It is November 1955. Gyuri, a young Hungarian basketball player, is on a train traveling to a provincial city south-east of Budapest. The incessant sound of a man snoring in his compartment bothers him so much that he decides to step out. The connection between the passive state of sleep and his decision to leave the scene unexpectedly triggers in Gyuri the desire to put behind him the whole experience of living under communism by “sleep[ing] through the entire thing, only [to] wake up when everything ha[s] changed.” What bothers Gyuri most is the boredom of life under communism. He muses that the “[d]ictatorship of the proletariat [in Hungary], apart from the abrasive and brutal nature of its despotism, was terribly dull.” One train of thought leads to another, and Gyuri concludes that socialism was simply “not the sort of tyranny you’d want to invite to a party.”

Although Gyuri is a fictional character from Tibor Fischer’s *Under the Frog*, a 1992 British novel inspired by the experiences of the author’s parents in Stalinist Hungary, his thoughts on that train ride in November 1955 might have well been shared by many Eastern Europeans who experienced everyday life under communism. In the case of the communist regimes established in Eastern Europe after World War II, the issue of controlling citizens’ everyday lives turned into a matter of both ideological and political imperative. One’s day was supposed to be shaped by an internalization of the communist ideology, expressed through a denial of subjective agency in favor of an unconditional embrace of collectivist ideals. In this sense, the individuals’ everyday thoughts and actions in the newly Sovietized satellite states were supposed to overlap with and conform to a reality shaped by ideological expectations and precepts. As historian A.E. Rees writes, “Stalin spoke of the Soviet state as a ‘monolith’ with every person acting as a cog (*vintik*) in a great machine,
exemplifying what Engels had characterized as ‘barracks socialism’ with its 
*étatisme*, regimentation and uniformity.”

The authors of this volume argue that attempts to achieve a monolithic 
control of the everyday under Stalinism gave birth to attempts to evade its 
overbearing pressure. Recent scholarship on Stalinist societies has emphasized 
that even at the height of post-war attempts to impose ideological uniformity 
and conformity in the states making up the Soviet Bloc, and in spite of the 
continuous use of violence and coercion by state officials, there was room for 
popular dissent, grassroots resistance, and differences of opinion. It is impor-
tant for students of Eastern European history to understand that people liv-
ing under communism constantly sought ways to challenge the system from 
within on an everyday basis. Visitors to castle museums in late 1940s–early 
1950s Czechoslovakia could, for instance, laugh at the jokes museum guides 
told, instead of listening attentively to their propagandistic preambles. In an-
other geographic context, that of Stalinist Romania, party officials could leave 
the stifling halls of power in Bucharest in order to practice nudism and carve 
out a bohemian lifestyle in a remote village located on the Black Sea coast. 
It is true that such domestic diversions and pastimes fit more in the context 
of the thaw, a concerted effort made between the mid-1950s and the early 
1960s by Nikita Khrushchev and reformist party officials to open up the 
Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites to more interaction with the 
West—a policy that was paired with an unprecedented emphasis on socialist 
consumption and improvements in people’s living standards. But even when 
the strong ideological pressures and controls characteristic of the hardcore 
Stalinist period weakened in the more liberal and emancipated atmosphere of 
the thaw, the fundamental tension between a conformist everyday dominated 
by ideology and an escape into individual expression and enjoyment contin-
ued to characterize life under socialism. However, the intensity and ability of 
persons to escape into a different realm of experience varied according to the 
impact of domestic and international developments on everyday life within 
the Eastern Bloc as a whole (such as the events of June 1953 in East Germany, 
those of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961, the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the spread of intellectual 
dissidence in several Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, the 
rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the continuous rivalry be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), as well 
as country by country.

Discussions of any attempt to transgress officially established boundaries 
need to take into account such chronological and regional discrepancies. At 
the same time, as post-Stalinist regimes became more permeable to ideas, 
forms of consumption, music, and fashions originating in the West, and
more responsive to the needs and the desires of a new generation of people that came of age two decades after World War II, the nature and content of people’s leisure pursuits turned into a hotly contested field. While officials were interested in regulating the way people spent their free time, members of the post-war generation saw leisure venues as opportunities for expressing themselves more freely. During the late 1950s and 1960s, new mass leisure practices, such as tourism, hitchhiking, wild camping, listening to jazz, dancing to beat and rock and roll tunes, and the wearing of tight-fitting jackets and jeans, symbolized the youth’s quest for everyday pleasures, adventure, and nonconformism, not just in the West, but in the Eastern Bloc as well. These leisure pursuits and countercultural ways of life allowed people to “escape” socialism “without leaving it.” This escapist mindset persisted even as the last two decades of socialism brought with them new challenges. In a period of economic and political stagnation and new repressive measures in the cultural sphere, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the revival of a stronger ideological stance and renewed controls over free time and some leisure activities; however, a new youth generation’s quest for its own ways of expression (exemplified, for instance, by the embrace not just of rock and roll, but punk and heavy metal lifestyles) continued to simmer underneath the cauldron of socialist party politics.

Framing these developments from the perspective of the impact they had on people’s everyday lives and their relationship to politics can tell us more about the nature of living under socialism. The study of everyday life has an illustrious lineage in historiography. From Anglo-Saxon practitioners of history written “from below” and German Alltagsgeschichte historians to Italian practitioners of microhistory, and historians belonging to the fourth generation of the Annales School in France, scholars have examined the subversive and emancipatory potentials of everyday life in various historical and geographic contexts. In spite of this, and until very recently, research on everyday life under socialism was scarce. The most important recent breakthroughs concern the early years of the Soviet Union and post-Second World War East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The study of everyday life in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been especially fecund and inspiring lately.

Taking cue from these studies, this volume bridges an important gap by offering coverage of more than just one socialist state in Eastern Europe. We hope that with its focus on East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, this volume will encourage further comparative interest in the study of everyday life under socialism. In order to achieve this, we have adopted a narrower focus. Instead of considering the sites of everyday life broadly by visiting important locales of people’s socialization under so-
cialism such as the factory, school, and domestic spaces, or by looking at the important issue of gender relations or socialist fashion and consumption, we examine it from the perspective of people’s attempts to acquire their own agency in the field of culture, leisure, and entertainment and the state’s attempt to control, monitor, and shape—in turn—these escape venues.

As a growing literature suggests, struggle and resistance were important components in both the building and dismantling of socialism. People resisted socialism in various ways. In their recent collection of essays, *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe*, Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe identify national communism, intellectual dissent, armed peasant resistance, and popular protests against communist rule as four different types of resistance against the socialist system. Unlike the well-known cases of popular protest that occurred in East Germany in 1953, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, or the spread of intellectual dissent and civil disobedience predominant in the events of the Prague Spring in 1968, and later in the activity of underground groups such as the Czech Charter 77 and the Polish Solidarity movement, escapes from the dull everyday life of socialism represented a softer (and therefore less examined) form of dissent against the socialist system. The paradox of many of the escapes discussed in this volume is that initially they were “socialist” escapes in the sense that they were often initiated by communist officials and only later embraced and turned into escape venues by the masses living under socialism. Authorities did not organize breaks and excursions solely to control, indoctrinate, and pacify the masses, but also to entertain and provide pleasure. State socialism did not question whether or not one should be able to escape, but rather how one should escape, with whom, and to what purpose. Through state-sponsored escapes, communist officials sought to both secure political legitimacy and fulfill the socialist promise of the so-called “good life” as a reward for labor, albeit often within the context of what bureaucrats deemed “productive leisure.” The attempt made by party officials in Poland and Bulgaria to teach workers how to enjoy relaxation in a natural setting could be considered relevant in this regard. Even daily escapes that groups and individuals initiated in spite of and against the teachings of the party, such as nudism, excessive smoking and drinking, the wearing of jeans, and listening to and dancing to Western music, could still be described as “socialist” because they developed in a spirit of defiance to state prohibitions, and as such they would be less meaningful if examined in a different context.

Overall, the concept of an escape is useful in understanding socialist leisure, entertainment, and recreation for several reasons. Whether physical or cognitive, escapes are conscious actions. They often involve planning and goal setting, both in the case of typical weekend activities and escapes of a more
extraordinary variety that included travel. As highly intentional acts, escapes are a useful tool for investigating state, group, and individual goals and motivations, as well as conformity and resistance. It is important to keep in mind that even in cases where state authorities expected nominal participation or planned escapes for employees or children, individuals were capable of independent action and had the ability to attach different meanings to leisure, recreation, and travel. Ultimately, the various escapes discussed in this volume commonly share breaks from labor, factory, office, or domestic duties, which also strengthened people’s individual agency under socialism.

Through the lens of people’s attempts to escape the boredom of life under socialism, we can better understand how average people experienced and reacted to state policies in their everyday lives. The escapes offer us new avenues to explore the effectiveness of state efforts to engineer society and win legitimacy among average people through leisure, entertainment, and related forms of cultural programming and consumption. They help us identify ways in which some Eastern Europeans found opportunities for enjoyment, agency, and self expression while living under repressive rulers in poorly managed shortage economies. While state-controlled escapes integrated political ideology with play, the development of parallel, non-sanctioned escapes provides a window into popular dissatisfaction, subcultures, and a degree of autonomy and independent identity formation in Cold War Eastern Europe. These escapes can also be described as reactions to the stifling processes of ideological routinization imposed from above and expected to be adhered to on an everyday basis. The very imposition of such everyday routines played a very important role in causing the population to develop a set of particular reactions to them. As sociologist Don Slater writes, “discourses on routine should be considered as performative, and processes of routinization (whether successful or resisted) centrally involve participants in taking an attitude to routinization itself: that is to say, the notion of ‘routine’ is topicalized by actors themselves, and this is consequential in the production (or the flouting) of routine.”  

In addition to their performative and cultural dimension, however, people’s escape from meaningless socialist rhetoric and routine into the world of meaningful leisure activities also had a strong spatial component. As the essays in this volume document, the escapes that people engaged in under socialism unfolded along a spectrum of multiple spatialities: space between the past and the present, geographic space, space to be travelled through, space to be discovered and incorporated, space to be enjoyed, space to be lit up, and space to be controlled. Their broader context can thus be defined along a continuum that stretched from the cultural realm to the spatial, kinetic, and physical components of everyday living.
Concert Halls and Estate Museums

In addition to the enforced policies of industrialization, collectivization, and state management of the economy, the Sovietization of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s led to the adoption of the Stalinist concept of kul’turnost’ (culturedness) as an ideal to be attained by workers. Kul’turnost’ was a model for the “inculcation of [socialist] disciplines” that, according to Vadim Volkov, “proceeded without recourse to open violence or terror.”19 As the socialist parties of Eastern Europe called upon the working class to replace the dominance of old elites with its own cultural hegemony, cultural sophistication required workers to master a broad body of knowledge and engage in specific practices that were meant to become routine. In addition to paying attention to personal hygiene, taking care of their personal appearance, and reading Soviet literature, socialist regimes also required workers to take trips to museums and attend cultural events.20 The emphasis communist parties in Eastern Europe placed on the latter is well-documented.21 The gap between desire and reality, however, was often considerable.

Creating a socialist culture required not just the self-education of the masses, but their adoption of a socialist spirit.22 Therefore, in the sphere of arts and culture, writers, painters, sculptors, and musicians were expected to write, paint, sculpt, and compose music according to the guiding principles of socialist realism, a literary and artistic style that was supposed to be easily understood by the masses, and thus forge a strong bond between intellectuals and the working class under the auspices of the party. Socialist realism had a strong propagandistic content.23 While works of art and literature painted glorious portraits of working class heroes, the regime asked musicians to collaborate and rally the masses through the production of a large amount of “sonic propaganda.”24 In Stalinist Romania, for instance, as Joel Crotty writes, Matei Socor, the President of the Union of Composers and Musicologists “and his supporters worked for the total Sovietization of Romanian music and promoted text-based music over symphonies and chamber works because the propaganda element was easier to promote.”25 This propagandistic element also played an important role in the case of the music festivals organized during this period in East Germany and Poland, as David Tompkins posits in his chapter in this volume. While escaping the ideological grip of the party was difficult for East German composers, the situation was better in Poland, where, as Tompkins argues in his chapter, “Instrumentalizing Entertainment and Education: Early Cold-War Music Festivals in East Germany and Poland,” music festivals—especially after 1953—afforded an escape from the ever-present pressure of Stalinist ideology. Whereas in the GDR the tight control of the party over cultural programming periodically estranged both
composers and audiences, in Poland, authors of choral and symphonic music were able to forge their own festival culture by going against the grain of official expectations.

Unexpected escape venues can be found in other contexts as well. For instance, after World War II, socialist regimes nationalized the castles, chateaux, and palaces owned by members of the aristocracy in every Eastern European country and turned many of them into museums to educate the public about the luxurious lifestyle of former elites. However, visits to the newly opened castle and chateaux museums in Czechoslovakia did not always fulfill their intended educational role, as Cathleen M. Giustino’s chapter entitled “Open Gates and Wandering Minds: Codes, Castles and Chateaux in Socialist Czechoslovakia before 1960” in this volume reveals. Throughout the 1950s, estate museums, such as the one at Ratibořice with displays celebrating Božena Němcová’s “beloved Czech novel” Grandmother, lacked signage that could bear the ideological imprint that the state required as part of its takeover of every aspect of Czech public life. State officials’ expectations for ideological correctness were repeatedly violated by improperly trained tour guides and continuously failed to be implemented to their letter. Visitors to Czechoslovak estate museums were thus often able to appropriate the meaning of exhibits on display through their own creativity and imagination.

As another example of ideological expectation gone awry, recent research on neighboring Poland (and the more distant Yugoslavia) shows that even workers, who, in broad educational terms, benefited from having access to the high culture foisted upon them by the party, often came up with their own version of it. In this respect, reading classic works of literature, listening to contemporary music in Poland, or visiting museums in castles and chateaux at the height of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia afforded an escape from the ideological expectations imposed in other areas of everyday life by the party state.

**Cabins in the Woods**

The party tried to educate workers not just through museum displays and music festivals, but also by teaching them how to make better use of their leisure time in nature. As field research in Poland in the late 1940s demonstrated, this goal was all the more important since workers in many Eastern European countries did not know what to do with their free time. Padraic Kenney points out that when “state-organized and -subsidized paid vacation[s] (wczasy)” in mountain resorts were offered to Polish workers in 1947, to the “consternation of union and party officials,” they did not take advantage.
On the one hand, workers preferred to spend time with their families after long hours of work in the factories, while on the other hand, they felt awkward in the presence of social superiors even after they had demoted them from their former positions of power.29

Notwithstanding, the party wanted workers to not only embrace new leisure opportunities made possible by a more egalitarian society, but also to participate in mass socialist tourism in rural and urban settings. Socialist tourism was a concept quite distinct from middle-class and elite tourism which had dominated historic tourist industries. Although traveling to foreign destinations was generally out of the question, there was a lot to discover at home in the first two decades following World War II, particularly in natural settings, both traditional leisure destinations and untamed pastoral locales.

The Soviet model of diverting interest in traveling to foreign countries into exploring domestic destinations also became the norm in Poland.30 As Patrice M. Dabrowski argues in her chapter on “Encountering Poland’s ‘Wild West’: Tourism in the Bieszczady Mountains under Socialism” in this volume, the Polish regime presented the Bieszczady Mountains, located in the southeastern corner of Poland, as a veritable terra incognita that was ripe for socialist citizens’ discovery and exploration. By the early 1960s, the region was opened for mass tourism after a highway was built to penetrate this natural setting and make it more accessible. Workers from the industrialized regions of Poland traveled to the villages dotting the Bieszczady area, where they were encouraged to escape into nature by taking strenuous hikes through the surrounding mountain ranges. Thus by the 1960s and 1970s, the Bieszczady mountains became a site for mass tourism. Socialist authorities, however, could not keep up with tourists’ demand for services and accommodation. In the end, escaping into the wilderness of the Bieszczady came to symbolize the failure of the socialist system to adequately address their needs. Instead of supporting the state in its attempt to create proletarian tourism, Poles turned away from it, finding in the wilderness of the Bieszczady, as Dabrowski argues, the opportunity to escape the oppressive strictures of the socialist quotidiant.

The connection between nature, leisure, and children also played an important role in socialist ideology and practice. Twin goals of healthy recreation in nature and political education came together in the central Pioneer camps the communist youth organization sponsored in East Germany. Similar to their counterparts across the Eastern Bloc, the East German Pioneer camps were situated in beautiful natural settings. However, the lack of basic amenities and, in some cases, polluted waters near the site left something to be desired, as Catherine J. Plum argues in her chapter in this volume, “Summer Camp for Socialists: Conformity and Escapism at Camp Mitschurin in East Germany.” The Pioneer camps offered a temporary escape into nature, par-
ticularly for children used to crowded mass housing, but not a respite from political education and other ideological unpleasantries and challenges in socialist East Germany. Communist youth leaders were most successful when they fused politics with fun, for example, by using a campfire setting for the singing of ideological songs, or organizing paramilitary adventure games in the woods. By the 1980s, the case study of Camp Mitschurin/Matern reveals a decline in political education, as nonpolitical activities expanded and Western influence increased based on the interests and prerogatives of Pioneers and camp employees.

Beach Parties

While the party initiated many of the state-supported escapes in nature described above, there were also escape sites that came into being as a result of private initiative and regimes’ occasional toleration of rebellious social groups or subcultures. Some dissenters challenged ideological orthodoxies regarding the human body, and sometimes socialist regimes made minor concessions. In East Germany, for instance, visual representations of the human body in party-sponsored journals and magazines represented an area where censors were willing to relax certain ideological taboos and satisfy popular demands. *Das Magazin*, a new journal the SED approved in 1954, published a female nude picture on a monthly basis during the first decade of its existence. This obvious concession was one of many efforts to make the 17 June 1953 worker’s uprising in the GDR fade from public memory by shifting attention to people’s material and erotic desires. By the 1960s and 1970s there was a veritable boom in nude photographs in various East German publications. A similar effort was underway in Hungary as well, where, after the 1956 uprising, humoristic publications such as *Ludas Matyi* offered readers both jokes and nude photographs.

While erotic representations of the human body gained acceptance under socialism, public nudism continued to stir controversy and resistance. The gamut of official responses stretched from tolerance to periodic moral outbursts (followed by interdictions) against it. Comparing East Germany to Romania is instructive in this regard. As Irina Costache discusses in her chapter, “From the Party to the Beach Party: Nudism and Artistic Expression in People’s Republic of Romania,” practicing nudism on the beaches of the Romanian Black Sea coast during the 1950s was limited to a small group of individuals closely connected to the upper echelons of the party. These well-connected artists and intellectuals established a tightly knit community in a remote village close to the Romanian-Bulgarian border, where their nudist practices
were tolerated by the authorities. During the late 1960s, the bohemian lifestyle of the early nudist settlers assumed even more of a counter-cultural bent through the arrival of a younger generation of students and intellectuals who, in addition to nude bathing, brought with them a keen interest in Western music and practices. The case of Romanian nudists illustrates the existence of important chronological discrepancies between socialist policies regarding public nakedness within the Eastern Bloc. While Stalinist Romania, a rather prudish Eastern Orthodox society, tolerated nudism, in East Germany through the mid-1950s, the regime fought vehemently against this practice, which had significant roots in working-class culture during the Imperial and Weimar period. The passage of time witnessed a reversal based on popular reception; beach nudism became extremely rare in Romania in the 1970s and 1980s, and progressively more accepted and widespread in the GDR.\textsuperscript{32}

As mentioned above, while loosening the grip that party officials kept on people’s everyday lives, the period of the post-Stalinist thaw produced new tensions and expectations, which allowed for experimentation in new types of escapes. Socialist governments played a role in their genesis by trying to compete with the West and providing entertainment and consumer goods to their citizenry. In spite of persisting Cold-War enmities, in the freer intellectual atmosphere of the thaw, socialist state officials encouraged a broad expansion of citizens’ leisure and consumption practices.\textsuperscript{33} They no longer based their models primarily on old Soviet practices,\textsuperscript{34} but rather on recent developments in Western Europe and North America.

Thus, the socialist world of the late 1950s and the 1960s was marked by an attempt to catch up and compete with the economies of the United States and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{35} Encouraging consumption and leisure became state-supported goals. As Eli Rubin writes in reference to the GDR, in that country “along with the emphasis on consumption, the SED regime also realized that it had to offer leisure opportunities to East German citizens, especially for vacations and weekends, to be able to construct an alternative to the kind of ‘good life’ rapidly opening up for the middle classes in the post-war West.”\textsuperscript{36} The post-war economic success of the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and France,\textsuperscript{37} and the global turn towards a consumer society,\textsuperscript{38} enticed socialist states to provide not only leisure opportunities for their citizens, but also the mass consumption of cars, household goods, music, sports, and services.

The tourism industry served as an important bridge in this respect. The goal now was not just to build socialism, but to market it both to foreign and domestic consumers.\textsuperscript{39} During the 1960s and 1970s, many Eastern European countries outperformed the Soviet Union in this respect. While the Soviet Intourist had a difficult time figuring out how to market socialism and deciding what to sell foreigners,\textsuperscript{40} the Czechs and Romanians attracted more and more
tourists from the West. The socialist countries with access to the Adriatic and the Black Sea also promoted sun and beach tourism. Soviet tourism officials advertised the city of Sochi as a getaway from the harsh Russian winter as early as 1946. The Black Sea resorts became a favorite destination not just for Soviet citizens, but those from Eastern European socialist states and, progressively, for Western visitors as well. By the 1960s, Bulgarians became experts in advertising their golden beaches and a variety of entertainment options to both domestic and foreign visitors. Socialist authorities in Bulgaria found no contradiction in their adoption of capitalist market practices and the building of socialism. The situation, however, was compounded by the fact that the Bulgarian state also wanted to sell a natural and naturally addictive product, namely tobacco. This led, as Mary Neuburger perceptively notes in her chapter, “Smoke and Beers: Touristic Escapes and Places to Party in Socialist Bulgaria, 1956-1976,” to the emergence of parallel discourses that constantly contradicted each other, one promoting a cure for smoking through physical exercise in natural settings, and the other marketing tobacco to foreign and domestic tourists in mountain and sea resorts.

Roadside Adventures and Bright City Lights

Geographic and chronological idiosyncrasies also existed between different socialist countries in the field of personal mobility. Many of the communist regimes that emerged in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s inherited a weak road infrastructure that precluded easy communication and transport between different areas within national borders. The use of horse carriages was widespread in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, and it was mostly through rudimentary public transit that workers could reach their workplace even in the more developed Eastern European countries.

However, the virulently “viral” effects of automobility and rising individual car ownership in the West could not be prevented for very long from spreading to the Eastern Bloc. The pressure to modernize came from the Soviet Union as well. Soviet leaders emphasized the importance of automobility in shaping the socialist society of the future as early as the late 1920s. Indeed, a future innovator in the Soviet automobile industry, Valerian Osinskii, wrote in November 1928 that the working class in the Soviet Union was “a class on wheels, the most revolutionary class in history, the class that forged an ‘iron party,’ and a class that will travel to socialism in the automobile.”

Although Stalinist party officials continued to pay attention to automobility, the results obtained by 1953 were meager. After 1945, for instance, the size and quality of the Soviet auto stock and supply increased not because of
internal developments (such as the creation of a Soviet automobile industry during the 1930s), but as a result of American and British wartime deliveries and looting in Eastern Europe.\(^{48}\) The Sovietization of the latter area also brought into the hands of the communist party officials new industrial resources for making automobiles, such as the Škoda factory in Czechoslovakia. Soon after socialist leaders founded the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a market for cars was born.\(^{49}\) By the 1960s and 1970s, the old Soviet Pobedas and Moskviches gave way to a new generation of socialist cars such as the Wartburg and Trabant (produced in the GDR), the aforementioned Czech Škoda, the Dacia (made in Romania), the Yugo (a Yugoslav version of the people’s car), the Polski Fiat (a proud Polish achievement), and the Russian-made Lada and the Zhiguli, emerging from the conveyor belts of new car factories built in the Soviet Union.\(^{50}\)

The road, repair, and refueling infrastructure necessary for the use and maintenance of these cars, however, was rudimentary in many parts of the Eastern Bloc. According to a Western observer writing in 1968, although the Soviet Union was by then “a highly industrialized country, […] its private sector” appeared as if only “on the threshold of the gasoline age.”\(^{51}\) This observation could be extended to other countries of the Eastern Bloc as well. Moreover, practices such as refusal to wear a seat belt and the bribing of policemen and drivers that historian Lewis H. Siegelbaum found so prevalent in his research on the car culture of the Soviet Union\(^ {52}\) infused the automobility culture of all of the other socialist states in Eastern Europe.\(^ {53}\)

This lack of resources, however, encouraged innovative approaches to scarcity as illustrated by the national hitchhiking program introduced in Poland in 1957, which the Polish socialist state supported up until its demise.\(^ {54}\) In his contribution to this volume entitled “Hitchhikers’ Paradise: The Intersection of Mass Mobility, Consumer Demand and Ideology in the People’s Republic of Poland,” Mark Keck-Szajbel maintains that the popularity of hitchhiking in that country transcended its borders, drawing in foreigners from both socialist and non-socialist states interested in taking advantage of this mode of travel. Indeed, authorities in both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union sponsored short-lived attempts to imitate the Polish hitchhiking program. In a country such as Poland, where the production and distribution of automobiles never satisfied popular demand, hitchhiking was a useful alternative for those who lacked cars. Moreover, hitchhiking held out the promise of both social and sexual encounters, while allowing those who engaged in it to reach remote rural destinations (not serviced by the railway), and learn more about the different regions of the country. Most importantly, however, as Keck-Szajbel argues, private transport offered an alternative to organized group vacations. By allowing youth to periodically escape the dust of industrial cities,
hitchhiking was a prized getaway tactic, which gave its users a sense of freedom and control over their own lives and everyday itineraries. In this latter sense, it was an escape that was more rewarding to people than many of the other socialist escapes discussed in this volume.

The increase in people's mobility and the advent of mass tourism in the Eastern Bloc prompted other important developments as well. Instead of being just centripetal (allowing people to make it to the woods, lake and sea shore beaches, and the mountains), socialist mobilities were also centrifugal bringing people from abroad and from the countryside to the metropolitan areas of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Turning the latter into destinations included in international tourist circuits became especially important to socialist authorities all over the Eastern Bloc. In order to achieve this they were willing—as we have seen—to allow surrogate capitalist enclaves to come into being in the very midst of the socialist economic system. These endeavors, however, caused new domestic cleavages that opened up opportunities for other types of escapes. Indeed, during the 1960s, as Alexander Vari shows in his chapter “Nocturnal Entertainments, Five-Star Hotels, and Youth Counterculture: Reinventing Budapest’s Nightlife under Socialism,” tourism officials in Hungary engaged in a sustained campaign to make the capitals’ nocturnal offerings more attractive to foreigners. Ranging from improved and more varied menus and evening entertainment in restaurants to luxury accommodations provided in new five-star hotels, what Budapest offered its visitors became more similar to what they could expect to find in Western locations. From a domestic perspective, however, the escapes into a surrogate capitalist world were reserved for party officials and the politically well-connected in Hungary. The majority of the Hungarian population had to enjoy nightlife in locales tightly controlled by the Communist Youth Alliance (KISZ); their escape route from socialism to capitalism did not lead through five-star hotels and fancy restaurants. It was rather in places such as the Ifipark (The Youth Park), a restaurant and concert venue located in Budapest, and dingy suburban Houses of Culture, where average Hungarians embraced pop, rock, and punk music. These musical venues created a parallel and non-party sanctioned route of escape for many young people, that culminated by the 1980s in the emergence of constantly policed and highly marginalized subcultures.

**Sports and Stadia**

The rise of such youth subcultures was a phenomenon to be noticed in every country of the Eastern Bloc in the 1980s. The youth groups varied from
punk rockers and heavy metal enthusiasts to often violent sports fans. The rise of underground subcultures challenging the mainstream orthodoxies of the socialist systems was especially noticeable during the last years of the GDR’s lifetime. As historian Mike Dennis writes: “At the beginning of the 1980s, Western skinhead music, dress and militancy began to appeal to young East Germans, including the violent-oriented football supporters, as an alternative to the dominant political and ideological system and its institutional instruments such as the Free German Youth.”

These developments and the domestic disturbances they triggered were particularly worrisome to East German authorities who had capitalized on the international sporting successes of the GDR as a way of legitimating not only the socialist way of life, but its very existence as a separate German state. Sport had played an important role in the building of socialism. Throughout their existence, the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe utilized sport in order to unify multi-ethnic populations, sustain a healthy and productive workforce, and attain international respect and recognition—in short as essential building blocks in the process of socialist nation-building. Therefore, as sports historian James Riordan has argued, sport under communism played “the quite revolutionary role of being an agent of social change, with the state as pilot.”

Between the 1950s and the 1980s, only the US, the Soviets, and select nations of Western Europe could challenge Eastern European teams in various international Olympic sporting competitions such as swimming, weightlifting, and canoeing. Many Eastern European countries were also strong in handball and football. Communist regimes both during the Stalinist period and after actively supported footballers and hoped to gather mass support from victories on the soccer field. The Hungarian soccer team, for instance, earned its most brilliant international successes before 1956. Moreover, the East German victory against the West German team at the FIFA World Cup games held in West Germany in 1974 turned many GDR citizens into supporters of their national team in spite of any personal grudges that they might have had against Honecker and his regime.

As an “artificial nation” in the crossfire of Cold War politics, the GDR needed sports as a common source of national identity and pride. The East German regime, however, with its priorities set high to support swimmers, ice skaters, and bobsledders, was slow in recognizing the importance of soccer in promoting state propaganda. While the Honecker regime heavily funded certain sports, it neglected others. Some of the most neglected and underfunded sporting events in East Germany were the highly popular motorcycle races. As Caroline Fricke shows in this volume in her chapter “Getting off Track in East Germany: Adolescent Motorcycle Fans and Honecker’s Con-
sumer Socialism,” the lack of funding stems from the fact that similar to soccer, motorcycle races produced a considerable amount of internal opposition against the regime in the form of unruly fans influenced by Western models. Instead of co-opting them, East German authorities further estranged rebellious youth by keeping them off of the race tracks at Bergring in Teterow, the site of one of the most popular motorcycle races in the GDR. Their decision backfired, however, since it created an unofficial campground and private escape site near the race tracks for motorcycle and heavy metal fans, and also prompted East German heavy metal enthusiasts to escape official interdiction by participating in yearly pilgrimages to the motorcycle races held in Brno, in neighboring Czechoslovakia.

While East German motorcycle fans protested against their marginalization by engaging in violent clashes with the police, the reaction of soccer fans to their surveillance and oppression was much more muted in Romania during the 1980s. There were several reasons for this. In his chapter “Power at Play: Soccer Stadiums and Popular Culture in Ceauşescu’s Romania” in this volume, Florin Poenaru explores the important dual role that stadia fulfilled in socialism. The regime used stadiums both as arenas for sports competition and as venues for large popular gatherings convened by the party to celebrate its successes building socialism. The latter were indeed extremely popular in all of the Eastern European countries during the height of Stalinism. Although by the 1960s and 1970s they were discarded as dull rituals symbolizing the power of the party in countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, they survived relatively intact in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In Romania in particular, they played an important role in propelling the revived personality cult centered on Nicolae Ceauşescu, the country’s all-powerful leader since 1965.

Party sycophant and court poet Adrian Păunescu orchestrated festivities known as Cântarea României (The Singing of Romania) in Romanian stadiums to celebrate Ceauşescu—one occasion among others when people were taken from their workplaces to sing the praise of the Conducător. While many of these events certainly contributed to the strengthening of the party’s ideological grip on people’s everyday lives, they could also serve as escapes from it. As Poenaru shows in his chapter, at the mass gatherings organized in the stadiums celebrating Ceauşescu, many people read books and magazines, gawked at each other, and even took photographs in the short intermissions between mass choreographic movements. People challenged the party during soccer games as well, when many of them chanted slogans that contained indirect criticisms of Ceauşescu’s all-powerful arm, the Securitate (the Romanian State Security). Together these two types of behavior served as escapes from the harsh daily reality of increasing state repression and shortages in
Romania. The smell of change was in the air. In the wake of popular discon- tent in December 1989, which led to urban rioting and ultimately the dis- integration of the regime, citizens all over Romania celebrated the execution of Ceauşescu and his wife in Bucharest as the people’s final escape from the repression they endured under communism.70

Conclusion

A similar celebration, with even more symbolic portent, took place just a month before, in East Berlin. The fall of the Berlin Wall was, as historian Joe Moran has recently stated, one of those rare moments when the contin- uum of history is disrupted through the “disturbance of the everyday, [and] the transformation of unthinking routine into new moments of awareness … For a few, extraordinary days in November 1989, Berliners shook off the monotony and predictability of their daily lives. They danced around in night shirts, let off fireworks and kissed strangers, with whom they exchanged the single word: ‘Wahnsinn!’ (Crazy).”71 Numerous observers in other Eastern Bloc capitals witnessed and described the carnival atmosphere occasioned by the fall of communism.72 In fact, the whole late 1980s un- folded in Eastern Europe under the sign of the carnivalesque.73 For millions of people, the fall of communism was the big escape that they had dreamt about for decades.

Twenty years after the event, there is agreement among scholars that com- munism in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 because of a variety of reasons, ranging from the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union to the economic and moral exhaustion of the socialist system itself.74 Seen from a macro-structural point of view, this is certainly true. If one extends one’s perspective to the microscopic fissures in the system caused by millions of individuals’ dreams and desires for a better life, the role played in it by the continuous breaks away from ideology and everyday routine are worth pondering. Examining the role of states-in-between in the life experience of the last Soviet generation, anthropologist Alexey Yurchak argues that from the perspective of the actors living under socialism, “the reference to ‘fun life’ refer[red] to a kind of ‘normal life’ in everyday socialism, a life that had become invested with creative forms of living that the system enabled but did not fully determine.”75 In spite of the illusion of normality that it provided to the regime, the quest for a pleasurable and creative life under socialism was an erratic variable embedded in the system. As many of the socialist escapes examined in this volume suggest, once people invested it with their wishes and desires, the variable also put pressure on the Eastern European and Soviet
regimes’ many internal fissures and cracks leading, together with a host of macro and global developments, to their ultimate implosion.

Notes

I would like to acknowledge Catherine J. Plum’s contribution to the content of this chapter, and thank her and Cathleen M. Giustino for their suggestions and comments.


5. I borrow this expression from Michel de Certeau. See the introduction to his book The Practice of Everyday Life, transl. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. xiii where the author discusses the significance of escaping the internal traps of a culture “without leaving it” in reference to the Spanish conquerors of the Aztec empire, on the one hand, and the Aztecs and the Mayans, on the other.


14. Scholars vary in their definitions of resistance, from broad to narrow applications of the term. While the authors of this volume accept broad definitions of resistance and opposition, the narrower concept of dissent, as used by Ian Kershaw, is also useful in characterizing a variety of forms of everyday opposition this volume discusses, from spontaneous verbal challenges such as telling a joke critical of a regime, to cultural practices which might include the adoption of Western forms of entertainment, fashion or sports heroes. For a discussion of the scholarly
debates regarding these terms see the preface to the second edition of Kershaw’s text, *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, Bavaria 1933-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), x–xiii.


20. It should be noted that the roots of such practices go back to the late nineteenth century when social democrats and socialists in Germany, England, and Russia were actively engaged in activities whose aim was to raise the cultural level of the workers. For more on this see Andrew Bonnell, *The People’s Stage in Imperial Germany, Social Democracy and Culture, 1890-1914* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005); Lynn Abrams, *Workers’ Culture in Imperial Germany: Leisure and Recreation in Rhineland and Westphalia* (London: Routledge, 1992); Chris Waters, *British Socialists and the Politics of Popular Culture, 1880-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); and E. Anthony Swift, *Popular Theater and Society in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), especially Chapters 2 and 5.


22. For a more detailed discussion, see especially the chapter on “The New Student,” in John Connelly, *Captive University*, 205–25.

23. For a recent exploration of the tenets of socialist realism, see Evgeny Dobrenko, *The Political Economy of Socialist Realism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), and for an engaging transnational perspective discussing its artistic and social impact in various socialist countries and beyond, see Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko, ed., *Socialist Realism Without Shores* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).

24. Joel Crotty, “A Preliminary Investigation of Music, Socialist Realist, and the Romanian Experience, 1948-1959: (Re)reading, (Re)listening, and (Re)writing Music History for a

25. Ibid., 155.

26. Taking workers to castle museums and thus educating them about the lifestyle of other social categories was not limited to Eastern Bloc countries. In France, for instance, the French Communist Party and the CGT implemented a similar set of vacation activities through their leisure organization called Tourism and Work. For more on this, see Sylvain Pattieu, “La ‘vie de château’ ou les gains symboliques du tourisme populaire, 1945—années 1980,” *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 56, no. 2 (2009): 52–78.


29. Ibid., 19-23. See also Duda, “Workers into Tourists,” 50–52.


35. For a discussion of Eastern European consumerism in a slightly later chronological context, and connected to the politics post-1968 normalization in Czechoslovakia, see Paulina Bren, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall … is the West the Fairest of them All? Czechoslovak Normalization and Its (Dis)Contents,” in *Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 9, no. 4 (2008): 831–54.
39. For more on this see Anne E. Gorsuch’s book *All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
41. Evidence for this development can also be seen in an increase in interest among French visitors in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria as opposed to the Soviet Union. For more on this, see Sylvain Pattieu, “Voyager en pays socialiste avec Tourisme et Travail,” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 102, no. 2 (2007): 63–77. It should be pointed out though that when seen from an East-West comparative perspective, the developments described above still did not match the scale of what was going on in Western, Northern, and Southern Europe. For more on this, see Thomas Mergel, “Europe as Leisure Time Communication: Tourism and Transnational Interaction since 1945,” in *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary History*, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (New York and London: Berghahn Books, 2007), 133–53.
43. See Anne E. Gorsuch, “‘There’s No Place Like Home’: Soviet Tourism in Late Stalinism,” 180.

50. It should be noted though that the Polski Fiat, Lada, and Zhiguli as well as the Dacia were slightly changed versions of the Italian Fiat and respectively the French Renault, and were made in Poland, the Soviet Union, and Romania as a result of mutual agreements between these countries and France and Italy. On the symbolic meanings attached to the Lada as a “socialist car,” see Peter Hamilton, “The Lada: A Cultural Icon,” in Autopia: Cars and Culture, ed. Peter Wollen and Joe Kerr (London: Reaktion Books, 2003), 191–98, while for more on the Yugo see Jason Vuic, The Yugo: The Rise and Fall of the Worst Car in History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010).


52. Siegelbaum, Cars for the Comrades, 7–8.


60. Ibid., 49.


64. For more on the ideological stakes of the competition between the two German states in the field of sports, see Uta Andrea Balbier, “‘A Game, a Competition, an Instrument?’ High Performance, Cultural Diplomacy and German Sport from 1950 to 1972,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 26, no. 4 (2009): 539–55.

65. It is interesting to note that while neglecting motor sports, the East German regime was keen to use bicycle races for a propagandistic purpose as early as the 1950s. For more on this, see Molly Wilkinson Johnson, “The *Friedensfahrt*: International Sports and East German Socialism in the 1950s,” *The International History Review* 29, no. 1 (2007): 57–82.


69. *Conducător* (leader) was one of the many epithets Ceauşescu adopted to enhance his megalomaniac quest for absolute power. For more on this, see Adrian Cioroianu, *Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere în istoria comunismului românesc* [On the Shoulders of Marx: An Introduction to the History of Romanian Communism] (Bucureşti: Editura Curtea Veche, 2005), 418–21. See also Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 213–15.


