The Prelude: Berlin, 1938–1941

On 10 June 1938, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister for propaganda, addressed over three hundred Berlin police officers: “The rallying cry is not law, but rather harassment. The Jews must get out of Berlin. The police will help me with that.” The first five years of Nazi rule witnessed the gradual, yet steady, tightening of restrictions against Germany’s Jewish population and its increasing exclusion from the country’s political, cultural, social, and economic life. Berlin was not immune to these developments. However, 1938 witnessed the start of ever more violent and radical policies designed to force the Jews from German soil. Although approximately 30 percent of Berlin Jews had emigrated by the end of 1937, over 110,000 still remained in the city. Moreover, despite the continual attacks on Jewish commercial activity that had been occurring since the early 1930s, Berlin’s Jewish businesses (or those designated by the Nazis as Jewish businesses) had managed to persevere to a surprising degree. Although the size of Jewish-owned businesses had shrunk dramatically over the preceding five years (with a vast majority too small to be listed in the city’s commercial register), Christoph Kreutzmüller argues that over 42,750 Jewish businesses continued to exist as late as the summer of 1938 (down from around 50,000 in 1933), with some 6,500 still large enough to be listed on the commercial register. Yet Nazi determination to rid the country of Jews increased exponentially during the year, as reflected
in a “surge of decrees” designed to destroy all Jewish commercial activity, fully isolate Jews from non-Jews, and bring the still nominally autonomous Jewish communities firmly under Nazi bureaucratic control. The final break with the regime’s more gradual policies of economic and social isolation came on the night of November 9–10, 1938, when the Nazi authorities unleashed a wave of terror and violence against Jews not seen since the middle ages: Kristallnacht.

The events of Kristallnacht marked a turning point for the Jews of Germany. Any remaining illusions of safety vanished, as did the idea of a Jewish future in Germany. In Berlin, Nazi hordes led by the SA ransacked and destroyed hundreds of Jewish businesses (exact figures are unknown), set ablaze nine of the city’s twelve synagogues, and, amid the beatings and killings, arrested or attempted to arrest some twelve thousand Berlin Jews, sending approximately three thousand individuals to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in the Berlin suburb of Oranienburg. The financial consequences also were devastating. In the immediate wake of the pogrom, the Nazis imposed a collective fine of one billion Reichsmarks on the country’s Jews. One month later, the Nazis ordered the nationwide Aryanization or liquidation of all remaining Jewish-owned businesses; the process took time, but between 1938 and 1941, 5,577 Jewish-owned businesses closed. Observing the turmoil around her, the non-Jewish diarist Ruth Andreas-Friedrich wrote, “Now I know it. The Jewish war has begun . . . with an attack across the board.” Indeed, in historical hindsight, the events of Kristallnacht presaged the imminent war against Europe’s Jews.

Berlin Jews were caught in a snare of degrading national and city laws designed to complete the isolation measures taken against them during the first five years of Nazi rule. In December 1938, the German labor office created a separate Central Administrative Office for Jews to coordinate all issues relating to Jewish housing, food, insurance, and labor. Segregated forced labor, introduced at the end of 1938 for all unemployed Jews, became official policy by 1940. Social ordinances banning Jews from most public spaces and Jewish children from attending school with non-Jews were followed by dozens of humiliating ordinances pertaining to ration cards, pets, bicycles, shopping times, curfews, housing restrictions, and the confiscation of all valuables. In January 1939, the Nazis required all Jews not in a privileged mixed marriage to add either Sara or Israel to their names. The outbreak of war in 1939 only intensified Nazi efforts to exclude and degrade. The steady eviction of Jews from their homes and government attempts to relocate them to so-called Jewish houses (Judenhäuser) served to further isolate Jews from non-Jews. On 1 September 1941, the introduction of the Judenstern (Jewish Star) allowed
the authorities to monitor the movements of Berlin Jews and better prevent their interaction with non-Jews.\textsuperscript{17} Daily life continued in the Jewish community but in an increasingly proscribed and unstable form. Those who tried to circumvent the myriad restrictions—and many of the future U-boats did—risked arrest, imprisonment, and early deportation.

The Nazis also consolidated the country’s remaining Jewish communities firmly under a newly created umbrella organization: Die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland (The National Association of Jews in Germany).\textsuperscript{18} Under the nominal cover of “Jewish self-administration,” the Reichsvereinigung was responsible for coordinating all facets of Jewish life: welfare services for the now-impoverished Jewish community; facilitating Jewish emigration; ration card distribution; and, as of October 1941, the organization of deportation lists. In reality, the Reichsvereinigung was under the direct control of the Gestapo and was responsible for enacting its antisemitic policies. Although the Reichsvereinigung attempted to care for the Jewish community, its primary function by the closing months of 1941 was the coordination of the Jewish community in Germany in preparation for the Final Solution.\textsuperscript{19}

In response to increasing and unrelenting persecution, Jews throughout Germany scrambled to procure the affidavits and visas necessary for emigration. Many succeeded. In Berlin alone, between 1933 and the outbreak of war in September 1939, some eighty thousand Jews emigrated.\textsuperscript{20} These numbers declined, however, as a number of potential places of refuge either were at war with Germany or already conquered. Moreover, the restrictive quotas set by many countries and the fantastic sums of money required to procure visas hindered mass emigration. Although Kristallnacht had awoken most Jews to the dangers facing them, the ensuing three years did not give most of them enough time to escape. In her memoirs, Inge Deutschkron, a future U-boat, remarked, “For the German Jews, even the most German among them, the events of November 9 were an alarm signal. Some believed that it was now five minutes before twelve. Actually, for most of them it was already five minutes past twelve—too late.”\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, when Heinrich Himmler ordered the halt to most emigration in October 1941 (emigration still being an option for a very small number), 73,842 Jews remained trapped in the capital of a country soon bent on their extermination.\textsuperscript{22}

On 18 October 1941, a train carrying 1,013 individuals left Berlin for Litzmannstadt in the Reichsgau Wartheland of what had, until September 1939, been Poland.\textsuperscript{23} This transport was the first of almost two hundred that departed from Berlin during the next three and a half years for various ghettos, concentration camps, and extermination camps in Eastern Europe. After eight years of various approaches to solving the
“Jewish Question,” in the wake of the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Nazi antisemitic policy quickly began to coalesce around the decision to exterminate Europe’s entire Jewish population. Even still, the process was uneven and piecemeal, and it was largely initiated away from the Berlin metropole. While the process of systematic extermination of Soviet Jews had begun in September and October 1941, Polish Jews had already been dying in great numbers since 1939 through ghettoization and the ensuing disease, starvation, and sporadic killings. Yet when the first deportation train left Berlin in October 1941, the fate of Jewish Germans was still somewhat unclear, as they were not initially marked for inclusion in the extermination measures already sweeping Eastern Europe. Indeed, the chief purpose of the Wannsee Conference (initially scheduled for 9 December 1941) was to clarify the position of Jewish Germans and who should be included in the deportation measures. This changed, however, with the declaration of war against the United States, which ultimately pushed the meeting of the conference back to 20 January 1942. Critically, on 12 December 1941, Hitler gave a speech to his Reichsleiter and Gauleiter, indicting Jews as responsible for what was now a world war; it was only at this point, as Christian Gerlach argues, that the inclusion of Jewish Germans in the extermination of European Jewry became an official reality. Thus, despite being the capital of the Third Reich, Berlin was not leading the way in setting extermination policy, and Berlin’s Jews could have had no way of knowing what awaited them, as their position in the Final Solution was still being worked out. Only with the Wannsee Conference did the relevant government agencies accept the program, thereby coordinating the fate of Germany’s Jews with the systematic deportation and murder of over six million European Jews. From this point on, although the size and frequency of the deportations from Berlin fluctuated, the Nazis never swayed from their ultimate goal of making the German capital judenfrei (free of Jews).

The frenetic sixteen months between the end of most emigration and the last of the major transports out of Berlin in March 1943 witnessed three main types of individual response to Nazi persecution: compliance, suicide, and submerging. A fourth option, escape from Nazi Germany to a neutral country, was incredibly difficult to pull off and will be examined in chapter 2. Each response, even compliance, contained some level of conscious choice, and this chapter pays particular attention to the relatively broad scope of personal agency still afforded the city’s Jews. These responses to Nazi terror did not operate independently of one another, and each individual response to the deportations invariably informed the decisions of others. The issue of compliance certainly provoked considerable debate within the Jewish community. Suicide was not only an act of
despair; it was also a rejection of Nazi persecution. Aware of the choices before them, approximately 6,500 Jews chose neither compliance nor suicide. These individuals instead chose to submerge. The factors prompting this response varied over the course of sixteen months, as did the rates of submerging. Indeed, Jews did not begin to flee the transports en masse until the last quarter of 1942, peaking during the Große Fabrik-Aktion (Large Factory Operation) at the end of February 1943, when approximately 4,700 Jews submerged.

Compliance

Most Jews obeyed their “evacuation” summons. No one reason explains the seeming lack of resistance to the deportations among the Jewish-German populace. Initial studies on the subject reinforced views of Jews as “archetypical victims.” Criticism has been scathing, emphasizing the seeming naïveté of Jewish-Germans as well as their misguided patriotism and faith in their own security. Why else, the argument runs, would they have agreed to a measure that in most cases was a death sentence? Jews had acculturated well to German society, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. In Berlin, in particular, Jewish contributions to the history and culture of the city were considerable. Proud to consider themselves “German citizens of the Jewish faith,” they served bravely in the First World War alongside their gentile compatriots. Eight years of Nazi rule had a sobering effect, but the notion of systematic extermination was as unthinkable as it was unprecedented. Moreover, widespread acculturation had the effect of convincing some Jewish Germans that the “Jews” to whom the Nazis referred could not possibly include them. Nazi “camouflage” policy also complicated the issue. Just as the regime later tried to pass off the gas chambers as showers to assuage the fears of its victims and ensure their cooperation, the Nazis also allowed many of the deported to write letters back home, in some cases as late as 1943. The notes were often brief: “I am fine. I am in Lodz. Send packages.” Others were more cryptic and troubling: “Send us something to eat, we are starving . . . [d]on’t forget me . . . I cry all day.” Such disturbing messages notwithstanding, few people in the city, at least until 1942, had a clear idea of what had happened to their friends and family, even if their suspicions of the worst began to grow.

The stereotype of the obedient German, Jew and non-Jew alike, also has contributed to explanations concerning Jewish willingness not only to board the transports but also to comply with earlier antisemitic ordinances, especially with regards to flouting restrictions demanding that
Jews wear the Judenstern at all times in public. Nor were these critiques solely the product of hindsight. Even some Jewish-German observers at the time, including those who later submerged, offered scathing—indeed, unfair—critiques of their fellow Jews, even going so far as to imply a simplistic link between those who obeyed Nazi ordinances in the months leading up to the start of the deportations and those who ended up complying with their deportation orders. The future U-boat Kurt Lindenberg, a prominent recurring actor in the first two chapters of this book, was one such individual. Writing about his experiences in Nazi Berlin, Lindenberg offered the following observation on the attitudes of Berlin’s Jewish population in 1941:

At this time, the Jews in Berlin began to divide clearly into two groups. The first group consisted of such people who surrendered to their situation with a certain fatalism and willingly obeyed all prohibitions and laws with a view to antagonizing their oppressors as little as possible. A large portion of this group viewed the people of the other group with an absolute hostility that sometimes led to denunciations (I am personally aware of such cases). The other group consisted of Jews who had a certain will to resist. They circumvented with cunning and spite as many prohibitions as possible, partly in order to take pleasure in as many bright spots as possible in their bedeviled life, and partly out of pure joy in not obeying in any way the abhorrent National Socialists. The first group speculated on a speedy end to the war, while the second group foresaw that a speedy end to the war was out of the question and that sooner or later all Jews in Germany that one could get their hands on would be killed regardless of whether they behaved “obediently” or “disobediently.”

Lindenberg wrote these words in 1944 from the safety of neutral Sweden. His testimony is peppered with such scathing indictments of Jewish Germans. His comments were also influenced by hindsight at the time of his writing and the credence he gave early on to the rumors trickling in from the east about the fate of deported Jews. That Lindenberg’s prescience on this matter and his combative, independent spirit saved his life are undeniable. Nor is Lindenberg entirely incorrect that a certain “will to resist” and a profound mistrust of “resettlement” characterized a number, likely a majority, of the future U-boats. Still, the divide he portrays, while instructive in painting a general picture about Jewish attitudes toward the Nazi state on the eve of deportation in 1941, is too simplistic. A number of Jews who chose to submerge wore the star, kept their heads down, followed Nazi-issued ordinances, and pursued legal means to forestall deportation until submerging was their only remaining choice. Lindenberg’s testimony, although recognizing the powerful role of the state and its or-
gans in shaping the behaviors and attitudes of Germans (Jews and non-
Jews), demands more from Berlin’s Jews than many could give and fails to
recognize a complex of factors leading to Jewish compliance as the depor-
tations began. This is especially true in light of the way that the Nazis, in
addition to their own ordinances and laws, also forced the administrative
apparatus of the Jewish community, the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in
Deutschland (National Association of Jews in Germany), and its lead-
ers to ensure the cooperation of the Jewish population. Indeed, by 1941,
employees of the Reichsvereinigung found themselves in the unenviable
position of drawing up deportation lists. Moreover, Lindenberg also dis-
counts the consequences of outright defiance, which only worsened the
situation of the community. Thus, when twenty employees of the Ber-
lin Jewish Community fled from a transport destined for Riga in October
1942, the Nazis arrested twenty employees of the Jewish Community and
the Reichsvereinigung; ultimately, seven were executed at the Sachsen-
hausen concentration camp. Fear, not perceived innate German obedi-
ence or a belief in “weathering the storm,” was a dominant factor at work.

Jews also complied with Nazi ordinances and the eventual evacuation
orders because they often had or felt they had no recourse. After years of
growing isolation, many Berlin Jews, like their compatriots throughout
the country, already had experienced a “social death.” Help from non-
Jews often was not possible; years of antisemitic policy and social pressure
had weakened or destroyed former friendships and acquaintanceships.
The feeling that following the deportation orders was the only option was
particularly acute among families wishing to remain together. Taking in
a family was next to impossible for most Germans, due to lack of space
and food, and very few large families went into hiding. On the eve of his
family’s submerging, for example, the one diver heard his mother remark
“that there were four of them and, as such, had no possibility to flee.”
Even when submerging was a possibility, some families opted for deporta-
tion rather than dispersing and living submerged but separated from one
another: “We will remain together!” Also, after eight years of humilia-
tion and persecution, many people no longer had the will to resist. Gerda
Fink and her husband escaped from the collection camp on the Große
Hamburger Straße in order to evade deportation. Her father, however,
simply had given up: “My father’s nerves were so weakened by the death
of my mother and sorrow over the carrying off of our relations, as well
as by years-long persecution, that nothing mattered anymore. When we
were picked up at the end of 1942, he made no attempt to escape these
criminals.” By the time the deportations began, many people were too
emotionally or physically broken to cope with the uncertainty and insta-
Bility of submerging.
Fear and despair were not the only emotional factors that influenced the deportees. Communal solidarity and familial love in the face of persecution also provided a powerful explanation for why people boarded the trains. The very agency that enabled some Jews to flee also presented many with dilemmas about whether to do so. Among Zionists, the decision to go into hiding or comply with the deportation orders was a matter of principle. By early 1942, many Zionists in Berlin reached the conclusion that they should demonstrate their solidarity with their Jewish brothers and sisters and allow themselves to be deported. Hechalutz, the Zionist youth movement dedicated to Jewish resettlement in Palestine, debated the matter. One member “... believed the Hechalutz pioneers had the ‘holy obligation’ to lead the Jews, even to deportation,” and many shared this opinion, arguing, in particular, against tearing apart families. Others, however, embraced the ideas of flight and escape, rather than “letting [themselves] be slaughtered like an animal by the Nazis.” As rumors began to circulate in 1942 about the final fate of the “resettled” Jews, the discussion acquired a new air of urgency. Some Zionists opted to dive, with an eye on making it to the Swiss border and carrying out a new mission to “bear witness for posterity of the work of the German Hechalutz and the Youth Aliyah.” Contact with a Swiss branch of Hechalutz, which helped facilitate escape over the border for Jews, made this an appealing alternative for those who rejected deportation.

In addition to political and moral considerations, many Jews ultimately decided to go into hiding for personal reasons. The U-boat Gad Beck stated in his memoirs, “In the end, love was the final factor in making the decision to live illegally”; in this way, he remained with his friends and family. Conversely, love for one’s family often was a driving force behind obeying the deportation summons. One evening in the fall of 1942, the brothers of Manfred Lewin, Beck’s first love, summoned him to their apartment. The Gestapo had arrested their family while they had been at work. The brothers, however, decided to join their family at the collection center in the Große Hamburger Straße. Determined to save Manfred, Beck went to Manfred’s boss to discuss the situation. The boss lent Beck his son’s rather ill-fitting Hitler Youth uniform. Wearing this camouflage, Beck approached the officer in charge at the collection center. He claimed that Lewin was a saboteur and possessed keys to several apartments under renovation. He promised to return Lewin immediately, and the two left the collection camp. However, Manfred soon stopped Beck: “Gad, I can’t go with you. My family needs me.”

There is, to be sure, something a bit implausible about the circumstances surrounding Manfred’s release, and the farewell between these two friends is perhaps a bit stylized in its published retelling more than half...
a century later. On the whole, however, there is good reason to believe that Beck was telling the truth, perhaps literally, perhaps figuratively. If the tale Beck spun to have Manfred released seems implausible, we must bear in mind that stranger and even more improbable events occurred during the Holocaust that saved people’s lives. Indeed, other equally daring and seemingly implausible moments recorded in Beck’s memoir find confirmation in both survivor testimony as well as Nazi police records. Still, we must reckon with this particular moment, in which Beck lost his first love, not being literally true; this scene, after all, might have been a way for Beck to say goodbye to a person he never had the chance to say goodbye to, a person whose memory followed him for the rest of his life. Even if this were the case, there is a deeper, perhaps even more powerful truth to this scene, a truth often attested to by survivors: love. Love is an impossible value to quantify, and its powerful role should not be underestimated. In this case, as in countless others, the love that prompted Beck to submerge was the very same love that drove many Jews to share the fate of their families—regardless of what they knew or surmised about what awaited them in the east—and stay together when their deportation notification cards arrived.

The motives for compliance with deportation orders varied considerably: fear and despair, physical and emotional exhaustion, familial love, and solidarity are only some of the reasons why so many Jews obeyed orders for “evacuation.” Doubtless, other reasons remain unknown, having perished with their victims. Although many Jews did not consider defiance or resistance (in the form of suicide or submerging), they did grapple consciously and constantly with the grave implications of their predicament. Evidence demonstrates that deportation was an omnipresent subject of discussion and debate among Jews and not merely a tragedy that they accepted with quiet resignation. Indeed, for those who made the conscious decision to follow their deportation orders with their heads held high and their eyes open, the act of compliance, to put a spin on Lawrence Langer’s term, was quite possibly their last “choiceful choice.”

Suicide

Despite the more than fifty thousand Berlin Jews whom the Nazis deported with little or no difficulty, others refused to go. On 11 November 1941, Eugen and Anna V., both aged fifty-six years, ended their lives by gassing themselves in their kitchen. Besides requesting that their bodies be cremated, the couple V. left a note for their children:
[D]ear Children!

What we will now do, we do in order to shorten an agonizing, degrading life. It must be a relieving thought to know that we are at peace, rather than tormented and hunted and inwardly worn down, vegetating far from home. We are now peaceful and happy, more so than we have been for a long time. We ate supper, are now drinking a glass of wine, and will then head into the kitchen for our final sleep. Think back 3 years: thus have our days and nights become, though graver still, since all prospect of rescue now seems impossible. We are too old to await different times; hold tight. Remain strong, upright, and unbroken, and do not mourn for us. We will be fine, once all is passed. So many people are now dying in the prime of life.

The thought of never hearing from you again is a difficult one; and yet with the future that would lie before us should we live, we would still have to plan on hearing nothing from you for quite some time. We could never be of help or comfort to you. But do not be bitter! The difficult life that you must lead will educate you in ways different than the secure existence of our youth could. Still, rather than knowing that you are in misery, persecuted and hunted, I would prefer you dead. And so should you view our choice to move on.

My last thoughts go with you.
Your Mother

All my thoughts and feelings are with you.
Your Father.  

This letter is but one of many composed by Jews throughout Germany during the years of National Socialist rule as a final testament to their desperation, their rejection of Nazi persecution, and, in many cases, their final act of “self-assertion.” To quote the historian Konrad Kwiet, “Suicide was the ultimate and most radical attempt to elude Nazi terror.” Faced with an uncertain future or, for those who believed the whispers, mass murder and imminent death, well over one thousand Berlin Jews committed suicide, with perhaps as many as two thousand Berlin Jews taking their lives during the main period of the deportations from the city (October 1941–March 1943). Persecution and fear of deportation were not the only motivating factors behind suicide. However, the high rate of Jewish suicides during this period and extensive eyewitness accounts leave no doubt of a strong link between deportation and suicide as
well as a growing suspicion throughout 1942 that the Nazis were killing those Jews they had deported. Although a direct link between suicide and submerging is more difficult to establish, the pervasiveness of suicide in the city did have an impact on the future U-boats. Many experienced the pain of losing loved ones at this time. Indeed, some individuals who ultimately ended up diving first tried to take their own life. Moreover, suicide became such a recognized and daily response to Nazi persecution that feigning the act became a useful decoy for some Jews who submerged.

In his postwar commentary on the fate of the Jewish community in Berlin, the U-boat and prominent postwar Jewish West Berliner Siegmund Weltlinger estimated that of the approximately 160,000 Jews living in Berlin in 1933, roughly 7,000 died in Berlin during the following twelve years, the majority of them through suicide. Nationwide, the figure is close to 10,000. Christian Goeschel estimates that the deportation years between 1941 and 1943 accounted for anywhere between 3,000 and 4,000 suicides of Jews throughout Germany. His argument that “German-Jewish suicides were a particular response to Nazi racial policy” is sound. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, suicide numbers among German Jews generally peaked during major instances of Nazi persecution (e.g., the nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses organized in April 1933 or in the aftermath of Kristallnacht in November 1938). Eyewitness testimony, the correlation between persecution and suicide rates, and the observations and attitudes of the authorities all validate his claim that suicide became “an everyday phenomenon among German Jews.” When the first transport left Berlin on 18 October 1941, suicides of Jews therefore increased dramatically. In 1941, 334 Jews took their lives in Berlin, and 64 others made the attempt. In 1942, 888 Jews killed themselves and 168 Jews tried to do so. Thus, the number of suicides and attempts by Jews in Berlin more than doubled after the deportations began. Finally, in the first quarter of 1943, when the last of the large-scale deportations took place, 205 ended their lives, with an additional 29 attempts. The main motive for these suicides was “racial persecution,” and the Nazis knew it. Police records frequently noted “upcoming evacuation” or “fear of deportation” as reasons for suicides and suicide attempts. However, official statistics do not list deportation as a motive for suicide. Rather, the authorities categorized all suicides according to seven motivating factors: “Economic Difficulties”; “Incurable Disease”; “Melancholy or Poor Nerves”; “Lovesickness”; “Fear of Punishment”; “Family Disputes”; and “Other Reasons.” Authorities listed Jewish suicides overwhelmingly under this final category. In the first quarter of 1943, when 205 Jews committed suicides, all but seven suicides were listed under “Other Reasons.” Similarly high proportions of suicides listed under “Other Reasons” are found in every
quarterly period between 1941 and 1943. Contemporary accounts from the Nazi authorities and Jews suggest a strong correlation between the deportations and incidents of Jews taking their lives. This connection also explains why suicide rates spiked when deportation transports left the city. The fact that 142 Jews took their lives in the second quarter of 1942 while 381 did so in the third quarter reflects the jump in the number of transports from 17 to 62. Thus, Nazi racial policy and the deportations likely account for the vast majority of the suicides listed under “Other Reasons.”

The rate of successful suicides among Jews was higher than among non-Jews, indicating either a level of confidence in their choice, a more reliable method, or both. Yet a small number of future U-boats also tried ending their lives during this period. Born in 1896, Grete Klein was the daughter of the former director of the Königsberg operatic theater. On 29 October 1941, however, she was waiting at the Levetzowstraße Synagogue collection point for a transport headed to Litzmannstadt in Poland. Determined to kill herself, she managed to steal poison from the doctors’ quarters. However, her attempt failed, and she spent the first three weeks of November recovering in the Jewish Hospital. During this time, a non-Jewish acquaintance of her father’s visited her regularly, despite the potential prison sentence involved for those who maintained “friendly relationships” with Jews. After her convalescence, Grete registered with the Jewish Work Office and went to work at the Electrolux firm in Berlin-Tempelhof. She stayed there for two months before turning to her father’s acquaintance and his landlady for help in submerging. Grete and the very few others with similar experiences were fortunate; the authorities deported most Jews who attempted suicide immediately after their recovery.

By the middle of 1942, suicide among the Jewish community in Berlin had reached epidemic proportions and no longer surprised anyone, including the Gestapo. Armed with this knowledge, some Jews intending to submerge feigned their own deaths. At the end of October 1942, Edith Ruth Epstein, fearing deportation, wrote her parents a goodbye note informing them of her plans to commit suicide; she then fled. Edith was not alone. Two months later, on the night of 9 January 1943, Dr. Arthur Arndt, his wife Lina, and their two children, Ruth and Erich, left their apartment in Kreuzberg and departed to their respective hiding places. Before leaving the apartment, Dr. Arndt left behind a suicide note, informing the authorities of the family’s intention to end their lives. Edith and Dr. Arndt hoped that a suicide note would throw the Gestapo off their trail for a time. In the time it took the Gestapo to verify the suicide notes, divers feigning suicide had gained a valuable window of time to disappear. Of course, false suicide notes did not protect those who submerged indefinitely. Without excellent forged papers, pass inspections...
and denunciations ensnared thousands of U-boats. Feigning suicide, although potentially useful, was of limited use. These limitations notwithstanding, faking one’s death is an early example of how some Jews in the city managed to manipulate the oppressive conditions created by the Nazis to their own advantage.

Submerging

Suicide was not the only option for Jews who refused their evacuation summons. Ernst Borchardt took a different path: “As the situation of the Jews became ever more critical, I decided, in order to escape the looming deportation, to live illegally.” Borchardt was not alone in his choice. Between autumn 1941 and March 1943, approximately 6,500 Jews in the city attempted “to live illegally.” Unlike suicides, however, which paralleled the rise and fall in the number of transports leaving the city, the prevalence of people submerging followed a different logic. Although every act of hiding was a direct response to the deportations, not all deportations prompted large numbers of Jews to hide. Indeed, until autumn 1942, the transports had a minimal impact on hiding rates. The prevalence of submerging, the specific factors prompting one to do so, and how one carried out the act varied over the sixteen months between the first transport leaving Berlin in October 1941 and the final, large-scale roundup of the city’s Jewish populace at the end of February 1943.

A confluence of factors influenced when and how Jews submerged. Survivors discuss the deteriorating position of Jews in the city, receipt of their evacuation notice, or else their narrow escape from the Gestapo while at work or on the street. Rates of submerging and the processes surrounding the act depended on several considerations, including age and gender, employment status, knowledge of conditions in the east, and, in particular, evolving National Socialist policy in dealing with the “Jewish Question.” Taken together, these variables explain the low rates of hiding throughout the first year of the deportations and the sudden, exponential growth in submerging rates during the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943.

The history of submerging evolved over time and falls into three periods. The first period, between October 1941 and September 1942, was characterized by low rates of submerging. A combination of factors—lack of knowledge of events in the east, the demographics of the early deportees, and the possibility of having one’s name removed from the deportation lists—account for the lack of attempts to hide. The second period of submerging lasted between October 1942 and the end of February 1943.
During this time, the number of people submerging grew rapidly. Although some individuals planned for their move underground, this phase witnessed increasingly last-minute acts of diving, often as the result of the Gestapo’s innovations in its arrest tactics. The final period occurred during the Large Factory Operation. Initiated on Saturday, 27 February 1943, this event lasted several days, although most arrests occurred during the first two days.\footnote{This massive, nationwide roundup signified the end to legal life for all but several thousand Berlin Jews not in mixed marriages or of mixed-race status and prompted the single largest act of submerging in the city.\footnote{Over the course of that week, approximately 4,700 Berlin Jews fled.\footnote{However, as a result of the surprise nature of the operation and the disciplined behavior of the security forces charged with its execution, submerging was harried and difficult to pull off.}} This massive, nationwide roundup signified the end to legal life for all but several thousand Berlin Jews not in mixed marriages or of mixed-race status and prompted the single largest act of submerging in the city.\footnote{Over the course of that week, approximately 4,700 Berlin Jews fled.\footnote{However, as a result of the surprise nature of the operation and the disciplined behavior of the security forces charged with its execution, submerging was harried and difficult to pull off.}}

**Phase One: October 1941–September 1942**

Forty-three-year-old Cäcilie Ott was one of the first divers in the city (see figure 1.1). She received her deportation notice in November 1941. Two days before her deportation—most likely the 27 November transport to Riga—an unnamed “acquaintance” offered her shelter\footnote{Ott accepted and disappeared, taking with her only the “most necessary” of possessions.}. Ott accepted and disappeared, taking with her only the “most necessary” of possessions.
On the evening of her departure, policemen appeared at her apartment: “The bird has flown the coop,” remarked one officer to the other, according to an acquaintance who listened in on the proceedings from the hallway. Ott intentionally had left some money and personal papers behind, along with the suitcase packed for her deportation, in order to suggest that she had committed suicide and thereby delay a hunt for her, and the authorities visited the morgue in search of her body. Thus began Ott’s three-and-a-half-year submergence. She was supported by those who first took her in and by a sister who, until her husband’s death a couple of years later, lived in a privileged mixed marriage.

Although the first several months of the deportations witnessed transports carrying one thousand individuals, relatively few people dived during 1941 and the first three quarters of 1942 (see figure 1.2). Approximately 15 percent of this study’s sample submerged during this time, even while the Nazis deported approximately 36 percent of the city’s Jewish population. Survivors who fled during the early months of the deportations are remarkably silent on the exact reasons they chose to do so. Many of them seem to have fled their deportations due to either previous encounters with the Nazis or else their strong political convictions rather than based on fears of what “resettlement” entailed. The majority of Berlin Jews did not submerge during these early months for three reasons: lack of knowledge of conditions in the east; the age and social composition of the early deportees; and the availability of legal and semi-legal recourses to forestalling deportation.

Unlike many survivors, Cäcilie Ott did not mention why she decided to submerge. At the time of her disappearance, she still had siblings in the city and maybe wished to remain with them. Perhaps her acquaintances had heard rumors about atrocities in the east and warned her. Yet rumors of mass killings were not widespread at this time and seem an
unlikely explanation. Although, in hindsight, Ott’s decision to submerge was a wise choice, she could not have known the fate that awaited her in Riga; the Nazis executed the entire transport of one thousand Jews on 27 November 1941. Certainly, the disappearance without a trace of one thousand Berlin Jews was bound to raise grave concerns, especially among Jews back in the city awaiting word from their deported family members. Even still, only 3 percent of U-boats in this study’s sample submerged in 1941. For the few who survived and recorded their experiences, these individuals either had suffered multiple arrests in the preceding eight years, had lost family members in concentration camps, or had needed to flee arrest by the Gestapo. For example, Ott’s brother had been imprisoned in the Buchenwald concentration camp for five years, and he died there in 1942. With almost no information on the camps and ghettos, the best explanation for why people made the choice to submerge so early was their earlier experiences with Nazi brutality.

Continued lack of concrete information on the fate of the deported Jews also accounts for the low rates of hiding during the first year of the deportations. The Nazis justified the first deportation from Berlin as a measure designed to open up apartment space for party functionaries and people who had lost their apartments to air raids. The administrative jargon of “resettlement” and “evacuation” did not yet arouse widespread fear and suspicion in those slated for deportation. One survivor, who decided to dive with his family while packing for their deportation, recalled, “We thought, it won’t be so cozy in Poland, but one will be able to survive.” In addition, the first deportees to Litzmannstadt were “almost without exception well dressed and carried with them on average 50 kilograms in baggage,” and they boarded older passenger cars, according to one witness. Thus, the nature of the deportees’ departure contributed to the myth of an actual resettlement.

The demographics of the early deportees offer another explanation. The first transports to leave Berlin primarily carried elderly men and women. When the deportations to the Theresienstadt ghetto began in 1942, the authorities scheduled people for deportation who were “... over 65 years of age as well as Jews 55 and older in delicate health along with family, provided they [were] not in a German–Jewish mixed-marriage, and their children under 14 years of age.” Only a small number of Jews 65 years of age or older (approximately 3 percent of this study’s sample) submerged and survived. The elderly were less able to cope physically and psychologically with the rigors of hiding than were younger Jews; suicide often remained their one outlet of “self-assertion.” Significantly, the data on submerging do not correspond neatly with available data on suicides in the city during this period, although both acts were responses
to Nazi persecution and deportation (see figures 1.3 and 1.4).\textsuperscript{98} Whereas rates of submerging remained low throughout the first year of the deportations, suicide rates stayed high, rising and falling in tandem with the number of transports leaving the city.\textsuperscript{99}

As figures 1.3 and 1.4 indicate, the rates of people diving remained largely unchanged once the deportations to Theresienstadt began during the second quarter of 1942, while suicide rates exploded. Although the age of the deportees and lack of knowledge were contributing factors, the social composition of many of the Theresienstadt transports also played a role in assuaging the fears of the deportees. Besides the elderly and young, the authorities deported respectable and important members of the Jewish community, including veterans of the First World War. Those excluded from the Theresienstadt transports included foreign Jews and Jews involved

![Figure 1.3. Numbers of Submerging and Suicide, 1941–March 1943.](image)

![Figure 1.4. Comparative Numbers of Suicides and People Submerging (1941–1943).](image)
in industries essential to the war effort.\textsuperscript{100} Though usually only a stop on the way to the camps and ghettos farther east, Theresienstadt doubtless played a role in cloaking the true meaning behind the deportations.\textsuperscript{101}

Due to the dangers inherent in submerging, Jews avoided submerging for as long as possible. Once they fled their deportations, they no longer had legal access to ration cards or housing and had to contend with the daily threat of arrest and deportation. Indeed, the growing desperation among members of Germany’s Jewish community caused many of them to turn to various individuals and agencies that they saw as being able to help them avoid deportation. To this end, Jews had three options open to them, short of submerging immediately or committing suicide. First, Jews could attempt to obtain a reprieve from the deportation. Usually, this came through what was known as a \textit{Reklamation}, an official complaint from their employer; this was a common practice until the beginning of 1943 for Jews employed in war-related industries. A second option was to turn to high-ranking administrators in the Reichsvereinigung who sometimes were able to remove names from transport lists.\textsuperscript{102} Connected to this was a third and highly uncertain possibility: the bribery of Gestapo officials, which could also be an option for those with sufficient financial means at their disposal. Indeed, the precarious position of Jews made some of them highly susceptible to the false promises of certain grifters masquerading as “emigration consultants” (\textit{Ausz wanderungsberater}) who attempted to—at times successfully—bilk unsuspecting Jews out of hundreds of Reichsmarks in exchange for supposed exemption from the deportations.\textsuperscript{103}

Employed Jews certainly had the greatest legal chance of avoiding deportation through obtaining a \textit{Reklamation} from their employer. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the entrance of the United States into the war in December 1941, forced labor served as a form of protection for thousands of Jews in the city. The future U-boat Paula Vigdor remembered her boss telling her and her coworkers that should they ever receive an evacuation summons to come see him immediately. When Vigdor received her first evacuation summons in November 1942, her boss got her a \textit{Reklamation}.\textsuperscript{104} The motivations behind the majority of these employer complaints are unclear. Certainly, economics played a dominant role: the cost of hiring and training new employees was a consideration. However, a complaint also was the simplest, most effective way for employers sympathetic to the situation of Berlin Jews to help their employees.\textsuperscript{105} Official complaints by factories, however, worked only for those still employed in industries essential to the war effort, and the number of Jews working in such industries fell from a peak of 26,000–28,000 in the summer of 1941 to approximately 15,100 on 1 January 1943.\textsuperscript{106} Even in the summer of 1941, no more than 35–38 percent of Berlin Jews were employed in forced labor. Thus, almost two-
thirds of Berlin Jews were in danger of immediate deportation. Still, Reklamationen figure prominently in some postwar survivor accounts and demonstrate that many of the future U-boats benefitted from this early alternative to deportation. Moreover, the number of survivors who attest to the importance of such reprieves, however temporary they were, also demonstrates exactly how attuned many future U-boats were to the complex and ever-shifting bureaucracy that surrounded them and structured their daily lives in the final years leading up to their decision to submerge.

Individuals unable to obtain a Reklamation resorted to other tactics to delay their deportation. High-ranking administrators in the Reichsvereinigung sometimes were able to remove names from transport lists. Bribery also was an option for those with sufficient financial means at their disposal. Thus, Dr. Charlotte Bamberg bribed an official in the “Speer Ministry” to remove her name from a 1942 transport. Yet the precarious position of Jews also made them vulnerable to people looking to turn a profit. Between autumn 1941 and March 1942, for example, the salesman Friedrich Wetzel and his accomplice Dr. Walther Schotte fraudulently collected 14,500 RM from sixteen Jews in return for a promise to have their names removed from the deportation lists. In some cases, Wetzel even promised to have their racial standing changed from Volljude (full Jew) to either Mischling (half Jew) or Arier (Aryan).

The scam run by Wetzel and Schotte is not only a sad and telling indicator of the increasing desperation felt by Berlin’s Jewish residents in 1941, but it also demonstrates a working knowledge on the parts of both perpetrator and victim of how the Nazi state functioned. Like the Reklamation, it shows that many Jews (and non-Jews) understood the regime’s racial laws and were well aware of how its administrative and deportation policies functioned. Individuals looking to swindle Jews clearly used this information to their advantage. The police noted in their investigation of Wetzel and Schotte that the accused knew quite well that a reprieve from deportation could only be granted by the State Police and only in cases where the individual was over sixty-five years old, infirmed, or involved in a war-related industry. Even then, a medical certificate issued by the Jewish Hospital in Berlin was required; still, medical certification did not guarantee a reprieve, as the Gestapo had the final say. Also, in a paranoid system that pivoted on the idea of race and racial purity, both Jews and non-Jews understood even in the early days of the deportation that racial status meant all the difference. Thus, in some cases, Wetzel’s promise to have one’s racial status altered to either Mischling or Aryan status demonstrates that although the fatal consequences of deportation were not yet fully understood, the link between full-Jewish racial status and the “evacuations” was certainly clear. Nor was Wetzel the only one promising such a change in racial status. Extant applications to the Ger-
man medical authorities from Jews seeking to have their or their child’s racial status changed to Mischling or Aryan testify to an understanding on the part of both perpetrator and victim that such a thing was possible.\textsuperscript{112} That at least sixteen Jews testified that Wetzel had been recommended to them and that they had believed his claims to be able to protect them attests to Wetzel’s knowledge of the system and his confidence in his own lies. In addition, both perpetrators and victims in this instance understood that the Nazi bureaucracy was far from incorruptible. The belief that deportation reprieves could be bought with the right connections provides interesting insight into the way both perpetrators of crime and their Jewish victims understood the Nazi state to function, whatever pretenses the Nazis may have maintained to the contrary. While corruption undoubtedly was a fixture of the Nazi state, both Jews desperate to avoid deportation and individuals eager to capitalize off of that desperation failed to understand one central point. Corruption, if and when tolerated, was the privilege of ideologically and racially pure members of the Volksgemeinschaft.\textsuperscript{113} Its privileges did not apply to Jews.\textsuperscript{114}

Ultimately, whatever the particular route(s), legal or otherwise, Jews chose to forestall their deportation, most attempts at a reprieve ended in failure. Charlotte Bodlaender received her evacuation summons in late December 1941 (figure 1.5). To prevent her deportation, she arranged

![Charlotte Bodlaender](image-url)
a marriage with a member of the Jewish community who worked for the city and who had thus been granted a stay of his deportation. Bodlaender scheduled her wedding for 25 January 1942. The authorities, however, scheduled her evacuation for 23 January. Although she had her papers in order, the Gestapo asked Bodlaender to appear before them to discuss the matter. An active member of the forbidden Communist Party of Germany (KPD), Bodlaender feared a trap and immediately went underground with the aid of members of her political circle. When she submerged, however, she was in an extreme minority and would remain so until the autumn of 1942. At that point, a shift in Nazi deportation policy in the city and the overall deteriorating position of Jews prompted a massive upswing in the number of people submerging.

Phase Two: October 1942–26 February 1943

On 2 December 1942, the non-Jewish journalist and future “Righteous among the Nations” Ruth Andreas-Friedrich opened her diary with a bleak entry:

The Jews are submerging in droves. Dreadful rumors concerning the fate of the evacuated. From mass shootings to starvation, from torture to gassing. No one can voluntarily expose oneself to such a risk. . . .

By the end of 1942, the notable flight underground of thousands of Jews in the city was underway. During the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943, approximately 70 percent of this study’s sample made the choice to submerge. Four factors explain this phenomenon. First, the whisperings of mass shootings and gassings in the east had ceased to be a rumor for increasing numbers of Berliners. Fewer Jews held any illusions concerning the fate that awaited them. Second, foreign laborers began to supplant Jewish laborers, and a Reklamation became substantially more difficult to obtain. Third, the average age of Jews in the city was younger than it had been a year prior, and most were largely employed in war-related industries. Younger Jews were better able to cope with the physical and psychological rigors of life on the run than were older Jews, and, due to their employment status, they were able to put off submerging until the end of 1942. Fourth, in the fall of 1942, the Berlin Gestapo significantly altered its arrest and deportation tactics. This shift reflected the regime’s increasing determination to solve the “Jewish Question” and reinforced in the minds of Jews the precarious nature of their existence. For those individuals who made adequate preparations to dive, the act of submerging during this period often represented more of a transition than an immediate plunge into the unknown. However, the evolving methods of
the Gestapo increasingly forced the hands of many Jews, prompting, by the end of 1942, increasingly ill-prepared and last-minute efforts to avoid deportation.

Throughout the summer of 1942, rumors of mass executions and gassings surfaced in Berlin. Although difficult to believe, the rumors became so omnipresent as to convince many Jews of their truth. Letters from the east grew increasingly ominous in their content before eventually stopping. Cioma Schönhaus, temporarily exempt from the deportations due to a Reklamation, received the following letter from his father in the Majdanek concentration camp: “Dear people, I have arrived here safely. Have you heard anything from Fanja? I have been looking for Mama everywhere. Cioma was right about everything. I’m glad he’s not here with us. Farewell, Your Beba.” Other individuals learned about the killings from gentile sources. Kurt Lindenberg, adept at moving through the city without wearing the obligatory star, received confirmation of his fears from soldiers back on furlough as well as civilians who had been in the east. Their eyewitness accounts of mass murder convinced Lindenberg of the need to “scarper” underground: “I told myself that it was better to freeze in the Berliner Tiergarten than to die like an animal of cholera or typhoid fever or be slaughtered in Poland.” By the end of 1942, such attitudes were commonplace among members of the Jewish community and contributed to the sharp rise in the number of divers in the city.

Moreover, by late 1942, the Reklamation was no longer an effective means of forestalling deportation. The original purpose of forced Jewish labor as an element of Nazi antisemitic policy had been to harness the productive energy of the Jewish unemployed to the benefit of the state while simultaneously extending control over the Jewish population. By 1942, however, Nazi victories throughout Europe provided the state with sufficient new sources of forced labor, most notably from the USSR and Poland, to replace Jewish forced laborers in Germany. Beginning in 1943, more than one hundred thousand forced laborers arrived in Germany each month. By the summer of 1943, over four hundred thousand foreign laborers had arrived in the city. Whereas a Reklamation for skilled laborers in 1941 and early 1942 provided months of protection from deportation, such exemptions by the end of 1942 bought Jews perhaps only a few weeks, at most. The plentiful supply of foreign laborers now obviated any further economic arguments for a Reklamation.

Gender and age also affected submerging rates. Current research strongly suggests that, relative to their percentage of the population, fewer women made the decision to submerge than men did, with women comprising approximately 55 percent of the surviving U-boats. Although still accounting for more than half of all divers, this figure is slightly less than
the overall percentage of Berlin’s female Jewish population. In part, this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that women with children were hesitant to submerge, and thus, spur-of-the-moment flights tended to be undertaken by younger women and single women during the final months of the major deportations from the city in late 1942 and early 1943. Another explanation is that younger, single women often remained the only remaining caretakers for their elderly and infirmed family members and did not wish to abandon them by submerging; they also knew their elderly relatives could not handle the dangers and pressures of an illegal life on the run.125 Yet even many of these single women faced the difficult choice of staying with their families or fleeing.126 As for mothers, even if they managed to find places for their children to hide, the thought of being separated from them and leaving behind their precarious—but still legal—existence prevented many from submerging until the last minute or even at all.127 Indeed, of the fifty-five individuals this book has identified as submerging during the Large Factory Operation at the end of February 1943, 65 percent were women.128

Concerning age, by the end of the first year of the deportations, the average age of the Jewish community was younger and employed. The earlier transports mainly were composed of the elderly, and suicides were highest among older Jews unable to cope with the uncertain prospects of deportation or life underground.129 Younger Jews were more likely to submerge than older Jews, and approximately two-thirds of all survivors in hiding were forty-five years of age or younger when the deportations began. Evidence also suggests that younger Jews sometimes were instrumental in persuading their elders to flee.130 In part, this has to do with the resilience and optimism of youth as well as its greater willingness to take risks. Also, many of these individuals were quite young when the Nazis came to power. They grew up in what one young diver described as a “bandit state,” and they had not been instilled with the same respect for order and the rule of law that their elders had. For instance, nineteen-year-old Erich Arndt convinced his parents to dive. When he first approached his family with the idea, the deportations had been going on for about a year. Erich kept coming home, his sister recalls, with ever more stories of people who had submerged. Initially hesitant that a family of four could find someone to take them in, Erich’s father finally told his son to give it a try.131 The Arndts were fortunate to have had many friendly neighbors; a number were former patients of Erich’s father, a neighborhood doctor. As something of a practice run, the Arndts stayed with two families on a couple of occasions. Eventually, Erich approached his neighbors about the idea of submerging. They supported the idea and even agreed to scout out other people who could help. In the meantime, the neighbors sug-
gested that the family bring any valuables to their place for safe storage. Beginning in October or November 1942, the family began transporting goods in secret to their neighbor's apartment. Finally, on 9 January 1943, the family submerged. The help the Arndts received from sympathetic non-Jews ensured not only that the family members had places to hide but also that six people ultimately found refuge instead of four, including Erich's girlfriend and her mother, making this one of the largest groups to submerge in Berlin.132

The Arndt family planned for their move underground, giving them a substantial advantage. Individuals who put credence in the rumors circulating about the ghettos and camps had time to put their affairs in order and plan for some of the unpredictability sure to accompany illegal life in the city. Early divers had more options than people who waited; the relatively large numbers of Jews still living legally in Berlin meant that those who dived early enough occasionally had friends and family who could take them in.133 For example, Herta Fuß spent her first three months submerged with Jews who were still living openly in Berlin.134 Non-Jews also convinced their Jewish friends and acquaintances that they should refuse the deportation summons and either dive immediately or, when deportation looked imminent, come to them for help.135

In some cases, aid from strangers appeared unexpectedly. The non-Jew Maria Nickel first met Ruth Abraham on the street in the autumn of 1942. Abraham was pregnant with her daughter. They exchanged addresses, and Nickel visited her around Christmas of that year. Nickel's second visit occurred in January 1943, while Abraham was recovering at her aunt's apartment after having given birth. Sometime between late January and early February, the Gestapo arrested Abraham's aunt. At this point, Nickel urged the family to flee and even offered her and her husband's ID cards for the Abrahams' use.136 The proactive manner in which Nickel approached and befriended the Abraham family was a rare occurrence, with respect to the entire Jewish population, but far more common among people who fled their deportation. Through Nickel, the Abrahams made invaluable connections that were to sustain them in hiding for over two years. Consorting with Jews was a dangerous act, but helpers such as Nickel were essential for survival.

The U-boat Kurt Lindenberg claims that “almost all people” who submerged had money set aside and/or connections with “Aryan” family members.137 Whether one can use the phrase “almost all people” is doubtful. However, those without family, friends, or useful connections were at a severe disadvantage. Almost no person survived the war without help at some point from non-Jews and/or family members in mixed marriages. Ample evidence suggests that many individuals had little or no money
with them and no ration cards, leading them to look for work or else rely on the hospitality of friends, acquaintances, and strangers. However, advance preparation was widespread enough for survivors to remark upon not having been well prepared: “I do not belong those [groups of] people, whose well-filled briefcases made a well-prepared illegal life possible.”

People who made plans to submerge often were better equipped to handle the deprivations and economic challenges of illegal life on the run, at least for a time. Although Lindenberg’s belief concerning what made submerging a success might not apply to everyone, he rightly claims that those who dived before the Gestapo was at their door had an advantage.

Indeed, Lindenberg was one of those individuals who made plans to submerge. However, once he finalized his plans, he continued to wait. An immediate flight underground was inadvisable, as his absence from work would have been reported to the Gestapo, and he feared such an action would result in his family's deportation. Still, he took other measures he thought necessary to prepare himself for that day. He stored clothes with non-Jewish acquaintances, saved every “pfennig” possible from work, and created two escape routes. The first led out of his family’s apartment through a metal grate to the roof of the building, which he had sawed through and carefully replaced. He also made a copy of a key to the back door of his factory. Thus, while leaving the date of his submerging open, Lindenberg did all he could to prepare for the moment when his deportation arrived.

He did not have long to wait. Of all the factors influencing submerging rates during this period, the arrival of agents of the Viennese Gestapo in October 1942 was paramount. Although not solely responsible for the increase in the number of people diving, the Viennese Gestapo underscored the gravity of the situation; indeed, some U-boats specifically refer to the “Viennese Gestapo.” These agents had a reputation that far outweighed their numbers. Charged with ridding the city of its Jewish residents, the Viennese Gestapo introduced new arrest and deportation “methods.” The introduction of these so-called “Viennese methods” paralleled a surge in people fleeing the transports. Indeed, as 1942 waned, fewer Jews had any doubts as to what lay in store for them. They needed to decide soon whether to submerge. The Gestapo became increasingly determined to make the decision for them.

Under the direction of SS-Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner, agents from Vienna arrived in Berlin, partly in response to allegations of corruption on the part of Berlin’s Gestapo leaders. Brunner arrived with his “mission” clear: “[t]o show the Prussian pigs how one deals with those bastards, the Jews.” In order to facilitate the arrest and deportation of the city’s Jews, Brunner augmented existing policies and introduced new ones,
including the expansion of the collection centers at the Levetzowstraße Synagogue and in the Große Hamburger Straße.\textsuperscript{145} Of particular importance for the history of the U-boats, Jews no longer received advance notice of their deportation, a tactic employed to prevent people from committing suicide or diving underground. Instead, officers now surprised them in their homes or on the streets, catching people unawares and bringing them in trucks to a collection center for deportation.\textsuperscript{146} Brunner created a map of Berlin, demarcating the Jewish residences, thus allowing for effective and large-scale raids built on the elements of fear and surprise.\textsuperscript{147}

Those individuals who had become adept at moving through the streets without wearing the Jewish Star sometimes were able to avoid these surprise roundups. Indeed, since the introduction of the star in September 1941, many Jews who chafed at the onerous and continually increasing number of restrictions placed on them by the Nazis and the violence and vitriol such a physical marker inspired in segments of the German population quickly learned how to navigate without the star and without getting caught, so that they could continue to take advantage of activities such as going to the movies, shopping outside of restricted shopping times, and visiting restaurants and cafés.\textsuperscript{148} Kurt Lindenberg, who considered himself one of those Jewish Berliners possessing what he termed a “will to resist,” spent a noteworthy portion of his testimony explaining how he and others managed it, so important was the act to how he viewed himself and his ability to survive:

[Not wearing the star] naturally entailed some difficulties as soon as one moved around one’s neighborhood streets. Since people there knew me, I had to be able to show the star on my left arm, which I always kept bent, as soon as someone asked me. Therefore, I fabricated a star that I attached to a cloth panel [Blechtoile] and held it there with a strong needle. This “star” was attached so firmly that on casual inspection it appeared sewed on. As soon as I was out of my “neighborhood,” I could inconspicuously let the star disappear and again walk with my arm held normally. With time, I acquired a certain conjuror’s skill. For example, I could jump with the “star” on my arm onto a moving bus, and while the conductor was busy punching my ticket, I let the “star” on my jacket disappear literally under the conductor’s nose. Something similar worked in reverse. One could board the bus without the “star,” and when one alighted at home, the “star” sat on the left arm, without even one of the bus passengers having seen what I had done.\textsuperscript{149}

Lindenberg’s methods were far from unique, however ingenious he portrays his methods. The trick, commonly understood by Jews in the city
and likely shared between them, was to make the star look firmly sewed on and yet easily removable once one had reached a part of the city where one was unknown; for all Berlin Jews, even the most daring, understood the folly and danger of walking around their own neighborhood without the star. Indeed, Lindenberg was taking a risk even by walking in his own neighborhood with his left arm bent to obscure the star, as fanatical Nazis could and did denounce individuals who did not wear the star prominently enough or else tried to cover it up, for example, by walking with one’s briefcase covering it. Fortunately, the size of Berlin and its many neighborhoods made anonymity far more possible than in smaller cities and towns, where moving around without the star was more dangerous, if not impossible. Yet however much learning to safely navigate the city without wearing the star might have helped these individuals avoid a number of surprise roundups, the Berlin Gestapo’s agents still reduced the “legal” Jewish population in the city to some six thousand within five months due to its new arrest tactics.

When members of the Gestapo arrived at an apartment building, they first blocked off the entrance, making escape difficult. The element of surprise played a large role. Unless one had planned and made an escape route, the only options were to try to hide somewhere in the apartment or not answer the door, in the hopes that the agents would leave. Gen-tile neighbors could help or hinder in the process. Herta Fuß’s building supervisor locked her in the cellar when “a large car” pulled up to her apartment. She waited until the coast was clear and fled to Jewish acquaintances. Due to the seeming random nature of the raids, some people took no chances and submerged at the first sign of a raid in their vicinity. The Gestapo informed those caught in their apartments that they had a certain amount of time (an hour or less) to pack a suitcase and come along. Agents and Jewish orderlies loaded the arrested onto trucks and then proceeded to the next building until the trucks (each holding up to thirty people) were full. They then sealed and locked the apartment, leaving inside any remaining possessions they did not confiscate or destroy immediately. Unlike earlier deportation procedures that took entire families together and gave advance notice, the surprise raids meant that individuals arrived home from work or shopping to find their family deported and their apartment sealed against entry. For those who had been considering diving, a sealed apartment was a terrible blow, often separating them from the few possessions and little amount of money they still had. Frequent reports, such as the following, from the various police precincts throughout Berlin at this time testify to the determination of some people to get back into their apartments:
Broken Seal. 7 January 1943

The building superintendent at Weinbergsweg 9 informed us on January 6 that the Jewish fugitive Gustav Israel Wawowitz, born September 25, 1897 in Tuchow and formerly residing in Berlin at Weinbergsweg 9, removed the seal placed on his front door by the Jewish Kultusvereinigung and took some things from the apartment.

W. is evading the evacuation and moving around Berlin without wearing the Jewish Star.157

Those still in possession of keys had this option. However, this was a risky move. Sometimes, Gestapo agents were waiting for people when they returned to their sealed apartments.

The raids trapped Jews throughout the city. Herta Fuß, sheltered by Jewish acquaintances in their apartment after her initial dive, was caught unawares one day when the Gestapo arrived to arrest the occupants. Fuß hid under the bed while the others were taken away.158 Such a narrow escape was not as improbable as it might seem. The same chaos of the surprise raids that trapped unsuspecting people also made it possible for people to slip through the cracks in the bureaucracy. The Gestapo agents had dozens of individuals to arrest. They had their lists of names and did not necessarily have time to search every building and every potential hiding place for unknown persons who may or may not have been there. Indeed, as already mentioned, just as agents did not always bother to break down doors when people pretended not to be at home, they also were not going to search every apartment when every person they were supposed to arrest was present and accounted for. They also did not always wait around when they showed up at an apartment and one of the inhabitants was at work; in their arrogance, they believed that, sooner or later, everyone would fall into their murderous grasp.

Along with raids on apartments, raids in the streets trapped many people. On 20 January 1943, the police arrested Berta Bernstein on the Rosenthaler Platz. She was not wearing the Jewish Star, and police discovered that she had fled her deportation summons.159 Nine days later, the Nazis deported Bernstein to Auschwitz.160 A wrong turn also could have disastrous consequences. On 17 January 1943, police stopped eighteen-year-old Günter Loewenberg for trying to drive down a closed street. After the officer ascertained that he had no papers, Loewenberg tried to flee but drove down a dead end. Indeed, the very size of Berlin that provided anonymity and made it conducive to submerging also meant that it could trip people up when navigating unfamiliar parts of the city. The arresting officer sat himself next to Loewenberg and forced him to drive to police headquarters. On the way, Loewenberg pretended that the car broke down. When the officer got out to inspect the engine, Loewenberg jumped back in the
car and drove off. An officer by the name of Schmidt got in front of the vehicle to force it to stop, but Loewenberg kept driving, a testament to his determination and desperation. Schmidt jumped on the radiator of the car and managed, after one hundred meters, to bring the vehicle to a halt. The police arrested Loewenberg and brought him to the local headquarters.  

On 18 April 1944, the Nazis deported Loewenberg to Auschwitz. By the end of 1942, the position of Berlin's remaining Jews had so deteriorated that the question was no longer if one would be deported but when, and it was this climate of persecution that explains the massive upswing in people submerging during the last quarter of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943.

By this time, then, submerging increasingly was a direct response to the Final Solution now sweeping Europe. It is also important to bear in mind that despite more than eight years of persecution when the first transports left Berlin in October 1941, those deportation transports appeared in Berlin somewhat later and continued longer than they did farther east and within Germany proper. Berlin Jews, despite reduced ration cards and incomplete attempts to create so-called Judenhäuser, did not face nearly the same degree of starvation and killing that plagued the inhabitants of the Polish ghettos, which began to be established beginning in the fall of 1939; indeed, by December 1939, at least fifty thousand Polish Jews had already perished. Even the introduction of the Judenstern in Germany came only in September 1941 (compared to two years earlier in Poland). With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the war for the annihilation of Europe's Jews began in earnest, but again, the outright slaughter that occurred there did not occur back in Germany. With the coordination of the Final Solution at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 and the construction of most of the main extermination camps that year—Chelmno in December 1941; Bełżec in March 1942; Sobibór in May 1942; Treblinka in July 1942—the killings escalated dramatically. By the time that the last major roundups of Jews in Berlin occurred at the end of February 1943, most other German cities had already deported the vast majority of their significantly smaller Jewish populations, and three-quarters of all Jewish victims of the Holocaust were already dead. Certainly, tens of thousands of German Jews were deported (especially in the first full year of the deportations), having no idea of the fate that awaited them. By the fall of 1942, however, the scale of murder was so great that it could not help but make its way back to Berlin's relatively large remaining Jewish population, and the Nazis went to little effort to hide the truth in Germany, even if they did not come right out and say it. Although conclusive evidence was lacking for most of Berlin's population (both Jewish and non-Jewish), eyewitness accounts from soldiers home
on furlough, public speeches made both by Hitler and Goebbels, and “rumors” about the large-scale murder published in such official party organs such as the *Völkischer Beobachter* made it clear for those individuals who wanted to listen that deadly events were occurring farther east.  

Yet as much as the decision to dive was a response to the increasingly substantiated rumors, survivors who submerged during this time remain silent on one important factor that presumably might have played a role in their decision: the course of the war, in particular, the German Wehrmacht’s defeat at Stalingrad. The capitulation of over ninety thousand soldiers of the 6th Army under the command of General Friedrich Paulus on 2 February 1943 marked a strategic turning point in Nazi Germany’s fortunes. The formerly unstoppable Nazi war machine had been dealt a decisive blow. As the news reached Berlin, opponents of the regime, Jews and non-Jews alike, must have taken heart. A not unreasonable assumption might be that the battle encouraged Jews that survival was possible, if they could just hold out a little longer by submerging. Indeed, resistance throughout Europe, both by non-Jews and Jews, increased in the aftermath of Stalingrad, which was shortly followed by the loss of all of North Africa and, in the summer of 1943, the Allied invasion of Sicily. The more the war turned against the Nazis, the more hope took hold that survival and liberation were possible. However, survivor accounts are almost uniformly silent on Stalingrad and its influence on decisions to submerge. Jews in the city were aware of the battle’s progress and spread the word. Doubtless, the Nazi defeat was welcome news and afforded some measure of hope. Yet Stalingrad was over 1,300 miles from Berlin. Even a swift defeat would take months. Moreover, at the time, Stalingrad did not spell certain defeat for the Nazis. Due to the lack of survivor commentary on the battle, it is therefore difficult to gauge the extent to which the battle prompted hesitant Jews to submerge. Certainly, rates of submerging continued to increase throughout the month of February, and Stalingrad might have been the reason, but without survivor testimony to corroborate the link between the battle and the decision to submerge, such a claim is difficult to assert with absolute certainty. Even still, considering the influence that the German defeat at Stalingrad had on resistance movements throughout Europe, Stalingrad should at the very least be seen as having provided hope for those Jews willing to submerge and those non-Jews willing to support them. Perhaps for some, even, it was a key motivating factor.

Agents of the Viennese Gestapo left Berlin in January 1943, but they also “left behind distinct traces.” These “traces” proved invaluable to the Berlin Gestapo one month later when it coordinated the roundup and deportation of the majority of the city’s remaining Jews during the
nationwide Large Factory Operation. On 18 February 1943, Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary that the operation would commence on 28 February 1943: “The Jews in Berlin now finally will be deported. With the deadline on February 28, they will all first be brought together and then deported in daily batches of up to 2000.” Although few Jews in Berlin were aware of the intended operation, what remained of their precarious existence as legal residents was about to disappear. For people still willing to take the risk, the time to go underground was upon them.

Phase Three: The Large Factory Operation: 27 February–5 March 1943

On 26 February, Moritz Henschel, the head of the Reichsvereinigung, approached Siegmund Weltlinger and requested that he be ready on the following day to participate in the roundup of Jews in a “large search operation.” Weltlinger, a leading member of the Jewish community, refused again, just as he had refused all previous requests to act as a collector (Abholer). Henschel was not dissuaded: “I cannot grant you dispensation for this day, and if you refuse, I will notify the Gestapo. The consequences will be yours to bear.” Weltlinger said nothing but returned home and, a few hours later, submerged with his wife Margarete (see figures 1.6 and 1.7).
The “large search operation” to which Henschel referred was what became known as the Large Factory Operation (Große Fabrik-Aktion).\(^{176}\) Initiated on Saturday, 27 February 1943, and lasting less than one week, this massive roundup signified the end to legal life for all but several thousand Jews not in a mixed marriage or of so-called mixed-race status.\(^{177}\) Over the course of that week, approximately 4,700 of the remaining 11,000 Jewish forced laborers went into hiding.\(^{178}\) In other words, roughly 43 percent of the remaining Jewish workers plus their families fled during this time and managed to evade arrest, if only for a short while.\(^{179}\) The operation meant that an illegal life was the one viable alternative to deportation, signaling a final call to act and an irrevocable break with what remained of pre-war life. Kurt Lindenberg recalled, “It was the day I decided to take my life-deciding initiative completely in hand and the day that meant I had irrevocably lost my parents and now began an underground life . . .”\(^{180}\)

The Nazis were prepared for this final operation and directed the energies of much of the Berlin security apparatus toward their goal of arresting over ten thousand Jews within one week. Through the end of March, the authorities deported over 8,600 Jews from Berlin.\(^{181}\) The Gestapo was responsible for coordinating the arrests in designated factories and firms, and the Waffen-SS was charged with overseeing the arrests and transports.\(^{182}\) However, the Gestapo did not reserve the operation’s scope to factories and firms where Jews worked. Around 8:00 a.m., members of the municipal police (Schutzpolizei) received Order Nr. 5620, ordering the police to arrest all Jews encountered on the streets and bring them to one of several collection camps throughout the city.\(^{183}\) The Gestapo began the operation on Saturday at 7:00 a.m. The day before, the Gestapo had notified leaders of the Reichsvereinigung and those firms employing Jews, although it had been known for some time that such an event was in the works.\(^{184}\) Yet, with few exceptions, the exact nature and extent of the operation was not clear until the morning it took place. Experience with Jewish suicides and flight, coupled with the training received at the hands of the Viennese Gestapo, had honed the Berlin Gestapo’s methods of conducting roundups. In many cases, Jews had little or no warning before their arrests, although suspicions of a massive roundup had been growing over the previous weeks. Rumors of a massive action against the Jews, combined with increasing arrests and deportations, are the logical explanation for the sharp increase in the numbers of people going into hiding. However covert Goebbels intended the planning of the operation to be, its scope made keeping it secret impossible. In addition to Gestapo, SS, and Schutzpolizei involvement, the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office), the Armaments Inspection of the Wehrmacht, the Labor Administration, firms and factories, as well as other ministry bureaucrats and city leaders
knew of the impending raids on the factories. In March, Goebbels cited in his diary “the better circles, especially the intellectuals” and the “short-sighted behavior of the industrialists” as responsible for warning Jews of impending deportation. However, the tip-offs came from all manner of Berliners: coworkers, police officers, friends, neighbors, and members of the Reichsvereinigung.

News of the operation also spread with the arrest of those Jews, mostly men, in privileged mixed marriages and therefore protected from deportation. The Gestapo brought these individuals to a special collection center in the Rosenstraße 2-4. As their gentile spouses gathered outside of the collection point to discover what had become of them, a week-long act of silent protest occurred. Due to the unprecedented nature of the protest, the lack of contemporary accounts, and the singularity of this act of defiance in the history of Nazi Germany, reports on the nature of the protest vary exceedingly. On the one extreme, as many as six thousand non-Jews, mostly women, gathered outside of Rosenstraße 2-4, defying police threats and guns aimed at them, crying: “Give us our men back!” (Gebt uns unsere Männer zurück!). This version of the event propagated the myth that large crowds and active protests in the face of continual police threats resulted in the release of the Jewish spouses. Recently, careful scholarship has determined that the protest was much smaller, numbering not much more than 150 persons. Certainly, the police did attempt to clear the street, and the occasional call for the release of the prisoners was heard. However, the protest was more of a “silent demonstration” than a protest in the commonly understood sense of the word. Perhaps most surprisingly, the presence of the protesters, although brave, had nothing to do with the release of the prisoners. Rather, the authorities brought the protected spouses to the collection point to clarify their racial status and recruit them as replacements for those Jews scheduled for deportation.

The vast majority of the city’s divers, however, may have been unaware of the events unfolding in the Rosenstraße, or its impact on their decision to flee was negligible. In fact, survivors do not discuss the event in their testimonies. Instead, their accounts of this period focus on how they evaded arrest or learned that their deportation was at hand. On 2 March, Ida Gassenheimer went to her bank to withdraw money, as was her custom at the beginning of each month. When the bank manager saw her, he exclaimed, “Frau Gassenheimer! You’re still here?! I have information that by March 5 there won’t be any Jews left in Berlin.” The following day Ida Gassenheimer went underground.
he almost certainly would not have known that the Gestapo intended to wrap up the event by March 5. However, Gassenheimer’s recollection symbolizes the tremendous shock experienced by many Jews during the operation and the final break with their former lives.

Despite rumors that a massive roundup was imminent, most Jews did not know when it would happen, finding out only when the operation was already upon them. Kurt Lindenberg, who had prepared to submerge, was caught at work that day. His supervisor appeared around 8:15 A.M. and informed the Jewish section of the factory that they were not to leave their stations; management was on its way. This section, which at first had employed twenty-five Jews, now employed just nine. The supervisor, a man remembered by Lindenberg as “respectable,” returned a couple of minutes later to inform them that “the riflemen are coming.”196 His arrest now imminent, Lindenberg proceeded to the coatroom, removed what few possessions he had, went back to work, and waited for the bathroom to be free; the bathroom was in the same hallway as the door to which Lindenberg had made a key. While he was in the bathroom, Gestapo agents arrived. When Lindenberg left the bathroom, he saw a member of the Gestapo guarding the door to the Jewish section. Lindenberg walked confidently past him; the agent suspected nothing. When he reentered the workroom, he turned on the lathe at the work station, pulled the key out of his pocket, opened the back door, and sprinted down the steps and out into the building’s second courtyard. He passed through the first courtyard of the building with no difficulties, but as he reached the exit, a truck blocked his path. Two SS men with carbines and bayonets were preparing to load Lindenberg’s coworkers onto a truck. Lindenberg realized that running was both pointless and suspicious. He walked calmly past the SS men and his coworkers and down the street—he began to run once he turned the corner.197

Lindenberg’s successful escape depended on several factors not available to those caught completely unaware at the onset of the operation. He had planned ahead by making a copy of the factory’s backdoor key. The Gestapo also did not know what Lindenberg looked like, and his confidence and calm did not arouse suspicion. He also was fortunate that the administrator called ahead to warn him and his Jewish coworkers that the Gestapo was on the way. Lack of preparation did not mean that people did not attempt to escape; thousands did. However, successful flight with no preparation or advance warning was less liable to succeed. Frieda Seelig seems to have been taken by complete surprise on the day of the operation. While she dashed across the factory courtyard to escape, one of the factory supervisors turned her in. The SS beat her, breaking at least one of her ankles and one of her feet. Her injuries were so severe that they took her to the hospital.198
The Nazi security apparatus in charge of the operation scheduled it for a Saturday, so as to disrupt production as little as possible and arouse minimal public attention. However, news spread throughout the city among Jews and non-Jews over the course of the first day. Already, thousands of Jews had gone underground thanks to advance warning. Survivors also sometimes credit their escape to pure chance. Although chance may explain why some people escaped arrest, circumspection and an acute awareness of the severity of the raids is a more likely explanation why many other individuals were able to evade the police. For example, some individuals, not sure what to think, stayed home from work to see if there was any truth to the rumors. Others had worked the nightshift and seen firsthand the roundups as they left to go home. By 1943, rumors of Nazi atrocities seemed more credible than two years earlier, and the city’s Jews were on their guard.

Jews also saw for themselves that a massive raid was underway. On the first morning of the operation, Ilselotte Themal’s uncle, with whom she, her child, and her husband were living, came into the living room and told her to look out the window at the building next door; he had heard screams. Themal saw police herding women onto a truck in the courtyard next door. With her *Judenstern* covered, she walked with her son to the local post office and called her friend in the neighboring town of Potsdam, Willi Vahle. She told him the family would like to pay a visit; Vahle understood immediately. She went back home, passing trucks filled with Jews. Her landlord, a party member who had long since stopped supporting Hitler, came into the apartment and told Ilselotte and her uncle to leave as soon as possible; he had heard that all the Jews were being taken away. On their way out of the building, they passed two men racing inside to arrest the remaining Jews still living there: the Themals. Fearing the worst for her husband at work, Ilselotte left word with her landlord to tell him, should he escape, that they had gone to Willi’s. To Ilselotte’s great relief, he arrived at the Vahle residence that afternoon.

Thus, the surprise home raids, which had started back in the autumn of 1942, continued during the operation. In some cases, these raids threatened people already in hiding, such as Herta Fuß, who had scrambled under the bed to escape arrest (see figure 1.8). She remained there for about an hour. Herta attempted to leave by the front door, but the key broke off in the lock. Located on the third floor of the building, Fuß’s only escape option was out the window. Although the food in the apartment had been confiscated at the time of the arrests, the sheets and hand towels remained. Having tied all of them together, Fuß waited until the small hours of the morning—between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m.—and lowered herself out of the window to the street below. She spent that night wandering the streets of Berlin, and the next morning she made for a new hiding place.
Despite the commotion caused by the operation, some people had no idea what was happening. Paula Vigdor took ill on 22 February, so her uncle invited her to stay with him. On Sunday morning, 28 February, Vigdor went home and found her door sealed against reentry. Her next-door neighbor opened the door and, astonished to see Vigdor, told her the Gestapo had been looking for her. She was to report to them when she received this message. Vigdor’s uncle counseled her to wait, but he was arrested two days later. Vigdor then submerged. Similarly, Eva Gotthilf had been home sick from work for about two weeks. On Monday evening of the operation, Gotthilf had gone out shopping with Aryan ration cards she had procured. When she returned home at 7:30 p.m., her apartment had been sealed and her father, sister, and brother arrested. Gotthilf handed over her purchases to her neighbors and set off to find her family.

The Große Fabrik-Aktion, whether a complete shock or not, reflected the Berlin Gestapo’s response to evolving Nazi policies concerning the “Jewish Question.” This massive operation was the capstone in a process that had taken almost one and a half years to complete. Now, with few exceptions, public life as a Jew in Berlin was no longer possible. The operation accounted for almost two-thirds of all attempts to submerge
and accelerated a tendency that had been occurring over the course of the previous sixteen months. Many Jews were not prepared. Yet diving was their best chance for survival. With their apartments sealed, their possessions confiscated, and many of their loved ones deported or waiting in the collection centers for deportation, the new U-boats needed to act with speed and confidence if they were to evade the Gestapo and survive.

Conclusion

The Nazi ban on most legal emigration in autumn 1941 left Jewish Berliners with three available options. For some people, the choice of compliance, suicide, or submerging was clear and involved little internal debate. Others, however, actively struggled with their decision. Some deportees later fled their transports or even the camps and returned to the city. Survivors of failed suicide attempts sometimes later made the choice to submerge. In the chaos of 1940s Berlin, Jews had a few highly circumscribed choices before them. However, they still considered their options with what agency they still had left.

Deportation and suicide were dominant features of daily Jewish life for the duration of the war. The majority of the city’s Jews, approximately 55,000, either complied with their deportation orders or else were ensnared before they could submerge; only 1,900 returned. Between 1941 and the end of March 1943, over 1,400 Jewish Berliners took their own lives. Fear, obedience to the state, lack of knowledge about events in the east, and despair, while dominant factors, do not account fully for the actions of all deportees. Familial and communal solidarity also motivated an unknown but likely significant number of Jews to board their transports. Indeed, Jews actively considered and debated compliance; deportation was not merely a tragic act that befell them. Suicides, like deportation, often were the products of fear and despair. The act of taking one’s life, however, had a deeper significance. For many Jews, suicide was their final chance to assert both their dignity and their rejection of Nazi persecution.

The future U-boats witnessed these events with increasing apprehension and horror. Unlike individuals committing suicide, however, whose numbers rose and fell in tandem with the number of deportation trains leaving the city, a striking majority of individuals who submerged waited to do so until the closing months of 1942 and the beginning of 1943. Lack of knowledge of events in the east likely explains the low rates of submerging in 1941 and early 1942. Even as the rumors of mass murder trickled into the city, many individuals bided their time and planned their actions carefully. Indeed, most people waited until the last possible mo-
ment to submerge. The Large Factory Operation at the end of February 1943 forced the hands of most Jews. By the end of the first week of March, almost 6,500 Jews were in hiding throughout the city. Despite a decade of persecution, the next twenty-six months proved to be unlike anything that the Jews of Berlin had yet faced. The challenges of submerged life often were overwhelming, and most people did not survive the ordeal. Moreover, on the evening of 2 March 1943, as thousands of Jews still scrambled to find shelter and evade arrest, bombers of the British Royal Air Force descended upon the city; approximately 480 Berliners perished.207 Although it was a small raid in comparison with what was to come, the bombings presaged the extreme difficulties and uncertainties awaiting the city’s newly submerged Jews. Speedy adaptation to their new circumstances was essential for survival.

Notes

2. For an in-depth look at the development of National Socialist Jewish deportation policy, see H. G. Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974). See also Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1972). More recently, the first volume of Saul Friedländer’s two-volume study on the National Socialist war against Europe’s Jews is a masterful and nuanced study of the steady erosion of Jewish life during the first half of the Third Reich. See Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, vol. 1: The Years of Persecution (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).


14. For a comprehensive list of the anti-Semitic ordinances enacted in the city between 1933 and 1945, see Gruner, *Judenverfolgung*.


17. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, 47.


22. Gruner, *Judenverfolgung*, 94. Although the October 1941 ban on emigration affected the vast majority of German Jews, a small number still managed to emigrate after that time. The number was small, however, with perhaps no more than four hundred individuals managing such a feat, and records are incomplete. An estimate of slightly less than four hundred individuals emigrating after the emigration ban can be gleaned from extant records. See BA R 8150/26, 8150/27; ZIH 112/21b; StadtA Mainz NL Oppenheim 52/28; YVA 0.8/14, “Monatliche Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1941–1943.” Also, YVA 0.8/145, “Jüdische Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1943–1945.” The documents can also be found at www.statistik-des-holocaust.de/stat_ger.html (accessed 4 January 2017).


up to the Holocaust, especially, as seen through the confluence of local and regional decisions made farther east, see Christopher R. Browning’s pivotal study: Browning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

27. See Gay, My German Question, 123–24.
30. See Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 97.
31. Deutschkron, Ich trug den gelben Stern, 88–89.
32. Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 86.
33. Widespread rumors concerning the fate of the “resettled” Jews were in regular circulation no later than the autumn of 1942. See Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 96. See also, Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945: The Years of Extermination (New York: Haper Perennial, 2007) xxii, 510–14.
34. ZfA, File of Kurt Lindenberg, “Personal Report.”
35. See Avraham Barkai, “In a Ghetto without Walls,” in Meyer, German–Jewish History, 4:346–54, 356–59. The short but critical history of the Reichsvereinigung, the difficult position in which it found itself, and its limited options for maneuver in an increasingly radical Nazi Germany has received excellent attention in Meyer, Tödliche Gratwanderung.
40. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr: 33971.
42. Beck, Underground Life, 62.
45. Beck, Underground Life, 63.
47. Beck, Underground Life, 63-64.


54. See, for example, Hartig, “Conversations,” 249, 260–61.


57. Goeschel, Suicide, 107.

58. Goeschel, Suicide, 97.


60. Goeschel, Suicide, 110.


65. Goeschel, Suicide, 107.


68. Goeschel, Suicide, 108.


70. See, for example, CJA, 4.1, Nr: 2470.

71. Goeschel, Suicide, 108.


74. Although there was no specific crime in Germany for hiding Jews, one could be punished for the broader crime of Judenbegünstigung (“privileged treatment of Jews”). The punishment for helping Jews varied considerably, ranging from incarceration in a concentration camp to shorter prison sentences to fines to sometimes nothing at all. See Croes and Kosmala, “Facing Deportation,” 123, 146. Also, Benz, Überleben im Dritten Reich, 40–41.


76. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr: 35368.
77. Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.

78. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr: 1042.

79. Jah, Deportation, 426–27. See also, Gruner, Persecution of the Jews, 163–64.


81. See Jah, Deportation, 519.

82. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, OdF Kartei, A-31677.


84. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr: 38677.

85. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr: 38677.

86. These data were compiled from submerging dates provided by some 425 survivors (25 percent of all U-boat survivors) in their postwar applications to the OdF, as well as those provided in postwar memoirs (published and unpublished) and interviews given by survivors to the Fortunoff Video Archives at Yale University. See also deportation figures in Gottwaldt and Schulle, Judendeportationen," 444–54.

87. I reached this figure by adding together the Berlin deportation numbers listed in Gottwaldt and Schulle, "Judendeportationen," 444–54. During this period, the Nazis deported approximately 26,606 Jews from Berlin. In June 1941, the Jewish population in Berlin, as categorized by race, was 73,842. See Gruner, Judenverfolgung, 94.


89. See, for example, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30320 and CJA 4.1, 2175.

90. Gottwaldt and Schulle, "Judendeportationen," 70.


96. Marnix Croes and Beate Kosmala suggest a similar figure in their comparative study of deportation in the Netherlands and Germany. See Croes and Kosmala, "Facing Deportation," 116.

97. Goeschel, Suicide, 109. See also Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 203.


102. On a discussion of the avenues available to the Reichsvereinigung to forestall or otherwise influence the deportation of individuals, see Beate Meyer, A Fatal Balanc-


105. See the case of the brush maker Otto Weidt in Deutschkron, Ich trug den gelben Stern, 90.

106. Gruner, Jewish Forced Labor, 19, 27.

107. Figures compiled from the deportation lists in Gruner, Judenverfolgung, 94, 98–101, and in Gruner, Jewish Forced Labor, 19, 27.


112. Indeed, even before the deportations began, some Jews attempted to apply to have their racial status legally changed. For a concise and excellent overview, see Jürgen Matthäus, “Evading Persecution: German–Jewish Behavior Patterns after 1933,” in Jewish Life in Nazi Germany: Dilemmas and Responses, ed. Francis R. Nicosia and David Scrase (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 53–64. For specific examples, see Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies (hereinafter, CAHS), RG 17.070M, Reel 1503, Cases 61732, 61737, 61771, 61757, 61805.

113. Rüdiger Hecht noted in his paper “White-Collar Crime in the Third Reich”, presented at the thirty-seventh symposium of the Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte, Frankfurt a/M, 16–17 October 2014, that “cases of corruption were considered illegal . . . but were not prosecuted or made public . . . some staff members lost their jobs but key figures of the Nazi political system were spared.” In Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 56 (Spring 2015), 127.


117. Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 96.


120. Gruner, Jewish Forced Labor, 4–6.

121. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 46.

122. Figure cited in Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 121.

123. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 34188.


125. Marion Kaplan also notes that this is one explanation, among others, for why fewer women than men emigrated from Germany when emigration was still an option. See Marion Kaplan, “Changing Roles in Jewish Families,” in Jewish Life in Nazi Germany: Dilemmas and Responses, ed. Francis R. Nicosia and David Scrase (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 34–35.
128. Based on a sampling of 425 individuals (25 percent of all U-boat survivors) who listed the date of their submerging.
130. LAB, C Rep. 118-0, Nr.: 30203.
131. Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
132. Ruth G. Holocaust Testimony (T-1763), Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yale University Library.
134. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
136. ZfA, File of Ruth Abraham, Testimony of Maria Nickel to the Entschädigungsamt Berlin, 5 May 1953. See also Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 220.
138. See also Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 208.
139. LAB, C Rep. 118-01, Nr.: 2754.
142. See, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544 and LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30579.
144. Safran, Die Eichmann-Männer, 189. For more information on charges of corruption on the part of the Berlin Gestapo, which involved high-ranking members of Berlin’s Gestapo enriching themselves off of the property of deported Jews, see Jah, Deportation, 347–58.
145. For a fuller discussion of Brunner’s new methods, see Meyer, Tödliche Gratwanderung, 207–10. See also Jah, Deportation, 363–417.
146. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr: 30544. See also Safran, Die Eichmann-Männer, 190; Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair, 192.
148. On the increase of public indignities suffered as a result of the introduction of the star, see, for example, LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30699 and 33971.
150. For example, see LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 4410.
152. Andreas-Friedrich, Der Schattenmann, 85.
156. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr. 31267; see also, CJA, 4.1, Nr.: 1596.
158. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.
162. Gedenkbuch, Bd. III, 2151.
163. Hayes, Why?, 241
166. On the general knowledge of the German population concerning the fate of the Jews in the years 1941–1943, see Peter Hayes, Why?, 155–56.
167. See, for example, Tausendfreund, Erzwungener Verrat, 50.
168. On the rise in resistance in the aftermath of Stalingrad, see, for example, Hayes, Why?, 197, and Friedländer, Years of Extermination, 401–2.
170. For Marie Jalowicz, already living submerged, the German army’s defeat at Stalingrad meant that the course of the war had been decided. In Jalowicz Simon, Untergetaucht, 209.
177. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 59. There is some disagreement between historians concerning the exact length of the operation. Beate Meyer argues that it lasted for one week and that it was officially declared finished on 7 March 1943: see Meyer, Fatal Balancing Act, 176, 177. In contrast, Akim Jah and Wolf Gruner emphasize a shorter operation, as the vast majority of Jews were arrested within its first two days and most were deported during the first four days in March. See Jah, Deportation, 426–27. See also, Gruner, Persecution of the Jews, 163–64, 179.
178. See Jah, Deportation, 519.
181. See Bundesarchiv (hereinafter, BA) R 8150/26, 8150/27, ZIH 112/21b, StadtA Mainz NL Oppenheim 52/28, YVA 0.8/14, “Monatliche Entwicklung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Berlin, 1941–1943.” The documents can also be found at http://www.statistik-des-holocaust.de/stat_ger.html.


185. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 78.


187. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 79

188. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 60.


190. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 10, 139–56.

191. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 144.


194. Wolf Gruner also notes the silence of contemporaries on the matter of the Frauenprotest until years after the fact. See Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 144–45.


198. CJA, 4.1, 2207.


200. See, for example, CJA 4.1, 2304.

201. Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 81.


203. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 30544.


205. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr.: 31551. See also, Gruner, Widerstand in der Rosenstraße, 81

206. LAB, C Rep. 118-01 Nr. 31267.

207. Werner Gierbig, . . . im Anflug auf die Reichshauptstadt (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1973), 64–65.