm and challenge existing assumptions, suggesting new avenues for exploring when and why people hid. They will also help incorporate the history of hiding in Berlin into Holocaust history and bring the tale out of the attics and cellars into the light of historical scrutiny. They will provide an empirical framework for the incorporation of myriad individual case studies, published memoirs, and anecdotal evidence into a coherent narrative, and they highlight patterns of behavior among Berlin’s U-boats.

The findings in this appendix draw on biographical data pertaining to 1,074 former U-boats, about 63 percent of all the survivors who submerged in Berlin. The data on dates of submerging are based on the testimonies of 425 of those same individuals, 25 percent of surviving U-boats. Any persons who submerged in the city in order to evade deportation or forced labor due to their Nazi-designated racial status are included as U-boats. In Berlin, the vast majority of U-boats were Volljuden (full Jews) under the 1935 Nuremberg Laws (whether or not they identified religiously as Jewish). It was mainly during 1944 that some Jews of previously protected status submerged, primarily divorced and widowed spouses of non-Jews or Mischlinge slated for work in the brutal forced labor detachments. The study relies on four main sources of survivor testimony: postwar aid applications in Berlin to the Main Committee for the Victims of Fascism (OdB) preserved at the Landesarchiv Berlin (LAB) or at the Centrum Judaicum Archiv at the Stiftung Neue Synagoge Berlin (CJA); unpublished written accounts collected by historians for the project “Rescue of Jews in National Socialist Germany, 1933–1945,” now held by the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung (ZfA) at Berlin’s Technische Universität; interviews conducted by the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University; and published memoirs.

“Submerging in Berlin”—A Clarification in Terminology

Although the individuals in this study submerged in Berlin, not all U-boats spent the entirety of the war there. Suspicious neighbors, pursuit by the Gestapo, and frequent air raids necessitated periodic movement: these are the three explanations survivors often give for their mobility. The precariousness of submerged life motivated many U-boats to leave the city, in some instances for the entire remainder of the war. A number of U-boats split their time between Berlin and other places. Mobility offered a number of advantages. First, there was always a risk of running
into a hostile acquaintance in Berlin, not least because in summer 1943 the Berlin Gestapo expanded the Jüdischer Fahndungsdienst (Jewish Search Service). This organization coerced former U-boats into service because they could spot Jews in the city more readily than most Germans and knew better where others might hide or gather. Their betrayal resulted in the arrest and deportation of hundreds of submerged Jews.9 From March 1943, air raids began to pose a greater threat.10 Yet even when Jews left Berlin, the city still functioned as a base, a known entity that offered a number of advantages to its former residents.

The intermittence of some U-boats’ presence complicates definitive claims on how many survived “in the city.” Survivors who registered in Berlin after the war did so because it had been their home before they submerged, not necessarily because they had spent the war there. Of the 425 testimonies compiled for this study, 92 (or 22 percent) specifically reference leaving the city. The actual percentage is likely higher. Most individuals who left Berlin did not spend the entirety of the war outside the city. And, of those who did, many stayed nearby, in towns and villages such as Rangsdorf, Barnim, Bernau, Stahnsdorf, and Strausberg, all less than forty miles away. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find testimonies such as that of Felix Z., who spent the majority of his time hiding outside Berlin but who gives Berlin addresses for fourteen of his fifteen helpers.11

Ultimately, individuals who survived outside Berlin should still be included in data on submerging in the city. While they might not have spent much of the war there, and while a few daring ones even managed to escape Germany entirely, Berlin cannot be discounted as the initial seat of their survival. These individuals made the decision to dive while living in the capital. Berlin was where they first heard the horrific stories trickling in from the east. Berlin was where they witnessed the deportations. Berlin was where they had lived, worked, and suffered. Their experiences in the city prompted their decision to dive, and Berlin could even exert a magnetic pull on those who left for a time: its anonymity lured some back, it supplied others with ration cards, and it provided a familiar base from which to spread out.

How Many Jews Attempted to Dive in Berlin?

Writing from exile in Sweden, whither he escaped in November 1943, the former U-boat Kurt Lindenberg estimated that in March 1943 perhaps 7,000 Jews had been hiding in the city.12 Most estimates put the figure closer to 5,000.13 Assuming that the correct number of Jews who survived is approximately 1,700, then a total of 5,000 hidden Jews would
indicate a survival rate of 34 percent, a figure markedly at odds with other estimates (a majority) that locate that rate between 25 and 28 percent. Moreover, if 4,700 Jews submerged in the days surrounding the Große Fabrik-Aktion, then 94 percent of U-boats would have had to flee during this time. This percentage seems improbably high. First, it does not account for Jews who submerged later, including Mischlinge slated for forced labor under Organisation Todt in 1944 and the 205 Jews who fled during a January 1944 roundup directed at those no longer living in a protected mixed marriage. Second, if only 6 percent of Jews submerged before or after the Aktion, this would account neither for the marked increase in the number of Jews diving during the last two quarters of 1942 nor for the spread of rumors to that effect. Third, it is unlikely that a small number of Jews attempting to submerge before February 1943 would have sufficed to prompt the Gestapo to alter its arrest and deportation tactics to prevent Jews from fleeing; the prevalence of such “disappearances” played a central role in the Gestapo’s decision in the fall of 1942 to stop notifying Jews in advance of the date of their deportation.

An estimate of 6,500 U-boats is most likely. If 4,700 Jews submerged in late February 1943, then that would leave 1,800 hidden individuals to account for. Records from September 1943 through February 1945 list 273 Jews who fled. Data on Jews who fled between April and August 1943 are lacking, but it is not unreasonable to assume that at least another hundred or so fled during this time. This would leave approximately 1,400 or so individuals who would have fled in the eighteen months between the first deportations in October 1941 and the end of February 1943. Unfortunately, we still have no way to determine the number of individuals who submerged and the number arrested before the summer of 1943. Yet, 1,400 fleeing between October 1941 and the Grosse Fabrik-Aktion at the end of February 1943 is certainly high enough to have caught the notice of the Gestapo. It is also large enough that tales of Jews submerging would have spread among a population still living above ground and that at the end of December 1942 remained almost 33,000 strong. It is therefore clear that an estimate of 5,000 Jews is too low, especially when one factors in the 4,700 Jews who fled during the Aktion. And yet in order to get closer to the number of Berlin Jews who dived, it is necessary to analyze when those Jews who managed to survive had gone into hiding.

When Did the U-boat Survivors Originally Submerge?

The prevalence of submerging, the specific factors prompting individuals to submerge, and variations in the process reflected the changing demo-
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graphics of the city’s Jewish population and the further radicalization of National Socialist antisemitic policy, as discussed in chapter 1. Figure A.1 represents a yearly and quarterly breakdown of submerging during these sixteen months.\textsuperscript{19} The first year of the deportations was characterized by low rates of submerging, despite transports in autumn 1941 routinely carrying 1,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{20} Of the 25 percent of survivors in this study who mention when they submerged, only 3 percent did so in 1941, followed by perhaps 15 percent or so during the first three quarters of 1942, even as the Nazis deported approximately 36 percent of the city’s Jewish population.\textsuperscript{21} The numbers, however, escalated dramatically during the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943, when somewhat more than two-thirds of all successful U-boats in this study’s sample submerged. Beginning in the autumn of 1942, the number of people submerging in the city grew noticeably. During the fourth quarter of that year, 24 percent of this study’s sample of U-boat survivors submerged, with an additional 45 percent submerging in the first quarter of 1943. The nationwide roundup begun on 27 February 1943 signified the end to legal life for all but a few thousand Berlin Jews in mixed marriages or those considered Mischlinge; it prompted the city’s single largest episode of submerging.\textsuperscript{22} This operation lasted several days, although most arrests occurred during the first two.\textsuperscript{23} Over the course of that week, approximately 4,700 Berlin Jews fled.\textsuperscript{24} In other words, roughly 43 percent of the remaining Jewish workers fled the deportations with their families during this time, thus evading arrest, if only for a short while.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figureA1}
\caption{Date of Submerging.}
\end{figure}

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This dramatic and tragic event has implications for our overall data on the city’s divers. Based on testimonies accounting for one-quarter of survivors, 14 percent of these had fled during the operation, although that percentage may be as high as 20 because some survivors in this study do not list the exact date on which they submerged in 1943.\textsuperscript{26} The midpoint of this range suggests a 17 percent survival rate. Therefore, around 800 of the surviving U-boats submerged during the operation. The other 900 survivors who submerged did so either before or after the event. The survival rate of this group clearly was much higher.\textsuperscript{27} People who made plans to submerge were often better equipped to handle the deprivations of a submerged life, and an average survival estimate of 50 percent for those who submerged before or after the operation reflects the attendant advantages. If a 50 percent survival rate—900 of these 1,800 U-boats survived—still might strike some as high, that rate would be lower were the number of Jews who fled 6,700 or 7,000 (per Kurt Lindenberg’s estimate). Conversely, if the number of U-boats who submerged at times other than the operation were lower, the survival rate for that group would be improbably high. Thus, a balanced estimate of the number of U-boats is necessary, and 6,500 seems quite plausible. The discrepancy between the two survival rates is telling. No more than one in five Jews who fled during the \textit{Aktion} survived the entire war submerged, because many of those who fled were not prepared, leaving them more exposed. Those who planned their flight were better prepared, thus indicating a greater chance at success. Ultimately, however, despite the discrepancy in these two rates, the overall rate of success in this scenario of 6,500 individuals who fled is 26 percent (1,700 survivors), a survival rate that tallies with current estimates.

\textbf{Arrest Numbers}

In the wake of the operation, the authorities deported 8,658 Jews from Berlin.\textsuperscript{28} Around 1,100 of those had attempted to submerge, and this group comprised a significant number of those deported on the 36. \textit{Osttransport} (which left Berlin for Auschwitz on 12 March 1943) and the 4. \textit{große Alterstransport} (which left for Theresienstadt on 17 March).\textsuperscript{29} Four earlier transports that left the city on four consecutive days beginning on 1 March 1943 likely also carried some U-boats, whose attempts to dive had lasted only a few days or even hours. Two smaller deportations from the capital took place on 19 April and 17 May;\textsuperscript{30} beginning in April, the deportation numbers decreased, although between one and five transports of varying size continued to leave the city each month. The authorities were seeking to deport from the Altreich by the end of June 1943 all full...
Jews not living in mixed marriages. They also hoped to deport that fall all Jews from countries allied with or not at war with Germany. In all, during the final two years of the deportations (approximately March 1943 to March 1945), all transports probably carried some Jews who had previously been living submerged in the city, but their number decreased sharply as arrests declined.

The decline in arrests of submerged Jews reflects more than just a decrease in absolute numbers. To be sure, with at least 4,000 fewer U-boats in the city in 1944 (as a result of arrests, deaths, and flight), the remainder became more challenging to uncover. An arrest of 4,000 U-boats in 1943 would represent a 62 percent decrease in the hidden population. If the authorities managed to arrest a similar percentage of submerged Jews in 1944, that would have reduced the surviving population in hiding to 950 by 1945, but more than 1,700 were hiding at that point. This strongly suggests, as this book argues, that Berlin’s remaining illegal Jews became better at evading arrest. An unknown number of Jews had left the city over the course of 1943 and 1944 for safer environs. However, even that confirms this book’s argument that the U-boats learned to employ a variety of strategies to secure a measure of safety. Indeed, many survivors seem unaware that in explaining how they survived, they also were explaining how they learned to survive.

**Gender, Age, and Family Status of Berlin’s Divers**

Gender and age influenced not only chances of survival but also the decision itself. The data on gender and age in this book are compiled from lists of survivors, not from all individuals who attempted to dive. They do
not permit, therefore, definitive claims about the gender and age of those who attempted to flee deportation. However, the data set is large enough to suggest that age, gender, and their intersection had a crucial impact on survival. Among Berlin’s U-boats who survived, 58 percent were women and 42 percent were men. According to the 1939 census of Berlin Jews, 57.5 percent of Jews were female, and 42.5 percent were male. This is a rather surprising correspondence and suggests two possible hypotheses. First, women and men dived and survived at rates equal to their percentage of the 1939 Jewish population. Despite the difficulties facing them, male U-boats were able to adapt successfully. This hypothesis rejects gender as having had any significant impact on survival, and it contradicts both historical literature and survivor accounts from the period. The second hypothesis is that proportionately more men than women went into hiding but that more men were arrested. Based on recent research in the field and this book’s own findings, the second of these two hypotheses seems more likely.

Current research strongly suggests that, relative to their percentage in the population, fewer women made the decision to submerge than did men. What remains unclear, however, is whether fewer women actually made the decision to dive or whether—due to a variety of factors—they chose to dive at the last minute, thereby lessening their chances for survival. In an ongoing study of attempts to hide in Germany, the Berlin-based Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand estimates that 55 percent of the U-boats were women. Although still accounting for more than half of all U-boats, this figure is slightly less than the overall percentage of females among Berlin’s Jewish population. In part, this discrepancy might be explained by the fact that women with children were hesitant to submerge and, thus, that spur-of-the-moment flights tended to be undertaken by younger and single women. Yet even many of these single women faced the difficult choice of staying with their families or fleeing. As for the mothers, even when these managed to find places for their children to hide, the thought of separation, as well as the thought of leaving behind their precarious but still legal existence, prevented many from submerging until the last minute—or even at all.

Those women who decided to submerge enjoyed two relative advantages. First, men, particularly younger men, were expected to be in uniform. Without credible false papers or a sound alibi, they attracted attention. Second, women could hope to find paid employment in private households—outside the purview of the Labor Office and other prying eyes. If men worked at all, they labored in manual trades, factories, or businesses, areas subject to government regulation; at their places of work, they had contact with other people, increasing the chances for de-
nunciation. These men had to rely on forged papers or the good will of employers (see chapter 3).42

When age is factored in, a more nuanced picture emerges. Years of emigration by younger Jews had taken their toll.43 In the 1939 census, more than half of the Jewish population was over the age of fifty, compared to only 24 percent of survivors who submerged (figures A.3, A.4).44 The average U-boat survivor was younger than the average age of the 1939 population, although they were still a bit older than one might expect (thirty-seven years for women and thirty-nine for men) and certainly older than most camp survivors, who tended to be in their teens, twenties, or thirties.45 Nearly half of male survivors and a little more than half of female survivors in this study were between the ages of thirty and forty-nine. Individuals between the ages of ten and twenty-nine comprised 23 percent of those individuals who survived, in contrast to 14 percent of the overall Jewish community in 1939. Those individuals ten years old or younger comprised 4 percent of survivors who dived, roughly equal to their share of the Jewish community in 1939.46

Jews fifty years of age and older still account for almost one-quarter of all U-boats who survived, indicating that age was not an insurmountable barrier. Indeed, older men appear to have benefitted from their age, with 27 percent of male survivors over the age of fifty versus 21 percent of female survivors. The higher rates of survival among these men might result from the circumstance that older men not in uniform were less likely to arouse suspicion than were younger men.

![Figure A.3](image-url)

Figure A.3. Age and Gender Distribution of Berlin’s Jewish Population in 1939 (by percent).
Jews between the ages of ten and thirty are somewhat overrepresented among survivors, suggesting that younger Jews likely were better able to take the necessary risks to ensure survival. In particular, when one considers the sometimes reckless behavior of youth (as recounted in survivor testimony), their survival rate is rather high.47 One should note that the gender composition of individuals in this age group is nearly equal, with roughly one-quarter of male and female survivors falling into it. The predominance of survivors in their thirties and forties might suggest that middle-aged Jews were best equipped to handle challenges. These individuals were young enough for the physical exigencies but old enough (particularly, in the case of men) to avoid suspicion. They were more likely to have helpful connections with gentiles from the pre-Nazi years. Intellectual and emotional maturity might also have aided them in better calculating risks.

Although the data on gender and age are suggestive, how accurately do they reflect the composition of the population of Jews who attempted to survive submerged? Current evidence strongly suggests that more women than men dived, even if they did so at a rate more modest than their share of the population. As for age, the average U-boat survivor was in his or her late thirties. Although research suggests that younger Jews and Jews over the age of fifty submerged in larger numbers, youths’ lack of connections coupled with their recklessness and the inability of much older Jews to handle the physical and emotional challenges of life on the run might
have resulted in a larger number of arrests or deaths. Survivors implicitly and explicitly reference gender and age in their discussions of submerging, indicating that they did indeed have a formative impact.

A significant number of survivors also fled with family members (table A.1). This study interprets the idea of “family” to include spouses and fiancés/fiancées, siblings, children, cousins, and other blood relations. Contrary to the example of Anne Frank, families seldom if ever stayed in one place together due to the difficulties of finding shelter large enough to accommodate them. Even when families did so, it was almost never for the duration of the war. Although family members often submerged together, most did not live together.

Table A.1. Size of Family Groups Who Submerged Together and Survived.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2 People</th>
<th>3 People</th>
<th>4 People</th>
<th>5 People</th>
<th>6 People or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the Whole</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figure is based on 1,074 individuals.

In this study’s sampling of survivors, 42 percent submerged with family, although a majority of these family units consisted of two people; generally, they were spouses, although siblings and cousins also hid together. The preponderance of small units reflects the challenges facing large groups seeking to shelter together. Many families hesitated to submerge due to their unwillingness to split up and their inability to find people who could help them all. However, because the U-boats often had to split up, family size had little impact on whether or not one was caught. Rather, the very small number of large families that survived submerged likely indicates how few decided to submerge in the first place. Also of note is that the gender breakdown of these family groups corresponds to the overall gender composition of the city’s divers. This suggests that whatever emotional benefits might have come with submerging with one’s family, the ability of the family to mitigate the gendered difficulties of hiding in Berlin was minimal. Not surprisingly, young children and adolescents benefitted from fleeing with their family: children aged fourteen years or younger make up approximately 13 percent of family groups that submerged, whereas they comprise approximately 3 percent of people surviving without family.
Conclusion

In recent years, scholars have revised to 1,700 their estimates of the number of Berlin U-boats who survived; this book has argued that by balancing what scholars know about arrest and deportation rates with what we know about who survived, we can revise to 6,500 the number of people who submerged. This revised figure suggests an even greater level of resistance to deportation by Jews and their helpers’ than has previously been assumed. Indeed, the act of submerging should be contextualized, for overall survival rates are contingent on when people chose to dive and what preparations they made. Thus, Jews who fled before or after the Große Fabrik-Aktion had a significantly higher rate of survival. Submergence therefore increased over time and depended on an array of variables, including rumors from the east, employment status and the effectiveness of the Reklamation, and the anticipated effects of submerging on family members (see chapter 1). In 1943, the Nazis arrested the majority of Berlin’s U-boat population. Yet in 1944, the authorities arrested such a modest number of U-boats that the number as a share of the remaining U-boat population fell precipitously. The sources suggest that the U-boats learned how to hide better. They built upon previous mistakes and became remarkably more adept at navigating the city, a process no doubt more feasible for many of them because Berlin was home.

The difficulties associated with discussing gender and age stem largely from the fact that the data are based only on those who survived and not on those who went into hiding. This study’s data set appears to confirm what scholars currently understand about Berlin’s Jewish community on the eve of deportation and the gender of the U-boats: more women than men survived, even if it appears that women went into hiding in proportionally lower numbers than men did. If we factor in age, however, a more nuanced picture develops. Men over fifty survived in higher rates than did women in the same age category. Interestingly, males between the ages of ten and thirty survived at rates equal to those of females, a figure that calls into question assumptions about the problems facing Jewish young men hiding. The explanation for this relative success remains elusive. Nor do the data on families shed much light on the topic. The gendered survival rates of families are nearly equal to those of men and women who hid alone, suggesting that the family ties did little to change the gendered balance in hiding.

Research on hiding largely remains locale-specific. Most of the literature on Germany examines either individual case studies, specific facets of hiding, or hiding in particular localities. The data presented here relate to Berlin; the act of submerging and the methods of evading
capture remained contingent on the city itself. Yet should the history of hiding during the Holocaust remain so localized? Certainly, the data in this article speak to Berlin and not to Paris, Warsaw, or Prague. But what might the particular demographics of hiding in these cities, if analyzed in conjunction with one another, say about hiding throughout Europe, the peculiarities of regional National Socialist antisemitic policy, and the myriad histories of hiding as they fit within the broader framework of the history of the Holocaust?

Notes


2. See *Gedenkstätte Stille Helden* (Berlin: Allprint Media, 2008), 8. The figure of 1,700 is the newest, revised estimate. See also Lutjens, “Vom Untertauchen,” 49. Original estimates put the number of U-boat survivors at 1,400. See Weltlinger, “Hast du es schon vergessen?” The data first cited by Weltlinger formed the basis for original estimates used by scholars when discussing the number of Berlin Jewish survivors. These works include Gruner, *Judenverfolgung*, 94; Moorhouse, *Berlin at War*, 306; Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair*, 228; and Maurer, “From Everyday Life,” 373. The recent estimate by researchers at the Gedenkstätte Stille Helden, indicating that at least 1,700 Jews survived in hiding in and around the city, is what I use. However, since I am unaware of any changes to estimates of the number who survived the camps or were never deported in the first place as partners in mixed marriages, the statistics in this book associate Weltlinger’s original data on camp and mixed-marriage survivors with newer estimates of the number who survived in hiding.


4. An early demographic overview of Jews in hiding throughout Germany is Avraham Seligmann, “An Illegal Way of Life in Nazi Germany,” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 37 (1992): 327–61. Seligmann utilizes an approach similar to mine, but bases his findings on only sixty-five testimonies, which he has gathered from throughout Germany. More recently, though, a host of scholars has begun to focus on demographic questions posed in this article. See, for example, Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation”; Kosmala, “Zwischen Ahnen und Wissen”; Kosmala, “Überlebensstrategien jüdischer Frauen in Berlin; and Lutjens, “Vom Untertauchen.” A more specialized statistical overview of the Große Fabrikaktion and its relationship to hiding may be found in Schoppmann, “Die 'Fabrikaktion' in Berlin,” 138–48.

6. Figure A.1 is based on a sample composed of 425 U-boats (25 percent of survivors); Table A.1 is based on 1,074 U-boats (63 percent of survivors). Figure A.2 is based on deportation records, figures A.3 and A.4 on the 1939 Berlin census.

7. The lists of survivors were published in the Jewish–German exile periodical Aufbau: Reconstruction over the course of two months beginning on 2 November 1945 in a section titled “Neue Listen von Juden in Berlin”; 16 November 1945, “Neue Berliner Liste.” The names of survivors who had been in hiding were designated with the letter “b.” Although some discrepancies exist, the lists are generally accurate. They were published between November 1945 and January 1946. The lists may be found in the following editions. For the year 1945: Nr. 45 (p. 28); Nr. 46 (p. 26); Nr. 47 (p. 26); Nr. 48 (p. 36); Nr. 49 (p. 26); Nr. 50 (p. 27); Nr. 51 (p. 27); Nr. 52 (p. 37). For the year 1946: Nr. 1 (p. 26); Nr. 2 (p. 32); Nr. 3 (p. 27). These lists contain the names of over nine hundred former U-boats. It should be noted, however, that Aufbau lists only Jews who were members of the Jewish Community. “Jews by Race,” who either listed themselves as “Dissidents” or “Christian,” do not appear in the lists. I collected additional names from testimonies found in the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung (ZfA) at Berlin’s Technische Universität.

8. Many of these were duplicated from testimonies at the Wiener Library in London and Yad Vashem.

9. The role of the Fahndungsdienst in tracking down the U-boats forms a dark and complex aspect of life in hiding. For more information, see Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat; and Jah, Deportation, 525–27. See also Wyden, Stella.


11. CJA 4.1, 3156, file of Felix Zacharias.


13. Kwiet and Eschwege suggest a figure of five thousand. See also Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 77, 81; Paulsson, Secret City, 2; Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 293; and Seligmann, “An Illegal Way of Life,” 328. Beate Kosmala, in contrast, estimates a figure closer to seven thousand: “Überlebensstrategien jüdischer Frauen,” 46.


16. Jah also cites contemporary eyewitnesses who noted that “too many” Jews were fleeing upon being ordered to report to the collection camp in the Levetzowstraße Synagogue: Deportation, 260–61.

17. This figure was reached by examining the numbers of Jews listed as flüchtig in YVA 0.8/145, “Jüdische Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1943–1945.”

18. For reference, see BA R 8150/26, 8150/27; ZIH 112/21b; StadtA Mainz NL Oppenheim 52/28; and YVA 0.8/14, Monatliche Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1941–1943.

19. This chart’s data are based upon 425 former U-boats (25 percent of all survivors). It also corresponds to current estimates released by the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung at Berlin’s Technische Universität claiming that the majority of U-boats submerged at some point in 1943, usually in the first three months. However, these fig-
ures are based on nationwide data. See Schoppmann, “Die ‘Fabrikaktion’ in Berlin,” 142. Also, see Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 115–16. Their conclusions are based on one thousand survivors, but the estimates are similar. Both this book and their article estimate that 3 percent of Jews went into hiding in 1941. Croes and Kosmala, however, argue for a lower rate of Jews submerging in 1942 (34 percent) than do I (42 percent).

21. I reached this figure by adding together the Berlin deportation numbers listed in Gottwaldt and Schulle, Die “Judendeportationen,” 444–54. During this period, the Nazis deported 26,606 Jews from Berlin. In June 1941, the Jewish population in Berlin (by “race”) was 73,842. See Gruner, Judenverfolgung, 94. A 3 percent submerging rate in 1941 for German Jews in general is also posited in Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 142.

23. Jah, Deportation, 426–27. See also Gruner, Persecution of the Jews, 163–64.
24. See Jah, Deportation, 519.
26. An estimate of 20 percent is not out of place. Claudia Schoppmann suggests 18 percent in “Die ‘Fabrikaktion’ in Berlin,” 142. In the postwar testimonies I examined, some survivors do not list the exact day they hid, but rather only a month or year. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that a number of those individuals who fled in February or March 1943 fled specifically during the Aktion, since that was the week when more than two-thirds of all Jews who went into hiding did so.

27. Figures based on my data set of 425 U-boats who survived in hiding, roughly 25 percent of known survivors.
29. Jah, Deportation, 520.
31. See Jah, Deportation, 519. See also Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 142.
32. Most recently, see Kosmala, “Überlebensstrategien jüdischer Frauen.” See also Schoppmann, “Die ‘Fabrikaktion’ in Berlin,” 142–43.
33. These data are based on 1,074 individuals in hiding, including the eight female and four male child survivors known to have been born on or after 18 October 1941. The age-related data are based on the age of the city’s submerged Jews as of 18 October 1941, the date of the first deportation transport to leave Berlin. A convenience sampling of 63 percent of 1,700 people would provide a level of probability approaching 99 percent. See W. Lawrence Neumann, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2011), 263–67.
34. Croes and Kosmala cite a similar number of women in “Facing Deportation,” 119.
40. See, for example, Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 203; Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 119; and Maurer, “From Everyday Life,” 370.
41. See for example ZfA, file of Dr. Charlotte Bamberg. See also Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 119.

42. See for example Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive.

43. See Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, 154.


45. Hilberg, Perpetrators Victims Bystanders, 188. As noted, the data are based on the age of the survivors as of the first transport to leave Berlin, on 18 October 1941. The average age of the women reflects data from 620 individuals and does not include eight female children born after 18 October; the average age of the men reflects data from 442 individuals and does not include four male children born after 18 October.

46. The small number of child survivors in Germany differs from that in other regions in Europe, where children tended to make up a higher percentage of survivors who had hidden. See, for example, Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 119–20, 129–30. See also Paulsson, Secret City, 224–27.

47. On the recklessness of youth, see, for example, Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 301–2. For individual examples of such reckless behavior, see Larry Orbach and Vivien Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground: A Young Fugitive’s Life in Nazi Berlin (Washington, DC: The Compass Press, 1996); and ZfA, file of Cioma Schönhaus, “Interview G. Rogoff,” 14.3.89 Basel, interview conducted by Neiss, Schieb, Voigt.

48. On the number of older Jews submerging, see Kosmala, “Überlebensstrategien jüdischer Frauen,” 42.

49. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 51.

50. See, for example, concerns of the Arndt Family in Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive; see also ZfA, file of Werner Foss.

51. Notable examples include Benz, Die Juden in Deutschland; Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair; Maurer, “From Everyday Life”; Benz, Überleben im Dritten Reich; Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat; Bonavita, Mit falschem Pass und Zyankali; Kosmala, “Überlebensstrategien jüdischer Frauen”; and Lutjens, “Vom Untertauchen.” For an excellent case study of a single act of hiding in Germany and of survivor memory, see Roseman, Past in Hiding.