

INTRODUCTION

Situating the Ethos of History

STEFAN HELGESSON AND JAYNE SVENUNGSSON

History is no longer what it used to be. With the advent of poststructuralism in the 1970s, theorists of history would pay increasing attention to the forms, assumptions and disciplinary conditions of historiography, rather than the ‘thing itself’. This differed from earlier twentieth-century debates between, for example, liberal and Marxist historians who struggled over the very content and truth of history – its ontology, one might say. Regardless of ideological orientation, and irrespective of any pragmatic difficulties in securing archival evidence, the actuality of history as that which ‘really happened’ – to allude to Leopold von Ranke’s famous motto – was never really questioned in those earlier exchanges.

The poststructuralist turn unsettled this attachment to the real by re-framing history as a regime of knowledge and mode of representation rather than an empirical science; epistemology, not ontology, took the front seat. History could now be theorized in terms of ‘discourse’ (Foucault) or ‘meta-history’ (White), which unmoored old truth-claims. Instead of being authorized as the science of the past, history could be defined as irreducibly involved in the construction, distribution and exercise of power. Contrary to earlier varieties of ideology critique – the notion of ‘false consciousness’, after all, presupposed the possibility of truth – there was, in the most extreme versions of poststructuralist theory, nothing ‘behind’ the narrative of the past. Nothing, that is, besides the conventions of genre and the will to power that governed these conventions.

The strongest thinker in this vein was Hayden White, whose mark on the field is impossible to ignore. By questioning the authority that historical

accounts can claim ‘as contributions to a secured knowledge of reality’, he opened the doors to an extensive interrogation of disciplinary procedures and assumptions.¹ Challenging the Aristotelian opposition between history and fiction, White argued in his seminal essay ‘The Historical Text as Literary Artifact’ that it was the cultural expectations shaped by literary culture that enabled the ‘emplotment’, or the meaningful configuration of events, in historiography:

As a symbolic structure, the historical narrative does not *reproduce* the events it describes; it tells us in what direction to think about the events and charges our thought about the events with different emotional valences. The historical narrative does not *image* the things it indicates; it *calls to mind* images of the things it indicates, in the same way that a metaphor does. When a given concourse of events is emplotted as a ‘tragedy’, this simply means that the historian has so described the events as to *remind us* of that form of fiction which we associate with the concept ‘tragic’. Properly understood, histories ought never to be read as unambiguous signs of the events they report, but rather as symbolic structures, extended metaphors, that ‘liken’ the events reported in them to some form with which we have already become familiar in our literary culture.²

In this reversal of the priority between fiction and reality, formulated in the early 1970s, we glimpse already the full-blown questioning of historiography in its established forms. We also see how drastically limited White was at this stage to a Western frame of reference (and, as is evident elsewhere in *Tropics of Discourse*, to a patriarchal one). As time passed, however, poststructuralist critique dovetailed in unanticipated ways with modes of inquiry grounded in social activism – notably feminism and anticolonialism. This would result in landmark studies by scholars such as Joan Scott and Dipesh Chakrabarty, among others, who argued that the discipline of history was shaped by – and, in turn, contributed to shaping – flawed patriarchal and/or Eurocentric conceptions of history, which rendered invisible the subaltern and the female gendered subject.

In her influential article ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, Scott, for instance, pointed to the inadequacy of existing bodies of theory for explaining persisting inequality between men and women. While ‘women’s history’ certainly had had the effect of raising gender awareness among historians, it nonetheless left the basic tenets of patriarchal historiography unchallenged: gender was a useful tool for the study of things related to women, but seemed irrelevant to the thinking of historians concerned with issues of economics, politics and power. By contrast, Scott made a forceful claim for the importance of gender as an analytical category for all areas of history:

The subject of war, diplomacy, and high politics frequently comes up when traditional historians question the utility of gender in their work. But here,

too, we need to look beyond the actors and the literal import of their words. Power relations among nations and the status of colonial subjects have been made comprehensible (and thus legitimate) in terms of relations between male and female.³

Chakrabarty would also occasionally incorporate gender in his analyses, but his main argument addressed the imperialist underpinnings of ‘historicist’ thinking. Famously, he maintained that histories of India, Kenya, China and so on, ‘tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called “the history of Europe”’.⁴ Beholden to a European conception of modernity, with predetermined roles assigned to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and/or the enlightened citizen of the liberal state, the unfolding history of the postcolonial state would always be found lacking. The historian’s task was therefore as philosophical and theoretical as it was empirical: the excavation of the hidden history of India by the Subaltern Studies Group (to which Chakrabarty was affiliated) would court failure unless it was accompanied by a rigorous questioning of the basic categories and concepts of modernity.

Although neither Scott nor Chakrabarty were making strong claims about the unknowability or fictionality of history, it is notable that their studies were marked by the double bind of using the institutional site of the discipline in order to interrogate the discipline. At an early stage in his undertaking to ‘provincialize Europe’, this led Chakrabarty to speak of a ‘politics of despair’ born out of a realization of the project’s very impossibility.⁵ He would soon distance himself from such pessimism, but it is worth reexamining this moment of despair from where we stand today, almost two full decades into the new millennium.⁶ Why, after all, did Chakrabarty feel that he could abandon the politics of despair? One explanation might be that the entire project of rethinking history was far more successful than he or anyone else had anticipated. Perhaps imperialist teleologies and patriarchal narratives now finally do belong in the past, championed by no one with an authoritative position in the discipline. And perhaps the very boundaries of the discipline are less clear-cut than before, with countless interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary overlappings between history, theology, philosophy, media studies, literary studies, memory studies and so on underway, productively enabling ever new forms of historical inquiry.

And so they lived happily ever after? Not quite: one of the great ironies of our age is that the fundamental gesture of questioning hegemonic narratives has proven to be perfectly adaptable to other, distinctly reactionary, political agendas. In the post-truth era of presidents Putin and Trump, ‘alternative facts’ (also known as lies) are brazenly presented as the thing-in-itself, as that which indeed happened, even when everyone knows that it did not.⁷ When media reports fail to comply with their political interests, ‘alternative media’ step in to support them. Long-standing public agreements about the

relationship between utterances and events have become tenuous, sometimes perilously so, in a distorted echoing of elements of poststructuralist theory. It would seem that current developments have confirmed the validity of the rhetorical question that Bruno Latour directed at the academic community already in 2004: 'While we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the *illusion* of prejudices?'⁸

We stand to be accused of comparing apples and oranges here: on the one hand advanced critique of academic historiography, on the other political demagoguery. Yet both developments force us to reflect on how the authority of the public truth-claim relates to the ethical commitment to justice. If postcolonial and feminist critique interrogated truth-claims in the name of justice, what we are witnessing with many current iterations of political populism is the undermining of justice through the manipulation of truth. The difference here is everything, and the shift we are experiencing today seems to restore to the question of truth some of the gravitas it had lost in the heyday of poststructuralism. Allow us at least to entertain this, optimistically, as one possible outcome of current events.

With the present volume, we invite the reader to engage more extensively, in our shared present, with complex relations between historiography, justice, gender, postcoloniality and notions of time. By the 'ethos of history', the title gestures towards both 'place' and 'character' as dimensions of history – recognizing thereby that such a place and character are caught up in a constant process of disciplinary and political renegotiations of the historian's responsibility. In the Greek tradition from which we derive the term, 'ethos' relates to something else than merely externally observable behaviour. Rather, it is to be understood as a disposition that makes certain types of behaviour more likely than others. Put differently, there is a *moral* dimension to both individual and collective forms of ethos that, insofar as it becomes an object of self-reflection, invites an interrogation also of the value of character. For Aristotle, 'excellence of character' is 'the settled condition we are in when we are well off in relation to feelings and actions', whereas with a vicious character this balance between feelings and external actions is disrupted.⁹ Perhaps it is this notion of ethos as a complex relationality that we can transpose to the field of history and the labour of critique. An ethos of history can only form through a web of relations between an emplaced subject – the historian, the reader, the citizen – and a range of other phenomena: temporal, disciplinary, cultural, political. Such relations are never just voluntary; nor are they rigidly predetermined. Rather – and this is where the contributions to this volume all in their diverse ways speak to our theme – 'character' is formed precisely in the engagement with and resistance against

those multiple relations. (In this regard, 'ethos' comes close to the 'structuring structure' of Bourdieu's notion of habitus.)¹⁰ Hence, the critical projects outlined above could be described as moments when the ethos transforms as a consequence of its own reflexivity. A 'vicious character' – to remain with Aristotle's vocabulary – would simply reproduce old patterns of patriarchal and colonial thinking, whereas an ethos worth its salt also entails a preparedness for change. By the same token, however, a settled ethos of history will not accept change as a value in and of itself, but will gauge the worth and urgency of particular changes.

Emerging from a transdisciplinary research programme in Sweden that ran from 2010 until 2015 (and also, more specifically, the conference 'The Ethos of History', held in Sigtuna, Sweden, in September 2015), the contributions here engage in diverse ways with the disciplinary expansion and transformation of history and, more broadly, historical thought. They present in this way a sampling of how the ethos of history has become a concern in our day across a surprising range of academic fields. It should be noted that neither of the two editors are historians by training; of the contributors, only a few work within the strict disciplinary domain of history. This could be seen as a limitation. More importantly, however, it manifests the multiple ways in which history matters across diverse disciplines and intellectual traditions.

There are several ways of understanding this transdisciplinarity. The intersections between history, on the one hand, and literary, postcolonial and gender theory, on the other, have already been mentioned. But other developments, such as the burgeoning field of cultural memory studies, the renewed interest in the philosophy of history and the temporal turn in media studies, must also be mentioned.¹¹ Clearly, the globalized, postcolonial and mediatized present in which multiple 'we's' live has produced a need for numerous reconfigurations of the scholarly approach to the past.

One of the most significant developments, reflected in all the contributions to this volume, is the renewed interrogation of time. Taking its cue from such various sources as hermeneutics, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, the process-oriented philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of past and present in *Specters of Marx* (an important point of reference for many contributors), the contemporary debate on historical time revolves mainly around three issues: nonlinearity, noncoincidence and immanence.¹² Moving away from the universal, public time of earlier conceptions of history, theoretical formulations today have moved decisively towards an understanding of time as embodied and experienced.¹³ This emphasis, in turn, has enabled a thoroughgoing questioning of both assumed linearity and coincidence. History, we have learnt, does not move in a straight line, nor is it uniform. 'Progress' in one part of the world or for

one sector of society will have another meaning for its 'others'. The relationship between what Reinhart Koselleck taught us to think of as the space of experience (the past) and the horizon of expectation (the future), has turned out to be far more multiform and changeable than the hegemonic narrative of modernity once allowed.¹⁴

A consequence of this interrogation is also that the ethical dimension of history has powerfully been brought to the fore. The bulk of the essays presented here locate themselves precisely at this nexus of time and (in)justice. In their various ways, they all demonstrate that it is the unfinished business of colonial conquest, racism, gender oppression and the Holocaust that make the past 'stick'. The after-effects of what had apparently been superseded by an enlightened liberal order – Francis Fukuyama's notion of the 'end of history' – have arguably become more palpable than ever and brought about a significant shift in the ethos of history.

Before exploring further the nature of this shift, however, we should remind ourselves that also history has a history. In the first chapter, Aleida Assmann returns to the beginning of Western historiography in early modernity and gives an overview of its major paradigms, from the 'critical ethos' of the Renaissance humanists, through the 'objectivist ethos' guiding the professionalization of historiography in the nineteenth century, and on to more recent shifts that have emerged in response to the violent pasts of European modernity. Changes in the historical ethos, Assmann suggests, 'happen whenever the relationship between history, politics and society is at stake and has to be readjusted'. The second chapter, coauthored by Claudia Lindén and Hans Ruin, can be read as an intriguing case study of this observation. The authors take us back to the late eighteenth century and point to the era's ambivalent relation to the past. This is the period when humanity grants itself a history in the sense of a temporal axis on which everything has its fixed chronological place. It is also, however, a period that is striving for the past to be not wholly past but in some sense still living, as can be seen in the era's fascination with classical antiquity, medieval legends, ruins and, last but not least, *vampires*. The thought-provoking thesis of this essay, explored through a close reading of three emblematic literary works, is that the vampire, as a creature that respects neither the boundary between life and death nor conventional historical chronology, in an essential way captures the period's inner tensions with regard to the past.

Not only vampires, but the past in general haunts us, as Derrida forcefully made us aware with his neologism 'hauntology' (*hantologie*), and it is in this ghostly guise that it places demands on the present.¹⁵ This is one lesson to be learnt from the growing field of testimonial literature, but also from the more general urge to heed to victims' demand for justice through memory politics, truth and reconciliation commissions or even outright legal

processes. As the past increasingly has become an arena for moral, political and even legal claims, historians have been faced with new challenges. These developments have called not only for a renegotiation of the detached posture traditionally ascribed to the responsible historian vis-à-vis the past, but also for a critical reflection on the sometimes strained relation between historical time, ethical time and the time of jurisprudence.

The two subsequent essays address these challenges in diverse ways. Taking her cue from the postwar debates in Germany and France about the applicability of statutory limitation to Nazi crimes, Victoria Fareld explores how the temporal space opened up by the legal notion of imprescriptibility has forced historians to raise questions about the relation between history and justice: 'Against a notion of the past as irreversibly and definitively gone, and which has been constitutive of conventional historical time, the idea of the imprescriptible has made visible another temporality in which the events of the past can be invoked as possible to act upon as if they were dimensions of the present.' Although legal definitions of crime, punishment and guilt should not determine the historian's relation to the past, the appearance of the principle of imprescriptibility has nevertheless contributed to a critical awareness among historians that their task is not primarily to reconstruct an absent past, but to deal with a past that lingers in the present and that can even be acted upon morally and legally.

That the idea of a past that can 'be acted upon' is not unambiguous is further explored by Berber Bevernage. Shifting the focus slightly, Bevernage turns to the increasingly influential idea (among policy makers, activists, therapists and academics) of 'historical dialogue' and 'shared histories' as ways to build peace and foster reconciliation in former or present conflict areas. As is revealed through an array of examples from the past decades, the various epistemic positions and narrative strategies of these endeavours differ essentially in their political motivation. Nevertheless, they all seem to rely on a specific philosophy of history: 'one in which historical conflict is not primarily caused by conflicting material interests or structural injustices but conflicting identities and perceptions.' The author asks whether this underlying antimaterialist approach does not in fact run the risk of diverting our attention from other causes of conflict – such as socioeconomic inequality, underdevelopment, economic exploitation or occupied territories – and calls for a more materialist approach, not in the sense of a return to a 'positivist or anti-narrativist approach', but rather in the form of 'a new political theory of narratives which indicates asymmetrical power relations in historical dialogue by focusing on narrative inequality and unequal control over means of narrative production'.

While a certain 'spirit' or 'spectre' of Marx – to refer once more to Derrida – may help us to navigate between positivist and relativist accounts of

history, Freud might offer the historian yet another way to steer a course between Scylla and Charybdis. Reflecting back on her own intellectual trajectory, Joan Scott relates how Freud's insistence on the ultimate indeterminacy of all knowledge has been a lasting source of inspiration for her own critical work as an historian. That being said, Freud himself was far from consistent on this matter. As Derrida observed in *Archive Fever*, there is in Freud a constant tension between the critical thinker who sought to undermine the modern myth of the rational self and the *Wissenschaftler* who claimed to pin down the truth behind the analysand's 'irrational' experiences and thereby only reinforced the hubris of modern rationalism.¹⁶ If there is a 'spirit' of Freud worth preserving, then, it is rather the 'post-Freudian Freud' – Freud read through the lenses of poststructuralism, feminism and postcolonialism, but also through the inner tensions of his own thinking. Applied to historiography, Scott suggests, the critical role of psychoanalysis may consist in attempting 'to account for the unconscious motives that play into and define what counts as an event or a fact, and that colour the debates – on all sides – about their meaning'.

Intriguingly, the detour through psychoanalysis has also refined Scott's notion of gender as a 'category for historical analysis' (see above). If in her earlier works 'gender' had the character of a fixed diagnostic category, in her more recent work, while no less fundamental, it has mainly an *unsettling* function, offering an approach that 'opens us to new readings of the past' and 'also reminds us that those readings are never entirely definitive, never the last word'. This destabilizing potential of the gender concept moves to centre stage in the following chapter by Kristina Fjelkestam, which explores a trajectory leading from first-wave feminism's preoccupation with gendered temporalities to more recent notions of queer temporality, including a focus on desire as an essential driving force behind all history writing. The answer to the question in her title – Does time have a gender? – is emphatically yes, and this needs to be factored into our historiographical critique. While admitting that the promotion of 'affective historiography' is not without its risks in an era of rising nationalism and concomitant ideological exploitation of the past, Fjelkestam argues that 'desire' nevertheless allows us to gain a conceptual foothold on the anachronistic, plural and multilayered nature of temporality.

But what about the *undesirable* past, the repulsive parts of our 'own' history and the painful history of others? In a trenchant reflection on how the colonial past lives on in the Brazilian present, Patricia Lorenzoni reminds us of the limits of academic writing when it comes to doing justice to the historical pain of others. Her essay is also, however, an exploration of possible ways of expanding these limits through nonacademic practices of narrating history. In the case of Brazil, one such practice is found in the

forceful tradition of liberation theology, channelled through the Catholic indigenist mission. In particular, Lorenzoni focuses on the 1973 document *Y-Juca-Pirama*, authored in the spirit of the Second Vatican Council and signed by a large group of Brazilian bishops and missionaries. While many historians, when addressing indigenous history in Brazil, have tended to reiterate the colonial impulse of viewing the *índio* as destined to disappear with the coming of colonial modernity, the document offers a relentless critique of colonial violence and emphasizes indigenous resistance. But it does not end there. On the last pages, the fate of the *índio* is juxtaposed with the suffering, death and resurrection of Christ, whereby a ‘prophetic temporality’ is activated, a temporality that not only disallows us from letting the victim perish into the past, but also in some way makes the missionary coeval with their own conqueror ancestors.

In ways that resonate strongly with Lorenzoni’s essay, Stefan Helgesson also investigates the resistant – if not directly emancipatory – capacities of prophetic temporality, but now as a narrative rather than theological modality. Focusing on the work of three writers from Brazil and South Africa – Euclides da Cunha, Olive Schreiner and Thomas Mofolo – the guiding assumption in this chapter is that the European high-imperial moment around 1900 was marked by brutal contradictions between spaces of experience and horizons of expectation in the plural. Hence, the expectation of progress among segments of mainly European and/or white creole populations had its counterpart in the horizon of *extinction* for colonized and racialized others – either literally, through death, or figurally, through disenfranchisement and cultural assimilation. The larger question broached by this chapter concerns, therefore, how narrative form can contend with a hegemonic horizon of expectation. Helgesson’s main claim is thus that the narrative ordering of time – particularly in the form of prophecy – has the capacity to exploit and expose the contradictions of the temporal regime of colonial modernity (particularly its narrativization of genocide and extinction) and allows a ‘radical time’ of decoloniality to be intimated.

The three concluding essays return us in various ways to some pressing issues in our present cultural condition. As already noted, this is not only an era in which lies are substituted for truth and serious news reporting is spurned as ‘fake news’. It is also a time when the profoundly ethical impulses of the identitarian movements of the past decades are turned into aggressive assertions of ‘superior’ identities, be it in the form of white supremacist ideologies, violent Islamist groupings or the numerous nationalist movements on the rise in Europe and elsewhere. These developments confront historians – indeed, any scholar – with entirely new challenges. To put it sharply: all the good intentions of pluralistic historiography, memory politics and discussions about cultural heritage notwithstanding, is there a not risk that

we play into the hands of segregating forces? How do we prevent that the replacement of a hegemonic notion of History with a plural vision of ‘histories’ only ends up reproducing the very idea of history it seeks to undermine?

It is in the light of such self-reflexive questions that Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback suggests that it has become time to interrogate the notion of ‘engagement with history’, current in many institutional, political, academic and aesthetic discourses. Faced with the challenges of an increasing ideological investment in the past, it is not enough to write history with political engagement. What is needed today is rather ‘engaged history’, a critical reflection on how even our best efforts to commemorate what history has destroyed constantly run the risk of ossifying the past in ways that ultimately disengage us from history. Inspired by Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of ‘engaged literature’, Cavalcante Schuback calls for a new relation between theory and practice, for a kind of critique that does not allow us to place ourselves at a safe distance from concrete situations and experiences: ‘What I am proposing is that history is indeed a risk, a risk that history is perhaps nothing but engageability itself. As such, it is what refuses fixing in strong figures and fast determinations, for it is permanently passing.’

From these more general reflections, Alana Vincent proceeds in her essay to draw attention to a specific instance of how public acts of memorialization may in fact overshadow the complexity of concrete historical experiences. In the wake of tragedies such as the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in Paris in 2015 or the New York grand jury’s decision (at about the same time) not to indict white police officers who had been filmed choking a black man to death, the world has seen an outpouring of digital sentiments expressed in Facebook statuses, Twitter updates and hashtags. While admitting that such commemorative acts may indeed be expressions of true sentiments of solidarity, Vincent also points to the precariousness of the kind of collective identity assumed by digital utterances such as ‘je suis Charlie’ or #ican’tbreathe. Since online interaction is stripped of many of the identity markers (ethnic, gendered, religious or class related) that inform judgement offline, it tends to acquire a claim to neutrality eroding the individual identities upon which any substantial solidarity must rest. Rather than hailing the redemptive potential of digital culture, Vincent therefore expresses concern that the underlying assumption of homogeneity in social media leads to a retreat from the negotiations of difference required by public life, at worst causing actual victims to disappear from view.

If there is a common ethos of the essays presented so far, it might be summarized as an overarching attempt to reconsider the past in terms of justice, desire, pain or engagement. But if we are to understand our rapidly changing world, perhaps we ought to reconsider the very idea that history is – or should be – exclusively about the past (or the past’s presence today).

This, at least, is the bold proposition of the final essay of this volume. In contrast to the prevailing focus among historians on the past or the past's presence, Zoltán Boldizsár Simon sets out to defend the thesis that history is equally as much about the future as about the past; 'that *we cannot even think historically without having a vision of the future in the first place*'. This is not a plea for a return to earlier theologies and philosophies of histories, which presupposed a rather fixed vision of the future and relied on a teleological conception of history. It is, however, an attempt to say that our present-day concept of history to some extent needs to tally with the vision of the future that is de facto influencing people's way of making sense of the world and of themselves as historical beings. This vision, Boldizsár Simon suggests, can today – at least in the Western world – above all be found in a radically unknowable technological future.

A time-traveller from the 1960s (to conclude by way of an anthropomorphic anachronism) would perhaps recognize this sublime, technological vision of the future as unknowable. They would be more surprised to confront our present-day preoccupation with philosophies of history and, above all, our persistent preoccupation with the past. To allude to Hamlet's famous lament, the time that we call ours is indeed out of joint, and the task of setting it right is far more precarious than the long parenthesis of the modernist ideology of progress once made it seem. The temporal, geographical and methodological range of the contributions to this volume is indicative of the scope of this challenge. We are living in an age when the ethos of history is being put to the test more insistently, and certainly on a more planetary scale, than perhaps ever before. Granted, the experienced urgency of the 'now' might be as old as historiography itself, but that does not make it any less salient as we contemplate the disorientating, literally un-settling, horizons of expectation of our present.

Stefan Helgesson is professor of English at Stockholm University. His work has dealt with southern African literature in English and Portuguese, Brazilian literature, postcolonial theory, translation theory and theories of world literature. He is the author of *Writing in Crisis: Ethics and History in Gordimer, Ndebele and Coetzee* (2004) and *Transnationalism in Southern African Literature* (2009), has edited volume four of *Literary History: Towards a Global Perspective* (2006) and is coeditor (with Pieter Vermeulen) of *Institutions of World Literature: Writing, Translation, Markets* (2015). He is currently leading the Swedish research initiative 'Cosmopolitan and Vernacular Dynamics in World Literatures'.

Jayne Svenungsson is professor of systematic theology at Lund University (Sweden). Her research is focused on philosophy and theology of history as

well as on political philosophy and theology. She is the author of *Divining History: Prophetism, Messianism and the Development of the Spirit* (2016) and coeditor of *Jewish Thought, Utopia and Revolution* (2014) and *Monument and Memory* (2015).

Notes

1. H. White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 81.
2. White, *Tropics*, 91.
3. J.W. Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', *The American Historical Review* 91(5) (1986), 1073.
4. D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27.
5. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 45.
6. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 46.
7. N. Fandos, 'White House Pushes "Alternative Facts"'. Here Are the Real Ones', *New York Times*, 22 January 2017.
8. B. Latour, 'Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', *Critical Inquiry* 30 (2004), 227.
9. M. Homiak, 'Moral Character', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Accessed 9 October 2017.
10. P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 170.
11. See M. Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); C. Lorenz and B. Bevernage (eds), *Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2013); A. Rigney, *The Afterlives of Walter Scott* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); L. Bond, S. Craps and P. Vermeulen (eds), *Memory Unbound: Tracing the Dynamics of Memory Studies* (New York: Berghahn, 2017); recent issues of *History and Theory*; J. Durham Peters, *The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015).
12. J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, trans. P. Kamuf (London: Routledge, 2006).
13. R. West-Pavlov, *Temporalities* (London: Routledge, 2013).
14. R. Koselleck, "'Space of Experience" and "Horizon of Expectation": Two Historical Categories', in *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. K. Tribe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 267–88.
15. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*.
16. J. Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

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