Introduction
Refugee Resettlement as Humanitarian Governance
Power Dynamics

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Introduction

Refugee resettlement is defined by UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as “the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement” (UNHCR n.d.). This definition has evolved over time,1 yet refugee resettlement has established itself as one of UNHCR’s three “durable solutions” to forced displacement in the international refugee regime alongside local integration of refugees in their country of asylum and refugees’ voluntary repatriation to their country of origin. More and more countries have instituted resettlement programs since the 1990s. Sixteen states had such schemes in 2008, and twenty-seven in 2016; these were mostly industrialized countries (UNHCR 2009, table 21; and see Cellini, this volume). However, as the UNHCR definition indicates, refugee resettlement relies on the goodwill of states. It is not a right, and a majority of states do not engage in it. The number of resettled refugees remains very low compared to the number of refugees hosted by countries of first asylum, which are mostly located in the Global South.

This book sets out to provide a comprehensive, knowledge-based analysis of global resettlement practices to academics, practitioners, and readers
interested in refugee protection and humanitarianism. We believe such a contribution is particularly timely in light of the current political climate and unprecedented efforts to undermine both a common humanitarian tradition and how we construe our facts about the world. Resettlement has traditionally been understood by scholars and practitioners as a part of global refugee management, with a particular focus being given to the scarcity of resettlement slots (Fredriksson and Mougne 1994; Newland 2002; Betts et al. 2008). This edited volume takes a different tack by understanding refugee resettlement as a form of *humanitarian governance* at the international, national, and local levels.

As is further explored below, we understand humanitarian governance as involving care *and* control: it is driven by a humanitarian ethos of helping the most vulnerable but in doing so involves practices ruling the lives of the most vulnerable without providing them with a means of recourse to hold the humanitarians accountable for their actions (Harrell-Bond 1986; Hyndman 2000; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005; Nyers 2005; Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Agier 2011; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). This analytical approach allows a more comprehensive understanding of the political, social, and symbolic properties of contemporary resettlement practices. Although resettlement is an important tool for protecting vulnerable civilians, it is also an unaccountable, costly process permeated by inequality. To examine resettlement as a form of humanitarian governance, we rely on three analytical approaches.

First, we take a lifespan approach to our discussions of resettlement, emphasizing movement in space and time. As refugee resettlement is presented as a “durable solution” to displacement, we believe that it is essential to understand refugee resettlement as a process that does not start when a refugee is chosen for resettlement. Selection procedures often take years, if not decades, and are simultaneously transnational and deeply local in nature. Similarly, resettlement does not magically stop once resettled refugees land at the airports of resettling states. A lifetime of vulnerability and resilience does not disappear because one crosses borders, and neither does the bureaucratic disciplining of refugees as humanitarian subjects. Thus, we label refugee resettlement an instrument of durable humanitarian governance.

Second, we analyze this spatial and temporal trajectory through the theoretical prism of power. We believe that it is essential to explore the *power relationships* among the many organizations, states, and individuals who have a stake in the definition and implementation of refugee resettlement. Such power relationships are shaped by the context of *global inequality*, which is the trigger for the need for resettlement programs in the first place, and exacerbated by the scarcity of resettlement slots.

Third, we assess resettlement as a *multilevel* form of humanitarian governance that can be analyzed by exploring and unpacking how resettlement
is constituted at the international, national, and local levels as policy and practice.

Compared to other aspect of international refugee management, refugee resettlement has received relatively little academic attention and only recently has become more wide ranging and multidisciplinary. This includes studies in political science, international relations, history, legal sociology, anthropology, geography, and health sciences. Three main themes can be identified. There is, first, a focus on specific resettlement policies and the population groups in question, such as the resettlement of Indo-Chinese refugees (Viviani 1984; Robinson 1998, 2004), the Sudanese “Lost Boys” (Bixler 2005), or Browne’s (2006) account of resettled refugees’ journey to Australia. A smaller number of studies has also been devoted to emerging resettlement countries in the Global South (Jubilut and Carneiro 2011; Ruiz 2015; Menezes 2016). This line of inquiry also incorporates analyses of the significance of states’ interests in the emergence of international cooperation on refugee resettlement (Suhrke 1998; van Selm 2003; Garnier 2014).

A second theme is the assessment—often through ethnographic methods (Horst 2006; Sandvik 2009, 2010, 2011; Thomson 2012) or advocacy research (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005)—of refugees’ experiences of the selection process and the accountability problems it engenders. This literature often frames investigations of refugees’ vulnerability and resilience and the motivations, actions, and omissions of resettlement bureaucrats at different levels. While scholarship on resettlement, vulnerability, and gender have been less explored (but see, respectively, Mirza 2011; Seibel 2016). A third theme, which has received the most attention, is the integration and adaption of resettled refugees, with a strong emphasis on the many challenges they face (Waxman and Colic-Peisker 2005; Nawyn 2006; Hugo 2011; Hyndman 2011; Ott 2013; Crock 2015; Darrow 2015; Losoncz 2015; Garnier 2016b). Drawing on lifespan approaches, a few studies connect the second and third themes (Mirza 2011; Spivey and Lewis 2015).

Across these thematic clusters, there is a concern with humanitarian governance, especially with the role and power of UNHCR as an international protection actor (Sandvik and Lindskov Jacobsen 2016). However, no comprehensive analytical treatment of resettlement as a form of humanitarian governance exists in the literature. To that end, this multidisciplinary volume brings together contributions from anthropology, law, international relations, social work, political science, public policy, and gerontology to offer a discussion of contemporary resettlement processes and the ways in which resettlement epitomizes both the international community’s unprecedented formal commitment to protect civilians, including refugees, and the reality of an often ineffective and unchecked resettlement bureaucracy. It also shows how past resettlement practices bear on current developments.
The volume complements and expands existing knowledge on resettlement selection processes and reception, with a geographical scope covering the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Brazil, Chile, Australia, Canada, the United States, Norway, and the European Union. Because we offer multidisciplinary perspectives grounded in a common understanding of refugee resettlement, we believe that the volume is greater than the sum of its parts. We argue that it constitutes a stepping stone to further advance refugee resettlement research but also to offer suggestions for improving resettlement practice, and therefore, refugee protection.

In the following, we lay out our conceptual framework. We then put it to use in an exploration of refugee resettlement as humanitarian governance from international, national, and local perspectives. This exploration leads us to highlight a number of paradoxes at the core of refugee resettlement and briefly show how future research could address these paradoxes. Finally, we introduce the volume’s contributions.

Refugee Resettlement as Humanitarian Governance

Historically, humanitarian governance has been construed as an act of benevolence aiming to help suffering people in need. Michael Barnett has described it as “the increasingly organized and internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering of the world’s most vulnerable populations” (Barnett 2013: 379). Humanitarian governance is situated within recent international relations literature as a subfield of global governance, which we understand as the multiple governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental efforts and mechanisms to manage common public goods and address international issues (Barnett and Duvall 2004).

An expanding body of literature shows how the practical deployment of this ethics of care (Barnett 2011) goes hand in hand with discourses and practices of control. Starting with Harrell-Bond’s (1986) revelatory anthropological study *Imposing Aid*, studies from various disciplines have investigated how Western states and global elites define situations as “crises” (Pandolfi 2003; Nyers 2005) and engage in undemocratic and unaccountable humanitarian governance operations. This has been notably exposed in the context of refugee camps (Hyndman 2000; Agier 2011; Ilcan and Rygiel 2015) and border policing practices (Pallister-Wilkins 2015). More broadly, in practices including day-to-day hospital care as much as adjudication of asylum claims and military interventions in foreign countries, Fassin (2012), Fassin and Pandolfi (2013), and Feldman and Ticktin (2010) have shown how “the humanitarian reason,” or caring on behalf of humanity at large, could substitute a focus on human rights and justice with an emphasis on compassion.

Compassionate rhetoric and actions may help alleviate acute suffering yet not sustainably reduce global and local inequality produced by conflicts
and disasters at various scales. Rather, they may contribute to reproduce inequality because of a short-term and ad hoc focus on needs alleviation in lieu of making crisis-affected societies sustainably peaceful and equitable (see also Keen 2008). These critical accounts are thus concerned with the distribution of power between actors involved in and affected by humanitarian governance.

In this volume we draw on these insights to explore refugee resettlement as an instrument of humanitarian governance involving the cooperation of many actors at the local, national, and international levels. We argue that it is an instrument of *durable* humanitarian governance because refugee resettlement is constituted by practitioners, and especially UNHCR, not as a rapid response to an acute crisis but as a durable solution implying a long-term concern for particularly vulnerable individuals, from their selection in refugee camps to their integration in resettling states. This vision of a continuum in humanitarian governance over time also speaks to migration and refugee scholarship’s increasing awareness of the need for a long-term focus in our analysis of migrant and refugee lives before, during, and after migration and flight (Griffith et al. 2013). Longitudinal studies show that many first-generation resettled refugees remain vulnerable in receiving societies (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2006).

The notion of a long-term, “durable” humanitarian governance continuum can, for instance, allow us to identify similarities in the ethics of care toward resettlement candidates, on the one hand, and in the context of their treatment in resettling states, on the other hand. It also allows a longitudinal investigation of mechanisms of control. Refugee resettlement is a comparatively costly instrument of international protection. This is because it comprises the identification of those considered the most vulnerable, a further (if orderly) displacement for the selected, and the fostering of their long-term integration, that is, investment in technologies of identification, selection, mobility, and settlement. Yet as an instrument of governance, refugee resettlement also lacks a “culture of accountability.” Previous research has observed how accountability in refugee resettlement programs is interpreted as narrowly focused upward toward donor states and UNHCR’s headquarters, excluding considerations of downward accountability toward refugees with respect to the equity and procedural fairness of the resettlement selection process (Garnier 2016c).

**Refugee Resettlement and Power**

Many of the abovementioned studies of humanitarian governance analyze the array of practices deployed to govern the humanitarian subjects and their contribution to entrenching global inequality. Agier (2011), for instance, focuses on instruments used to “manage” the “undesirables” in
refugee camps. In this volume, and following Harrell-Bond’s (1986; Verdierame and Harrell-Bond 2005) advice to not neglect the agency of refugees themselves, we explore the variety of power dynamics at the core of refugee resettlement. A common definition of power is “the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.).

Traditionally, power has often been assimilated with a resource, and this is a representation we find at the core of statements such as “money is power” and “knowledge is power.” Focusing on authority, discursive power, and institutional power in global governance, Barnett and Duvall (2004) have challenged this view, pointing at the difference between the source of power and its actual execution, and have also questioned the nature of power: does the capacity to do something mean that someone dominates someone else? Or does someone have the capacity to do something because he or she has the capacity to convince others to freely engage in an activity that requires cooperation? Building on Barnett and Duvall’s concept of power, we argue for the need for a more systematic focus on the multileveled nature of an international regime, that is, how and to what extent this regime permeates day-to-day interactions—but also what kind of feedback effects can be expected from the ground to the core of the regime.

Doing so, we are indebted to critical scholarship on the governmentality of migration (Walters 2015) and international migration management (Geiger and Pécoud 2010) while being keen to emphasize the nuances of multileveled power dynamics. To that end, in this introduction we draw on political geographer John Allen’s concept of power. Allen (2003: 2) defines power as “the relational effect of social interactions.” Defined as such, power encompasses forms of power with others (such as persuasion and negotiation) and power over others (such as authority, which compels one to do something, and coercion, which forces one to do something). Allen focuses on the space in which forms of power are deployed, for instance on the proximity that is required for coercion to occur, or on the broader scale at which persuasion can be deployed.

From the vantage point of power relationships, a particularly confounding aspect of refugee resettlement is that it is not codified in hard international refugee law: the 1951 Refugee Convention does not mandate it. However, UNHCR has been very prolific in codifying its understanding of refugee resettlement into soft law though numerous guidelines and handbooks. The lack of a binding legal framework means that the implementation of refugee resettlement requires considerable political resources and near-constant mobilization of international and domestic advocates to persuade decision makers to deploy the instrument, and negotiations are often required to settle the size and nature of resettlement contingents. Scholarship on the politics
of persuasion has argued that associating resettlement’s humanitarian objectives with concerns more pressing to the state, such as security and economic well-being, may be effective (Betts 2009). However, the international community’s failure to even set a modest resettlement target in the context of the Syrian crisis has cast a shadow on these expectations.

Still, at the local level, UNHCR’s soft law often has authority or even coercive power when implemented by selection officers toward resettlement candidates who can be considered to have no option but to adhere as closely as possible to the selection criteria to be considered for resettlement. Yet, UNHCR exerts these forms of power over resettlement candidates with very limited accountability. Misappropriation (or just lack of use) of soft law instruments such as the Resettlement Handbook, or the failure to detect and dismantle corruption schemes, can lead to distortion or nonimplementation of core humanitarian values and refugee protection objectives (Sandvik 2011), and this can eventually weaken UNHCR’s persuasive power at the global level.

Coercion can also be an issue when resettled refugees are faced with forms of social control because of their difficulties to gain footing in the formal labor market, and thus be either subjected to social control deployed by welfare professionals or to labor exploitation. However, it would also be a mistake to ignore the ways in which refugees exert their agency to negotiate access to resources and persuade bureaucrats and employers of their credentials. Local bureaucrats involved in resettlement, even though their margin of maneuver is reduced by scarcity of resources, also adapt their practice and aim to preserve their negotiating power.

Drawing on these concepts, the remaining of this introduction investigates the power dynamics of refugee resettlement as an instrument of durable humanitarian governance. We start by focusing on the role of UNHCR in defining refugee resettlement and promoting it in the international community as a durable solution to forced displacement. This will illustrate UNHCR’s power of persuasion and negotiation in the international sphere as well as the modalities of institutionalization of these forms of power in soft law. We then focus on how individual resettling states are approaching refugee resettlement and to what extent UNHCR is able to convince these states to align their resettlement priorities with its own. Lastly, we address the machinery of refugee resettlement at the local level, as a bureaucratic and social process both in states in which refugees are selected for resettlement and in resettling states. Here, we discuss how UNHCR’s soft law tools are implemented and to what extent it has authority or even coercive power, but also whether and how local actors, and especially refugees, are also able to use their power of negotiation and persuasion so as to achieve their goals.
Exploring Multileveled Power Dynamics

UNHCR and the International Promotion of Refugee Resettlement

As mentioned earlier, the definition of refugee resettlement has evolved over time. Scholarship on refugee resettlement in the interwar period and in the aftermath of World War II insists on the mix of demographic, economic, geopolitical, and humanitarian considerations in the selection of refugees for resettlement, which reached its highest numbers ever in the 1950s (Kunz 1988; Miles and Kay 1992; Wyman 1998; Neumann 2004; Karatani 2005; Long 2013). Clearer humanitarian contours were given to refugee resettlement as UNHCR was established in 1950 and the Refugee Convention adopted in 1951, which, until the 1967 Protocol, only applied to refugees fleeing the aftermath of World War II (Holborn 1975; Loescher 2001) and still allows its application only to European refugees. Legal, financial, and institutional hurdles thus limited UNHCR’s capacity to develop an extensive body of knowledge codifying resettlement as well as its power of persuasion over states in regards to whom to resettle. This was of particular concern for African refugees, as Sandvik explores in this volume.

The willingness of Western states to engage in large-scale refugee resettlement dwindled in the context of diminishing labor needs and a shift in the geographical focus of forced displacement from the Global North to the Global South. In 1975, the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis resulted in large-scale global resettlement efforts toward non-European refugees, yet also led to a crisis of confidence of Western states in the ability of UNHCR to screen “genuine refugees” for resettlement (Viviani 1984; Robinson 2004). Whereas one in twenty refugees identified by UNHCR was resettled in 1979, only one in four hundred was resettled in 1993 (Fredriksson and Mougne 1994: 5). Only a handful of states kept regular resettlement programs, most notably the United States, Australia, Canada, and Scandinavian countries, and these programs did not necessarily focus on resettling UNHCR identified resettlement cases (see also next section). The decline of refugee resettlement, and limited prospects for repatriation in many cases regardless of UNHCR’s increased focus on this “durable solution,” fueled protracted displacement in the Global South as well as an increase of asylum claims in the Global North (Chimni 2004; Shacknove 1993).

Following an influential internal review of refugee resettlement in the 1994 (Fredriksson and Mougne 1994; Garnier 2014; and see Sandvik; van Selm, this volume), UNHCR engaged in a conceptual and organizational resurgence of refugee resettlement. Refugee resettlement was redefined in major policy documents such as the Agenda for Protection (UNHCR 2003) as an instrument of international protection focusing on the most vulnerable refugees (a humanitarian instrument) but also to contribute to international solidarity by complementing other “durable solutions” to forced displace-
ment (a strategic instrument). Resettlement practice was to be aligned with this redefinition with the development of an increasingly extensive body of resettlement guidelines to be used in the field, most significantly the *UNHCR Resettlement Handbook*, published for the first time in 1997.

UNHCR made significant efforts to convince additional states to engage in resettlement, notably in Central Europe and Latin America, and to promote international resettlement cooperation with the establishment of regularly meeting multilateral resettlement fora. It also expanded its capacity to refer resettlement cases to resettling states, allowing UNHCR to stress the existence of a gap between resettlement needs and resettlement places (see UNHCR 2010: 2, 2012: 2). In this context, UNHCR has expanded its partnerships with NGOs, which may take core responsibilities within the resettlement process, such as the identification of resettlement cases and preparation of resettlement submissions (Piper and Thom 2014: 43f; UNHCR 2015). Major NGOs seconding UNHCR in these tasks are the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS),4 the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), International Rescue Committee, and Refuge Point. Finally, UNHCR increasingly engaged in knowledge production and dissemination on the integration of resettled refugees (UNHCR 2011: 52f; Casasola 2016).

UNHCR's power of persuasion in redefining refugee resettlement is undeniable. As van Selm explores in this volume, a number of resettlement initiatives have been launched under the auspices of the Strategic Use of Resettlement (SUR), most notably the multiyear resettlement of over 100,000 Bhutanese refugees from camps in Nepal to several resettling countries. It has also supported multilateral resettlement initiatives not explicitly promoted as SUR but focusing on specific refugee groups, including Burmese refugees from Thailand, the Sudanese Lost Boys and Somali minorities from Kenya, Burundian refugees from Tanzania, and Liberian refugees from Guinea and Sierra Leone (UNHCR 2011: 57f; Casasola 2016). More broadly the ratio of refugees accepted for resettlement on the basis of UNHCR selection criteria has increased (UNHCR 2011: 50; and see Garnier, this volume).

UNHCR has also been directly involved in the design of the European Union Joint Resettlement Program established in 2012 (Garnier 2014), in the design and implementation of emerging resettling states such as Brazil and Chile, and in the elaboration of multilateral resettlement initiatives in Latin America (see Jubilut and Zamur; Vera Espinoza, this volume). Going beyond what was originally advocated in its 1994 review, but in line with UNHCR’s stronger ties with the private sector, UNHCR is also involved in public-private partnerships aiming to promote privately sponsored refugee resettlement (Garnier 2016a). This is a substantial achievement if one recalls the drastic decrease of resettlement places and, more broadly, the 9/11 attacks.
Yet there are obvious limits to UNHCR’s power of persuasion. UNHCR’s efforts have not been followed by a sustainable increase of resettlement places. The recent upswing in the offering of resettlement places was mostly related to the resettlement of Syrian refugees, and sharply declined (46 percent) in 2017 (UNHCR 2018: 30). Moreover, focus on Syrian resettlement was accompanied by a tightening of asylum systems and a stronger focus on repatriation for other refugee populations in many countries of the Global North (see van Selm, this volume). UNHCR has also been unable to achieve the inclusion of a global resettlement target of 10 percent of the world’s refugees in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants adopted in September 2016 by the UN General Assembly (Garnier 2016a).

The US withdrawal from the negotiations of the UN Global Compact on Migration, which aims to implement the New York Declaration, justified by the alleged lack of compatibility of this global initiative with US interests (Wintour 2017), will certainly further undermine UNHCR’s efforts as it denotes an unwillingness to negotiate in the global arena (Jubilut 2017a). Finally, in spite of the ever-expanding production of knowledge on “best practices” regarding resettled refugees’ well-being from their selection to their integration, UNHCR is at fault to ensure the large-scale deployment of such practices. The next section explores one of the factors limiting UNHCR’s persuasive power: states’ authority over the actual unfolding of national refugee resettlement program, while the following section is devoted to local challenges.

National Resettlement Discourses and Practices

Contrary to the provision of asylum, refugee resettlement is not, as mentioned, codified in hard international law. UNHCR provides advice on refugee resettlement that national governments are at their own discretion to follow or not. A state traditionally committed to refugee resettlement, yet suddenly suspending it (as did Denmark in 2016; see Kohl 2016), does not contravene any international legal standards. This volume’s annex compiled by Amanda Cellini offers a detailed panorama of national resettlement diversity, on which the next paragraphs draw, and specific national cases are explored in various chapters. Here, to keep the overview concise, we only focus on current practices and discourses.

The offering of resettlement places is strikingly uneven. The United States has so far consistently offered the largest number of resettlement slots, even as it has declined sharply since 2016 (UNHCR 2017: 30). Canada and Australia have long followed, with each slightly above 10 percent of the global total over decades, even though the number of offered slots has in both cases significantly expanded in the context of the Syrian crisis. In this respect, Canada has in 2015–2017 proceeded to its largest-ever resettle-
ment intake, with more than 40,000 Syrian refugees being resettled between November 2015 and February 2017 (IRCC 2017). Only two Scandinavian countries have sustainably offered above 1,000 resettlement places yearly: Sweden and Norway. Yet several countries have for the last few years, in the wake of the Iraqi and Syrian crises, offered larger numbers, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and Finland.

The setting of an annual resettlement figure is in some cases done by the executive branch of government, in other by the legislative branch. In either case, the decision follows consultations with “resettlement stakeholders” generally including UNHCR as well as public bodies and civil society organizations involved in resettlement from case selection to long-term integration. Such planning largely differs from the more confrontational and reactive nature of the elaboration of asylum policies (Alink et al. 2001). Yet, as in the case of asylum politics, broader advocacy toward the general public is also mobilized by “stakeholders,” especially when they have the resources to do so.

Given the US role in resettlement, resettlement advocacy is particularly strong and diverse there, with, for instance, HIAS committing itself to “leading the American Jewish community to push for needed reforms in American and international policies that protect all refugees” (HIAS n.d.). Contrary to asylum/refugee status determination cases, the judiciary does not play a significant role in resettlement decisions. The means of recourse for refused resettlement candidates are very limited, largely because they are not on the territory of resettling states. This also limits the persuasive power of UNHCR, which often plays a significant advisory role in asylum decisions, but has long led to less domestic conflicts between government branches over the definition of who enters the country (on the Australian case, see Garnier 2014).

Time will tell whether President Trump’s executive order to ban immigration from specific countries, including a temporary suspension of entrance of refugees already granted a visa to the United States and the permanent suspension of the resettlement of Syrian refugees, as well as a cut by half in US resettlement places constitute a dramatic shift away from such consensus (Yuhas and Sidahmed 2017). In any case, the ban followed a political conflict between US Republicans and Democrats at both federal and state levels (Ford 2016). Similarly, Reklev and Jumbert in this volume stress that refugee resettlement means different things to different political parties in Norway.

In political-administrative discourse, all resettling countries insist that their national resettlement program is an expression of humanitarian responsibility and international solidarity. The United States also presents it as a reflection of national values (see Darrow, this volume), while Australian governments repeatedly insist on the generosity of the country, which re-
settles more refugees per capita than any other—the fact that other countries host far more refugees per capita than Australia being rhetorically obscured (see Losoncz, this volume). Emerging resettlement states Brazil and Chile both present it as a tenet of humanitarianism. In addition, resettlement in Brazil can be seen as a tool for emerging innovative regional leadership (see Jubilut and Zamur, this volume) and Chile as a historical duty as it is itself a postauthoritarian state from which many have been resettled in the 1970s (see Vera Espinoza, this volume).

As for who is selected for resettlement, vulnerability is used as a criterion in all cases, yet some countries also legally require that resettled refugees demonstrate their ability to integrate into their society, even though implementation of the requirement varies (see Garnier on the Canadian case, this volume). Most countries include streams for various categories of resettled refugees, such as following the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, Women-at-Risk, or Survivors of Violence and Torture. Yet especially major resettlement countries have categories for persons whose resettlement is not only advocated by UNHCR but also by domestic private actors, including the resettlement-involved NGOs mentioned earlier. The most prominent of these categories currently is Canada’s private sponsorship stream, which allows established associations but also more informal groups of citizens to sponsor refugees (Hyndman 2011; Casasola 2016). It has been argued that the existence of private/community sponsorship, on top of providing additional resources to refugee resettlement, helps ensuring broad social support for refugees; however, the Canadian experience has proven so far hard to replicate beyond its borders (Garnier 2016a).

In all cases, the integration of resettled refugees is a multileveled process involving various levels of governance as well as civil society, whereby the actual configuration of responsibilities varies significantly (see Cellini, this volume, for details). Political incorporation depends on resettled refugees’ legal status on arrival. Permanent residency and thus a pathway to citizenship is automatically granted on arrival in some countries, such as Canada, yet other countries, such as Germany, insist on the granting of a temporary permit at first. The timeline of expected socioeconomic integration into mainstream society also varies significantly, from an insistence on economic contribution within a few months for refugees in the workforce in the United States to the provision of specific welfare benefits for several years in Scandinavian countries.

Even though national governments have the authority to set the regulatory parameters of refugee resettlement, and UNHCR works toward persuading national governments of the value of its numerous resettlement guidelines, both the selection of resettled refugees and, to a lesser extent, their socioeconomic integration occurs at a distance from the headquarters of international and national institutions. Hence, the last section of this in-
Introduction focuses on refugee resettlement’s power dynamics at the local level.

Local Resettlement Experiences

From selection to integration, resettlement locally relies on complex, multi-actor bureaucratic dynamics riddled with power imbalances. Resettlement candidates can be rejected at three different stages of the resettlement procedure. On the basis of an individual interview, a local protection officer from UNHCR, or a staff member from a seconding NGO (UNHCR 2011: 390f) can recommend resettlement for an “individual case” (an IC). Yet this recommendation can be disregarded by a resettlement officer (again from UNHCR or a seconding NGO), who may decide to not open a resettlement file for the IC. If the file is opened, the proper resettlement procedure starts, involving collection of documentation supporting the IC’s claims as well as, eventually, an individual screening interview.

The resettlement candidate does not have the right to bring counsel to resettlement interviews. In practice, these interviews frequently take place without the aid of qualified interpreters. While the interviewee has a formal right to read through the resettlement form prior to signing it, many do not understand the legalistic language used in the form, and protection officers rarely have the time to explain how the interviewee’s story fits with the various concepts and categories that determine eligibility. Regardless, the credibility of the IC is assessed on this basis. Following the interview, the quality of the submission is reviewed. Depending on the intensity of the violation, or risk of violation, of the refugee’s rights and the need for resettlement the submission is categorized as “normal,” “urgent,” or “emergency.”

If UNHCR’s regional hub accepts the case, the resettlement dispatch is submitted to a potential resettlement country that has expressed interest in refugees with this nationality or personal profile. There are no formal requirements as to the timeliness of the decision. What constitutes “reasonable speed” depends on the size of the caseload and many other logistical, administrative, and financial factors. In the likely event of a negative response, the candidate only receives a standardized letter of rejection. Since many refugees have no permanent contact details, they may not receive notice, or they may receive it only after severe delays (Sandvik 2009, 2011).

Because of a resettlement candidate’ limited recourse in case of a resettlement decision he or she considers wrong, and because of the lack of information on the development of his or her case, the refugee’s power to persuade officers of the strength of his or her case and to negotiate a positive outcome is significantly constrained. The resettlement candidate appears to be coerced into accepting the decision and, even in the case of a positive outcome, to be subject to the symbolic violence of resettlement selection.
criteria. Nevertheless, resettlement candidates find ways to deploy persuasive power, for instance by performing their case as close as possible to the guidelines, whose existence they are well aware of, not only in resettlement interviews but also by producing letters and documents relating their experience, which they will attempt to deliver to who they consider to be the persons in charge of processing their case (Sandvik 2009).

Thomson, in this volume, explores some of these strategies as used by a Congolese resettlement candidate in a Tanzanian refugee camp. Collectively, resettlement candidates also stage protests at the front of highly visible UNHCR offices, infamously in the case of Sudanese refugees at the front of the UNHCR office in Cairo in 2006. The Sudanese refugees were motivated by an intense sentiment of being ignored by UNHCR and complained about their unfair treatment using the language of human rights law. In a nearby park, they self-organized locally as a community they considered safer and more social than their regular lives, in which they were scattered in slums in and around Cairo (Moulin and Nyers 2007). This collective dimension also speaks to scholarship on political organization of refugees in camps, whereby some wish to be resettled and some do not, which may affect collective political agency (Holzer 2012; Lecadet 2016).

Resettled refugees’ integration equally involves structural imbalances and information scarcity but also opportunities for resettled refugees and involved organizations to overcome hurdles. Whereas performing vulnerability may be at stake during the selection process, the socioeconomic marginalization of many resettled refugees often means numerous encounters with welfare systems of host countries and their specific dynamics of care and control. In her chapter on the implementation of US refugee resettlement, Darrow, in this volume, insists on the structural constraints encountered by NGOs specifically mandated to integrate resettled refugees in the workforce as quickly as possible. She points at their strategies to negotiate the employment of particular individuals or group and emphasizes the justificatory discourse mobilized by these implementing partners and broader American society, which strongly stigmatizes the unemployed poor. Rapid employment is a slightly less pressing concern in the Canadian and Australian resettlement programs, which also have a stronger tradition of state-driven welfare than the United States.

Still, Garnier, this volume, and Losoncz, this volume, stress the individual and structural disadvantages resettled refugees face in the labor market, including limited proficiency in official languages, limited education, lack of recognition of foreign credentials and training, discrimination, and indiscriminate provision of settlement services to both immigrants and refugees. Garnier focuses, in this volume, on Canada and Quebec’s discontinuity between a focus on resettled refugees’ vulnerability as they are selected for resettlement and an emphasis on mainstream socioeconomic integration
into the domestic middle class postarrival. She stresses that resettled refugees most successful on the labor market benefit from a conjunction of favorable personal attributes and of auspicious institutional measures. Vera Espinoza, in this volume, highlights the importance of mismatched expectations between local implementing agencies in Brazil and Chile and resettled refugees, noting that the better informed both parties were about the other party’s expectations prior to the arrival of resettled refugees, the greater the ability of the latter to preserve their sense of agency postarrival.

Another critical source of both agency and constraints for resettled refugees is their family ties. This is explored in Lewis and Young’s chapter in this volume recounting in diachronic perspective the resettlement experience of Cambodian and Karen refugees in the United States, pointing at cultural resilience but also at intergenerational conflicts in regard to the significance of cultural markers. Further, their chapter illustrates the enduring nature of difficulties faced by generations of refugees throughout the resettlement process. This can be seen to support the view that refugee resettlement, itself borne out of global and local inequality, fails to sustainably reduce it.

Refugee Resettlement’s Paradoxes and Future Research Agenda

Our exploration points to the following paradoxes. First, we distinguish between types of power and this leads us to a paradox in regard to the visibility and invisibility of UNHCR’s power in refugee resettlement. As the international organ overseeing refugee policy worldwide, UNHCR’s persuasive power often seems mighty when it is in fact constrained by scarce resources and the political environment in which it is involved. By contrast, the local power of UNHCR is considerable, as it can make authoritative decisions changing the life of refugees and seems to even be able to coerce them into particular decisions; yet such power is a lot less visible to the international community. This in/visibility paradox could be more closely investigated in research on the multiple roles, and forms of power, of UNHCR in specific cases. Such research could bring together multisited ethnography, critical geography, international law, and policy implementation-focused scholars. It could also suggest pathways for UNHCR to be more accountable to refugees, while highlighting the nefarious impact, at the local level, that UNHCR’s limited resources have on refugees.

Second, our comparative overview of national resettlement policies indicates a paradox relating to the processes of politicization and depoliticization of refugee resettlement in resettling states. Until recently, the issues of refugee protection and resettlement have not led to extensive political engagement by national communities in receiving states, a trend that might
have been affected by the “refugee crisis” in the European Union and the Trump administration’s travel bans (Jubilut 2017b). Specifically in terms of resettlement, there has been a relative lack of domestic political controversies around refugee resettlement as compared with asylum policy, or policies in regard to irregular migration may have preserved resources for resettlement and ensured its continuation and legitimacy.

However, depoliticization may also have led to the demobilization of domestic audiences around refugee resettlement, contributed to the stagnation of available resettlement slots, and contributed to the avoidance of focus on resettlement’s failings. The presentation of refugee resettlement as the only well-accepted way to seek protection in some resettling states may also have contributed to threaten the legitimacy of asylum. To tackle this de/politicization paradox, studies combining critical discourse analysis and policy analysis could contrast the evolution of domestic resettlement discourses and the evolution of resettlement places, as well as compare political discourse on refugee resettlement with political discourse on asylum. Research findings may help suggest ways to develop a more political discourse on refugee resettlement, which advocates both more resettlement places and better resettlement policies.

Third, our focus on refugee resettlement as durable humanitarian governance hints at a paradox in the portrayal of the vulnerability and resilience of resettled refugees. Refugee resettlement is primarily motivated by humanitarian concerns. Resettled refugees are often portrayed as victims, and their considerable resilience seems obscured in discourses and practices of humanitarian governance. Yet, once in resettling states, the discursive and practical space for the vulnerability of resettled refugees is limited, as resettled refugees are generally expected to integrate, perhaps after a few months or a few years of transition, like the average immigrant.

This vulnerability/resilience paradox calls for more research into what prevents a focus on refugees’ resilience before resettlement and into what impedes refugees’ resilience in resettling states. This could include longitudinal, decade-spanning explorations of the fate of particular cohorts of resettled refugees, including analyses of the political discourses surrounding these particular groups. Such analyses could combine ethnographic, social work, and political science methods. Such research could also include policy analysis studies of the opportunities for and limits to domestic humanitarian constituencies promoting refugee resettlement. Results of such research may foster both discourses and practices preventing the stereotyping of resettled refugees while showing ways to decrease structural obstacles to the expression of their resilience.

Beyond the exploration of these paradoxes, we advocate more research into resettlement in the Global South.
The majority of refugees comes from, and stays in, the Global South; thus in-depth multidisciplinary investigations of existing Global South programs could point at both opportunities and challenges specific to particular regions. In this volume, Jubilut and Zamur, and Vera Espinoza do so in the cases of Brazil and Chile in the Latin American context, while Sandvik offers insights into intra-African resettlement experiences. Refugee resettlement initiatives could also be assessed as examples of South-South cooperation, or as vantage points to analyze power dynamics with a Global South focus or even the emergence of regional power as an important category in refugee protection (Jubilut and Zamur, this volume).

Pursuing this research agenda would give greater insight into refugee resettlements’ entrenchment in global inequality but also indicate some steps to reduce manifestations of said inequality. We are, however, aware that much more needs to be done to tackle global inequality: overcoming it would in fine means that refugee resettlement is not necessary anymore. We have perhaps never been further from such situation.

Presentation of Chapters

Joanne van Selm’s chapter takes a political and juridical approach to investigate the role of the Strategic Use of Resettlement (SUR) in sustaining interest in resettlement writ large and adding to the refugee protection regime. The chapter relies on reports written on the subject of SUR from its introduction to the present, supplemented by some additional conversations with current policy makers regarding their thinking on whether SUR has continued potential. Introduced in 2003, SUR is intended to add a multiplier effect to the resettlement of refugees. In theory SUR offers opportunities for rethinking and refashioning not only resettlement but also the whole refugee protection regime—from orderly arrivals in developed countries to knock-on effects in terms of greater protection capacity in regions of origin. In both theory and practice, however, there are many pitfalls, including in the consequences of the language used (with the emphasis on strategy and multipliers, rather than protection) and in the devaluing of the resettlement activity itself.

Kristin Bergtora Sandvik’s chapter proposes a critical legal history of international resettlement through a discussion of the gradual incorporation of African refugees into such schemes. Today, African refugees are prominent in the resettlement efforts of UNHCR and the major resettlement countries. Yet, until recently, African refugees were excluded from resettlement to the West. This chapter argues that this radical shift cannot be explained only by changes in quota allocations or domestic legal systems.
It surveys the historical evolution of the African resettlement candidate as a bureaucratic-legal category through three lines of inquiry: first, through the evolvement of resettlement in international refugee management; second, by unpacking the configuration of African refugees in UNHCR’s interventions; and, third, by pointing to how the renewal and reform of resettlement that began in the mid-1990s produced rationales that not only undermined previous exclusion but also facilitated a greater inclusion of African refugees. In conclusion, Sandvik proposes that, as well as reflecting a more inclusive humanitarianism, the changing face of resettlement is linked to global migration management.

Liliana Lyra Jubilut and Andrea Cristina Godoy Zamur’s chapter offers a case study of refugee resettlement in Brazil drawing on international law and international relations scholarship. Brazil has been praised as a model and a regional leader and has been a proponent of new ways of conceptualizing and implementing refugee resettlement in Latin America since the early 2000s. Relying on bibliography assessment, document analysis, exchanges with policymakers, and the authors’ own experience with refugee protection in the country, Jubilut and Godoy aim to identify the power categories in Brazil’s refugee resettlement in the program’s current phase. The chapter concludes that Brazil’s resettlement is both a case of positive achievement for an emerging resettlement country and an interesting case study in identifying power dynamics in resettlement, not least for being a thought-provoking example of the quest of soft power through humanitarianism and for suggesting a possible use of regional power in refugee resettlement.

Focusing on the US resettlement program, Jessica H. Darrow’s chapter draws on social work literature and argues that US resettlement operates with a shifting view of resettled refugees. At admission, refugees are framed as deserving of the American humanitarian ethos, which is reflected in resettlement legislation. However, and similar to the framing of poor people of color in the United States, the moral worthiness of resettled refugees in the long term depends on the ability to integrate into the labor market. The latter largely relies on the role played by resettlement agencies’ caseworkers, whose work Darrow has observed over several years using ethnographic methods. Darrow’s chapter concludes with perspectives on refugee resettlement under the Trump administration, which is positioning itself as overtly hostile to refugees.

Adèle Garnier’s chapter resorts to insights from scholarship on incorporation to analyze the relationships between the selection of resettled refugees and their labor market participation in Canada, more specifically the province of Quebec. Relying on regulatory analysis and interviews with settlement organizations and resettled refugees, the chapter argues that humanitarian constituencies in Canada effectively used their power of persuasion in the late 1990s to foster an increase in the admission of more vulnerable
refugees from the early 2000s. Yet this power of persuasion is more limited in regard to integration in part because settlement is geared to offer services to all immigrants, whose overall profile is closer to the Canadian middle class than that of resettled refugees. This limits the negotiating power of more vulnerable resettled refugees as well as the bargaining power of service providers who aim to specifically support them. Garnier discusses the significance of these findings for Canada’s resurgence as a global resettlement leader under the prime ministership of Justin Trudeau.

Ibolya Losoncz’s chapter focuses on refugee resettlement in Australia, the third main contributor to international resettlement efforts. Concentrating on resettled refugees’ labor market participation, it investigates the extent to which Australia’s resettlement program delivers on its desired outcome of giving resettled refugees the same political, economic, social, and cultural rights as those enjoyed by nationals. Conceptually Losoncz combines insights from Merton, Granovetter, and Putnam and draws on data from the author’s ethnographic study with recently settled South Sudanese refugees and a recently released large sample size longitudinal survey of humanitarian migrants (Building a New Life in Australia). The chapter shows how Australian government institutions fail to provide accessible pathways to resettled refugees to turn their personal resources and capabilities into economic and social participation, hence severely limiting their negotiating power and agency.

Linn-Marie Reklev and Maria Jumbert’s chapter addresses the Norwegian political debate on burden sharing in refugee protection following the Syrian crisis, with a particular emphasis on resettlement. Based on a media analysis and interviews with key informants, it identifies three discourses that dominate the Norwegian refugee field: the cost-and-capacity discourse, the nation-state discourse, and the humanitarian discourse. The chapter argues that these three discourses take part in “discursive battles” in the political field and that the outcome of these battles shapes the political space for Norwegian resettlement initiatives in practice. Moreover, the chapter investigates how the image of Norway as a humanitarian power and peace nation has been contested in this process. The chapter shows that the cost-and-capacity discourse is the current hegemonic discourse that largely shapes and defines the values and interests of core actors in this area. Reklev and Jumbert conclude that the form and extent of future Norwegian resettlement initiatives depend on the hierarchy and power relations between the dominant discourses in the field.

Rooted in the disciplines of gerontology, family science, and human development, Denise C. Lewis and Savannah S. Young’s chapter builds on extensive engagement with Cambodian and Karen refugees from Burma in the United States. The chapter relies on these refugees’ narrative to explore similarities and differences in parallel past, present, and future experiences
of resettlement in the United States. A reliance on refugees’ voices brings to light needs not met by various response agencies, as well as families’ collective actions to address those needs. The chapter focuses more strongly on the journey from home countries to resettlement and how refugees frame and respond to the stressors associated with those journeys to aid in successful integration of resettled refugees; the chapter also improves our own understanding of refugees’ needs during and after resettlement. Rather than viewing refugees as powerless in the face of seemingly catastrophic events, this chapter acknowledges the power refugees possess as they navigate the terrain of flight and settlement. Lastly, Lewis and Young provide a critique of current US policy responses to refugee resettlement as they relate to our participants’ narratives.

Marnie Thomson’s chapter inquires into Congolese refugees’ experiences with the selection process for resettlement, drawing from years of ethnographic research conducted in refugee camps, aid compounds, and government offices across Tanzania as well as in UNHCR regional and global headquarters. Refugees’ stories reveal the ways in which resettlement selection varies case by case and depends on the discretion of case evaluators. Their stories also bring to light the risks refugees are willing to take to convince resettlement officials to select them. Some refugees admit to partaking in fraud; from their perspective such actions implicate corrupt resettlement officials or at least an unjust system. Resettlement selection decisions may represent aid workers’ control over refugee lives, but being selected signals refugees’ regaining power over their own lives.

Combining insights from critical geography and anthropological scholarship, Marcia A. Vera Espinoza’s chapter draws on a broad range of qualitative data collected between 2013 and 2014 in Chile and Brazil to confront the expectations of Colombian and Palestinian resettled refugees with the expectations of resettlement organizations during the process of their integration in these two emerging resettlement countries. This allows exploring the complexities of resettlement, a process that is designed, experienced, and even resisted by different actors. The chapter highlights the translocality of resettled refugees’ experience, that is, the simultaneous role of various locations in the construction of their identity. This revision of resettlement as an experience going beyond target numbers and policy can contribute to enhance our understanding of this durable solution in emerging resettlement countries and to reflect upon structural gaps in refugee resettlement more broadly.

Astri Suhrke and Adèle Garnier’s concluding remarks insist on important characteristics of the global refugee regime: its structural fragmentation, normative diversity, and UNHCR’s dependence on a handful of resettling states. A moral economy perspective on the resettlement regime suggests that resettlement, as much as it bears costs, serves important protection
functions for at-risk refugees and reminds wealthy societies of their humanitarian obligations.

Amanda Cellini’s annex offers a systematic comparison of all existing twenty-seven resettlement programs as of the end of 2016. Cellini focuses not only on respective resettlement statistics on their evolution in recent years but also on resettlement’s national regulatory basis, main resettlement actors, eligibility criteria, and the involvement of UNHCR. No comparable database exists, and we believe the annex can be of great use to both practitioners and academics keen to further advance refugee resettlement research.

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Notes

1. This will be explored in greater detail later in this introduction.
2. For instance, Turkey has maintained the geographical limitation of the Refugee Convention and thus does not grant refugee status to people fleeing from outside
Europe. However, Turkey has adopted domestic legislation providing a binding asylum framework for all persons in need of international protection, and it provides temporary protection for Syrian refugees. As of December 2017, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior estimated that Turkey hosted 3.4 million refugees, 90 percent of whom originated from Syria (Refugee Rights Turkey 2017; European Commission 2017).

3. UNHCR’s increasing focus on resettled refugees’ vulnerability is part of the expansion of humanitarian hard law and soft law constructing vulnerability (see, for instance, Sandvik 2012).

4. HIAS was established in the late nineteenth century to assist the relocation of Jews expelled from Russia who sought protection elsewhere; it then expanded to foster the resettlement of persecuted Jews worldwide. In the past few decades, it has shifted its focus to other populations of refugees seeking resettlement, including in Africa and Latin America.

5. For more on the authors’ take on a research agenda on resettlement, see Garnier, Sandvik, and Jubilut 2016.

References


