Chapter 2

SURVIVING

In March 1943, Joseph Goebbels boasted that Berlin was judenfrei. He was wrong. Although the authorities deported over 8,600 Jews in the immediate wake of the operation, some 6,790 Mischlinge (half Jews), members of Mischehen (mixed marriages), Jewish widows and widowers of non-Jews, and Jewish citizens of either neutral countries or those allied with Germany still resided legally in the city as of the summer of 1943. In addition, at least several thousand U-boats remained at large. Yet the demands placed upon them during their initial months underground were formidable; for many, the challenges were insurmountable. Lack of preparation, insufficient contact with potential aid-givers, and the demanding requisites for survival left many Jews exposed and vulnerable. Between March 1943 and January 1944, the Gestapo, aided by its network of Jewish informants and civilian denouncers, likely arrested over 4,000 individuals, almost two-thirds of the city's submerged Jewish population.

Central then to the U-boat experience was the elemental and daily process involved in simply surviving, above all procuring shelter, food, and, if possible, false papers, while also avoiding denunciation and arrest. Survival underground often became an individual learning process, one characterized by continuous trial and error without a single correct answer. Yet despite the formidable challenges that awaited the city's divers and dashers in a life on the run, things were not as hopeless for them as one might expect. When Jews in the city dived, it was not into an unfamiliar world of foreign customs, unknown enemies, and an unfamiliar
landscape. It was Berlin; indeed, more or less the same Berlin as the one they had been living in the day before they submerged, with the same patterns of daily life and the same landscape. What had changed overnight was the legality of their presence. And while their new, illegal status did presage a host of new obstacles to overcome, most Jews who submerged had unknowingly been preparing for this day for years. Indeed, the eight years of Nazi rule leading up to the deportations had already provided a number of the city’s divers and dashers with a valuable degree of training of how to work within and without the system. Those who for years had defied Nazi prohibitions on Jews frequenting public venues such as theaters, parks, beaches, cinemas, and cafés already had a basic grounding in how to navigate these areas without being denounced. Similarly, those who had learned to move comfortably without wearing the star were already somewhat prepared for how to conduct themselves, and they knew which neighborhoods were safest for them. Middle-class women who had found work during the 1930s to supplement the family income already had gained useful skills, and they were accustomed to working outside of the home and taking on the responsibility of head of family. In short, Berlin’s divers submerged into a socially, culturally, and topographically recognizable context.

To be sure, all of this would soon change. Joseph Goebbels’s Sportpalastrede, in which he called for total war, had occurred on 18 February 1943, shortly before the Large Factory Operation. World War II was turning against the Germans. The Nazis’ drive to capture and exterminate every single Jew under their control continued unabated. Moreover, as the Allied air campaign against Germany’s cities ramped up, the once familiar landscape of Berlin changed with it, creating new dangers and obstacles. Yet as the city changed, Berlin’s submerged Jews changed along with it. They did not live in a bubble, watching as life in the city evolved before their eyes, but rather engaged with these changes and the ensuing challenges as best as they could and adapted based on their own personal observations and experiences. Thus, U-boat responses to the challenges of survival were as varied and diverse as the challenges themselves. Although help from non-Jews was instrumental, survival, in the end, depended on self-reliance and the speedy acclimation of the U-boats to their new life. Finding a place to shelter was incredibly difficult. The dangers of denunciation and increasing Allied air raids on the city forced people to move around frequently. Sources of food, never plentiful, steadily dwindled as the tide of war turned against Germany. To alleviate the physical strains associated with procuring food, some U-boats turned to the black market. For the right price, they could buy not only food and ration cards but also false papers. False papers, although useful for deflecting unwanted
suspicion, were an inadequate safeguard against the dangers of denuncia-
tion and arrest. Yet experiences of arrest also varied, and these illustrate
not only how the U-boats lived but also how the Nazis developed ruthless
and innovative methods to counter their survival tactics. Indeed, many of
the city’s Jewish divers and dashers proved remarkably resilient and cre-
ative, as evidenced by a few bold and successful attempts to flee to neutral
countries.

Finding Shelter

Dr. Charlotte Bamberg submerged with relative ease in January 1943. She
got to an old friend, known by all in the neighborhood as “Papi,” who
told her, “I already have four of your sort. . . . I myself live in my fac-
tory, so you all can move around freely at my place. The door lady has
been bribed; she already has received fifty kilograms of flour.”2 Assured
of a place to stay, Bamberg packed her belongings and moved into Papi’s
apartment. Several months later, members of the security police appeared
at the apartment; someone had denounced them. With their papers more
or less in order, Bamberg and the others were able to provide a plausible
alibi. Yet the police left the apartment on a note of suspicion: “You all
definitely are Aryan, right?”3 Bamberg and the others immediately fled to
different locations. The next day, the police raided the apartment.

Bamberg next moved in with a countess, and in the summer of 1943,
she relocated to a spare room in Papi’s factory. By August, however, she
was back in Papi’s apartment with her former roommates. Her stay there
ended in November—this time permanently—with the destruction of
the apartment in an air raid. By this point, long-term shelter had be-
come increasingly difficult to find. Often, Bamberg did not learn where
her next lodgings were located until as late as 6:00 p.m. Over the course
of the following year and a half, Bamberg moved over a dozen times. She
always managed to find a place to stay, even if her roommates sometimes
consisted of mice and rats: “But I always managed it. I was never without
a roof over my head.”4 In this respect, Bamberg was more fortunate than
many of her fellow submerged Jews.

Finding and maintaining a place to stay was difficult; for many U-boats,
it was impossible. Yet without adequate shelter, they were too exposed, a
condition that contributed to the high rate of arrest in 1943. The cen-
trality of shelter to Jews’ experiences manifests itself in survivor accounts
in three ways. The first appears in discussions concerning the continual
search for shelter. Family in mixed marriages and non-Jewish friends were
critical allies, but help often came from unexpected quarters. Second, sur-
vivors discuss the quantity and quality of their accommodations, highlighting the diverse and transient nature of illegal life. Third, survivors focus on the factors that prompted them to relocate. Fearful hosts, suspicious neighbors, personal conflict, and air raids are the main reasons given for moving.

The majority of divers submerged spontaneously during the Large Factory Operation and often had no immediate recourse to shelter. Even Jews who had planned ahead frequently found themselves looking for new places to stay. The ease with which they acquired lodgings varied considerably. Jews with gentile friends or family members in mixed marriages benefitted from these relationships, as did those who had connections to resistance groups. Other factors, such as access to money or not “looking Jewish” also helped. In many instances, however, Jews only had their own initiative on which to rely, thereby increasing substantially the risk of arrest.5

Gentile friends and acquaintances played a crucial role in sheltering their Jewish friends. They also were responsible for convincing individuals that survival was feasible. When Eva Gotthilf decided to search for her family after their arrest during the Large Factory Operation (see chapter 1), members of the police (Schutzpolizei, or Schupo) turned her away at the collection center.6 They urged her to be sensible; she could do nothing for her family, and she would not be permitted to stay with them. After wandering the streets of Berlin during the night of 28 February, Gotthilf went to say goodbye to non-Jewish acquaintances. These acquaintances, however, refused to let her leave. With no possessions and only fifty Reichsmarks in her wallet, the family took her in and provided her with shelter for the next eight months.7

The support provided by Gotthilf’s friends stands in marked contrast to the disappointment experienced by others. Fear of denunciation and arrest inhibited many would-be helpers, and potential sources of aid yielded nothing more than pity or apologies. Erich Hopp went into hiding in 1942 with his wife Charlotte and his son Wolfgang. They first turned to friends and good acquaintances for shelter, but to no avail. One friend turned them down with the explanation that “[their] Jewish corpses . . . might be found in his apartment after an air raid.”8 His fear was not unfounded.9 Jews often chose not to risk discovery in the air raid shelters and remained in apartments during the bombings. Yet the death of an unregistered person in an apartment endangered the helpers and any other Jews who might be under their protection.

In their postwar accounts, survivors rarely condemn the individuals who refused them help. Rather, they emphasize the dangers their potential hosts faced and the small, yet essential, instances of aid they provided.
In particular, survivors were grateful for their silence. Erich Arndt and Bruno G. spent much of their illegal life in a small factory. After the war, the owner of the factory below the one in which they had sheltered said that he had always suspected that Jews were hiding there. Bruno remembered with gratitude: “[This factory owner] was one of many, many Germans who helped us not as much as [those who provided us with shelter] but indirectly, some of them only by keeping their mouth shut, which was just as important.”

The number of U-boats who survived thanks to the silence of their German neighbors is unknown. Certainly, Germans who remained silent in the face of Nazi persecution bear some responsibility for the fate of European Jewry. However, a different form of silence saved the lives of hundreds of Jews throughout Berlin, demonstrating the potentially redemptive value of silence. During a time when actions spoke louder than words, the silence of gentile friends, neighbors, and strangers was of inestimable value. In some cases, non-Jews who initially refused to take in Jews either took them in later or put them in contact with other non-Jews. In this way, the city’s divers and dashers built aid networks and found accommodations. Even still, it is important to remember that non-Jews who provided submerged Jews with a temporary home were constrained by the circumstances of their own lives. They could not significantly alter their conduct for the benefit of those living submerged, and therefore many drew Jews into their daily routines, sometimes in unexpected and unwise ways. Charlotte Bamberg’s experience walking five Scottish Terriers and a Persian cat to the bus stop to pick up her helper from work illustrates this phenomenon (see introduction).

U-boats also found shelter with relatives and friends in mixed marriages. The prevalence of aid from these individuals is unknown, yet at the end of July 1943, 6,790 Jews were still residing legally in the city. By the end of February 1945, that number had fallen to 6,284. These individuals and their children, acutely aware of the plight facing illegal Jews, reached out to family members, and even strangers, in an attempt to find them help. Certainly, enough Jews benefitted from Mischlinge and Mischehen to warrant one U-boat to remark, “I didn’t have Aryan relatives, and so I stood alone . . .” Lilly Post, however, did not stand alone. After narrowly escaping arrest in February 1943, she turned to an uncle living in a privileged mixed marriage and spent the remainder of the war with him. In other cases, children who had married non-Jews were able to hide their parents. Ultimately, Jews in mixed marriages served as a valuable bridge between the world of the U-boats and the world of non-Jews.

Despite the help that some couples in mixed marriages readily gave, sheltering with them carried its own dangers. Those in Mischehen were located on the margins of German society, suspect in the eyes of their
neighbors, and often watched by the Gestapo, so they were in a worse position to help than non-Jews. One false step or an unguarded word against the regime endangered not only the couple but also the Jews they were concealing. Moreover, as the war progressed, their legally protected status and continued presence in German life became increasingly untenable for the regime. Already, in 1942, Mischlinge and couples in Mischehen began to be conscripted into forced-labor battalions. Starting in 1944, Jewish widows and widowers of non-Jews, hitherto protected from arrest, were also subject to deportation and thus no longer able to aid the U-boats.

Some Jews also turned to resistance groups for help. In February 1943, Jizchak Schwersenz founded the Zionist youth group Chug Chaluzi (Pioneer Circle). The members of this group established hiding places for dozens of illegal Jews and provided them with food and false papers. Communist resistance groups also figured in the salvation of some people. One survivor even claimed that “it was almost impossible for people to submerge for years on end who did not belong to the illegal Communist organization.” This statement is a clear exaggeration; it was also written in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Berlin. Although a number of Jews did receive substantial support from communist groups and their sympathizers, most illegal Jews did not belong to such groups. Certainly, in the early years of Nazi Berlin, there were a few communist resistance groups in which Jews played key roles, but in the 1930s, what remained of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) had been slow to recognize the dangers of National Socialist antisemitic rhetoric. Jewish membership in the KPD during the Weimar Republic was never high in any case, with estimates placing membership in 1927 at about 1,000 out of a total membership of 140,000. Indeed, as John M. Cox, argues, the KPD never showed much courage in confronting the so-called “Jewish Question.” Although Kristallnacht changed that somewhat, by the time Jews in Berlin submerged, the KPD had been decimated by relentless persecution. Moreover, firmly affiliating oneself too closely with a resistance group—communist or not—was incredibly risky, as the Gestapo could target them at any time, and usually only undertaken by individuals with strong political convictions. Indeed, the dangers of Gestapo infiltration were everywhere, as evidenced by the arrest of the party’s entire domestic leadership at one meeting in 1935.

Other individuals used money they had saved to procure shelter. Jews who submerged before their scheduled deportation often had money and valuables for barter set aside. Georg Gustav Segall and his wife Rita had 2,000 RM when they submerged on 10 October 1942. This enabled them to stay for a while in hotels and guesthouses under false names. The
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money did not last long, however, and Georg soon sought out people with whom they could stay.24 Although helpful, money alone was not enough to ensure steady shelter. The availability of lodgings also was contingent on one’s appearance: specifically, did one “look Jewish”?25 After submerging sometime in late 1942 or early 1943, the Pineas family, husband and wife, separated. The husband went to Vienna, and the wife stayed in Berlin. One day, a judge contacted her for an interview, after a parson in Württemberg charged him with saving Jews from the deportations. As the judge deemed that she did not look “pronouncedly” Jewish, he considered her an acceptable risk and sent her to live at the parsonage as a guest.26 Indeed, not fitting the Nazi physical stereotype of a Jew gave people with fairer hair and a lighter complexion an advantage.27 The most ardent Nazi supporters never dreamed that Jews could look like anything other than the stereotypical cartoons found in the Nazi tabloid gag Der Stürmer.

Despite the support that some Jews received from family, friends, and strangers, many individual divers stood alone and relied on their own initiative to find a place to stay. After her harrowing escape from the window of her first hiding place, Herta Fuß stayed with a non-Jewish acquaintance for a few days. She then spent an unspecified number of nights sleeping on the streets.28 One day, she approached an elderly woman and, after striking up a conversation, inquired whether the woman knew of a place where she could spend a few nights. Fuß explained that her brother was home on vacation, and he and his wife needed their privacy. Remark- ing on Fuß’s “innocent eyes,” the woman told Herta that she had a place for her to stay, and Herta moved in with her.29 For homeless individuals like Herta, a combination of courage, personal initiative, and an ability to lie seamlessly were their best hopes for survival. However, as these U-boats lived alone and without stable, trustworthy connections, they had the greatest chance of being caught. They had no warning if a denuncia- tion in their circle of acquaintances took place and fewer people to turn to for help and advice. In the chaotic and unstable submerged world of Nazi Berlin, the existence of these individuals was doubly uncertain. Indeed, by November 1943, Fuß awaited deportation after her cover story fell apart.

Dashing around the city in a struggle for survival was an indication of just how difficult it was to hold on to shelter. No location was completely safe: “We had to be on the move constantly, not hidden in an attic or basement but just try [sic] to evade being caught in one way or another.”30 Also, the quality of those locations varied considerably, ranging from comfortable homes to dwellings scarcely worthy of the name. Moreover, the need for shelter challenged Jews’ prewar social prejudices and forced them into living situations that once would have been intolerable. Hid- ing places were as diverse as the lives of the U-boats, demonstrating both
the extreme need facing the city’s illegal Jews and the dynamic nature of hiding.

Survivors rarely provide a comprehensive list of every place they stayed, because life on the run was so transient. Each day brought new anxieties over finding cover, and many individuals often did not know until the evening where they would spend the night. In an eight-month period in 1943, Kurt Lindenberg hid in fourteen different locations, not including train cars and telephone booths. Some of the divers simultaneously held multiple hiding places, with one daytime shelter and one nighttime shelter. In fact, few people managed to remain in one location for the duration of the war. The average U-boat likely sheltered in over a dozen different locations. One man claims he moved twenty-eight times. But generally only those places where people lived for an extended period of time or that stood out as noteworthy receive mention in survivor testimony. As a result, many people only mention a few places they stayed, even though their testimonies state that they hid in almost a dozen different locations.

The exigencies of survival introduced the U-boats to a “most colorful collection” of hiding places: “From a luxurious 4 bedroom apartment above a small gardening summer cottage, a bomb-damaged room in a bombed-out house, a sales room in a clothing goods store, a workers cottage in a Berlin suburb, etc.” Indeed, some individuals found relatively comfortable lodgings with the aristocracy or in pleasant homes with friendly company. Others had to contend with cramped, vermin-infested, and primitive situations. Often, the city’s many summer garden cottages (Lauben) provided shelter. An architectural fixture in Berlin and throughout Germany, these small, unheated cottages were often little more than shacks. Although a refuge from hostile eyes, they were scant protection from the elements. Dirt floors absorbed the cold and damp, and the temperature inside rarely reached forty degrees in the winter. Often, Jews could not find even a Laube. One woman and her family slept outside, on floors, or in basements, “until good friends every now and then gave us shelter.” Indeed, experiences sleeping in the city’s parks, in train station waiting rooms, or even in the city’s ten-cent toilettes were common. Yet these forms of “shelter” were often the only refuge many divers could find.

The need for refuge also introduced some individuals to the “seedier” elements of Berlin and forced them to confront their present social reality. Despite almost a decade of persecution and social isolation, some Jews still clung to their pre-Nazi social status and upbringing, attitudes that sometimes conflicted with the realities of underground life, especially for those individuals who had grown up in a solidly bourgeois milieu. The quicker they learned that prewar social distinctions had no place in their under-
ground life, the sooner they could focus on survival. Erich Hopp and his son Wolfgang spent their first ten days on the run with the madam of a brothel at Mulackstraße 40a. The street, narrow and dark even today, was located in one of the most undesirable quarters of Berlin. By his own admission, Erich Hopp was a gifted individual and had been a well-respected man of excellent family before the Nazi rise to power: decorated veteran of the First World War, professor of literature, author, poet, president of the Association of Authors for the Protection of Intellectual Property, presiding member of the Union of German Intellectual Workers, honorary member of the German Women’s Book Association, honorary councilor of the League of Film Actors, grandson of a Kolberg rabbi on his father’s side, and grandson of the chairman of the Jewish Community of Breslau on his mother’s side (see figure 2.1). He recounted his impression of the brothel after the war: “The tables had bright-colored lamps which Wolfgang thought pretty. . . . I lay awake, reviewing the paradox: here we were safe—in a brothel! And safe for how long?” The inhabitants of Mulackstraße 40a treated Hopp well, but for a man of his social and intellectual situation, the “paradox” must have been extreme indeed.

Figure 2.1. Erich Hopp.
A variety of individual factors prompted the city’s divers and dashers to relocate, but three predominate in survivor testimony. First, fearing denunciation, many people who took in fugitive Jews later turned them out. The financial and physical strain of supporting Jews and the personal conflicts that sometimes arose between diver and helper were a second factor. Third, air raids destroyed the dwellings where Jews sought asylum. Although Allied bombing runs on Berlin were a small concern for the first three years of the war, increasing raids caused widespread damage and forced many submerged Jews to surface.

Submerged Jews frequently had to contend with their helpers’ fears. A decade of Nazi rule had turned neighbor against neighbor, and many non-Jews turned individuals away, or else only allowed them to stay for a night or two. During the Large Factory Operation, Paula Vigdor turned to her uncle’s former housekeeper for protection. However, the housekeeper’s sister-in-law refused to allow Vigdor to remain for long. She had seen Jews loaded onto trucks and considered Vigdor’s presence an unacceptable danger. Occasionally, the women did allow Paula entry into the apartment at night. More often, however, no one answered the door, and Vigdor had no alternative but to sit all night on the front steps. Only after recognizing that this shelter was entirely lost to her did Vigdor turn elsewhere.49

Although the fears of many potential helpers were premature, they were not unfounded. The city’s divers and dashers came under frequent suspicion, even when they lived with false papers.50 Neighborly curiosity was not always good-natured, and residing illegally in one of Berlin’s many apartment houses, especially cramped, overcrowded apartment flats in poorer, working-class districts, posed an ongoing challenge. Three-year-old Fredy K. had to leave his first hiding place when the acquaintances who had taken him in were made aware by the neighborhood that he was a “Jewish type” (jüdischer Typ). Fredy’s helpers, frightened by what had transpired, returned him under cover of a foggy night to his mother, who was hiding in a different neighborhood.51 Several facets of Fredy’s experience warrant commentary here. The first concerns the response of Fredy’s helpers, who clearly viewed the neighbors’ comments that Fredy was a “Jewish type” as a sign that he was in danger. Yet the exact circumstances surrounding the interaction are unknown. Fredy’s testimony, submitted at the age of six to the OdF in the fall of 1946, is remarkably well written, and a three-year-old child (as he was at the time of the incident) would not have remembered these details. It is therefore likely that his testimony was dictated by his parents, neither of whom had been at the scene and who probably received this knowledge from Fredy’s helpers. Moreover, Fredy devotes only one sentence of his testimony to describing
this event. We therefore are left to speculate on the context in which these remarks were made and who, exactly, made them. Were they meant as a pointed warning or an outright threat? Were they made out of fear or hostility, and, if fear, was it fear for Fredy or fear of the authorities getting involved in the private lives of the residents of the building? Second, Fredy claims that the “neighborhood” (Nachbarschaft) brought up his appearance to his helpers. This term suggests a broader suspicion and concern among the residents of the building in which Fredy was living and indicates that he was not hiding at all but living openly with his helpers, which could potentially lead to denunciation. Proceeding from this is a third, crucial facet of Fredy’s story: he and his helpers were not denounced but rather, depending on the tone and context in which the comments were made, at most threatened with denunciation or else made aware that Fredy’s appearance might lead a hostile unknown in the neighborhood to denounce him. Although a great deal of research has been done on the role of denunciation in Nazi Germany, the motivations of many of the denouncers is largely unknown, with historical explanations for the motivations not going much beyond categorizing them as either “affective” (i.e., done with a real regard for the Nazi regime and its ideology) or “instrumental” (i.e., to settle personal scores or vendettas and use the state apparatus for one’s own personal gain)—the latter of which was likely the more common of the two motivations.  

With regard to Fredy’s case, we cannot know—but should still ask—why he was not denounced. After all, his helpers certainly felt threatened and frightened enough to send him back to his mother; they perceived a real threat to his safety. And if the comment on his appearance was meant to suggest an “affective” desire to denounce, as it clearly reflected a distinct National Socialist antisemitic feeling, then why did a hostile neighbor not go straight to the Gestapo? There are several possible—and not necessarily mutually exclusive—explanations. One might be, of course, that a real concern for Fredy’s safety motivated the comment. Perhaps there was an ardent Nazi in the building, one known for denouncing others, and concerned neighbors, wanting to know as little as possible of Fredy’s background for their own protection, issued a coded warning to let his helpers know that sheltering Fredy was dangerous for all parties involved. Another potential explanation is that the “neighborhood,” suspecting that Fredy was Jewish, issued a preemptive warning in order to head off any possible denunciation, because it did not want the Gestapo or police involved in the workings of the neighborhood or building. If this were the case, the neighborhood turned its back on Fredy and endangered his very life, not out of any real affection for National Socialism and its antisemitism but rather out of a selfish and stubborn desire for normal-
ity, which the appearance of the feared Gestapo could threaten. Indeed, if that were the case, what we see here is not mere indifference to Fredy’s plight but rather a decidedly aggressive apathy that refused to tolerate anything or anyone that could cause disruption. On that score, it is also not unreasonable to speculate whether the apartment building perhaps housed political opponents of the Nazis or individuals engaging in illegal black market activities who felt threatened by Fredy’s appearance in the neighborhood.

Another potential explanation for the warning is that the neighbor issuing it was not entirely sure and did not want to run afoul of the Gestapo by falsely denouncing Fredy’s hosts. Indeed, the scale of false denunciations made on instrumental grounds was so great in the early years of the Third Reich that the Gestapo, perpetually understaffed and overstretched, made it a crime to falsely denounce someone. Fredy, of course, was too young to know this, but adult U-boats were not. Take, for instance, the case of the diver Konrad Latte. A gifted musician, Latte camouflaged himself and spent part of the war traveling Germany as a member of a touring music group. While on tour, Latte’s future wife informed him that a certain woman in the group, an ardent Nazi, was about to report Latte to the Gestapo on suspicion of being Jewish. With no false papers—Latte continually claimed they had been lost in an air raid and was awaiting new papers, which likely aroused the woman’s suspicions—Latte realized he had no other choice than to confront the woman. As reported by his chronicler, “[Konrad] told the woman he would not tolerate the offense of being called a Jew, and invited her to accompany him to the Gestapo office to settle the question, reminding her of the stiff penalties for denouncing a true German. She declined, and the matter died.” In Fredy’s case, a degree of uncertainty might very well have made the neighbor commenting on Fredy’s appearance think it best to issue a thinly veiled warning rather than risk a false denunciation.

One final and important facet of Fredy’s story is the actual comment that the neighborhood thought he looked a “Jewish type.” Fredy’s testimony on that score is rather unique among the OdF testimonies in that the issue of “looking Jewish” rarely appears in these early testimonies, although it does show up a bit more frequently in later testimonies and memoirs. Interestingly, survivors rarely elaborate on what it meant to “look Jewish,” suggesting that even decades after the demise of the Third Reich, the matter of “looking Jewish” within the context of Nazi Germany was somehow self-evident. One survivor only went so far as to say that her husband, also living submerged, did not look Jewish, and she elaborated by stating that he did not look like a “Stürmer caricature” (see image, below). This suggests an astounding degree of credulity on the part
of Der Stürmer’s seven-hundred-thousand-strong readership, something that likely aided submerged Jews, none of whom resembled the bizarre and often photo-touched portrayals.\footnote{56}

Such caricatures as the one pictured above, hallmarks of the virulently antisemitic Der Stürmer, portrayed Jewish men as squat, overweight, and physically unfit, often balding, but otherwise with black hair, large, downward-hooked noses, protruding, fleshy lips, and, occasionally, an effeminate demeanor, all of which was meant, in the words of the historian Claudia Koonz, to “alert readers to the connection between inner depravity and external appearance” central to Nazi race ideology.\footnote{58} Even if not all Germans were as hatefully gullible as the readership of Der Stürmer, Nazi propaganda for nearly a decade had impressed upon the German public that Jews looked and acted a certain way. For those individuals who bore absolutely no resemblance to Nazi propagandist images of Jews, camouflaging one’s self as Aryan to navigate the streets of Berlin was an excellent strategy. Indeed, many of the U-boats recognized the absurdity of the Nazis’ antisemitic stereotypes, and a few even managed to have some fun with it while highlighting the stupidity and inaccuracy of the state’s racial propaganda. Bruno G., who, in his own words, did not look “typically Jewish,” dated a Jewish girl who looked “Aryan”: she had blonde hair, blue eyes, and was tall and slim. In the aftermath of the introduction of the Judenstern, Bruno and his girlfriend intentionally used to walk around busy parts of the city, their stars prominently displayed, enjoying the stares of passersby who could not believe that the two of

Figure 2.2. “Jewish Congress,” Der Stürmer, no. 34 (July 1934).\footnote{57}
them were Jews.\textsuperscript{59} Although useful, as almost all of the testimonies discussing not “looking Jewish” indicate, years of Nazi antisemitic propaganda had managed to pervade not only the minds of ardent Nazis but also those of most Germans, both Jewish and non-Jewish. As a result, just as having a supposed non-Jewish appearance was a considerable benefit to some U-boats, being a “Jewish type” complicated matters. Indeed, fears of looking Jewish, heightened by years of the antisemitic caricatures and propaganda that had permeated society, caused some Jews to exaggerate in their own minds the “Jewishness” of their features.\textsuperscript{60} To counter these stereotypes and allay their own fears, some female U-boats dyed their hair.\textsuperscript{61} One woman even went so far as to undergo rhinoplasty to change her appearance, thinking that her nose was too Jewish, despite what non-Jews told her to the contrary.\textsuperscript{62}

Suspicious and hostile neighbors on the lookout for Jews were not the only factors forcing many dashers to be constantly on the move. The destitution of many of these individuals presented an unsustainable physical and financial burden for some helpers and was yet another reason that caused them to turn out the U-boats who had sought shelter with them. One survivor lost her hiding place of nine months due to the “universally catastrophic food provisioning” that gripped the city in 1944.\textsuperscript{63} Her helper could no longer feed her. Although the average German engaged in non-heavy employment was entitled to 2,400 calories per day, this figure became increasingly “theoretical” as the war entered its final years.\textsuperscript{64} Jews and their helpers with neither the means nor the inclination to procure food on the black market were reduced to sharing, and 2,400 calories per day did not suffice for two people.

Personal conflict between submerged Jews and their helpers also contributed to the transient nature of submerged life. In late November or early December 1943, Herta Fuß turned to a former colleague for shelter, as Fuß had recently escaped from the collection camp and required assistance. Fuß noted that this colleague lived together with an “Aryan,” suggesting that the colleague was either Jewish or a Mischling. One evening around 11:00, while Fuß was washing her clothes, the colleague entered the room and ordered her to leave immediately. Fuß threw her wet clothing over her arm and headed to a hotel.\textsuperscript{65} Apparently, the colleague’s partner had fallen in love with her. Herta does not elaborate, but perhaps there had been an affair, or the man had made advances. Possibly the colleague merely suspected a partiality on his part. In any event, this case serves as a useful corrective to romanticized visions of heroic helpers and solidarity with Jews in the face of Nazi persecution. Human insecurities continued to intrude on the lives of the U-boats and their helpers and further complicated efforts to find and maintain lodgings.
Bombings also frustrated efforts to find shelter. Allied air raids destroyed hiding places and displaced almost every U-boat during the war. By the end of the war, over one million Berliners were homeless. Indeed, as the air war against Berlin intensified, the chances of finding suitable shelter worsened, and the physical alterations to the cityscape caused by the air raids had a direct impact on the U-boats’ chances for survival. The physical stability of Berlin, which had initially been a known constant when most Jews dived, began to shift out of all recognition, with disastrous consequences: “The heavy air attacks accumulated, little by little all acquaintances and friends were fully bombed out, and we no longer had accommodations.”

Loss of shelter deprived Jews of essential protection and exposed them to discovery by the authorities. In some respects, the Allied air raids certainly brought some measure of hope and a sense of abstract justice to the U-boats and their friends. One survivor remarked decades later that she used to wish the bombers could swoop down and pick her up. Another said that he never really thought the falling bombs could hurt him and his submerged friends: the bombs were for the Germans, not them. Yet that was wishful thinking. The bombs, of course, fell at will, destroying essential shelter and causing injury and death to Jews and non-Jews alike.

In survivor testimony, air raids usually blend together, thereby stressing the strong association made by many U-boats between daily life and the air war against Berlin. Survivor depictions of the raids underscore the broadly felt fear and uncertainty of underground life. One notable exception, however, is the airborne Battle of Berlin, directed by Air Marshal Arthur Harris of the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The RAF waged this air battle against the city from August 1943 until the end of March 1944. However, the first massive strike against the city did not come until 22–23 November. These two evenings witnessed the only attempt by Allied forces to ignite a firestorm in the city, the likes of which consumed Hamburg and Dresden. Only due to its wide boulevards and open spaces was Berlin able to avoid total catastrophe. Nevertheless, on the first night alone, over 700 bombers dropped 1,132 tons of high-explosive bombs and 1,334 tons of firebombs on the city, the second largest tonnage dropped on the city during the entire war. Between 22 and 26 November, the city suffered staggering losses: 400,000 homeless, 68,000 domiciles destroyed, and 2,966 dead. The November raids are some of the only raids on the city mentioned by multiple survivors. Despite more than eighteen months of bombings and the devastating Battle of Berlin in April and May 1945, the events of November 1943 stood out with clarity. The bombings were of such magnitude that one survivor even uses them to pinpoint the date of her arrest. U-boat victims of these raids not only lost their shelter, they also lost their few remaining possessions, including
food, money, and false papers, thereby complicating efforts to survive. The raids, however, did not destroy solely shelter. Dr. Charlotte Bamberg’s juxtaposition of the November raids with her life in the preceding months is telling of the power of the raids to demolish more than concrete and stone: “We enjoyed lodging, a household, and convivial living, until being bombed out fully [in November] 1943.”

The immense difficulties associated with finding and maintaining shelter were a concern throughout the war. However, evidence indicates that the problem of locating suitable places to stay was even more acute in the opening months after submerging, as Jews attempting to live illegally in the city still needed to build up networks of helpers. The first months were therefore a period of acclimation, of experimenting, of figuring out whom to trust. Frightened hosts and suspicious neighbors, although common, were not the only factors prompting the divers to move. The financial and emotional demands of providing for U-boats led to open conflict. The air raids were an added concern. Particularly in 1943, when several thousand U-boats were still living in the city, bombs forced people into the open and left them even less prepared for illegal life than they had been previously.

**Food and False Papers**

Helene and Paul Helft had been arrested on the first day of the Large Factory Operation. Somewhere near Dresden, Helene and her husband escaped their transport. After spending two nights in the forest without food or shelter, Helene made her way to business friends near Dresden. She received food and money to get her and her husband back to Berlin. In Berlin, Helene decided to try to retrieve some of her possessions from her sealed apartment, but the apartment’s porter fetched the police. Only through her cunning was Helene able to escape arrest, although she does not say how. Helene’s experience illustrates a central problem for many U-boats: Jews found themselves underground with little or no money. Thus, a number of Jews defied all risk to get into their former apartments to retrieve cash or any possessions that might be used to trade or sell for food, false identification papers, and other essentials.

The availability of food in Berlin decreased at a time when U-boats needed it most. Most Jews, deprived of legal access to meats, fats, and fruit since rationing began, were in a substantially weakened state when they submerged. Mindful of the damage that poor rations had inflicted upon civilian morale during World War I, the Nazis set up a complex system of rationing meant to keep the German people working for victory. Combined with the severe exploitation of agricultural regions in Eastern Europe, the rationing system enabled the Nazi state to provide for its cit-
izens until the final weeks of the war. Indeed, by the beginning of 1944, Germans remained the best-nourished people in war-torn Europe. Yet rations continued to decline, especially in regards to meats and fats. At the start of the war, meat constituted 12 percent of a standard consumer’s monthly diet, and fats constituted 6.5 percent. By the middle of 1943, those figures had dropped to 5.7 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. By April 1945, the figures had reached 0.9 percent and 1.9 percent. Considering that the Nazi state did not always meet its promised rationing targets, the true figures might be somewhat less. For submerged Jews, they were undoubtedly much lower, during a time when they needed every ounce of energy to stay nimble, alert, and ahead of their enemies.

Hunger reached such proportions that some U-boats turned to eating spoiled food, old sausage casings, or even dog biscuits. Jews had few other options open to them to alleviate their desperate hunger pangs. Some non-Jews did share food, or else they undertook the dangerous task of procuring food by trading or selling Jews’ possessions. In fact, for non-Jews unable to shelter U-boats, providing food was an important way for them to contribute to their survival. U-boats who had money sometimes chose to eat set meals (Stammgerichte) in a restaurant or pub. The meals in these locales did not require ration cards. However, they also lacked fat and meat and were neither hearty nor appetizing. One U-boat in his early twenties claims he ate five portions a day to keep up his strength. Otherwise, some individuals turned to stealing to feed themselves. At one point during the war, Bruno G. received a ration card for two hundred grams of bread. He went into a bakery when it was empty and requested four rolls, knowing that the baker would have to turn around. When she did, Bruno reached behind the counter and grabbed a handful of ration stamps. He then waited calmly for his rolls, handed over the requisite stamps, gave the Hitler salute, and walked out.

Submerged Jews also put what little money they had toward buying false papers, a valuable asset in the struggle to evade arrest. Yet one usually could not procure false identification papers without great financial outlay and risk. Moreover, as 1943 progressed, the postal identification card, one of the most common and accessible forms of identification, no longer counted as valid identification during pass inspections. As a result, many Jews were left with expensive identification papers of questionable value. Even when an individual received the papers gratis, he or she still had to pay to have the photograph changed and a new official stamp affixed. Often, they could not afford the exorbitant prices charged for these services.

In early 1943, Konrad Friedländer decided that his postal identification card was no longer a guarantor of his safety. He therefore turned to his good friend Rudolf Kopp. Kopp provided him with an official identity card, filled out by the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkom-
mando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) (see figure 2.3). Yet even these excellent papers only protected Friedländer in case of raids by the police or Wehrmacht. They were not, after all, an identification of citizenship. Also, the cost of forging the papers was 6,000 RM, an exorbitant sum that one of Konrad’s helpers paid. Although false papers varied considerably in price, and Friedländer’s appear to be somewhat pricier than many, most records indicate a cost of at least 2,000 RM for decently forged papers. Friedländer’s good fortune in having such friends was not unique among...
survivors. However, high rates of arrest suggest that it also was not the rule. For many people, false papers and a steady supply of food were neither safe nor easy to come by. Those not fortunate enough to receive false papers and food from friends sometimes turned to the black market.

The Black Market

The black market was a central feature in the lives of Berliners, a liminal space, underground yet in plain sight, where Jews and non-Jews alike operated in contravention of the law, albeit with a great difference in risk. It was vast, comprising hundreds of individual and overlapping “networks.” For some people, including U-boats, trading on the black market functioned as their primary occupation, and the individual sometimes operated in as many as fifty or sixty different trading “rings.” In other cases, the level of involvement was smaller, involving perhaps forty individuals operating through one contact. Until 1944, most illegal trade occurred indoors: in bars, restaurants, and cafés. The gradual destruction of the city forced the trade to move outdoors, and all areas of Berlin had some level of black market activity. However, almost 50 percent of all trade occurred in one of four neighborhoods located in the center of the city: the Mitte district (16.7 percent), followed by Charlottenburg (11.5 percent), Prenzlauer Berg (9.8 percent), and Schöneberg (7.5 percent). Evidence suggests that the various sites of illegal trade were well known, and this parallel underground drew in a number of Jews looking to earn a living. However, not all Jews who turned to the black market did so for financial gain. Most were searching for food, false papers, and other goods. Studies show that the two most sought-after products on the black market were food and food stamps (23 percent) and material/clothing (23 percent); tobacco followed (19 percent), then services (13 percent). These data correspond to the needs of many Jews who braved the black market.

Survivor accounts testify to the importance of the black market, the exorbitant prices charged, and the advantages of having taken money and goods into hiding. When Adolf Bielschowsky submerged on 16 October 1942, he took with him approximately 6,000 RM. Of that, 2,500 RM went toward obtaining a doctored service record book. Bielschowsky obtained the book from a certain Wichmann, a Jew active on the black market during 1943. Wichmann had been introduced to Bielschowsky at a small café in the center of the city by Franz Kaufmann, a Jewish convert to Christianity. Kaufmann was active in the Confessing Church and was known for helping hundreds of Jews obtain false papers and ration cards. In addition to the 2,500 RM, Bielschowsky paid 150 RM to have his own photograph added to the illegal document.
Although false papers were in high demand, food was the most sought-after commodity. As the war progressed, it became one of the most expensive. Bielschowsky paid 250 RM for a complete book of ration stamps. Individual food stamps varied in price, between 9 RM and 10 RM. Heinz Goldmann bought his ration cards from a Frenchman at the S-Bahn stop Hohenzollerndamm on the southwest edge of the Berlin city center. According to his brother Herbert, Goldmann paid 60 RM for ration cards equaling one pound of fat and 30 RM for ration cards entitling the carrier to one pound of meat. Since many Jews submerged with little or no money, the cost of food on the black market was doubtless prohibitive.

The sites where Jews encountered the black market demonstrate the centrality of restaurants, pubs, train stations, and other public meeting places to the pursuit of illegal trade. Bielschowsky’s first black market contact moved away in July 1943, but he soon found a new connection, when a stranger approached him in a small bar in the neighborhood of Prenzlauer Berg and asked if he needed ration stamps. The U-boat Leopold Chones also bought his ration stamps in a pub, the Lokal Südstern, in the Berlin district of Neukölln. These locations served as venues where Jews could socialize with both non-Jews and U-boats and establish valuable trading contacts. For example, the Goldmann brothers frequented a restaurant called Zum Klausner. There they met Paul Regensburger, also known as Dr. Regen, another U-boat.

Yet the black market, although a central feature in the lives of many U-boats, was dangerous. Kurt Lindenberg recalled, “The fantastic sums that one could earn through illegal trade did not compare to the accompanying danger. Actually, all of my illegally living acquaintances, who quietly occupied themselves with illegal trade, were ‘nabbed’ sooner or later.” The arrest of one Jew in a black market circle often led to the arrests of others. Indeed, between August and October 1943, the Gestapo arrested Adolf Bielschowsky, his contact Wichmann, Paul Regensburger and the Goldmann brothers, and Leopold Chones. In the case of Regensburger, the police found him dining at Zum Klausner. Still, need and desire drove countless Jews onto the black market. For many, it was the only source of food and false papers. Although the number of U-boats regularly working on the black market appears to have been small, some level of contact with illegal trading often was unavoidable; it enabled survival.

Arrest

Fritz-Günther Meyer and his wife submerged on 8 May 1943. The Meyers found shelter with a non-Jew, and, with the help of another U-boat,
Fritz-Günther found work as a supernumerary at the State Opera. On 10 September 1943, under unknown circumstances, the authorities arrested Meyer’s wife and took her to the collection center in the Große Hamburger Straße to await deportation. Determined to save his wife, Meyer turned to a former colleague now working at the collection center, a Jewish orderly (Ordner) named Baches. Baches operated as a courier between Meyer and his wife. He smuggled in a package of shoes and gloves for Frau Meyer and a hammer and chisel to effect her escape. In turn, he brought Meyer a letter from his wife, assuring him of her well-being and determination to hold on. Soon, however, the news reached Meyer of his wife’s impending deportation. In response, he wrote a letter to the camp leadership, requesting a stay of his wife’s deportation and his intention to turn himself over to the authorities in twelve days, after settling his affairs.

Meyer, however, had no intention of turning himself in. Rather, he attempted to stall the authorities, while making the final preparations for his wife’s escape. To that end, on 28 September, Meyer paid Baches a visit at his apartment. He proceeded to give Baches a rope, two steel saws, and some medication, in the hope that his wife could use them to escape her transport. He also gave Baches a letter containing instructions on how and where his wife best could execute her escape. He included a timetable, travel cards, and a punched train ticket from Berlin to Breslau for his wife’s use. Meyer then arranged to meet with Baches the following day at 2:00 p.m. When he arrived at Baches’s apartment, agents of the State Police arrested him.

In Nazi Berlin, the phenomenon of arrest was omnipresent. At one point or another, most U-boats narrowly escaped from the police and their informants, and almost all knew of someone who had fallen prey to arrest. Indeed, the Gestapo’s formidable methods, developed under the aegis of the Reich Main Security Office, were highly effective. Nazi security forces apprehended approximately 65 percent of all U-boats over the course of 1943, accounting for almost 88 percent of all arrests of submerged Jews. Although the Nazis continued their pursuit of illegal Jews until the closing days of the war, evading capture in 1943 proved most difficult.

In Berlin, agents of the Gestapo hunted down the city’s divers and dashers, working from detailed lists obtained from the Jewish Registration Office (Jüdische Meldestelle) and the Berlin Jewish Community. They compared transport lists with the names of deported Jews, allowing them to ascertain whether a Jew had submerged. With this list in hand, the Gestapo methodically pursued its prey, relying on three primary methods to ensnare the U-boats. First, pass inspections and police raids, although also a useful means of tracking down military deserters, were effective in identifying fugitive Jews. Second, denunciation by non-Jews was an om-
nipresent threat. Not infrequently, denunciations led to a domino effect and the arrest of dozens of illegal Jews in a short span of time. Agents of the Gestapo also coerced U-boats they arrested into divulging the locations of other Jews. In some cases, they even persuaded some of these Jews to work for them. These so-called Fahnder (searchers), although few in number, proved to be a third and equally insidious threat to Jews attempting to evade arrest and deportation.

Pass Inspections

On 20 September 1943, members of the Kriminalpolizei (Criminal Police) came upon forty-five-year-old Max Zickel in the city’s Mitte district. Upon questioning, Zickel failed to provide proper identification. He soon admitted to having not worn the Jewish Star for over a year, and the police took him into custody.116 Zickel’s encounter with the city’s police was an all-too-common occurrence for the city’s illegal Jews. Discussion of pass inspections in survivor accounts is usually quite matter-of-fact and cursory, suggesting that the inspections were such an intrinsic part of life in the city as to warrant little explanation. Indeed, carrying ID papers had been a fixture of German society, even before the Nazi seizure of power. Only by this point, for the U-boats, these papers meant the difference between life and death. Comprehensive arrest records do not exist, but inspections likely account for a large number of arrests, especially during 1943, when many U-boats were without shelter. Although false papers provided some level of protection, Jews had to trust to their knowledge of when and where such inspections might occur and adjust accordingly.

Navigating the streets of Berlin was a nerve-wracking affair, and the U-boats had to be on guard constantly. The police cordoned off sections of streets, requiring all people to show identification. Male U-boats were at particular risk, as the purpose of pass inspections had as much to do with tracking down deserters from the German army and fugitive foreign workers as with locating fugitive Jews.117 When the police were in doubt as to a person’s identity, they sometimes tipped off Jews working for the Gestapo that someone they inspected might be Jewish.118 Moreover, as the war progressed and the German home front radicalized in the face of total war and increasingly diminished prospects for victory, these inspections increased in frequency.119 Over time, the city’s camouflaged Jews operating in public recognized the most likely locations for police and Gestapo raids: certain cafés and restaurants, the opera, the black market, and trains became off-limits for all but the most daring.120

Many U-boats developed specific tactics to mitigate the dangers of pass inspections. Among men of fighting age, appropriate military identifica-
tion and uniforms were invaluable. Günter Fabian, twenty-three years old at the time of his flight underground, was in possession of an identification card issued by the German Volkssturm (Home Army). His future father-in-law also provided him with a Volkssturm armband, allowing him to blend in with other men his age and deflect suspicion. Other, younger men donned Hitler Youth uniforms, demonstrating their belief that an outward display of support for the regime served as a form of protection against suspicious Germans. For Jews lacking false papers or a borrowed uniform, the best way to deflect suspicion was not to run or slink away into the shadows but rather to engage people: “The best means of disarming a mistrustful starring person was to ask them where a street was or for a light for a cigarette.” Although these methods did not protect one from large-scale pass inspections, they did lessen the chances of being reported to the nearest police officer.

As the air war against Berlin intensified, the need to take cover put the U-boats in a difficult position. Public bunkers were subject to inspections, and Jews were hesitant to use apartment basements, as their presence might raise awkward questions among the residents and the air warden. As a result, Jews often eschewed proper shelter, at least until the closing days of the war forced many to risk the bunkers. For most of 1943 and 1944, however, some had no other alternative than to take cover in the streets, in parks, or in “slit trenches” and watch the bombs fall around them: “Often enough, I saw death before my eyes . . .” More commonly, they opted to remain in the apartments of their helpers, vulnerable to shattering glass, fire, and, most fatally, a direct hit.

If a U-boat survived the air raid, they still had to contend with discovery by the building’s residents. Indeed, the first task of the air warden after the all-clear sirens rang was the inspection of the building and each apartment for damage. Jews were aware of this threat, and despite the fire and turmoil that engulfed entire neighborhoods, they could not rest. As the wardens made their rounds, U-boats fled or hid themselves as best they could. In August 1944, Erich Friedländer experienced a near miss when an air raid targeted the neighborhood of Friedrichshain. As the sirens rang, Friedländer, fully dressed and prepared to flee after the raid, took his place in the corridor of the building’s second floor, protected only by the walls and two thick blankets. Bombs directed at a local factory pulverized the neighborhood. One bomb destroyed the entire fourth floor of Friedländer’s building, half of the third, a portion of the second, and then dropped into the neighboring basement, where it exploded. After the raid ended, Friedländer heard the voice of the air warden coming to make his inspections. Erich attempted to hide in the lavatory. By this point, however, the upper floors of the building were ablaze. Taking advantage of
the ensuing confusion among the neighbors, Friedländer grabbed his possessions and fled through the smoke and fire to his next hiding place.¹²⁷

**Denunciation**

On 7 August 1943, the Gestapo received the following anonymous handwritten letter:

_Urgent. Jewish Matter_

_Wish to make an important communication to you concerning a Jewess. I have noticed for some time that people are hiding a Jewess in this building, and she does not wear a star. The Jewess is called Blumenfeld, and she is being secretly hidden [sic] by Frau Reichert, Berlin W., 38 Passauer Strasse, 3 floors up, front building. This must be stopped immediately, send an official straight away about 7 in the morning to pick this woman up._

_When this Jewess lived in the building before she was always cheeky and stuck up. But you will have to be quick because otherwise she might disappear and go somewhere else._

_Heil Hitler¹²⁸_

When the authorities arrived at the apartment to question Blumenfeld, she claimed Slovakian citizenship but was unable to produce her passport, which she said was at police headquarters awaiting an extension of residence. After further questioning, Blumenfeld admitted to being a Jew.

Denunciation of illegal Jews was one of the Gestapo’s most valuable tools. Although most of the agency’s records either disappeared or were destroyed at the end of World War II, extant data from two cities (Würzburg and Düsseldorf) demonstrate that the organization was quite successful in enforcing racial policy, coordinating deportations, and hunting down fugitive Jews with a minimal number of personnel.¹²⁹ The average German citizen played a critical role in enabling the Gestapo’s success and in reinforcing popular perceptions of the Gestapo as a larger and more omnipresent organization than it was. The Nazi state fostered an impromptu and organic network of denouncers, some motivated by hatred and greed, others by fear and uncertainty, and the Gestapo benefitted from the atmosphere of mistrust it created among the German people.¹³⁰

Survivors routinely remark on fleeing their shelter due to being spied on. However, many often were unaware that their presence in a building had aroused any suspicion until agents of the Gestapo or its accomplices arrived to arrest them. The number of Jews arrested as a result of denun-
ciation is unknown. However, the transient nature of submerged life and the need for Jews to blend in with non-Jews as much as possible meant that the Gestapo relied heavily on informants and anonymous denunciations. Moreover, denunciation did not only endanger the safety of the denounced person and their helper. Ruthless and unrelenting interrogation by the Gestapo often led to multiple arrests. The arrest of Lotte Blumenfeld stands as perhaps the strongest example of the ramifications of denunciation. Her case highlights the complexities of successful evasion and the interconnected nature of submerged life in the city. However, Blumenfeld’s arrest also illustrates the tenuous position of these connections. One act of denunciation had the potential to destroy multiple lives.

Blumenfeld’s submerged life began in January 1943. For the previous five months, she had been waiting on an official emigration visa to enter Switzerland. Although illegal, Blumenfeld had connections through a non-Jewish acquaintance who was head of the Protective Police Reserves. By the end of January 1943, the emigration papers had not arrived, so Lotte submerged. After hiding for fourteen days, she again visited her acquaintance to inquire about the papers, but she was put off. During her next visit, she was told the papers would be a long time in coming, but the connection could arrange for Lotte to receive a Slovakian passport, albeit without a permit of residence. Lotte agreed and received in late May or early June 1943 new papers with the name Marie Sochmanowa. A couple of weeks later, Blumenfeld returned the passport to her connection, as he promised to obtain a residence permit for her, something that would arouse less suspicion. Blumenfeld called him again on the evening of 11 August, and her acquaintance told her to call back on Friday, 13 August. Lotte Blumenfeld gave this testimony to the Gestapo on 12 August 1943. Sometime between her last telephone call and the following morning, the police arrested her. Although a passport might have prevented Lotte’s arrest, the denunciation was grounds for immediate questioning.

Blumenfeld’s denunciation first led to the interrogation of the woman providing her with shelter and to her connection in the police reserves, both of whom initially prevaricated. The woman in whose apartment Blumenfeld resided testified that she believed Blumenfeld’s story concerning her Slovakian origins. This claim seems doubtful, as the denunciation letter suggests that Blumenfeld’s Jewish identity had been known in the building for some time. Blumenfeld’s police connection also tried to deflect suspicion during his interrogation on 12 August. He claimed that he had not seen Lotte for a long time and denied all charges. After the police confronted him with 5,000 RM, supposedly to be used in securing the authorization for another Jewish couple’s entry into Switzerland, the reserve officer confessed to everything, including to the origins of Lotte
Blumenfeld’s false papers. His confession then led to the arrest of Leon Blum on 16 August 1943.

Blum’s arrest then led to the arrest of Franz Kaufmann and two of his associates on 19 August. A notable figure in church resistance in the Third Reich, Kaufmann had a distinguished professional career, and his history attests to the rich, complex, and varied interactions between Jews and Christians before the Nazi rise to power. Born on 5 January 1886 to a Berlin Jewish family, Kaufmann later converted to Christianity. He served in the 10th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment, and he was promoted to first lieutenant in 1913. He was wounded on 18 March 1918 and awarded the Iron Cross First and Second Class, the Bavarian Military Order of Merit Fourth Class with Crossed Swords, and the Frontline Service Cross. After the war, he received his doctorate in law and political science, served in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, turned down an appointment as city councilor, and then worked as chief secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry and later in the Reich Public Accounts Office until his dismissal in 1936. In 1934, Kaufmann married the non-Jew Margot von Walther, and at the time of his arrest, the couple had a three-year-old daughter. Having raised his daughter in the Protestant faith, Kaufmann qualified as living in a privileged mixed marriage. He was a member of the Confessing Church and, in 1942, began working to aid Jews living illegally.

Kaufmann was instrumental in procuring false papers for Jews. Members of the Confessing Church dropped post office ID papers (among other forms of identification) in the collection box, and Kaufmann then had the papers doctored with new photos and seals. He also received the necessary documents from other intermediaries and anonymous sources. One of the head forgers for the group, a U-boat named Cioma Schönhaus, then made the necessary changes to the papers. Kaufmann’s case is noteworthy not only for the number of arrests it prompted but also for how it demonstrates the importance of the Confessing Church for the underground movement, collaboration between Jews and non-Jews, and the simultaneous strength and fragility of such groups that endeavored to aid Jews. Indeed, the momentum created by Blumenfeld’s arrest accelerated with the arrest of Franz Kaufmann. According to secondary sources, the police arrested Kaufmann with a notebook containing the names and addresses of illegal Jews and his fellow conspirators. Also on Kaufmann’s person at the time of his arrest was a variety of identification documents waiting to be forged.

According to his confession, Kaufmann began helping Jews on the run after meeting Leon Blum in 1942. Kaufmann told Blum that he was “sympathetic to fugitive Jews,” and Blum asked Kaufmann if it would be pos-
possible to procure identification papers for a U-boat, Lotte Blumenfeld.\textsuperscript{139} Kaufmann then contacted a U-boat named Wichmann, who obtained the necessary papers, likely on the black market, where he was active.\textsuperscript{140} Through his connections in the Confessing Church, Kaufmann regularly received batches of false papers from two Jews, Ludwig Lichtwitz and Cikoma Schönhaus, who forged the papers for the sum of 100 RM per ID. Kaufmann met at regular intervals with Lichtwitz at the parcels section of a post office. Kaufmann received the doctored passes, and Lichtwitz received new ones to forge.\textsuperscript{141} The interrogation soon returned to Wichmann, with whom Kaufmann was scheduled to meet the following day, 20 August. Along with confirming the complicity of Wichmann, Schönhaus, Lichtwitz, and two other individuals, the Gestapo forced Kaufmann that evening to reveal information pertaining to eight Jews and one non-Jew. Where possible, he provided current addresses, true names, and false identities. When asked how many Jews he had helped since 1942, Kaufmann replied that he needed time to consider the matter. At 10:00 p.m., the Gestapo concluded the first day of interrogation.\textsuperscript{142}

The second day of Kaufmann’s interrogation began at 9:30 a.m. on Friday, 20 August 1943. Kaufmann began with the following statement:

\begin{quote}
As a result of my arrest yesterday morning, I have been confronted with a completely new situation. Until that point, I saw it as my task to place myself protectively in front of those who had entrusted their care to me. Naturally, it is a difficult decision for me henceforth to abandon those, before whom I had stood protectively. This decision could mature only gradually, and hence, I ask that you not be angered with me if today I correct and add to the information given during my questioning yesterday.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

As part of his “corrections,” and almost certainly the result of torture at the hands of the Gestapo, Kaufmann was forced to divulge the aliases of several of his partners, and he proceeded to give an unwilling and damning confession regarding the whereabouts of almost two dozen Jews.\textsuperscript{144} Most of those people mentioned were not arrested as a direct result of Kaufmann’s confession. Some, such as Dr. Charlotte Bamberg, had changed hiding places.\textsuperscript{145} In other cases, the individuals had emigrated or were assumed deported. Kaufmann sometimes was able to lie about the full extent of his relationship with his partners and what they knew of his illegal activities. Still, the thoroughness with which the police pursued every missing Jew and every non-Jewish helper was as disheartening as it was ominous.

By 23 August, besides Lotte Blumenfeld, twenty-seven people somehow connected to Franz Kaufmann had been arrested. Over the next eight weeks, the police arrested over two dozen more Jews, Mischlinge,
and non-Jews. By 12 October, the State Police reported a total of fifty individuals, mostly Jews but also non-Jews, arrested as a result of the denunciation of Lotte Blumenfeld. The documents suggest the figures were even higher than that. Moreover, searches were still underway, including the hunt for the forger Cioma Schönhaus. Trials were held for those non-Jews and some Mischlinge who had helped Jews evade capture. As for the U-boats, the file is clear:

Those arrested Jews on file, insofar as their file is no longer needed, have already been evacuated, that is to say, have had state police measures taken against them. The Jews Kaufmann, Neuweck alias Wichmann, Segall alias Engelmann . . . and Lichtwitz alias Langenbach, for the purpose of further investigation, are to be found in the collection camp in the Gr. Hamburger Str. 26.146

Thus, only Jews who were perceived as being of some use to the police were held in custody; the Gestapo deported the others as soon as possible.147 Two of the individuals arrested, Rolf Isaaksohn and Fritz Neuweck (alias Wichmann), worked for the Gestapo as informants tracking down U-boats. One Mischling protected from deportation received an eight-year prison sentence. Dr. Franz Kaufmann, the nexus of this center of resistance and aid, was racially Jewish according to the Nuremberg Laws; he was held in police custody and never charged.148 The Gestapo sent him to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp where its agents executed him on 17 February 1944.149

Jewish Informants

Berlin’s submerged Jews not only had to contend with arrest through pass inspections and denunciation by non-Jews, they also had to worry about betrayal by other Jews, whose participation in the denunciation and arrest of the U-boats is a bitter and complicated chapter in the history of hiding in the city. Two types of Jewish denouncers aided the Berlin Gestapo, although the numerical consequences of their actions varied as greatly as did their motivations for providing information. The first and most common type provided one-time information to the Gestapo, as the result of either torture or false promises. The second type of informant was known in bureaucratic circles as a Fahnder (searcher). Survivors referred to them simply as jüdische Spitzel: “our all too well-known Jewish spies.”150 These men and women did not provide one-time information. Rather, with systematic and frequently zealous efficiency, they worked with the Gestapo and often took the lead role in tracking down Jews on the run. Although
no more than a couple of dozen operated at any given time, the *Fahnder* played a central role in tracking down hundreds of illegal Jews.\textsuperscript{151} Jewish acts of betrayal illustrate the desperation that accompanied arrest as well as the Gestapo’s horrific ability to infiltrate every aspect of German society and to intimidate and manipulate everyone who fell within its grasp.

On 27 August 1944, agents of the Gestapo, most likely Jewish *Fahnder*, arrested twenty-year-old Lothar Orbach during a game of billiards at the billiard hall he regularly frequented. Orbach looked up from the game to find a pistol pointed at his head. A fellow U-boat managed to escape, but the Gestapo deported Orbach to Auschwitz on 6 September 1944.\textsuperscript{152} From there, Orbach was transferred first to Niederorschel and then to Buchenwald, where he was liberated on 12 April 1945.\textsuperscript{153} Before leaving for the United States in September 1946, Orbach and an acquaintance paid a visit to the man who had betrayed him: nineteen-year-old Siegfried G. Shortly before his deportation, Orbach had heard from an acquaintance working in the Gestapo collection camp that G. had been responsible for his arrest.\textsuperscript{154} Siegfried tried to exculpate himself. Orbach, working in postwar Germany to track down and interrogate Nazi war criminals, took G. to a Russian officer in the city and had him charged as a Nazi informer.\textsuperscript{155} Fifty years later, Orbach remained unaware of what had happened to Siegfried G. Orbach assumed he had been released, but in his memoirs, the apprehension of Siegfried served as an act of closure: “[It] relieved me of a burden.”\textsuperscript{156}

Siegfried’s case made its way before the Jewish Community’s Honor Court (Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde). The community established the court to ascertain if and to what extent individual Jews had “offended against the interests of the Jewish community” during the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{157} Although the court could not issue prison sentences, it did have the right to deprive Jews of access to social welfare and of recognition as a Victim of Fascism.\textsuperscript{158} The court’s rulings shed some light on the moral dilemmas faced by Jews whom the Gestapo arrested. In the summer of 1944, Siegfried G. was a seventeen-year-old who recently had been arrested by the Gestapo. Orbach believed that G.’s transgression had been a traffic accident involving an unregistered motorcycle.\textsuperscript{159} However, G.’s main offense had been his work falsifying papers for submerged Jews.\textsuperscript{160} According to Siegfried, the Gestapo tortured him, a statement perhaps confirmed by the sling G. wore at the time of Orbach’s arrest.\textsuperscript{161} The court concluded that Siegfried’s act of betrayal was the result of the impossibly difficult circumstances under which he found himself and, moreover, his young age. As the court concluded, “One cannot expect from such a young and inexperienced person in such an intractable and dangerous situation the same courage and consideration as from a mature male adult.”\textsuperscript{162}
Siegfried’s case is indicative of many that confronted the court. Denunciation and betrayal, although predominantly non-Jewish acts, unfortunately occurred with relative frequency. When the police or the Fahnder arrested a U-boat, they brought the individual in for questioning to the Jewish collection camp, which, in March 1944, had relocated from its location on the Große Hamburger Straße to the former Jewish Hospital under the leadership of Gestapo member, SS-Hauptscharführer, and Criminal Police Secretary Walter Dobberke. A member of the Nazi Party since the spring of 1937, Dobberke had been assigned to help implement and oversee the deportation of Berlin’s Jews beginning in 1941. Following the last major deportations from the city in March 1943, Dobberke then turned most of his energies to coordinate the tracking down, arrest, and deportation of the city’s divers and dashers. Upon arrest, the former U-boat was brought before either Dobberke or a subordinate and interrogated as to the location(s) of other Jews. They often used a combination of torture and promises to send the prisoner to the Theresienstadt Ghetto instead of to Auschwitz in order to extract confessions. The Jewish Fahnder working at the collection camp also pursued their own methods to extract confessions from former U-boats. They offered to help the prisoner find work for the Gestapo or to put in a good word and get them sent to Theresienstadt. They also resorted to trickery and lies, pretending that they, too, had been arrested. After “commiserating” with the prisoner about their common fate, they sometimes persuaded them to divulge the whereabouts of other Jews.

The number of U-boats whom the Gestapo and Fahnder were able to arrest through these one-time confessions is unknown. A former secretary to Dobberke as well as a former Fahnder testified after the war that most arrested Jews divulged the whereabouts of other U-boats. However, both of these individuals had it in their best interest to implicate as many Jews as possible to deflect blame. On the other hand, one inmate of the collection camp claimed that only sixty Jews betrayed other Jews. The reality likely lies somewhere between heroic refusal and widespread cooperation. Of the approximately 4,800 U-boats arrested, perhaps several hundred Jews provided credible information to the Gestapo, much of which was obtained through torture, false promises, and trickery. As one confession often led to the arrest of multiple individuals, had most captured Jews divulged the whereabouts of other Jews, far fewer than 1,700 U-boats would have survived the war. Also, many submerged Jews intentionally avoided one another to protect themselves and others in case of arrest; not everyone could provide useful information to the Gestapo. Lastly, not all credible information led to arrests. The fluid nature of submerged life often meant that addresses were obsolete by the time the Gestapo arrived.
In most cases, acts of betrayal were one-time events that in no way reflected a willingness or desire on the part of Jews to aid the Nazis. Siegfried G. was a typical case of the horrific consequences associated with arrest and the difficult choices that faced most people once confronted with the imminent reality of Auschwitz. This qualification does not negate the understandable anger of those who experienced betrayal. However, it does illustrate how quickly freedom of choice diminished once the Gestapo made an arrest. Those who refused to help the Gestapo certainly displayed heroic resolution, but Jews who were tortured faced an overwhelming situation in which survival was one of the few clear thoughts able to penetrate the mist of pain, dread, and despair. Even still, fear of the camps never led the vast majority of Jews to join that small, despised, and feared minority of former U-boats who actively aided the Gestapo in its hunt for the city’s divers and dashers: Berlin’s Jewish spies, the Fahnder.

On the evening of 8 August 1944, Lola Alexander stood on the platform of Berlin’s Gesundbrunnen railway station and waited, as usual, for her fellow U-boat Ursel Finke (see figure 2.4). Finke and Alexander both worked at small lending libraries owned by the non-Jewish couple who hid them. As Finke appeared, Lola stared in paralyzed disbelief. Ursel had been arrested by a man from whom she already had escaped once before: the Fahnder Gerhard Behrendt. Behrendt had brought Finke to his superior, the Gestapo Kommissar Herbert Tietze, who was waiting at the train station. Determined to avoid deportation, Finke broke free and threw herself in front of an oncoming train. When she came to, a crowd had gathered before the platform. Finke had fallen under the train, which tore apart her one leg but did not kill her. As she was pulled to the platform, the crowd, unaware of her true identity, chastised her for her stupidity. Finke retorted, “You should try being persecuted as a Jew!” Behrendt approached her and told her that he and Tietze were good people and would have let her run. In response to her request that they now let her do so, Behrendt gave her a sneering grin and replied, “But you can’t!”

Figure 2.4. Ursel Finke.
As a result of the Large Factory Operation, the Berlin Gestapo established the Jewish Search Service (Jüdischer Fahndungsdienst) in the spring of 1943, an organization unique to Berlin and Vienna. Its employees were tasked with tracking down the city’s estimated five to seven thousand illegal Jews. The exact number of individuals arrested by the Fahnder is unknown. However, in 1950, the East German police charged in absentia Rolf Isaaksohn, one of the most notorious Fahnder in wartime Berlin, with having betrayed upward of 250 hidden Jews. His accomplice and wife, the equally notorious Stella Goldschlag, was responsible for at least one hundred arrests. Even if the other Fahnder were far less aggressive and successful, their actions as a group account for possibly as many as one thousand arrests (22 percent) of all U-boats.

Under the camp leadership of Walter Dobberke, the Gestapo recruited its Fahnder from those former U-boats whom it felt could help track down especially large numbers of Jews. For Jews who accepted Dobberke’s offer, the job offered a number of advantages. The Fahnder received ration cards, police identification, freedom of movement, and the right not to wear the Jewish Star. In some cases, they were allowed to continue living with their spouse. Some received a monthly payment of 160 RM. Dobberke even offered the false hope that working for the Gestapo protected their families. A variety of factors, largely but not exclusively self-serving, prompted these individuals to offer their services to the Gestapo. In turn, a perverse symbiotic relationship developed. The Gestapo needed the Fahnder to help them track down Jews evading deportation, and the Fahnder offered their services in order to avoid deportation.

The composition of the Fahndungsdienst varied exceedingly. Other than being Jewish, these spies had only two qualities in common. The first was their large circle of Jewish associates and their knowledge of the Jewish community. Indeed, the Fahnder Behrendt, although in a privileged mixed marriage, had worked since 1938 for offices of the Jewish Community or in forced Jewish factory labor. Rolf Isaaksohn and Fritz Neuweck (alias Wichmann), both arrested during the Franz Kaufmann affair, had been active on the black market forging false papers and had many contacts. The second was their willingness to work for the Gestapo. Postwar attempts by former Fahnder at self-exculpation proved largely cynical or inadequate. The deadly Stella Goldschlag, known in U-boat circles as the “Blond Poison,” underwent two trials in postwar Berlin. She argued that she had been a victim and had offered her services to the Gestapo only in exchange for saving her parents from deportation. Yet not only was Goldschlag responsible for betraying her first husband, she also continued to work for the Gestapo after it deported her parents. Her next husband, Rolf Isaaksohn, was, if possible, even worse. His contempo-
raries noted his perverse fascination with Nazi pageantry during the thirties. He once threatened to denounce his own family to the regime, and evidence suggests that not even Stella could match him in ruthlessness. Isaaksohn fled the collection camp in the Jewish Hospital during the final days of the war, and the East German government declared him dead in 1953. The psychology of these individuals requires further study. However, Isaaksohn’s behavior suggests a certain level of cheap mimicry of his persecutors and perhaps even self-loathing. Similar to those concentration camp prisoners who resorted to imitating their SS oppressors, some of the Fahnder may well have fallen into the same psychological trap.

Using Jews as informants held several advantages for the Gestapo. First, the Fahnder understood how submerged life operated. They were well acquainted with illegal methods of procuring food, the types of shelter sought out by Jews, and the cafés, restaurants, and other social venues Jews frequented. Second, years of social isolation from the non-Jewish population had created a level of useful anonymity for Jews attempting to live illegally. At the same time, however, Jews became more visible to other members of their steadily shrinking community, and the Gestapo used the Fahnder to identify Jews who otherwise would have escaped their notice. Third, the Gestapo manipulated the trust between Jews to maximize the level of information the Fahnder were able to take from the U-boats, resulting in a larger number of arrests. Indeed, these informants regularly passed themselves off as fellow U-boats to win the confidences of those they betrayed. Lastly, the Fahnder served an important function by augmenting the Gestapo’s extensive infiltration of German society. In the past few decades, historians have countered the myth of the Gestapo as an “omniscient and omnipresent” entity in German society. Its success at infiltrating and intimidating German society would not have been possible without the participation of the German public in “policing” itself. With respect to tracking down U-boats, the Fahnder brought with them a level of knowledge of submerged life without which the Gestapo would have been far less successful. The Fahnder took the lead in hunting down and arresting Jews, as in the case of Ursel Finke, while members the Gestapo served an auxiliary role. Indeed, the initiative and successes of Fahnder were such that the Gestapo reduced the number of its own employees working in the collection camp.

The U-boats were acutely aware of the presence of the spies, and survivors frequently mention the dangers such individuals presented. The Fahnder scoured the city and surrounding countryside, and according to one survivor, they “had a better eye for who was Jewish,” in part because as Berlin’s Jewish community rapidly shrank during the deportations, those who remained became better known to one another. Many Fahnder also
relied on their former identity as U-boats to get close to fugitive Jews, and individuals often were unaware that they were speaking with a member of the Fahndungsdienst until it was too late. Some, like Ursel Finke, attempted to flee at all cost, to the point of throwing themselves in front of an oncoming train. Others resorted to fighting back. Indeed, betrayal by a fellow Jew provoked such anger on the part of some U-boats that the Fahnder ultimately received permission to carry a sidearm for their own protection. Over time, U-boats also learned to avoid certain cafés, theaters, and restaurants frequented by other illegal Jews. In the end, the safest way to avoid denunciation by Jews was to limit one’s contact with other divers or, at the very least, to avoid sharing addresses and names. Despite the comfort that came with socializing and speaking freely with other Jews, the risk that one might be speaking with a Jewish spy or future spy was too great. Although surviving the war often required putting one’s trust in strangers, submerged Jews learned to divulge no more than was absolutely necessary.

Escaping Germany

On 29 September 1943, as a result of the Franz Kaufmann affair, the Gestapo arrived to arrest the Jewish forgers Ludwig Lichtwitz and Cioma Schönhaus. Although the agents succeeded in apprehending Lichtwitz, Schönhaus was nowhere to be found. In fact, he had fled the country to neutral Switzerland. With careful preparation, including the right outfit, appropriate papers, and a mind that had weighed almost every possible scenario or question he might encounter, Schönhaus rode his bike more than four hundred miles to the Swiss border. While an escape into Switzerland was not impossible, it was almost so, and an acquaintance tried to talk Schönhaus out of such an act, arguing that with his excellent false papers he was safer in Berlin. In the case of a wanted master forger, this was not true. However, the fact remains that the flight from Berlin to neutral countries was an incredibly difficult feat. It is unknown how many German Jews attempted to flee to neutral countries and how many succeeded, but the number is likely quite low. Stories of flight from Berlin and escape to neutral countries are therefore noteworthy. They demonstrate not only the difficulties inherent in such a move and why so few likely attempted it but also the U-boat understanding of German society and, for those who attempted these escapes, their ability to use that understanding to their own advantage.

Kurt Lindenberg, a central figure in this study thus far, dared to escape Nazi Germany in November 1943. His plan had begun to form during
that summer. He does not mention why he decided on Sweden instead of Switzerland. He knew, however, that a direct flight was impossible, so he set his sights on Denmark, a country he assumed to be anti-Nazi and therefore filled with people who might help him. Lindenberg’s resolve to flee the Reich developed for a number of reasons. The first was the termination of “an unhappy love affair” with the daughter of a senior police lieutenant serving in Warsaw. She knew that Kurt was Jewish, and she stood by him until her mother discovered the affair from a neighbor and ended the relationship. Second, the precarious position of the U-boats steadily worsened, and one by one his acquaintances disappeared. Lindenberg also feared the upcoming winter and the increasing air raids on the city. He saw escape as his best chance for survival.

Lindenberg spent the summer planning his escape by learning all that he could about traveling to Sweden. Gathering information on the transportation possibilities was integral to his extensive preparations. He hung around train stations and asked questions about the shipments of fish arriving; his pretext was that he was employed by a fish distributor. Lindenberg also spoke on the telephone with the product information office of the German National Railway (Reichsbahn) concerning transportation options. He conversed for hours with the drivers of Danish fish import trucks. Once he even went so far as to visit the Swedish consulate in Berlin. He told the consulate who he was and how he had heard that the Swedes had taken in Danish refugees. He then asked them which German ports were involved in exporting coal to Sweden. In this case, he was informed that coal exports to Sweden had stopped; this, in fact, turned out to be a lie. Lindenberg ascertained the truth after calling the Reichsbahn.

One of the biggest obstacles he faced was that he could not ride a train over the border. German police and military pass controls were tight; officers would have noticed a young man not in uniform, and forged papers were beyond his financial means. Although Lindenberg had his original birth certificate and a document certifying that he was not fit to serve in the military, the papers were of questionable worth. Thus, the first part of his trip would have to be in a cargo car. Once in Denmark, although he could ride in a regular carriage, he still required a ticket proving that he traveled from Germany. Tickets needed to be punched upon boarding the train and surrendered upon leaving the train station. Lindenberg first bought two train tickets for Berlin-Copenhagen. He went to the local train station when it was crowded and passed through boarding control. The man punching the train cards assumed the second person had already passed through and punched both of Lindenberg’s tickets. Lindenberg waited for a while and then exited, handing over one of his two tickets at the control. A few days later, Lindenberg returned to the station, bought
a new ticket, and, upon his exit from the station, turned over the ticket he had had punched a few days earlier. He now had a valid ticket that would enable him to circumvent official ticket controls.

When Lindenberg spoke of these plans to other illegal Jews, however, he only met with attempts to dissuade him. For Lindenberg, their timid reaction was typical: “The German Jews are indeed Germans, insofar as they have no individual courage, just like the majority of Germans.”195 The majority of U-boats did not attempt to escape Germany. Their general response, according to Lindenberg, was as follows: “No, no, if we’re nabbed here, then we just had rotten luck. But to want to make one’s way through the German border is downright suicide.”196 Indeed, most survivors do not mention attempts to escape Germany, likely because they considered fleeing the country to be too great of a risk. Lindenberg, however, was not looking for a travel companion. He just wanted to see what people thought. Indeed, by his own admission, Lindenberg was an Einzelgänger (loner), a term that when seen in conjunction with his decision to flee Germany by himself highlights the highly individual nature of submerged life.

On the morning of 5 November 1943, Lindenberg attempted to begin his journey. He arrived at the train station and proceeded to the cargo cars. However, his car was located toward the end of the tracks and had not yet been loaded. Lindenberg left the train station and spent the day wandering around the city, going into two movie theaters and eating three separate meals in local pubs. By the end of the day, his car still had not been loaded. Indeed, the train did not leave until late the following night. Even then, it only went as far as the Berlin neighborhood of Pankow before halting yet again. Finally, on the third night, the train wended its way through Brandenburg and Mecklenburg to Rostock. In Rostock, Lindenberg broke his nose when one car being coupled to his car threw him across the room. The train then proceeded on to Warnemünde, where Lindenberg was to catch a ferry. In Warnemünde, the marina police almost arrested him, but his false documents carried him through the ordeal. With a swollen nose and blood smeared over his face, Lindenberg secured lodgings for the night with a woman whom he described as a “clueless angel.” He then spent the next night in the smoking salon of the ferry that would take him to Denmark.

Lindenberg arrived on 11 November in Gedser, Denmark. With his valid train ticket, he took the fast train to Copenhagen. The train, however, was delayed, and he arrived in Copenhagen after curfew. Luck was with him, and his false papers worked on the Danish officials. Lindenberg had three addresses of people to whom he could turn for help. After ringing the buzzer at one address and waiting for some time, a woman let
him in and brought him upstairs to her apartment. She then fetched the wife of the pastor who lived downstairs. They provided him with bread, butter, a fried egg, and a bottle of Carlsberg beer. The woman, the sister of someone Lindenberg knew in Berlin, also gave him five Kroner and some Danish ration stamps and offered him a place to stay for the night. The next day Kurt accompanied the woman to the home of the family for whom she worked. The mistress of the household invited him in and promised to get in touch with people who might be able to ferry him to Sweden. For Kurt, acclimated to the difficulties of hiding in Berlin, the experience was somewhat unreal: “When I thought about which difficulties and diplomatic chess games were necessary in order to obtain secret accommodations in a house in Berlin, here seemed to me like a dream.”

That afternoon, a young man came to the house and said that Lindenberg soon would be heading to Sweden. That evening, the contact drove Lindenberg, a Danish Jew, and another fugitive from the Gestapo to the coast, put them in a boat, and on 12 November 1943, Kurt Lindenberg arrived safely in Sweden.

Lindenberg’s story of escape highlights the extreme difficulties and unexpected dangers that accompanied those attempting to flee Nazi Germany. There is more to his story than highlighting difficulty and danger, however. Of particular importance for contextualizing and understanding Lindenberg’s successful preparations for his flight to Sweden via Denmark is recognizing that many of the same factors that affected the chances for Lindenberg’s successful escape are those that historians of the Holocaust have long understood as critical for explaining the varying Jewish survival and mortality rates throughout Nazi-occupied Europe: location, the attitude of local populations to the persecution of the Jews, and, especially, timing. Indeed, Lindenberg’s escape allows us to see these broader factors at work in the survival of one individual and to read a larger narrative of Jewish survival into Lindenberg’s highly personal and brief description of his escape. Although Lindenberg might have opted for neutral Switzerland, like Cioma Schönhaus, who fled to that country a little more than a month before Lindenberg’s own flight, Sweden remained his destination. Lindenberg does not indicate why he chose Sweden, but historical hindsight allows us to observe the aforementioned three factors at play. The first is that Sweden was closer than Switzerland and required less time to travel through hostile Nazi Germany; the less time spent in the cradle of Nazism and its fanatical adherents, the better. The second factor concerns the attitude of the Swiss and Swedish governments to the plight of Jewish refugees. Stemming from a decree issued by the Swiss government in October 1939, unauthorized refugees (including many Jews) apprehended by the Swiss police were sent back to their country of origin, a policy not
always uniformly enforced but one that remained in effect at least until late 1943. On the other hand, Sweden, which initially had had a similar attitude toward Jewish refugees as the Swiss government, changed course when the deportation of Norwegian Jews began in late 1942, and the Swedish government offered asylum to those Jews who managed to reach the country.200

Third, Lindenberg happened to choose his flight to Sweden at just the right time. To what extent Lindenberg was aware of the policy changes of the Swedish government is unclear, but we do know, based on his conversation with a Swedish consul at the embassy in Berlin, that by early October 1943, Lindenberg had heard of the escape to Sweden of the vast majority of Denmark’s Jewish population. The Jewish population in Denmark (numbering around seven thousand) had been left relatively unmolested for the first three and a half years of Nazi occupation in comparison to Jews in most other occupied countries. This came to an end in the autumn of 1943. The Nazi occupation authorities, under the command of Dr. Werner Best, were determined to solve the “Jewish Question” in Denmark and scheduled a roundup of Danish Jews for 2 October 1943. The plans, however, were leaked, and the Swedish government announced its intention to accept all Danish Jews who could reach its shores. What ensued was a concerted, nationwide effort by the Danish people to first shelter and then smuggle, on fishing boats, almost the entire Jewish population of Denmark to safety in Sweden. In the end, the Nazis only managed to arrest 485 Jews.201 This was and is still remembered as a truly heroic and remarkable feat, and as the news of the rescue (if not its scale) had already reached Lindenberg in Berlin, it quite likely served as a source of hope for him, who must have felt reassured in his choice of destination. In short, the timing of Lindenberg’s escape could not have been better. He arrived little more than a month after the flight of Denmark’s Jews to a nation that already had demonstrated its rejection of Nazism’s murderous antisemitic designs and that now had a network of individuals in place to help ferry Lindenberg out of the country almost as soon as he had arrived.

Lindenberg’s successful flight was due to a number of factors outside of his control, including the attitude of the Danish people and the Swedish government, but it is also undeniable that his careful preparations (months in the making) played a central role in his survival. We also should be mindful that Lindenberg was a particular type of individual: headstrong, a risk taker, but also a quite methodical individual who planned ahead and who even in the months before he was forced to submerge had been preparing for that eventuality (see chapter 1). In understanding why some Jews took the even greater risk to flee Nazi Germany,
we therefore need to treat his withering judgment that Jewish Germans had no courage as too simple and certainly unfair. Lindenberg was a single man, twenty-two years old. He was not hiding with family or friends. He was young and active enough to brave the cold and hunger. He was comfortable with lying and taking great risks. Even with the war still raging as he wrote the account of his escape in neutral Sweden, Lindenberg already recognized his own cunning and daring: “With the gangster tricks that I learned in these 8 months [in hiding], I would have gotten on well in the gangster world of Chicago in the ’30s.”202 While this is certainly true, to some degree every Jewish diver in Berlin needed to learn such “gangster tricks” in order to survive, even those Jews who never contemplated escaping the country. Fleeing Nazi Germany was not an option for most; for others it was too great a risk. Lindenberg’s flight to Sweden was a success, but not one that could have been foreseen by any person at the time. Just as submerging was a personal decision, so too was the act of fleeing Nazi Germany.

Conclusion

The year 1943 was the first for most of Berlin’s Jews who made the decision to dive into the shadows of Nazi Berlin and live submerged. For the majority, it was also their last. Survival in the dangerous and chaotic world of Berlin or even farther afield was simply not possible. The obstacles involved in procuring adequate food and shelter as well as false papers proved insurmountable. Supporters of the regime and the aggressive Fahnder threatened to ensnare Jewish divers at every turn. The air raids on the city further complicated efforts to survive. Although some individuals were able to rely on their own cleverness and ingenuity, without sufficient networks of aid provided by friends, family, and goodhearted strangers, the city’s divers and dashers were dangerously exposed and vulnerable. By the end of the year, the Gestapo had succeeded in arresting approximately 4,200 fugitive Jews.203

Indeed, however much stories of survival provide a tentative road map to navigating the dangers of Nazi Berlin, the high arrest rates in 1943 indicate that there was no single “correct” way to live submerged. To make such a claim implies that those Jews captured by the Nazis somehow made mistakes or did something wrong. Survival tactics that worked for some individuals ultimately led to arrest and deportation in other instances. In understanding then why some Jews managed to evade capture where others did not, we must be resigned to understanding that survival, in so many instances, also came down to issues of luck and fate, two admittedly
vague and unhelpful terms for understanding the process of survival, but also essential components of the experience.

What is interesting in the stories recounted by survivors is how seldom issues of luck or fate appear in their testimonies but also what discussions of luck or fate do reveal about individual survivors, in the rare instances they use those terms. Several factors likely influenced U-boat use of the words “luck” and “fate.” The first might be that survivors employ the terms to excuse their having survived when so many other Jews did not. Crediting survival to luck or fate might function to deflect guilt or assuage conflicted feelings, especially for Jews in hiding, most of whom lost almost all of their family and friends during the Holocaust. Another explanation might be that U-boats used the terms to describe an occurrence they were unable to process at the time it happened, and they can only attribute their survival to luck, even if in historical hindsight we are able to see larger, clearly explainable factors at work, for example, the fortuitous combination of location, the attitude of the Danish population to the treatment of Jews, and the timing that contributed to Kurt Lindenberg’s successful escape from Germany to Sweden. Finally, as mundane as the explanation might sound, perhaps the former divers used the term reflexively, simply reaching for the first vaguely appropriate word that came to mind; this is especially true in the months immediately following the end of the war, before survivors had the chance to fully process all that they had experienced. However, it bears repeating that relatively few U-boat testimonies contain these terms, and if they go into detail, survivors tend to be fairly explicit in explaining how and why they survived. Despite the increasing death, chaos, and confusion caused by the air raids—as shelter vanished, food became scarce, and Berlin’s landscape was altered—daily life in the city still retained a degree of logic and routine, allowing Jews to construct at least a bare semblance of sense and order and thus provide in their testimonies a basic explanation of how specific processes factored into their survival. While there was no tried-and-tested formula for survival and certainly no guarantees, it is undeniable that despite the many challenges facing them, Berlin’s submerged Jews operated in a less arbitrary and brutal environment than that of the camps. If the camps were night, black as pitch, Berlin remained in a state of twilight, light enough to navigate albeit too dark to do so with absolute certainty. Yet the individual and individualistic nature of submerged life gave the U-boats a greater hand in navigating that twilight to effect their own survival, thereby lessening the need to discuss vague ideas of luck and fate. That the city’s former divers largely avoid discussions of the role of luck in survival is a testament to the very nature of their experiences submerged.
Ultimately, then, those U-boats who managed to survive their first year submerged, succeeded not solely due to issues of luck and fate or the essential generosity and aid of non-Jews. Rather, they underwent an individual learning process, one characterized by trial and error. The transient and chaotic nature of submerged life presented Jews with an almost impossibly large number of hurdles to overcome. However, it also provided them with a wide variety of tools to use in facing the myriad threats to their existence. By the end of the year, those Jews who had evaded capture were beginning to acclimate—at least on a basic level—to their new lives. They began to develop strategies to maximize their chances for survival and create a certain level of “normality” in their otherwise unstable lives. As they learned to navigate the city, they formed networks of helpers and began building personal relationships that would provide them with invaluable emotional support in the coming sixteen months.

The Third Reich still controlled vast swathes of Europe, and 1944 would bring with it more denunciations, arrests, despair, and struggle. However, amid the fight for physical survival, moments of light and hope still existed. Indeed, figure 2.5 suggests a parallel narrative of survival, one in which Berlin’s submerged Jews surfaced on occasion and attempted to do more than simply survive: they attempted to live. The pursuit of cre-

Figure 2.5. Christmas, 1943. The gentleman pictured is Walter Riesenfeld living submerged and celebrating Christmas with Grete Hoffmann (right) and Elisabeth Fritz (left), the two sisters sheltering him.204
ating and maintaining a life, so integral to individual identity and so central to the history of Berlin’s divers, will be pursued in the next chapter.

Notes

1. For a more detailed discussion of arrest rates, see the appendix in this book.
5. Benz, Überleben im Untergrund, 12.
6. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr. 31267.
7. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr. 31267.
9. See the case of Ursel Reuber and Eva in Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 210–17.
10. Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
11. Indeed, the number of Jews residing legally in the city in February 1945 had actually increased from the previous year, standing at 5,847 at the end of July 1944. See YVA 0.8/145, “Jüdische Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1943–1945.” The documents may also be found at http://www.statistik-des-holocaust.de/stat_ger.html.
12. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31551.
14. CJA 4.1, 1602.
15. See LAB C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31225; LAB C Rep 118-01, Nr.: 2220; and, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31551.
16. See, for example, LAB, CJA 4.1, 1602.
17. Avraham Barkai, “‘The Final Chapter’ in Meyer, German–Jewish History, 4:381.
20. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 32306 and LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 947.
22. John M. Cox, Circles of Resistance: Jewish, Leftist, and Youth Dissidence in Nazi Germany (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 74–75. Cox’s noteworthy study is not merely interested in Jewish, communist dissidents but also Jewish left-wing dissidents in Germany more generally, and his book demonstrates that this was a truly politically diverse group.
25. See, for example, ZfA, File of Susanne von Schüching, “Interview Frau von Schüching,” interviewed by Marion Neiss, 14 November 1984, 10; and Ruth W. Holocaust Testimony (T-619), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
26. Herman P. Holocaust Testimony (T-128), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
28. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
29. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
30. Ruth W. Holocaust Testimony (T-619), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
32. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31551.
33. See the case of the father of Ruth G., in Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
34. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 30929.
35. ZfA, File of Julius Flatow.
36. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 30929.
38. See, for example, LAB, B Rep. 078, Zug. 6026, UH 633, M 009, R 161, 15; ZfA, File of Dr. Charlotte Bamberg, “Untergetaucht”; and Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
40. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30363.
41. CJA 4.1, 3089.
42. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 38009.
44. See, for example, Schönhaus, *The Forger*, 113.
46. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 30929.
47. Boehm, *We Survived*, 100.
49. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31551.
50. CJA 4.1, Nr.: 698.
51. LAB, C Rep. 118-01.
54. See, Gellately, “Denunciations and Nazi Germany,” 237, and Reuband, “Denunzia-
tion im Dritten Reich,” 222–23.
56. See the testimony of Ruth W. Holocaust Testimony (T-0619), Fortunoff Video Ar-
chive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library. On Der Stürmer’s readers-
ship numbers by the late 1930s, see Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge,
57. Photograph accessed on 19 May 2018 from Calvin College’s German Propaganda Ar-
chive, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/sturmer.htm
59. Testimony of Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for
Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
61. Friedländer with Schwerdtfeger, “Versuche, dein Leben zu machen,” 114. Mark Rose-
man also noted the phenomenon of dyeing one’s hair in his study of the experiences
of a young Jewish woman in hiding in Nazi Germany. See Roseman, Past in Hiding,
333.
63. CJA 4.1., Nr.: 516.
64. Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 82, 84–85, 99.
65. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
67. CJA 4.1, 495.
68. Annelies H. Holocaust Testimony (T-276 and T-1866), Fortunoff Video Archive for
Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
69. Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust
Testimonies, Yale University Library.
70. This “Battle of Berlin,” waged solely in the air, is not to be confused with the Battle
of Berlin waged by the Soviet army against the city in April/May 1945. For more
information on the air battle, see Gierbig, . . . im Anflug auf die Reichshauptstadt,
81–158; Ralf Blank, “Kriegsschäden und Luftkrieg an der ‘Heimatfront,’” in Das Deut-
sche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd.9: erster Halbband, Die Deutsche Gesellschaft
1939–1945; Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (München:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 372–75.
71. Gierbig, . . . im Anflug auf die Reichshauptstadt, 102–3.
72. Gierbig, . . . im Anflug auf die Reichshauptstadt, 106. See also, Jörg Friedrich, The
Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945, trans. Allison Brown (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2006), 76. See also, Christian Dirks, Axel Klausmeier, and
Gerhard Sälter, “Verschüttet” Leben, Bombentod und Erinnerung an die Berliner Familie
73. Gierbig, . . . im Anflug auf die Reichshauptstadt, 116–17.
74. See, for example, CJA 4.1, 1613; CJA 4.1, 2898; CJA 4.1, 1602; CJA 4.1, 1810;
CJA, 4.1, 1716; CJA, 4.1, 3156. The November raids also receive mention from non-
Jewish diarists in the city. See Ursula von Kardorff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen (Mün-
chen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992), 129–132. See also Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schatten-
mann, 120–21.
75. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
76. CJA 4.1, 1716.
77. ZfA, File of Dr. Charlotte Bamberg, “Untergetaucht.” A parenthetical notation in the margins of Bamberg’s testimony notes the date of the bombing as November 1943.
78. CJA, 4.1, Nr.: 697. A few significant discrepancies exist between the testimony of Helene and her husband, Paul (see: CJA 4.1, Nr.: 698), although large parts of each testimony correspond to one another. In the above case, Paul does not mention arrest or deportation, although he does confirm that Helene returned to the apartment (albeit, in his testimony, with a friend) to try to retrieve possessions from the apartment.
79. Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 208.
80. Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 207.
81. On the state of Jewish wartime food rationing, see Avraham Barkai, “In a Ghetto without Walls” in Meyer, German–Jewish History, 4:335. See also, Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 83.
82. Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 82.
85. See, respectively, Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library; Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library; Ruth W. Holocaust Testimony (T-619), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
86. See Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library. See also Eric H. Boehm, “The Strength of Two,” in Boehm, We Survived, 21.
87. See, for example, Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
88. CJA 4.1, 3156. See also, Jalowicz Simon, Untergetaucht, 168.
90. Bruno G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1764), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
91. See also Maurer, “From Everyday Life,” 369.
92. Entschädigungsamt Berlin, Entschädigungsakte Nr.: 1.010 I.
93. See the following section on the black market for a comparison of costs for false papers.
94. Entschädigungsamt Berlin, Entschädigungsakte Nr.: 1.010 II.
97. See the infamous case of Martha Rebbien in Zierenberg, Stadt der Schieber, 88.
98. For example, see Zierenberg, *Stadt der Schieber*, 136.
100. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.
103. For more information on the relationship between these individuals, see chapter 2, the section on “Denunciation.”
104. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.
105. See, for example, ZfA, “Erlebnisse der Frau Charlotte Josephy.”
106. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.
107. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr. 31267. See also CJA 4.1, 1999.
111. For more information on the arrest of these individuals, see the section “Denunciation” in chapter 2. For other arrests on the black market, see, LAB, A Rep. 408, Nr.: 4 “Tätigkeitsbuch 17. Polizei-Revier Kriminalpolizei Weinbergswe 12,” 1. Januar. 1943–31. Dezember. 1943, #19, #66, #77.
112. Meyer’s wife likely was scheduled for either the 28 September 1943 transport sent to Auschwitz or the 14 October 1943 transport sent to Auschwitz. See Gottwaldt and Schulle, “Judendeportationen,” 460.
114. See the appendix in this book.
117. Tausendfreund, *Erzwungener Verrat*, 51. See the case of the Mischling Werner Rosenbaum who was arrested as a deserter, in CJA 4.1, 1810. See also LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 33122.
119. See the testimony of Gerda Fink in LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 33971.
121. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 32306.
123. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 35596.
124. CJA 4.1, 3156.
125. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 33203; LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr. 30278. Also, CJA 4.1, 1817; CJA 4.1, 1810.
128. Note in Marion Neiss, “Postscript,” Schönhaus, *The Forger*, 209. The original note may be found in LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617. Note: there is a slight discrepancy between the note in Neiss and the note from the Landesarchiv Berlin with respect to the opening line and closing greeting. However, the body of the letter reads the same.
129. The organization of the Gestapo and the diverse methods the agency utilized to achieve its aims in the Greater Reich and throughout occupied Europe receive ex-


131. The particulars of the case may be found in LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617. See also Neiss “Postscript,” 209–10.


137. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.


139. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.

140. For more information on Wichmann, see the section in this chapter, “The Black Market.”

141. Although Kaufmann placed most of the responsibility for the forging on Lichtwitz, Schönhaus’s memoirs suggest that his work as a forger was central to the endeavor. See Schönhaus, *The Forger*.

142. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.

143. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.

144. The full confession and list of names may be found in LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.


146. LAB, A Rep. 355, Nr. 18617.

147. LAB, A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 141210.


149. For more on the Kaufmann case, see Jah, *Die Deportation der Juden aus Berlin*, 527–30.


152. Larry Orbach and Vivien Orbach-Smith, *Soaring Underground: A Young Fugitive’s Life in Nazi Berlin* (Washington, DC: The Compass Press, 1996), 311. Orbach’s memoirs do not mention Hirsch having been present at the time of the arrest. However, Hirsch claims that he was there, and nothing he says in any other regard co-
tradicts the circumstances behind Orbach’s arrest. See Hirsch’s statement in LAB, B Rep 002, Nr. 4861: Das Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde. For confirmation of Orbach’s deportation date and destination, see also, Gottwaldt and Schulle, “Juden- deportationen,” 465.

153. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 7436. See also, Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 329.
154. Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 308. See also, LAB, B Rep 002, Nr. 4861: Das Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde.
155. Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 335.
156. Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 335.
158. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 276–78. See the case of Inge Reitz, in Wyden, Stella, 275–76.
159. Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 308.
160. LAB, B Rep 002, Nr. 4861: Das Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde.
161. LAB, B Rep 002, Nr. 4861: Das Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde. Orbach noted the sling, in Orbach and Orbach-Smith, Soaring Underground, 305.
162. LAB, B Rep 002, Nr. 4861: Das Ehrengericht des jüdischen Gemeinde.
163. Gruner, Judenverfolgung, 90. For more information on Dobberke, his role as camp leader, and his interrogation methods, see Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 59–64.
164. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 72–73.
165. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 84–85.
166. See Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 74–75.
170. ZfA, File of Ursula Finke. BERICHT UEBER MEINE ILLEGALITAET WÄHREND DER NAZIZEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND von Ursula Finke, Berlin-Lichtenberg. The details of Finke’s arrest and interaction with Behrendt are also found in Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 133. See also Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 305.
172. Doris Tausendfreund locates the origins of this service in the spring of 1943, as a consequence of the Große Fabrik-Aktion. See Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 69. In contrast, Akim Jah traces the origins of this group of individuals to Alois Brunner’s tenure in Berlin, arguing that it was expanded in the summer of 1943 after the last major deportation of Jews from the city occurred. See Jah, Die Deportation der Juden aus Berlin, 525–27.
174. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 142, 156. So well-known to Berlin’s divers and dashers were Isaaksohn and Goldschlag that Marie Jalowicz Simon, in her memoirs published in 2014, mentions them specifically. See Jalowicz Simon, Untergetaucht, 305.
175. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 72–73.
176. See LAB, A Rep. 358-02, Nr. 141210
177. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 77.
179. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 78.
180. Wyden, Stella, 245. Peter Wyden’s biography Stella attempts to provide deeper psychological insight into her motivations. A fascinating read, Wyden’s study is openly influenced by his own childhood memories of Stella, but nonetheless is still rich in survivor anecdote and testimony.
181. Wyden, Stella, 255.
182. Wyden, Stella, 216. See also LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 38067.
186. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 84–85. See also the testimony of Annelies H. and the case of the informant Rachmann in Annelies H. Holocaust Testimony (T-276 and T-1866), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
188. Gellately, Gestapo and German Society, 8.
189. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 81
191. Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 82.
199. On the importance of timing, see Hayes, Why?, 225–25. The various factors affecting the survival rates among Jews throughout Europe receives excellent attention in Hayes’s sixth chapter, “Homelands: Why Did Survival Rates Diverge?”
201. On the rescue of the Jews of Denmark, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2:545–47.
203. For a discussion of arrest rates, see the appendix in this book.
204. Photograph courtesy of Martina Voigt. Privatbesitz, Reproduktion Gedenkstaette Deutscher Widerstand/German Resistance Memorial Center, Berlin.