

## CHAPTER 5

# BUREAUCRATIC LOGIC, BUREAUCRATIC AESTHETICS

## THE OPENING EVENT OF HOLOCAUST MARTYRS AND HEROES REMEMBRANCE DAY IN ISRAEL

### Author's Note

This chapter was prepared first in 2001 for a workshop on Performance Genres and Comparative Aesthetics, organized by Angela Hobart and Bruce Kapferer. It is offered here as a case study of how bureaucratic logic organizes a major public event in Israel, one that annually commemorates the Holocaust dead. Though in more recent years technology has been put to good effect in this event, its logic of organization has not changed. Throughout the emphasis is on representation through the presentation, one after another, of linearly and precisely defined social categories. The murderous events that constituted the core of the Holocaust were dynamic in the extreme, killing upon killing upon killing . . . Yet its commemoration here abuts on the static. In this there are lessons for the kind of aesthetics that bureaucratic logic enables and promotes. I return to bureaucratic aesthetics in Chapter Eleven.



My concern here is with logics and aesthetics that organize rituals. I will argue that the logics of ritual organization are intimately related to practice, informing practice

with its shaping of goals, action, movement, direction. So, too, are aesthetics crucial to practice; for that matter, perhaps practice works best, if I can put it like this, when given its senses by aesthetics. Aesthetics are crucial to practice; while logics of organization hardly exist without practice. Logics, in the terms used here, are the ways that inform how the practices of connecting, of fitting together—people, things, worlds—are done. Aesthetics, on the other hand, enable the very connecting, the fitting together, to be done in practice. Aesthetics are informed, obviously, by cultural logics. The logic of ritual organization and the aesthetics of practice form a set without which there is no such phenomenon that might be called ritual. However, I do not intend that there be any clean-cut conceptual distinction between “logic” and “aesthetics.” Perhaps because through practice, logic and aesthetics mesh together epistemology and the sensuous, their relationship is vague. In my view, the relationship between logic and aesthetics is teleological rather than lineal—if logic is present so are aesthetics. Perhaps logic generates its own aesthetic as it is practiced into being by that aesthetic.

I want to argue more generally that aesthetics are crucial to all practice—to the very practice of practice—in the regularities of mundane living; and that in this sense the aesthetics of ritual practice may not be radically distinct from those of everyday practice. To make these arguments relatively straightforward, I will discuss aspects of the state ritual that officially opens Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day in Israel (*Yom HaShoah v'HaGvura*), a day popularly if facetiously known as Holocaust Day. Officially, the ritual is called a Memorial Gathering (*atzeret zikaron*). The logic of organization of this event I will call bureaucratic logic, and its aesthetics, bureaucratic aesthetics. I will argue that this ritual, despite its empathic and emotive sacralization in Israeli society, is an extension of the logic and aesthetics of mundane bureaucratic order. The military logic of organization is continuous with the logic that organizes the performance of the Holocaust Memorial Gathering. Here the logic and aesthetics of ritual are organized as a continuation of mundane, bureaucratic practice.

Underlying my argument is the claim that in the history of modern Western thought, the conceptualization and treatment of “aesthetics,” as a higher-order condition of value and knowledge, took a terribly wrong turn, in its thorough and unrelenting identification with beauty, art, truth, reflection, and so forth. To save the significance and the inestimable value of aesthetics in the mundane, and in the ritual living of lives, aesthetics should not be severed and parted from the grounding of social and personal practice.

### The Aesthetic “Feel” of Practice

My understanding of the aesthetic in mundane living is quite rough and ready—for that matter, murky—and again is not given to any neat definition. My sense of the aesthetic is something like the “feel” that one has for that which one is doing; the feel for that which can only be called the “rightness” of how one is doing what one

is doing, or how this is done in concert. The aesthetic in mundane living is related to Bergson's idea of "habit memory," which is a way of attending kinesthetically to one's own body, monitoring that which one is doing. As Sheets-Johnstone (2000: 360) points out for the individual, "this is memory etched in movement," providing unconscious ways of behaving that "engender a *felt sense of rightness* in doing what one does . . . we feel at home in our bodies . . . because we resonate with a familiar dynamics, a tactile-kinesthetic dynamics that we have come to establish as our own way of doing something, whether brushing our teeth, throwing a ball, playing the violin, or walking" (Sheets-Johnstone 2000: 360–61, my emphasis). This sense of rightness or "fitness" (Hardin 1993: 12)—kinesthetic, sensuous, interpersonal—indexes the aesthetics of living unselfconsciously, in the main. No less, this sense of rightness is one of feeling—unselfconsciously, one monitors affectively. This is a sense of rightness not in moral terms but in the sense of how one does that which one is doing.<sup>1</sup> The aesthetics of mundane living are forms of autopoiesis, of self-organization, that produce and conserve personal and intercorporeal awareness through feeling the rightness of action, of practice, inside oneself, outside oneself, and between oneself and others (see also Inglis and Hughson 2000: 289). To put this otherwise, the everyday aesthetics of practice are feelings of rightness-in-doing, of feeling that which feels right in doing that which we are doing. In Michael Polanyi's (1966: 17–23) terms, one could say that mundane aesthetics are a kind of "indwelling" of tacit knowing, a knowing that, as he puts it, always relates to or includes more than we can tell, were we able to relate this knowingly. Paraphrasing Polanyi, Jack Katz (1999: 314) argues that "effective action requires that we disattend our body as we act, focusing away from the point at which our body intersects with the world." In my view, tacit knowing is the feeling of disattending/attending that enables the exterior world of practice and the interior world of experience to be united as the exterior world of experience and the interior world of practice (see also Dufrenne 1973: 446). Mikel Dufrenne (1973: 377) argues that to feel is to transcend. The aesthetics of practice transcend practice by enabling practice to communicate "more than we can tell," while feeling the rightness of not needing to, or not being able to, tell this. The aesthetics of practice integrate us with that which we do, in ways that self-produce and self-organize this integration as more than we can tell and as feeling the rightness of this.

This positioning, as Katz (1999: 314) points out, "leads quickly to an appreciation of the essential place of aesthetics in all behaviors, however mundane or esoteric." In mundane living, it is the aesthetics of practice, in my terms, that enable people and social orders to naturalize their own arbitrariness, to know their worlds tacitly as "natural," as "taken for granted" (see Bourdieu 1977: 164; Garfinkel 1967; Geertz 1983: 86–91). Without the aesthetics of practice/experience there is no feel of rightness in practice, no feel that this is how doing is doing, how doing is done, how done continues on into doing.

Aesthetics, then, are crucial to the naturalness of the feel of mundane practice as more than we can tell, indeed, as more than we can know, self-consciously, self-

reflexively. Practice is inevitably the fitting together of person and world, person and person, person and action, action and action—their fitting into, yet through one another. Aesthetics—the synesthetic, sensuous feel of things fitting together (and not fitting together)—is that which enables us to proceed coherently, perspectively, and prospectively in the hereness of nowness, as it were. Simmel (1994a: 10) wrote that “the human being is . . . the bordering creature who has no border.” I would add that the bordering creature in kinesthetic movement is always on the edge of coming into being, and so is always creating borders in order to cross them, in order to move. The aesthetics of practice have something intimate to do with the creation and crossing of borders, and how these are done. It is by creating and crossing borders, the sites at which exosmosis and endosmosis (Simmel 1994b: 11) of the fluidity of selfness and otherness occur, that fitting together is accomplished. To put this yet more emphatically, without the mundane aesthetics of practice, there likely would not be self-integrating individuals nor, for that matter, social life. The aesthetics of practice not only enable practice—they are the persuasive grounds, the grounds that persuade us that practice is in the process of being done as the kind of practice it is (or is becoming). Perhaps this could be called the persuasive self-embodiment of the truth-claims of practice. Aesthetics may be more like an ongoing *gestalt*, in the sense of a “coherent entity” (Polanyi 1966), or an entity whose coherence is continuously coming into being, fitting itself together self-persuasively, even as that which it fits together ruptures and breaks.

Since we must know ourselves indirectly, through interaction, through others and their mediation, through what might be called the “practice of betweenness,” there is always a break (perhaps an ongoing break) in any aesthetics of mundane practice. The very feel or sense of rightness also constitutes a temporal lag, however small; a lack of synchronization with oneself and with others. As Katz (1999: 315) puts it, “I see, hear, feel, and express myself through actions that in part always remain behind myself, always just beyond the reach of my self-awareness.” In this regard, we are always trying to catch up with ourselves and with others. This is integral to the sense of mundane aesthetics as more than one can tell. But this is also the break between a ritual and mundane social order—the possible shift from an aesthetics of mundane practice to something else; the world catching up with its rituals and their visions (and dynamics) of order; the break that may open toward radical shifts in aesthetics of performance or that may continue to hone its aesthetics, but in different venues.<sup>2</sup> Here, my concern is with the latter, as it organizes the opening ritual of Holocaust Remembrance Day.

## Bureaucratic Logic and the Event of Presentation

Earlier I said that cultural logics inform us as to how practice fits together people, things, and worlds. Bureaucratic logic indexes how certain kinds of cultural taxonomies are organized and practiced. Recent studies of modern bureaucracy and its

origins recognize clearly that it is constructed of premises about how worlds are put together, how they work, and how this knowledge may be known (Brown 1978: 373; Morgan 1986; Astley 1985; Melossi and Pavarini 1981). Nonetheless, not recognized is the premise; that the epistemology of bureaucratic logic is to intimately engage in the invention and practice of taxonomy that is lineal, exclusivist, and hierarchical in character. Bureaucratic logic is a mentality of the modern world that consciously invents and deploys lineal taxonomy to create, to control, and to change order. The conscious control over processes of classification is a most powerful means through which to shape social order (Handelman 1995; Shamgar-Handelman and Handelman 1991: 308).

The use of bureaucratic logic encourages the invention of forms of classification that are hierarchical and exclusivist. In true Linnean fashion, the boundaries of categories of classification on the same level of abstraction are mutually exclusive and are organized in hierarchies of subsumation and exclusion. This lineal logic of classification—of membership that is permitted, exclusively, in one and only one category on the same level of abstraction within a given taxonomic scheme—is powerfully implicated in the making of “difference” in modern life. That is, it is implicated in our mechanistic capacities to make infinitesimal and infinite distinctions of difference that mutually exclude whatever they fragment, while insisting on the significance of these divisions. (On this logic, see Wyschogrod 1985.) In hierarchical terms, we perceive levels of difference as nesting quite neatly and naturally within one another, thereby encompassing difference within yet more subsuming difference.

Bureaucratic logic informs institutions as to how to continually invent and implement new taxonomies by reimagining and reorganizing the social categories of everyday life. This logic consciously informs how to consciously create social categories that can be made to divide, to fragment, to reclassify, and to reshape members of any social unit—group, community, family, relationship. This logic informs how to perceive that the making of division through the creation of a boundary is also the demarcation of differences that are naturalized on either side of this border. Therefore, bureaucratic logic foregrounds the significance of boundaries that separate mutually exclusive categories from one another.

No less than any other mode of informing the organization of realities, bureaucratic logic is enabled by its own aesthetics of practice that give to its use the feel of rightness. In keeping with the significance of ocular centrism and the gaze in the modern epoch (Foucault 1973, 1979; Jay 1992a), these, one may say, are the aesthetics of anatomization—of laying out, defining, classifying, specifying, inspecting, and enumerating all of the parts that constitute some totality. In modern bureaucratic society, in the modern bureaucratic state, these aesthetics of bureaucratic logic are performed in public most explicitly in rituals that I call events of presentation (Handelman 1998). The organization of performance in the public event of presentation often (but not necessarily always) is pervaded by aesthetics of bureaucratic logic. Again, I am arguing that it is aesthetics that enable us to sense the rightness of orga-

nization and practice; and so, too, of performance (which, as noted, I understand as the heightened consciousness, and perhaps the morphogenesis, of practice). In other words, the logic and aesthetics of events of presentation are strongly continuous with the logic and aesthetics that organize so many domains of mundane life. There is no radical shift in logic and aesthetic from the mundane to this kind of ritual.<sup>3</sup>

The event of presentation often shapes, puts into place, and demonstratively shows social taxonomies. To a high degree, taxonomies are put on view, their categories filled, and members of these categories are used to perform a repertoire of symbolic actions. Perhaps there are here taxonomies in motion, a spectacle of bureaucratic logic whose aesthetic feel of rightness enables their performance. Events of presentation may be societal icons, fully open to the inspection of the public gaze. These rituals rarely conceal any mysteries, nor is their atmosphere particularly mysterious. Their purpose may be to assert the determinacy of the significance that they enclose within themselves. Such rituals are ocular-centric, their symbolism arranged often in the form of a relatively static tableau, or a tableau in motion. The actions of performers (like the categories they embody) rarely overlap and are carefully allocated, measured, and often synchronized. Order is continually seen to be practiced during the event.

The opening ceremony of Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Day is held in Jerusalem at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Memorial Authority, which is the national site of Holocaust memorialism in Israel. The ceremony, televised in its entirety, is a major ritual occasion of the state, the first of the three major “ritual days” legislated after Israel’s declaration of independence.

I have chosen this Holocaust occasion to press my arguments on bureaucratic logic and bureaucratic aesthetics in statist public events especially because the Holocaust is a highly emotional and volatile subject (and increasingly so) in Jewish-Israeli everyday life (Friedlander and Seligman 1994; Young 1990; Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman 1996; Handelman 2004: 171–99; Feldman 2000; Kidron 2000). In Israeli discourse, popular and academic alike, the ritualization of the Holocaust is attended to primarily (and often solely) in terms of moral, philosophical, theological, historical, and political valences and their consequences, as if the logic and aesthetics of ritualism and commemoration are irrelevant to how these valences are expressed and conveyed. Yet it is the logic of ritual organization that in no small measure is shaping the significance of the Holocaust in Israeli society.<sup>4</sup> And in no small measure it is the practiced aesthetics of this logic that enable such events to take, naturalistically, the presentational, taxonomic form that they do, and to be appreciated as such.

### **The Military Envelopment of the Memorial Gathering**

Like all Israeli state events, the Memorial Gathering is enclosed by a cocoon shaped by military classification. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has a major presence in this opening event, described in the next section. Yet the explicit participation of the IDF is but the tip of the military presence—the Gathering exists as it does by being

enveloped by the military. The presence of the military envelope serves a practical and functional purpose—to ensure monothetic order in keeping with the forming capacities of bureaucratic logic and the state-form. The differences between military and bureaucratic logic are more matters of content and direction than of premises of classification. Therefore my discussion is of the military as the exercise of bureaucratic logic. Both the Gathering and the IDF are metonymic with bureaucratic logic. In terms of a logic and aesthetics of classification and its practice, the military instructions to protect the occasion cannot be separated from the performance itself of that occasion. I turn now to these instructions and their monothetic logic.

The overall responsibility for planning and enacting the event lies with Yad Vashem. Nonetheless the Army's instructions to secure and to protect the site of the Gathering envelop and ultimately control Yad Vashem's roles. Though Yad Vashem appears in official control of the Gathering, there are points at which this institution is dependent upon or subordinate to the IDF. At times there is a struggle between the overt and hidden enactments—one example will suffice here. The Army's concern is to secure the Gathering against terrorist attacks. The President and Prime Minister of the State attend, as do official representatives of foreign states. Yad Vashem wants the event enacted according to its script. Both Yad Vashem and the IDF are deeply committed to the vision of the State and nation-in-arms as the protective bastions against any future Holocaust. The final rehearsal takes place in the late afternoon, before the Gathering begins. Some hours before, the IDF seals off Yad Vashem as a closed military area, under the Emergency Regulations. The Army controls all access and movement within this area.

In 1988 the Gathering took place some months after the outbreak of the first Intifada, and the local IDF Commander decided to seal off the site (itself distant from any actual clashes) earlier than usual, in what Yad Vashem personnel described as a fit of "security hysteria." Consequently the announcers and members of the choir and orchestra were either unable to enter the site or to rehearse properly there. This could have affected the performance adversely, and led to discussions between Yad Vashem administrators and Army officers. A compromise was hammered out, but the Army's ultimate control of the site was uncontested.

Both sides in this dispute are organized through bureaucratic logic. At issue is not only a division of labor and spheres of authority, but the very forming and application of taxonomic categories—the relentless creation and invocation of arbitrary, categorical difference. Yad Vashem orders the presentation of the Holocaust in monothetic terms, and the Army does the same to Yad Vashem. Yad Vashem, open to the public six days a week, and receiving in the neighborhood of a million visitors a year, is redefined categorically by the IDF, and on this basis is turned into a fortress, into another order of ordering.

The significance of the IDF's act of closure may be lost on the parties concerned, yet it must be stressed. The official Holocaust memorial is itself remade—ghettoized—within the national landscape intended ideologically to be open. The fortress is besieged

within itself, granted the status of a protected species, and placed apart. As the participants commemorate the Holocaust, they themselves are set apart as the potential victims of another Holocaust (thereby encouraging their self-classification as such). This irony is foreign to the bureaucratic logic used. At issue is whose taxonomic ordering of reality will prevail. The Army has the advantage, since it envelops Yad Vashem in its timescape. The military vision of order puts in place and territorializes a taxonomy of control and discipline hidden in the main from the Gathering's participants, yet intended to embed them all within its surveillance. The classified territory becomes the mirror image peering within itself in a panopticon-like way. The Army creates an event within which order is made yet is not to be seen, complementing the order made to be seen in the Gathering itself. The Army relentlessly and symmetrically divides and classifies time, space, people, and function. There is no ambiguity in classification. Everyone and everything connected with the Gathering is placed in one or another category. The focus here is on Army planning for a Gathering in the 1990s. After this I discuss relevant aspects of the Gathering enacted at that time.

Time was sliced cleanly into two consecutive phases. The first phase spanned four days, from the 7th to the 10th of April, during which preparations and rehearsals were done. The second stage began at 15:00 hours on the 10th of April, when military forces secured the area, and lasted until the end of the Gathering at approximately 21:00 hours. The list of Army goals was lengthy and exhaustive: to control all approaches to the ceremonial plaza where the Gathering would be held; to secure the entire area of Yad Vashem and its roads and byways, using foot patrols on the near and distant peripheries, motorized patrols on the roads, as well as positioning bomb disposal personnel; to establish observation points at controlling locations; to use military police to secure the parking lots; to use civil defense reservists and soldiers of the Women's Corps to search the bags (and where necessary, the person) of all entering the ceremonial area; to use bomb disposal personnel to check all vehicles entering the area; to have in readiness Medical Corps personnel to treat and evacuate, according to need; and to coordinate with bodyguards of the Security Services (*Sherutei Bitakhon*, aka *Shabak*) who safeguard the seating of Israeli dignitaries. Safeguarding the ceremonial plaza itself was also the responsibility of the Security Services from the moment the dignitaries entered.

To implement these goals, the IDF used several hundred military personnel belonging to the regular army, the Military Police, the Border Police, the sappers, the Medical Corps, the Women's Corps, and the Civil Defense Guard. Military personnel were divided into eleven units: these included a regional command center with communication specialists; forces to secure and to safeguard the approaches to Yad Vashem; a preventive force on a rooftop overlooking the plaza; an assault force for more incisive intervention; and patrols on axes triangulating the entire area of the memorial complex.

This relentless classifying shapes discrete, modular, monothetic categories. Taken together, these categories are organized vertically (those ranked higher control those

ranked lower) and horizontally (categories on the same level do not overlap in their contents and functions). The dimensions of each category are measured: the kind and number of personnel, the kind and number of weapons and other artifacts. Together, these categories totalize space and time—they suck in, subsume, and make order among all the phenomena toward which their taxonomy is aimed. Nothing, no one, is left outside the monothetic classifying of space, time, people. The taxonomy includes itself, and so is self-sealing. All are under control and discipline, whether they know this or not. Since the categories are modular, they can be altered, shifted, redesigned, added to or subtracted from the taxonomy without changing the operational efficiency of the classifications.

The effect of having all the categories of the military taxonomy in position on the ground, enveloping and surveilling everyone and everything within the Holocaust memorial, is something like a public event in its own right. An event of presentation, but organized as a concealed scopic system controlling itself and aimed at the Memorial Gathering. This systemic apparatus is hidden from outsiders who do not hold the code to the military taxonomy. Nonetheless the hidden military classification is present and piercingly scopic, in place and space, reshaping the landscape into vectors of force, moving according to preset instructions, holding everything within its gaze. An event that itself is the gaze of control, a symmetric, systemic, covert tableau, the embodiment of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics in systemic motion—a lookout precisely here, a roadblock directly there, a patrol moving through a specified axis, an assault force held in instant readiness.

The military event is an analogue of the state-form, capturing and containing through the forming enabled by bureaucratic logic and aesthetics. The covert military event surveils the entire site of the Memorial complex, enveloping this and the Gathering performed there. The military apparatus cocoons the memorial site in its taxonomic closure, gazing at the displayed tableau of the past, at the practice of Holocaust memorialism. The hidden present (the military) disciplines and orders the visible past (the Holocaust event) that is made to appear as if it controls the visible present. The tableau of the Memorial Gathering is immobile and static, in contrast to that of the military, mobile, flexible, systemic.

## The Memorial Gathering

My concern here is to show how the Memorial Gathering is performed as a taxonomic tableau of categories, one that embodies in its organization ideas of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics, as discussed earlier. I do not closely interpret the symbolism of this event (as I have done elsewhere for the opening ceremonies of Israeli Remembrance Day for the War Dead and Independence Day; see Handelman 1998: 191–233).

The gathering lasts approximately one hour. The setting is the Warsaw Ghetto Plaza (dedicated to the revolt staged in the ghetto) at Yad Vashem, dominated on one side by a high brick wall (called the Wall of Remembrance; hereafter, the Wall),

within which are embedded reproductions of Nathan Rapoport's original sculpture and bas-relief that stand on the site of the razed Warsaw Ghetto (see Young 1989). The sculpture and bas-relief effectively divide the Wall into sections, two categories; and during the ceremony itself attention is shifted from one to the other (from right to left, facing the Wall, the direction in which Hebrew and Yiddish are written).

### The Taxonomy of the Wall of Remembrance

The large bronze bas-relief of the Last March is embedded within the right side of the Wall. The bas-relief depends through a horizontal, longitudinal axis that depicts Jews—all older men, women, and children who look like they are from a ghetto or *shtetl*—clustered together, eyes averted from the viewer, bent beneath the burdens they carry, appearing to walk into a strong wind, sorrowfully marching to some unknown destination. Whatever this destination, it leads to their annihilation. To the left of the bas-relief is a sculpture of the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, one that emphasizes verticality and height. Recessed within the Wall, these fighters, most of whom are young, stand tall and strong at the ready, grasping rifles and grenades, facing the viewer and looking straight ahead at a distant horizon. In the Warsaw original, the bas-relief is placed on the reverse side of the ghetto uprising sculpture, so that bas-relief and sculpture cannot be seen together. At Yad Vashem, the bas-relief and the sculpture are placed in a lineal relationship of two scenes. The bas-relief (given this genre of art) has less depth of figuration and more sketchiness than does the more fully formed sculpture.

These two scenes constitute a taxonomy of the sequencing of narrative history, one that more cleanly divides Jewish perceptions of history into a before and an after, into categories of destruction and ascension, and that shifts one into the other. As I noted above, at Yad Vashem these two scenes should be looked at from right to left—from the driven despair of the breaking edges of generations of Jews, of the very young and the old on the bas-relief, to the fierce determination of the ghetto fighters, the maturing of embattled but powerful strength. The scenes move from the horizontal stretch of the bas-relief, an even plane of suffering that extends indefinitely without relief, to the unbending verticality of the sculpture, which stops movement through posture, gesture, and positioning (even bending the lineality of the Wall), communicating a message of this-far-and-no-further. These are all themes of the dominant narrative of the Holocaust in present-day Zionist Israel, and, so too, of Yad Vashem. It is this narrative framing that dominates the taxonomic shift from catastrophe to regeneration that is enacted within the ritual gathering. I first discuss the visual placement of social categories along the Wall, and then their performative sequencing during the ritual.

Since its inception, the plaza has been used as the venue for the ritual gathering. The Wall itself is made to frame the performance. The major social categories of the performance are laid out, in lineal fashion, along the breadth of the Wall. The vertical, recessed sculpture of the ghetto fighters is used to break this tableau into

two segments. To the right (facing the Wall) of the vertical sculpture, the area of the bas-relief, the catastrophe and sorrow of the Holocaust dominate the performance tableau. To the left, the fighting response dominates.

For the ritual, a central memorial beacon is placed between the bas-relief and the ghetto fighters sculpture—but more to the right side, identified with the Holocaust catastrophe. In 1991, the gas flame of this beacon reached to the very top of the Wall. The flame emerged from a cone set atop a squared base, rising high through a spiral of barbed wire, searing and transcending the barbs that tore the flesh, heart, and the very life of the Jewish people. To the right of this central beacon are two podia that are used by the announcers of the ceremony (who also perform the memorial readings) and by those who deliver speeches and prayers. Still further to the right are situated the choir and orchestra. The right side, then, is identified more with what could be called civil/religious (as opposed to military) order, as well as with Holocaust suffering.

By contrast, the categories of the left side are identified primarily with military order. Immediately to the left of the central beacon stands the Honor Guard of the IDF, with naked bayonets fixed to automatic weapons. Further left, atop a lower extension of the Wall, are placed six memorial beacons in memory of the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust. During the ritual the beacons are lit ceremoniously by persons chosen by the Yad Vashem administration. The beacon lighters are assisted by Gadna paramilitary youth in uniform who hand them the lit torches with which they kindle the beacons. Framing the entire tableau at its extreme left is the flag of the state. Thus, the fighting response to the Holocaust—the IDF Honor Guard, the beacon lighters, the paramilitary youth—is itself framed, enclosed on its right by the ghetto fighters sculpture and on its left by the state flag. The sequencing of the ritual shifts from stateless Holocaust victims driven fatedly, to Jews standing their ground, focused for battle, intergenerational, national.

Thus, during the performance, the narrative—or, more accurately, the visual sequence of taxonomy, of bas-relief and sculpture—is extended from World War II into the present. This sequencing of categories shifts the Jews from that of uprising (signified by the sculpture) to that of the State of Israel (signified by the national flag). The fighting response extends into the present, within the state. During the ritual, the entire Zionist version of recent history is taxonomized as a classification of historical events laid bare and explicated before the gaze of the audience.<sup>5</sup> The audience sits facing the Wall, dignitaries and speakers in the first row.<sup>6</sup>

In terms of the sequencing of the ritual, the initial focus of activity tends to cluster around the bas-relief, with its figures bent beneath tribulation—the unredeemable tragic side of the Holocaust tableau. However, with the lighting of the six beacons, the focus of activity is shifted to the fighting response. The beacon lighters are often living heroes and heroines of the Holocaust—the living embodiments of the Warsaw Ghetto sculpture—who stand above the level of the audience, on the low wall of beacons, to the very left of the tableau. By contrast, the Jews depicted in the bas-relief

no longer exist in this version of history—either they have been turned into survivors and perhaps fighters (who live in Israel), or they are dead “martyrs,” in the language of this day of remembrance. In any case, there is no mimetic embodiment of the category of martyr within the performance of the ritual—only the ghostly outlines of figures long past, frozen in the bronze of the bas-relief. When all the taxonomic categories are added together, category by category, they constitute a version of history that connects the annihilation of the Holocaust to the fighting response in the face of oppression, and connects the fighting response to the active, armed protection offered to Jews by the State of Israel (which is embodied by the Honor Guard and paramilitary youth, who protect the beacon-lighter survivors, all of them grasped within the protective envelope of the IDF, which safeguards the entire site).

### Taxonomy and the Three Generations

The section of the performative tableau that I am calling “the fighting response” is embodied in three distinct categories that are no less metaphysical and historical in their temporal linkage. These categories are those of three generations of fighters, which can be likened to the grandparental, the parental, and their offspring. The beacon lighters are analogous to the grandparental generation who, born in Europe, survived the Holocaust (often heroically), and made the decision to “ascend” to Israel, thereby making this their future, through which they aligned themselves with the generation of founders and pioneers.<sup>7</sup> They light the beacons of remembrance, which are also flames of destruction and sacrifice, rising and transcending, as it were, their own pasts. The Honor Guard of the IDF, standing near the beacon lighters, fixed bayonets at the ready, is composed of young soldiers who are doing their compulsory military service. They are analogous to the generation of children of the survivors, who have grown to maturity within Israel. They serve the state directly, in its uniform modality, honoring and protecting the generation of Holocaust survivors who themselves pioneered the Jewish fighting response in Europe and who later joined their efforts to those of the pioneers in Israel. The beacon lighters are handed their torches by the uniformed (but unarmed) paramilitary youth. The youth are analogous to the generation of Israeli Jewish grandchildren to whom belongs the more distant future. As they hand over the lit torches, the paramilitary youth (the still-unformed future) enable the beacon lighters (the past) to remember and to commemorate, all the while protected by the Honor Guard (the fighting present).

The narrative structures and the three-generational paradigm of remembrance are at the heart of the symbolism of the gathering; and they are encoded through the aesthetics of temporal rhythmicity, of low to high. I emphasize the aesthetics of temporality because, in terms of my earlier argument, it is aesthetics that enable the natural feel of the rightness of practice. The experiencing of the organization of categories in sequence as temporal—in a relationship of low to high—feels right in a fully natural sense in monotheistic cosmologies.

Neither the rhythmicity of Jewish time nor the paradigm of three generations is explicitly recognized in the ritual. The bureaucratic logic for the composition of symbolic meaning seems to require the specification and description of discrete taxonomic elements and categories. But beyond this, bureaucratic logic should enable the arbitrary combining or joining of categories to one another, in somewhat arithmetical ways, by bringing them into conjunction—added to, subtracted from, or mixed together. Yet, aesthetically, these taxonomic elements and categories are enabled to be practiced, felt, and experienced as moral rhythmicities of time. And, though in practice we recognize the rightness of these rhythms of temporality, they are also “more than we can know,” and therefore they encompass us aesthetically in ways that in their fullness of becoming are beyond our ken.

### **Bureaucratic Logic and the Planning of the Ritual**

The presence of bureaucratic logic is plainly evident in the comments of a planner and organizer of the early opening ceremonies of remembrance at Yad Vashem, which first used the Wall of Remembrance. He stated that the arrangement of taxonomic categories, in my terms, along the length of the Wall was primarily a matter of practicality, of a somewhat arbitrary positioning according to available space. Thus, one listed the elements needing to be included, without particular attention to the consequences of their particular positioning in relation to one another. So, once the decision was taken to use the Wall and the taxonomic categories I have mentioned, the only space sufficient for the six beacons was on the left side. Therefore, since the national Honor Guard defended/celebrated the beacon lighters, it too went to the left side. The national flag, then, also went to the left side, as did, of course, the paramilitary youth whose task it was to hand a lit torch to the beacon lighters. But then, all space on the left side was taken up, and the choir had to go to the right side, and so, too, did the orchestra. This disposition, said the organizer, “has no meaning.”<sup>8</sup>

The distribution along the Wall of categories of participation was done, approximately, according to the following thinking: first, decide which elements should be included in the ritual; second, arrange them in relation to one another so that they all fit into the available space/time. In this there is the arbitrary character of bureaucratic logic, yet also the tacit aesthetic perception (which accords with this logic) that like goes together with like. Once the beacons were positioned arbitrarily, the beacon lighters, Honor Guard, paramilitary youth, and flag also joined the beacons. All these elements fit together naturally; they belong together without much thought. Once they were brought into conjunction, their positioning in relation to one another—their symbolic interaction—immediately began to make emergent, perhaps even unintended, meaning (see Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman 1993). One result of this interactive making of meaning was the structuring of the doubled visual narrative; another was that which I am calling the paradigm of the three generations,

clustered about the flames of sacrifice, remembrance, and freedom. Relatively unrelated symbols brought serendipitously near to one another within contexts officially defined as symbolic are likely to be felt symbolically related to one another—they are felt, aesthetically, to fit together even if this remains implicit.

The organizers of the first Holocaust memorial ceremonies decided that a proper ritual of remembrance should include at least three discrete, taxonomic categories of symbolic activities, without specifying their relationship to one another. These categories were the following: (1) a category of actions mandatory for a religious memorial (the reciting of the mourner's prayer [*kaddish*], and of "God full of mercy" [*El maleh rahamim*]); (2) an "artistic" category (consisting of appropriate music and song); and (3) a category of speeches and readings. Music and songs, readings and speeches, were then mixed together and synchronized through alternation: a song followed a speech or reading, and so forth; while the religious practices were clustered toward the end of the ritual. In keeping with bureaucratic logic, these three categories were defined arbitrarily, yet their conjunction produced an aesthetically clean-cut alternation between words and song that felt right—perhaps in that it maintained the discreteness of speech and music, even as it brought them into conjunction. Furthermore, these secular practices were kept together in a broader category, separated from the category of religious practices, most of which were used to close the ritual.

### **Bureaucratic Aesthetics: Exactitude, Itemization, Modularity**

Bureaucratic aesthetics insist on the exactitude of definitions of categories, their borders cleanly demarcated in relation to one another, demonstrating their differences. In keeping with the aesthetics of exactness in division, the sequence of ritual action was divided into segments of measured time, to produce as perfect a synchronization as possible between these parts within ritual space. This aesthetics of exact division and combination, of parts fitting together as if in a machine, are what, above all, enabled the performers to be in the right place at the right time. In a way, this exactness of synchronization was the primary integrating force in this ritual, holding together pieces that otherwise might have little or no sense of connectivity with one another. Much of the logic of integration of this ritual is in the construction of time and space as formats, without which many of the parts marshaled for the ritual might well fly off symbolically in all directions, or trip over one another.

Crucial to this construction of integration is the role of the announcer. In the performance itself, one of the tasks of the announcers is to report the condition of synchronization in the ritual, by telling the audience which segment will perform next. This fully expresses the bureaucratic logic that informs the event, since the announcing of each segment is simultaneously an enunciation of the demarcation of its bounded modularity. The announcer does coordinate the ritual from within its own enactment—but, since the ritual is not organized systemically, the announcer (unlike the commander of the military envelope) has no capacity to modify its course. The

announcer may be more a representation of integration within the ritual, than a generating force that produces integration.

In this kind of event it is the extreme modularity of the contents or parts of the ritual that enables its construction and integration as a whole; and, so too, the capacity of its organizers to add and subtract modules almost at will. This is true, of course, for the arbitrariness of much of the practice of everyday life in social orders organized by bureaucratic logic, aesthetics, and apparatuses. There are, then, powerful continuities and similarities between the organization of the gathering and the organization of the everyday.

### The 1991 Memorial Gathering: Sequencing

In the 1991 gathering, there were twenty discrete segments. Their sequencing (and the time of each in minutes) was as follows:

1. entry of the Honor Guard (five minutes before the start of the ritual)
2. entry of the president of the state (2:00)
3. lowering the state flag to half-mast (2:30)
4. lighting the central memorial beacon by the president (3:00)
5. song by choir (2:00)
6. speech by the chairman of the Yad Vashem directorate (2:00)
7. song by choir (2:00)
8. speech by the director of Yad Vashem (2:00)
9. song by cantor, “God, God, why did you forsake us?” accompanied by the choir (3:00)
10. speech by the representative of partisans’ organizations (3:00)
11. speech by the prime minister (5:00)
12. reading of poem by an announcer (2:30)
13. song by choir (2:00)
14. lighting the six beacons (8:00, including the introductions of the announcer and accompanying music)
15. reading by an announcer of a text of the “live witnessing” (*edut haia*) of the massacre of Jews in the area of Pinsk, during World War II (3:00)
16. readings of psalms by the Sephardic chief rabbi of the state (2:00)
17. recitation of *Kaddish*, the mourner’s prayer for the dead (2:00)
18. song by cantor, *Yizkor*, the prayer of remembrance (6:00)
19. songs by choir (2:00)
20. singing of the national anthem, *Ha-Tikvah* (The Hope) (2:00)<sup>9</sup>

The total time formally allocated to the ritual is one hour and thirty seconds.

Like the tableau placed through space along the Wall, the sequence of acts through time is categorical, segmentary, and modular. Parts or segments can be inserted or

extracted with ease. The logic of connectivity among these modules and the sense of rightness of their performance apparently must be external to the ritual itself. That is, the ritual has no internal dynamics that are organic to it. Most segments have been rehearsed, and it is through this that participants learn about their roles in connection to other segments; but they have no mandate, say, for ad hoc improvisation if something should go wrong with the organization of time/space in performance. The bureaucratic logic and aesthetics of performance seems to require that, in their entirety, segments be externally administered by a director or organizer—in a functional sense, by bureaucrats who ensure that the performers of every category be in the right place at the right time for the correct duration.

Especially notable in the tableau of categories of persons and segments of practice is just how little kinesic movement there is by the performers and when there is motion, just how contained and restricted it is. Some categories of persons are glued in place throughout the event (Honor Guard, choir, orchestra). Others move very short distances (from the front row of the audience) to take fixed positions temporarily on the podia and behind the beacons. The contents of the taxonomic categories take up their assigned positions and remain rigidly in place. At all times the entire tableau is overt and visible to the gaze of the audience—and, of course, to the television camera that need hardly shift position in order to telecast the performance.<sup>10</sup> The performer is the (near) perfect embodiment of his category of membership in the performance—he neither expands nor restricts this, nor plays with this. Instead he always contributes to the vision of overall perfected taxonomic ordering. All of this speaks to a regime of discipline in aesthetic presentation that is beyond the nationalist and the statist but is closest to the bureaucratic ordering of people and things.

## Framing

Despite the segmented character of performance modules, there is some framing of sequence at the beginning and the end of the ritual. Yet this framing, too, is highly categorical and modular. As the representation of the protective might of the state, the IDF Honor Guard takes up position first, to await the entry of the president and prime minister, the ranking citizens of the state. Within the ritual, the Honor Guard, the military, anticipates the arrival of the civil state. The state flag is lowered to half-mast, signifying the entry of state and citizenry into mourning. The central memorial beacon is lit, signifying the entry of the people into remembrance. Though none of these symbolic acts are essential to such an event, their sequencing demonstrates the logic of the state's protective encompassment of the performance.

Thus, the people do not enter into remembrance until the state first enters into mourning. In these terms, the state controls, coordinates, and synchronizes the remembrance of the Holocaust. State control is practiced through the presentation, in sequence, of a taxonomy of categories of power (the Honor Guard), of authority (the president and prime minister), and of peoplehood (the central beacon). So, too, the

end of the event is practiced by the collective singing (by performers and audience members) of the national anthem—the ritual does not end until the state grants it closure. Though this framing signifies the control and power of the state throughout the ritual, the logic of categorization and connection in presentation is that of the bureaucratic. In other words, it is the way in which the bureaucratic mindset organizes the event as it does that enables the ritual to signify the control and power of the state as it does.

In these aesthetics of presentation the taxonomic categories are displayed and activated, one by one—each is a segment, discrete and quite self-contained, lacking dynamics of design that generate any organic momentum of performance. Just as each category of controlled and constrained formulaic action is added to the next, so, too, can the event be deconstructed into these segments without doing much violence to the event as a whole. Despite the variety of physical postures of the different categories of performers—standing on guard, sitting and holding musical instruments, standing and lighting a beacon, standing and orating, standing and singing—the very immobility and functionality of their embodiments, their movements, suggest that like proper functionaries they could all be seated behind a desk or stood behind a wicket. This ceremonial montage points to the resonance generated by bureaucratic logic in modern social orders like that of Israel with the ordering of society beyond the ritual site, almost without needing any inflection, let alone transformation.

### **Lighting the Memorial Beacons**

The taxonomics of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics organize the lengthiest segment of the ritual, its dramatic highlight, the lighting of the six memorial beacons. Each year a Yad Vashem committee chooses one or more themes to commemorate in the Memorial Gathering, the categories of persons who will represent this theme, and the actual persons who will embody these categories by igniting the beacons in the name of the theme. In 1991 the theme chosen was the fiftieth anniversary of the destruction of the Jewries of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Bukovina. In its deliberations, the committee emphasized that the Holocaust lives of those chosen had to be unique and striking, so as to attract the media. In the 1991 ritual, the beacon lighters numbered eleven (three beacons were each lit by two persons in unison, and another by three in unison). They had been military heroes, partisans, survivors of ghettos and escapees from concentration camps, children during the Holocaust (one, now a Supreme Court justice, hidden by a “peasant savior of souls”), the mother of a young child slaughtered at Babi Yar whose own mother had been murdered there, and a “righteous gentile” who made his home in Israel.<sup>11</sup> Each of these represented a particular segment of the destroyed Jewries of the themes, and each segment was declared as such by the announcers.

Despite the qualifications of heroism and suffering of the beacon lighters, and despite the death and pain they commemorated, this was enunciated in the announcers’

texts as the enumeration of a precise anatomy of horror and as a trait list of its attributes and locations.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the first beacon lighter was introduced by the following text (given here in part):

A full fifty years after the extermination of the Jews in the Soviet territories conquered by the Nazis, in memory of the Jews of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Byelorussia who were murdered . . . the murder of Ponar—near Vilna, the nine in Kovno, Rumbala—near Riga, Maly Trostinets—near Minsk, and many other places, ascending first to light the beacon is a new immigrant from the Soviet Union who was in a prisoner camp in the Minsk Ghetto, escaped and joined the partisans in the forests, one of the survivors of the concentration camp, Skarzysko.

This trait listing, together with those of other texts, seems to practice the premise that an enumeration of details at the microlevel of Nazi actions will produce a comprehensive vision of the multitude of catastrophes that today we call the Holocaust. (In this regard, see the critical comment by Jay [1992b: 103].) This kind of listing by categories that are cross-indexed, as it were, with other categories, is precisely one of the attitudes of bureaucratic logic, enabled by a bureaucratic aesthetic, which equates the addition and enumeration of mass with a holistic totality. This logic and its aesthetic of every detail in its proper place are commonplace in the organization of our lifeworlds.

## Conclusion

If events like the Memorial Gathering are organized through bureaucratic logic and the aesthetics of practice, then this makes a difference in the kinds of messages that the event can communicate. From the perspectives of the state, the organizers, and the audience, the Memorial Gathering is a moral project of the state, carried out in the name of the Jewish people. Given that the state is a Jewish one, the moral duty of its representatives is to remember the evils of the past—evils that fragmented and threatened the Jewish people—and to protect these fragments, as a whole, from threats in the present. This whole is, of course, more than the sum of its values. Crucial to this moral project is the practice of remembering the past. Here, remembering is cast as an itemization, an accounting of the past, occurrence by occurrence, point by point—perhaps an aesthetic double-entry bookkeeping of remembrance. Nonetheless, holism in turn requires ways of communicating its totalistic and comprehensive visions, ones that encompass the discrete itemizations of remembering.

I have argued throughout this chapter (and elsewhere) that bureaucratic logic is pervasive in the modern world and that it dominates what I call events of presentation. The practice of bureaucratic logic is enabled by the bureaucratic aesthetics of lineal organization, arithmetic modularity, exclusivist classification, and exactitude in itemization; and, for that matter, the invention of all these modalities. Thus, these

logical and aesthetic qualities of taxonomization dominate public events that are organized in ways similar to the Memorial Gathering. In the case of the gathering, the power of taxonomizing is brought home more clearly by the ways in which the military envelops the event through its own taxonomies. But the premises of taxonomy used by the military are no different from those used to organize the gathering, and, for that matter, both are quite similar to ones that are powerful, if more camouflaged, in the practice of daily life in social orders with prominent bureaucratic infrastructures. To no small degree, in keeping with taxonomic logic and aesthetics, the relationships between the practices of the ritual and the practices of daily life are fractal.

The elements used in the gathering are without a doubt highly symbolic—nevertheless, the practice of this kind of event depends on connections within and among taxonomies rather than on relationships that are organic, dynamic, and transforming. The bureaucratic message is made explicit in the visible tableau of the gathering. This message stresses the practice of exclusivist classification, fragmentation, and itemization, at the expense of the holism of the vision of remembrance. The state's holistic, moral project is shaped, modified, and fragmented by its passage through the organizing media of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics. The vision and feeling of the Holocaust stand rigidly at attention, open to minute inspection, petrified in place. The vision shifts toward the totalitarian in its presentation.

Ironically, bureaucratic logic and aesthetics contribute to separating the Jewish Holocaust from all other atrocities and to classifying it as the unique, historical occurrence of the planned extermination of an entire people—a category with a single member (indeed, a category that paradoxically is a member of itself and is therefore self-sealing and quite resistant to surrendering its self-referentiality, which augments its power exponentially). This exclusivist patterning, with all its inherent dangers (see, for example, Ophir 1987) resonates with the taxonomic treatment of profound tragedy that characterizes the Memorial Gathering. In this instance, bureaucratic logic and aesthetics support (indeed, nourish) the exclusivist state, nationalism, and remembrance that recursively gather themselves within themselves, an in-gathering that separates the Holocaust from too many other instances of human catastrophe.

In Israel, many persons both identify with and feel alienated from these state rituals. Part of our identification (even as this may repel us) is because we ourselves often are both the practitioners and the targets of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics in everyday life. The kinds of classification used, and the practice of their enabling, are common-sensically obvious to us in the way we live much of our lives. We are not reflexive about our practice of this logic nor about its aesthetic enablement—about our practice of practice. Another reason for our lack of reflexivity is the way in which scholars, in particular, philosophers and art historians, have framed off, classified, and separated aesthetics from its role in the practice of everyday life. It is this separation of aesthetics as a realm apart, one dominated by values of beauty and truth, by genres of art, literature, music, and so forth, that has focused scholarly and elitist reflexivity

almost exclusively on aesthetics per se, as a discrete domain of culture. In so doing, the intimate enabling of virtually all practice that aesthetics does, is lost.

The final point I will make points to intimations of lawfulness in the use of bureaucratic logic and aesthetics. One scholar, Michael King, has argued that in Western legal systems, law depends for its ontology on a binary code of lawful/unlawful, legal/illegal, and the like. To carry this a step further, law is a prime way of classifying everyday acts within exclusivist taxonomies, with great authority, and with powerful social and personal consequences. Legal systems operate to generate decisions that clarify conditions of vagueness, overlapping rights, allocations of responsibility, and so forth; and legal systems underwrite these decisions with lineal, ontological sanctification. King (1993: 223) suggests further that “any act or utterance that codes social acts according to this binary code of lawful/unlawful may be regarded as part of the legal system.” In other words, this logic of the legal system is much more embracing and totalizing than the formal system as such. Yet even more than this, the binary meets the criteria of exclusivist taxonomic classification. Therefore, this kind of taxonomic classification, which has a much broader range than the binary as such, can be substituted for the latter. Now, I have argued that the operation of such exclusivist logic points to the presence of bureaucratic logic. In my terms, then, the operation of bureaucratic logic in Western societies continually implicates the presence of lawfulness. Indeed, bureaucratic logic is itself authorized ontologically to a degree by a sense or feeling of lawfulness in producing and practicing the kind of lineal, taxonomic classification that it does. There is then an aesthetics, itself imbued with a sense of lawfulness, indeed, of rightness, that enables the practice of bureaucratic logic in everyday life. This is one modern version of aesthetics that enables practice—and one, I think, that helps to explain why the bureaucratic logic of classification used in the Memorial Gathering and in everyday life works on so many of us aesthetically. However, it might also explain why we may be so ambivalent to the practice of such classification, yet without knowing exactly and precisely why.

## Notes

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1. In other words, it is done like this because it is done like this—this is how it is felt to be done when one does it.
2. For my purposes here the difference between mundane practice and performance is that the latter is that of practice writ large, consciously and self-reflexively. Therefore, mundane practice slips in and out of performance, apart from the conscious shift into ritual, in which performance becomes the mundane.
3. This is so despite claims for the sacralizing qualities of all manners of ritual, including, for example, “secular ritual” (Moore and Myerhoff 1977). Not a few of the studies in that volume,

- with their focus on “ritual,” would have benefited from being analyzed in terms of bureaucratic logic.
4. The ethos of bureaucratic framing conditions all statist rituals in Israel. For an example of the collision between bureaucratic logic and popular sentiment, see the discussion of the funeral of the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, in Bilu and Levy (1993).
  5. In later years, a second state flag has been placed atop the Wall, above the bas-relief, as a symbol of the statist, national encompassment and transcendence of the sorrow symbolized by the suffering Jews, beneath.
  6. In later years, a large video screen has been hung on the Wall, above the Honor Guard, and is used for audiovisual contextualizations, for example, to personalize the introductions of the beacon lighters through autobiographical narratives of these persons, which were taped beforehand.
  7. The Hebrew term for Jewish immigration to Israel is *aliyah*, literally, ascent.
  8. Binyamin Arnon, interviewed at Yad Vashem by Noemi Lerner, 24 July 1991.
  9. By 1995, some of the speeches by functionaries had been taken out of the program.
  10. One may argue that the stronger sense of movement, of dynamics—archetypal, historicist—is located in the poetics of rhetoric, song, and prayer, which I do not discuss here. Nonetheless, the speeches are stilted; the songs, often old favorites; and the psalms and prayers, generic insertions into ritual.
  11. The honor of “righteous gentile” is bestowed by Yad Vashem (in the name of the state) on non-Jews who endangered their own lives by rescuing Jews during World War II.
  12. In this respect, the form of these introductions resembled the *Yizkor* prayer of remembrance that can be expanded to include a limitless listing of attributes to be remembered.

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