Without knowing what lay in the future, the late 1980s may have seemed as good a time as any to review the history of European integration. In 1987, two years before Europe’s Cold War barriers would unexpectedly collapse, the historian Wilfried Loth took stock of this history in the preface to a documentary account of European integration. This volume was commissioned by the European University Institute, a European Community (EC) venture nestled in the hills above Florence. According to Loth, such a project could help the EC, ‘too often seen in purely technocratic terms’, to acquire ‘an historical self-awareness and consequently … a political identity’. The signs were good: seeing ‘so many workers from different countries and universities’ commit themselves to this shared endeavour led Loth to believe ‘that Europeans are approaching agreement about the history of their integration’. Expressing such a desire for scholarly and even broader social consensus about history may seem an unusual goal for a prominent historian to espouse. Yet, Loth was doing what many other intellectuals have done over the course of the twentieth century: he was envisioning a version of Europe – Europe as an integrated whole – with the ambition of bringing it to life. By spotlighting this Europe, defining it, narrating its history, explaining its growth and noting its shortcomings, he and his fellow historians were telling Europeans to ‘become what you are’: members of an ideal unified Europe that until now had only ever partially existed in its historical manifestations.

It is no peculiarity of historians of European integration to recognize that the historical context they establish will frame how individuals and societies interpret their present and approach their future. Yet, these historians of the European project did seem to be predominantly looking forward rather than back – an uncomfortable position for historians to maintain for any extended period of time. They were, of course, by no means alone in this regard. As the launching of the federalist Spinelli Group of leading European politicians and intellectuals in September 2010 suggests, many European leaders continue to work towards the ideal of a fully fledged federal Europe, even if their efforts may, as yet, have failed to inspire many of their fellow European citizens, who seem less inclined to vote in European elections or to provide retrospective validation in referenda for the decisions taken by their leaders.
By contrast, the purpose of this book is to move away from teleological histories and understandings of European integration; to do so not by seeking to debunk the desires for unity felt by many Europeans across the twentieth century, but by taking them seriously in their historical diversity. The book does this by focusing on the activities of, and debates between, politicians and intellectuals who sought to create a united Europe from the interwar period to the early post-Second World War years. The Europes with which this book is concerned are primarily, therefore, those which never happened – what could be called lost Europes. They were very different in their contours and characters from those more commonly associated with European integration. In particular, they were the work, most often, of outsiders: individuals who by their ideology and choices stood outside the mainstream of interwar political debate. Many of these individuals were also exiles. Their common European experience of exile afforded them a comparative perspective on the factors that united and divided Europeans and the loyalties that were shared across national borders. Similarly, their experience of the First World War, as well as of National Socialist aggression demonstrated that individuals’ security and prosperity were not only affected by ideological conflict occurring at a national level but also by international clashes that affected all Europeans. Beginning this study in the interwar period therefore highlights not only the support for European integration that grew among groups acutely affected by national and ideological rivalries and war, but also how these groups became Europeanized by their experiences.

By focusing on such a time period, the book seeks to problematize what, I will argue, is a foundational myth of integration as a linear and solely post-war process. It will do this by demonstrating the variety of formulae for European integration that existed in the early post-Second World War years, which, in turn, had their roots in pre-existing debates and discourses about Europe. As will be shown, support for European integration was not simply a reaction to the divisions and enmities destructively evident during the Second World War. Instead, it grew out of longer traditions of internationalist thought and intersected with deep-rooted dissatisfactions regarding the reconfiguration of Europe after Versailles and more broadly concerning the growth of nation-states from the nineteenth century onwards. These longer-standing discourses did not fit easily with the definition of European integration that came to the fore during the post-war years. The ways of talking about Europe, and imagining its political future, that emerged in the preceding decades had been based predominantly on rejection of the political status quo. In contrast, the European integration that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s was focused primarily on stabilizing the nation-state structure of Europe, and the democratic structures on which it was based. This book’s concern with lost Europes thus orientates it away from a concern with the origins of the new Western Europe of the post-1945 years and points attention back towards mid-century plans for integration, often designed to address the problematic post-First World War redrawing of the European map alongside the
weaknesses of interwar democracy. Yet, examining the variety of blueprints for new Europes, which never came into being but which were formulated by many prominent intellectuals and politicians in the mid twentieth century, also has the effect of forcing us to recognize afresh the contingent nature of the Europe that developed after 1945.8

It may seem quite easy to argue that historians of integration should extend their focus back further than 1945; it is perhaps not so obvious why a study such as this should not look further forward than the early 1950s. However, much can be gained by focusing on the early post-war years when both Eastern and Western German states had been created, and when various versions of European integration had already been realized. These forms of integration included the founding of a European parliament; the forming of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which established a supranational European authority to administer Marshall Plan aid; the signing of the Brussels Defence Pact; and the formulating of the Schuman Plan, which laid the foundations for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).9 Moreover, debates within civil society about how to integrate Europe were in some ways at their most vibrant during this period, particularly as party orthodoxies had not yet been enforced at the national level and the Cold War divisions had not been firmly set. For instance, the German pressure group Europa Union was said by 1951 to have eleven thousand members and three hundred local circles in Western Germany and formed part of a wider Union of European Federalists (UEF) that by 1950 numbered two hundred thousand members across Europe. Similarly, journals with a European agenda enjoyed an unprecedented popularity at this time.10 Transnational organizations such as the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) grouping of Christian Democrats also convened some of the most important high-level meetings between the European leaders who went on to be the architects of the European Union (EU) during these years.11 Such initiatives are important for understanding how European politicians became persuaded of the merits of integration and how they could legitimize the early measures of post-war integration in the eyes of national electorates. Yet, they are often passed over quickly in wide-ranging histories of integration that concentrate on the major treaties and thus range from ‘Rome to Maastricht’ or from ‘Paris to Lisbon’ and may serve to reinforce the impression that integration was merely a series of negotiations concluded between national statesmen.12

The histories foregrounded in this book thus serve to complicate the largely diplomatic, institutional and economic histories that have dominated the recent historiography of European integration. As will be argued, European integration cannot be adequately grasped as a series of negotiations by a small number of national politicians and technocrats; nor can it be seen as the result of a collective Damascene experience by Europeans after 1945.13 By contrast with histories such as those by Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik, which only begin with the plans devised during the later Second World War or post-war years, this history
Between Yesterday and Tomorrow illustrates the social and ideological sinews that tied the post-war period to the interwar. It does this while acknowledging that the changes in post-war European nations such as Germany were decisive as they took the ‘long road West’ and embraced parliamentary democracy and peaceful coexistence with their neighbours. Indeed, as this history will show, the process of European integration should not be dismissed as a series of happy accidents retrospectively justified by self-interested national politicians who decided to cover themselves in federalist camouflage. Rather, it was influenced by the self-awareness and political identities of leading political and intellectual groups, whose ideas of Europe and plans for European integration helped to create a ‘permissive consensus’ behind the measures of European integration enacted by political leaders.

While many of the issues addressed above have resonance in a variety of national contexts, this is a book concerned first and foremost with German views of Europe, or more exactly with the visions of Europe articulated by German-speaking (and -writing) intellectuals in Europe from the late 1920s to the 1950s. The definition of being German in this period was, of course, somewhat elastic. Many of the people with whom this work is concerned were not formally German, either by birth or by citizenship. Many were exiles from Germany, while others formed part of the more long-standing Central European diaspora of German-speaking intellectuals who had proved so influential during an era of educational and political modernization. Indeed, one of the goals of this work is to illustrate how debates about the make-up of Europe in the mid twentieth century refracted competing ideas about the extent (or limits) of the German community – ideas that were often formulated by intellectuals and politicians in Austria and Switzerland who felt marginalized from the predominant version of German national community represented by the Prussian state and its successors. As will be shown, ideas for unifying Europe were often made by German-speaking intellectuals who saw European integration as a means of recovering a more all-embracing, European version of a German community.

Another reason that the book focuses on Germany is that the ‘German problem’ has often been seen as the main incentive for post-war European integration, although Germany’s role as ‘good European’ after 1945 has also been subject to varying, often critical, interpretations. This book seeks to explain how this country moved from practising aggressively nationalist politics in the 1930s and early 1940s to advocating a pooling of national sovereignty within an integrated Europe in the post-war period, without falling back on a Stunde Null or Zero Hour thesis.

Europe from the Perspective of Civil Society

Accordingly, the analysis offered in this book is not primarily of the actions performed by the major national political players and technocrats (Milward’s ironic European ‘saints’) who negotiated treaties for European integration. Rather, it
is more concerned with the shaping of public opinion in and beyond Germany, provided we understand public opinion not as some numerical construct of individual views but as a more malleable and complex phenomenon composed of the way in which opinions are formulated and channelled in response to the influences of a wide variety of actors. In particular, I will focus on the associations – some connected to media production, others feeding into political parties – that make up civil society as a particularly important type of opinion former. By focusing on such civil society bodies, I will offer a perspective on whether European integration can be assessed from the viewpoint of an emerging European society and not merely as a series of negotiations between national politicians. I look at the intellectual activities of a variety of civil society organizations, such as their publishing of journals and their taking part in international conferences, as important ways in which individuals worked to integrate Europe, and, in turn, integrated themselves within European networks and institutions.

Before I go any further, it is probably necessary to give a clearer definition of what I mean by civil society. The term in German – Zivilgesellschaft – emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and suggested a kind of association between individuals that disrupted the hierarchical relationships characteristic of absolutist and corporatist states. Yet, it faded in the nineteenth century, only regaining currency in the 1980s, via its use in an Anglo-American context. As Konrad Jarausch has commented, this term enjoyed a ‘surprising revival’, not least because of the role played by civil society organizations in bringing democratization to the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. However, the term has also been used to describe the associational life that constituted an important intermediate space in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between the private sphere of family life and the institutions of state, within which the interests of like-minded individuals could emerge and take on political significance. As historians of post-war Germany and of post-communist Eastern Europe have shown, civil society activity has been valorized as a way of schooling people’s political sensibilities, of encouraging them to argue, lobby, and disagree, all with a degree of civility. It has also been encouraged by European policy-making elites in recent years, due to their concern about the ‘democratic deficit’ that appears to be widening in Europe, as national populations apparently fail to legitimize the decisions of European politicians through referenda and voting in European elections. These moves on the part of policymakers and bureaucrats towards conceptualizing and encouraging a European civil society have, in turn, led political scientists to reconsider European integration from the perspective of such European associations, organizations and movements. However, their studies rely on a slender historical record. This book attempts such an analysis for the mid twentieth century, with particular reference to Germany, assessing how the civil society organizations that flourished in the interwar and early post-1945 periods did or did not help to integrate Europe.

As will be argued, it is important to understand how groups operating in this intermediate space between private life and government mobilized opinion behind,
or against, forms of European integration. This should not, nevertheless, mean rehabilitating a Whiggish history of integration by uncritically emphasizing the activity of such associations. Indeed, these associations did not always function as the ‘consensus-building little republics’ that Alexis de Tocqueville described when he characterized them as the bedrock of democracy. Indeed, rather than functioning as a ‘transmission belt’ between individuals and politicians, many of the organizations that worked to promote European integration lobbied against the democratic constitutions in the post-1918 nation-states. They appealed to earlier forms of supranational community such as the Austro–Hungarian Empire, which they claimed protected European communities from the ideological and nationalist enmities that engulfed post-First World War Europe. Similar organizations in the early post-1945 period also agitated against, rather than simply supporting, the early democratic institutions in the Federal Republic. For instance, they rallied opposition to the creation of centralized institutions in the Bizone/Trizone, questioned the reconfiguration of the political parties and lobbied against Konrad Adenauer’s policy of *Westbindung* or alignment with the West. Yet, for all this, the engagement of political associations, not least in the area of European integration, was an important part of the history of how democracy was reintroduced into western Germany and of how European integration policies were formulated by democratically elected governments and approved by national electorates.

The different ways in which these organizations sought to bring about political change raises methodological considerations, particularly concerning how one approaches groups with such different goals and effects, and whether these groups can be analysed together within one study. Certainly, groups active in the political field aimed to make a different contribution to those active in the literary field and this should be recognized when reading sources. As this book will illustrate, political actors, particularly when working within political parties, sought to advance policy proposals within ideological packages that commanded consent and support from large groups of the population and competed with
rival parties. By contrast, organizations within the literary, even literary–political, field, sought primarily to provide commentary. Whatever critiques or suggestions they made and whatever political influence they sought to exercise, their utterances did not make the same claims as a politician’s: to provide a mandate to effect change or exercise authority by taking control of the instruments of state on behalf of those addressed. There is therefore something of a division between the way in which Merkur is analysed and the study of the more directly political groups, the ISK and Demokratisches Deutschland. Nevertheless, as will become apparent, the line between associations active in the public sphere and parties and government agencies is a porous one, with individuals moving between these bodies. Indeed, the history presented here illustrates how the revival of a more open political life in Germany was achieved by the interaction of new and revived associations with a refashioned party-political sphere.

Narratives of European Integration

Approaching the history of European integration from the perspective of civil society therefore addresses a notable gap in the historiography and makes a distinctive contribution to this history. This is not to say that the pre-existing literature has not served to advance our understanding of European integration. Indeed, European integration history has been a source of vibrant debates, which have refracted some of the most significant recent methodological controversies about which sources to consult and which kinds of political, economic and social developments to prioritize when writing history.

For instance, debates in the 1980s and 1990s pitted the federalist account advanced by Walter Lipgens, among others, against the neo-realist or rational choice interpretation best represented by Alan Milward. The first generations of post-war historians of integration such as Lipgens focused on post-1945 Western Europe and told an admiring intellectual history of the heroic first steps taken by European federalists. These persecuted and marginal figures in fascist Europe had gone into exile and the underground resistance and went on to argue for a far-reaching federation of Europe. This would break up the state system in Europe in favour of a multi-level structure of governance with a mixture of ‘self-rule’ by the regions plus ‘shared rule’ at a European level. Lipgens’s far-reaching documentary history of European integration included the plans of a wide variety of political and civil society pressure groups, including National Socialist groups. Yet, the reception of Lipgens’s work by neo-realists has tended to view his narrative as constructing a grand litany of European ‘saints’. This litany starts with interwar luminaries such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Paneuropa Union, and Aristide Briand, the author of a plan for European integration laid before the League of Nations in 1930, and climaxes with the European Movement that emerged out of the wartime resistance movements headed by Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli.
Turning away from intellectual history and towards political and economic history, neo-realists such as Alan Milward found that the groups profiled by Lippens, whatever their popular support (which was often quite limited), had a negligible effect on the national politicians and bureaucrats who negotiated the early measures of European integration. These individuals – Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer and others – envisaged a much more limited form of intergovernmental union than the federalists. Their approach to integration led Milward to conclude that European integration was less the institutional realization of wartime plans by visionaries who had glimpsed the future beyond the nation-state, and rather a process of negotiation between national leaders, whose economic self-interest prompted them to sacrifice elements of national sovereignty in order to preserve their nation-states from a more radical crisis.32 Milward’s focus on the economic causes of integration was taken up by prominent political scientists such as Andrew Moravcsik, whose *Choice for Europe* also stressed the continuing role played by national actors for whom integration was the best way of ensuring the economic viability of their nation-states in Europe.33

The neo-realist analysis has thus disenchanted the study of European integration and illustrated the economic rationale behind this process (which predated 1945). Nevertheless, after more than sixty years of deepening integration, it appears doubtful that the European project can be adequately analysed at only the level of short-term decisions by individual statesmen and events such as the European treaties. When viewed across the *longue durée* European integration appears instead to be a rather more profound development than a mere series of feats of crisis management, as the various European treaties appeared according to the neo-realist account.34 To deal with the causes of European integration, a number of historians have recently suggested that we need a reconsideration of the cultural and intellectual history behind the phenomenon of European integration. They have stressed that such a cultural and intellectual history approach can also take European integration history out of its ghetto and link this process with more wide-ranging historiographical trends observable in the mid twentieth century.35

One way in which recent histories have attempted to do this is to connect the growth in support for an integrated Europe with what has been described as the Westernization of Europe after 1945. By Westernization, historians such as Anselm Doering-Manteuffel have referred to a process akin to Americanization, stressing, however, that such a process was not merely marked by cultural transfer from the United States to Europe but represented the multiple entanglements between peoples from both continents.36 These historians of Westernization have focused on measures such as the Marshall Plan, which saw $25 billion of aid being provided for European reconstruction in the decade after the war and created the first supranational institutions within which Europeans worked together, planning their economies and allocating resources.37 They have also illustrated how the contribution of the United States has been greater than the sum of any such treaties. For instance, exiled German intellectuals and politicians
helped to ‘Westernize’ German political discourse and practice after 1945, often elaborating schemes for the reconstruction of Europe conceived within American organizations and then transmitted back to their home countries via Allied governments or the Allied-controlled post-war media.\(^{38}\)

Historians have also recognized that supporters of European integration could be agents of Westernization but could alternatively seek to resist the increasing Americanization of Europe. They could do this by advocating a more unified political community based on pre-national traditions in Europe, such as the Holy Roman Empire. Seeking to reconstruct how ideas of an integrated Europe were formulated in Germany in the twentieth century, historians from the Westernization school largely identified two versions of integrationist thought: a liberal, pro-Western tradition (discussed above) and an \textit{abendländisch} tradition. The \textit{abendländisch} model of integration was formulated by predominantly conservative groups who sought to offer an alternative vision of Europe to the post-Versailles European settlement. They appealed to an Occidental, pre-nationalist Europe with its roots in a Christian culture that had supposedly unified the aristocratic states of the Holy Roman Empire from 1648 to 1806. These groups referred to this Europe as the \textit{Abendland}, the most literal translation of which is Occident, yet which had a much greater currency in German than this equivalent has ever possessed in English. While this term was sometimes used to mean simply ‘the West’, it was also employed to contrast a West with its heart in the Central European \textit{Kulturländer} with a West with its centre in the \textit{Zivilisationen} of the United States or Britain and France.\(^{39}\)

As the early histories of the \textit{abendländisch} movement illustrate, this conception of Europe as \textit{Abendland} had an extended life beyond 1945, in many ways predominating over more liberal conceptions of a ‘Western’, Anglo-Americanized Europe, until the early 1960s. However, while \textit{abendländisch} academies and journals propagated plans for integration into the 1960s, such models of European integration waned in influence during this decade as Germany became established as a successful member of the U.S.-dominated Western European bloc. This argument suggests that, although many intellectual and political groups were sceptical about allying with the United States and about reviving parliamentary democracy in Europe, their anti-Bolshevism prompted them to make common cause with pro-democratic groups in order to wage a ‘fight for freedom’ against the Soviet Union. Accordingly, they became committed to the Western bloc, largely because the Cold War forced such either/or decisions upon political groups, and ultimately dropped their plans to reshape Europe along the lines of the \textit{Abendland}.\(^{40}\)

The histories of the \textit{abendländisch} case for Europe have thus tended to offer a picture of a westernizing Germany, even if this process has been described as non-linear and abbreviated. Yet, a number of historians have further complicated this picture, recovering a variety of alternative plans formulated by Germans throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These include the attempts made by Germans to establish their country as the leading member within a
Mitteleuropa, composed of a community of nations from East Central Europe. This entity was valorized as a way of negotiating the tensions between a German statehood(s), a greater German nationality and the presence of Germany within a wider central European region with a profoundly mixed ethnic make-up. The influence of such a German-centric vision of European unity was significant, and provided much of the underpinning for the ideas articulated by German political leaders during the First and Second World Wars. For instance, figures such as Friedrich Naumann formulated plans for a union between Germany and the Habsburg Double Monarchy as the first step towards creating a *mitteleuropäisch* community that would form the basis of a German-French Empire that could rival the British. Leaders such as Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler could build on such plans, claiming that by bringing together the peoples of Central Europe around some form of German-led federation, their empires could offer an effective defence against the non-European forces of East and West, as well as providing a new form of political organization. Similarly, conservative politicians and businessmen proved receptive to Nazi plans for a commercial *Mitteleuropa* because Germany had already become a dominant trading partner in this region during the interwar period, with Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia proving to be one of the largest areas for German exports after France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Such plans for a *Mitteleuropa* also appear to have receded in the post-Second World War period. Nevertheless, it will be suggested in what follows that these schemes for Central Europe reemerged in albeit altered form periodically throughout the mid and late twentieth century, as the numerous references in post-war histories to ‘rediscoveries’ of Central Europe have illustrated.

Accordingly, one of the major contributions of recent histories of European integration has been to expand our horizons when considering how European integration was theorized and popularized in Europe during the twentieth century. In so doing these histories have, at least partially, decentred the story of the EU-ization of Europe, illustrating how the post-war European project emerged out of a constellation of competing visions for a unified Europe. Furthermore, they have enriched the study of European integration from an earlier narrower focus on diplomatic or institutional histories.

The history outlined in this book also seeks to offer a broader perspective on European integration history. It approaches integration as something more profound than a mere series of negotiations between diplomats and politicians, regarding integration rather as a process of encounter, interaction, competition and cooperation between Europeans that occurred as part of everyday experiences, such as travelling, conducting business, fighting wars, and sharing technology. As will be shown, these experiences informed and changed Europeans’ beliefs about themselves and their neighbours, their visions of the past and future, their habits, and their political allegiances and actions.
Towards a New Intellectual History of European Integration

Seeking to make a contribution to a broader social and cultural history of European integration, this book focuses on people's ideas of Europe as they interacted with one another. It therefore claims that the ideas people formulated offer insights into, as well as having had a profound impact upon, their lived experience. This argument thereby suggests that intellectual history should be seen as a vital part of the social and cultural history of European integration. One implication of this claim is that the ways in which Europeans conceived of an integrated Europe and communicated these ideas to one another, in the process not only travelling through each other's countries and consuming each other's cultural goods but also creating organizations and institutions that linked Europeans to one another, were among the most important ways in which Europe became integrated. As a consequence, the intellectual history presented here involves analysing how ideas emerged out of particular communal, institutional and political constellations. It also assesses the role these ideas played in deciding how communities, intellectual organizations and political parties were structured and how they interacted and competed with one another. As will be shown, the inherited meanings that attached and clung to concepts such as Europe profoundly shaped the ways in which individuals and societies explained the political events they confronted. These concepts of Europe were thus a force that could influence people to form into organizations or break away from them, seek to construct peace or make war, or to offer their support to, or withhold their backing from, parties.

Narrating such an intellectual history of European integration nevertheless presents many challenges, as it involves assessing the role played by ideas of Europe in a variety of political debates and discourses. For instance, reconstructing plans for European integration entails exploring people's ideas about cultural and political geography, political systems, history, religion and revolution, among many other things. These elements served to give Europe content – as place, historical civilization and political community – and gained their own meaning as features of the European 'rhetorical topography'. I now examine each of these aspects in turn.

As the historiographical review above has made clear, concepts of Europe had a geographical dimension. Individuals and groups formed mental maps of Europe, for instance, locating Europe in the West or the Abendland (with Asia starting East of the Elbe or of Vienna's Landstrasse depending on your perspective) or describing a core Europe in a mitteleuropäisch community that would rival and overtake the nations on Europe's Western fringes. These mental maps were highly value laden, with the West either appearing as the height of civilization or as decadent while the East often featured as primitive and wild. Such perspectives have been illustrated by Vejas Liulevicius whose work profiled the German Drang nach Osten (drive toward the East), whereby Germans and Austrians sought to fulfil their Hegelian 'world-historical task' to settle and civilize the East. As I will argue, Germans were rarely content to simply think about their relationship with
or within the West but conceived their role as being a Central European power that could unite the Western and Eastern components of the abendländisch civilisation. As such, the argument presented here will take issue with the subsuming of debates about European integration within an overarching Westernization thesis. Instead, I contend that an integrated Europe was usually presented in the mid twentieth century as a future goal, and as a recovery of a lost federalist past, which would be achieved via a Western alliance but would be distinct from it. This suggests that the rather one-sided focus on Westbindung predominant in the historiographical literature can obscure the more deep-rooted attachment of many Germans to a Europe more like the mitteleuropäisch Holy Roman Empire and more like the Central Europe within which Germans had been dominant for much of the first half of the twentieth century, than a Western Europe still regarded as merely a torso by politicians such as Helmut Kohl as late as the 1980s.53

One of the corollaries of the Westernization thesis is that those who sought to bind the Federal Republic and the nations of Europe within a transatlantic Western alliance also sought to democratize its political culture. They therefore conceived of Europe not only as a geographical space but also as a political system. Indeed, this implication is clear for advocates of the Westernization thesis who see the winning over of West Germans to liberal democracy to be the most conclusive evidence of the Westernization of Germany.54 However, if we focus instead on those who advocated tying German reconstruction into a broader project for European integration, can we argue that such attempts at Europeanization also constituted an attempt to democratize the new West German state? If so, what kind of democracy did they aim for? As Martin Conway has argued, the type of democracy that became the predominant form of government in Europe between the late 1940s and the mid 1960s was a ‘constrained’ form of democracy, ‘in which decision-making was largely remote from the people’.55 The argument advanced in what follows will suggest that groups across the ideological spectrum conceived of European integration precisely as a means of constraining, rather than extending, the kind of parliamentary democracy they believed had stirred up partisan enmities and delivered nationalist demagogues during the interwar years. Furthermore, it will be argued that this constrained form of democracy was regarded as more viable than the interwar version of democracy which was often excoriated as an Americanized Wilsonian import. For many, the interwar version was regarded not as having protected individual and minority freedoms and rights so much as having entrenched ‘mass rule’ through the rise of increasingly radical mass-membership parties, which led to the dominance of one ideological faction over another and of majorities over minorities.56

In the analysis of Europe as political system that follows, it will be suggested that the Westernization thesis cannot do justice to the variety of ideas current among Germans in the mid twentieth century concerning what sort of political system an integrated Europe should represent. For instance, the creation of states according to what was seen as a Wilsonian right to national self-determination in 1918 had, in
many Europeans’ eyes, brought about a de-integration of Europe by increasing the numbers of borders within Europe and restricting the movement of peoples and goods around the continent.\(^57\) Furthermore, rather than Wilson’s ideas serving to Westernise Europe, they appeared to provide an ethnic basis to nationalism. This was particularly problematic given Europe’s ethnic make-up and conflicted with, for instance, other Western ideas of constitutional nationhood such as those formulated by the French.\(^58\) By contrast, advocates of European integration argued that a unification of Europe would not only re-unite Europeans who had been divided as citizens of rival nations, but would also see power devolved again to the regional and local levels, thereby reviving an earlier form of abendländisch order, based on the looser federal arrangement of the Holy Roman Empire.

Implicit in such arguments in favour of European integration was a scepticism about how parliamentary democracy functioned in Europe, particularly with regard to the role of parties. Advocates of an integrated Europe that would be led by a supranational elite and made up of largely self-governing regions, believed that such an institutional framework would limit the power of centralized national political parties first to divide nations and then to claim to speak and act in the name of these nations. This did not mean that such advocates of European integration dispensed with the language of democracy; however, they all sought to avoid a recapitulation of the democratization ushered in by the post-1918 settlement. In common with many groups that had sought to defend democracy and resist dictatorship in the 1930s and 1940s, they advocated a radical refashioning of what appeared to be a terminally compromised parliamentarianism in the interwar period.

As these discussions of democratic reform in Europe suggest, plans for European integration also involved offering rival interpretations of European history. We will see that support for integration was tied to a long-standing tradition of federalist sentiment within Germany, which, as Maiken Umbach has argued, ‘never disappeared from the German political imagination’ and provided rival narratives of German development to a Prussian nationalist one.\(^59\) Indeed, the arguments advanced by the groups featured in this book suggest that we may have misunderstood how incompletely regionalism in Germany was overcome by the Bismarckian unification of 1871. Rather, instead of German unification replacing regionalism with nationalism, the constitutional settlement of 1871 – whereby sovereignty lay with the Bundesrat, the representative of the aristocratically ruled states established by the Vienna Settlement of 1815 – meant that regional sentiments continued to shape political discourse into the twentieth century and provided much of the impetus behind support for further measures of federalism in Germany and Europe.\(^60\) According to this argument, instead of a new unitarist consensus being established in Imperial and post-Imperial Germany, the dominance of one region – Prussia – over the others, continued to inflame regionalist loyalties, particularly in the southern states, through into the Weimar period.\(^61\) As a result, the federalist sentiment of Germans, who could look back with nostalgia to the Holy Roman Empire, could be mobilized to ensure support for the federalist reforms proposed in the late 1940s at a German and European level.\(^62\)
Taking account of such historical narratives offers us a new way of understanding support for integrating Europe as a Third Way, which was advocated by federalists in the late 1940s and 1950s as a means of keeping European nations out of a future war between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the following account recognizes the importance of the Cold War to Third Way sentiment, it also looks for the latter’s deeper roots. It suggests how support for a move away from the nation-state could have a particular persuasiveness in parts of Germany (and Austria) that had experienced the birth of the nation-state as more a process of partition than of unification. In these regions power was de-localized and centralized in a Prussian government that went on to separate Germans from one another by means initially of military victory and subsequently by military defeat. From this vantage point, the emerging superpowers in the post-1945 period were fitted into a longer-standing trajectory of dominant nations imposing their political authority on European localities and regions. Thus, the United States to some extent and the Soviet Union to a far greater extent appeared as the imperialist heirs of the nationalist spirit of the nineteenth century. This impression was garnered through the post-war settlement of 1918 and seemingly confirmed by the bloc-building these powers initiated at Potsdam.

Groups that lamented the post-Second World War dominance of godless mass polities such as the United States and Soviet Union often cited the falling away of religion as a cause of European decline, as had the similar groups that bemoaned the post-1918 reconstruction of Europe. Both sets of groups hearkened back to a supposedly more united Europe or Abendland that had been, so the story went, unified through the rise of Christianity and the formation of the Holy Roman Empire. This appeal to a medieval, or at least, pre-nineteenth-century Europe may sound fantastically nostalgic but was nevertheless widespread in Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century. Such conceptions of Europe as Abendland were formulated by initially Catholic but increasingly ecumenical religious and political groups who produced journals such as the influential Hochland and Abendland. These groups aimed to counteract the feared Untergang des Abendlandes (decline of the West) envisaged by Oswald Spengler among others through a re-Christianisation and reunification of the continent.

Although such groups often existed in a tense relationship with the Catholic Church’s hierarchy, they argued that obedience to the universalist Catholic Church (with its local authority figures, the priests in every parish) or at least to the universalist tenets of Christianity would reunite Europe’s masses. According to these arguments, the masses had been divided by the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, and radicalized as members of ideologically profiled political parties, which encouraged them to see ideological enemies at home and abroad. Such abendländisch groups, particularly during the interwar period, contrasted religious forms of community and hierarchy with democratic types and worked against the democratic order in the European societies of their time. Yet, as we will see, not only abendländisch groups on the Right but also liberal and social-demo-
ocratic advocates of European integration who had witnessed a National Socialist ‘sacralization of politics’ advocated versions of religious revival or of religiously inflected politics in Europe as a means of relativizing the claims of the political sphere in post-Second World War Europe. Thus, while the analysis offered here will trace the rise of Christian democracy and the embracing of democracy by the Christian churches in the post-Second World War period, it will also show how Christianity was used as a depoliticizing force in the democracies of this era.

This focus on the role that religion played for advocates of European integration might lead us to believe that such advocates were typically war-weary quietists. As we will see when looking at groups on both the Right and Left, this was certainly not always the case. Rather, agitating for European unity could, and often did, involve calling for radical and even revolutionary change in Europe between the 1920s and 1950s. This agenda for European (re)unification could be styled as a conservative revolution, as it was by right-wing groups active during the interwar period. They envisaged overthrowing the established order in the various European nations and threatening the sovereignty of nations that encompassed minority populations made up of co-nationals from a neighbouring state. Similarly, European unity could be conceived of as the goal of a socialist revolution. This kind of revolution would, according to socialist theorists, dismantle the transnational economic forces that sustained the increasingly dictatorial political regimes in the various European nations during the interwar period. Indeed, as socialists in interwar and wartime Europe became disillusioned with the neo-imperialism practised by the Soviet Union but equally disenchanted by the apparent unsustainability of parliamentary democracy in Europe and by the Machiavellian foreign policy of Western European statesmen, they believed that a unified revolutionary movement would rise up in Central Europe and bring about the withering of the (nation-)state.

Such a focus on the revolutionary aspirations of advocates of European integration may appear surprising given that European integration was conceived by post-Second World War leaders as a means of avoiding the revolutionary upheaval of the post-First World War period. Certainly it is true that mainstream politicians and parties converged around an agenda for European unity that sought to minimize ideological strife within and between nations. Nevertheless, the arguments that such politicians made for European federation involved advocating radical change, including the kind of radical personal transformation that personalists among the early federalist and Christian democratic movements believed necessary. Similarly, social-democratic advocates of European integration, even if they did not advocate Marxist revolution, contended that, only if radical economic reforms could be carried out on a European level, could parliamentary democracy be practised safely within the nation-states. Further than that, they looked to more direct forms of democracy and self-management, suggesting their abiding ambivalence about parliamentarianism and anticipating many of the New Left arguments advanced in the 1960s.
These themes will recur in what follows. For now, I move to an outline of the chapters, summarising how the argument develops as the three groups cited above are studied in greater depth.

The Structure of the Book

This book analyses three groups in three sections with two chapters devoted to each group. While each section moves chronologically from the 1920s to the 1950s, the book as a whole juxtaposes the interwar, wartime and post-war experiences and projects of the groups across the same timeframe. Each section is relatively self-contained, although instances of communication and cooperation between the featured groups are highlighted.

The first two chapters of the book are focused on a cultural journal, *Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, founded in the French Zone in 1947 and still thriving, having attracted contributions from some of the most prominent names in cultural and political life in Germany and Europe after 1945. The book begins by focusing on how such a cultural journal made the case for an integrated Europe. It does this because, before political parties were allowed to function again in Germany and at a time when book production was low, cultural journals were licensed by occupation authorities, attracting circulation figures usually in the tens of thousands and gaining the most highly regarded intellectuals of the day as contributors and readers. Chapter 1 outlines the interwar background to the founding of this journal, highlighting how cultural journals also thrived in the interwar years, emerging out of the flourishing associational life evident in Germany during this period. This chapter and chapter 2 show the continuities between influential civil society groups in the interwar and post-1945 periods and the ways in which they sought to mobilize support for European integration. They illustrate how concerns about the growth of American and Soviet power, as well as a fear of the rise of democratic nation-states and the mass politics practised within them, animated much of the *abendländisch* support for Europe across this period. They therefore offer a nuanced perspective on the Third Force agenda for Europe, excavating its roots in the politics of the interwar period rather than seeing it solely emerge out of the resistance movements.

The remaining chapters focus on two groups that were influential in the forming of the post-war political parties in Germany. As Wolfram Kaiser has illustrated, the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands or Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the SPD were among the primary agents in shaping how European integration was advanced, negotiated, criticized and extended after 1945, both at a domestic and transnational level. The research presented in the following chapters will suggest that the history of the two major parties’ European policy was shaped not only by short-term competition between them and by the short-term interests promoted and defended within diplomatic
negotiations. Rather, the European policy of these parties was greatly influenced by debates about European (dis)unity in predecessor organizations during the interwar and wartime periods. Thus, the approach of the major parties towards integration can be usefully historicized by analysing such groups as the ISK and Demokratisches Deutschland, both of which developed proposals for European integration not only in conversation with Western Allied governments but also with ideological colleagues from across Europe.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the ISK, an interwar splinter group from the SPD whose members went into French and British exile, and whose leader, Willi Eichler, became one of the SPD’s most important theorists as the major author of the Godesberg Programme of 1959. Chapter 3 describes the founding of the ISK and its flight into exile after 1933, focusing particularly on how its internationalist ideology shifted during these years towards an advocacy of European integration. Chapter 4 describes the reintegration of its members within the SPD after 1945, illustrating how its leaders went on to shape the SPD’s policy towards European integration. These chapters contextualize the supposedly ‘nationalist’ European policy of Kurt Schumacher. They suggest that the SPD’s commitment to European integration as a means of reforming parliamentary democracy and of pursuing an internationalist agenda that would reunite East and West has been misunderstood in much of the pre-existing historiography. The chapters also highlight the existence of transnational debates between exiled socialist groups that complicate the traditional narratives of international cooperation (or lack of cooperation) between European socialist parties after 1945.74

The final two chapters are concerned with Das Demokratische Deutschland, a cross-party coalition of exiles from Nazi Germany that formed in wartime Switzerland and whose members went on to be influential in CDU and SPD politics. The organization was a rival to the Freies Deutschland group that was established in that country as part of a broader Soviet-sponsored Freies Deutschland popular front of German exiles that issued some of the early salvos in the Cold War. The leaders of Demokratisches Deutschland went on to assume leading positions in post-war European federalist movements and in post-war party politics in Germany. Chapter 5 focuses on the ideas for European integration formulated by the group’s leaders as they worked with Allied secret services and foreign ministries to plan for post-war reconstruction, offering rival proposals to the Freies Deutschland group. It highlights the federalist orientation of the largely southern German leaders of the group who conceived of European integration as a means of shifting the balance of power away from northern states such as Prussia and recreating a Central European community with its heart in the Catholic, southern Germanic states. Chapter 6 spotlights the post-war careers of the group’s leaders, showing how figures such as Wilhelm Hoegner sought to increase the autonomy of the southern German states within a ‘Europe of the regions’. These chapters, taken together, illustrate how European integration intersected with a broader Cold War agenda but also suggest that, in many ways, European integration was conceived as a way of keeping European nations out of the
Cold War. They therefore show some of the deep continuities in federalist sentiment in Germany but also how such sentiment was Europeanized after 1945.

The Conclusion offers an overview of the central themes of the book, highlighting the elements of continuity and change across the period between 1926 and 1950. It also looks beyond these dates, assessing how support for a Third Force Europe fed into the Ostpolitik initiatives of the 1950s and 1960s. Reviewing the policies of leading German politicians towards Eastern Europe throughout the twentieth century, it argues that while these leaders continued to push forward measures of European integration within the ‘Western’ European Community they never stopped seeking to increase West Germany’s influence and trade presence in the East Central European region as well as to reunify East and West Germany. The Conclusion finishes by offering further suggestions for rethinking some of the concepts used by historians to describe European integration and the history of mid-twentieth-century Europe in the light of the research presented in this book.

Notes

2. For more on the efforts of intellectuals to foster European integration, see J. Lacroix and K. Nicolaïdis (eds), European Stories: Intellectual Debates in National Contexts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3. Thanks to Martin Conway for help with this point.
6. For a recent discussion of some of these longer-term internationalist perspectives, see M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012).
8. Thanks to David Vincent for help with this point.


32. See the Introduction to Milward, *European Rescue of the Nation-State*.
C.-D. Krohn and A. Schildt (eds), Zwischen den Stühlen?: Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegszeit (Hamburg: Christians, 2002).


50. This phrase is taken from P.T. Jackson, Civilization the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006) p. xi.


54. On this see Jarausch, After Hitler, pp. 103–5.


72. An interest in federalism emerging out of ‘the spirit of resistance’ has been revived in recent years, see F. Niess, *Die europäische Idee – aus dem Geist des Widerstands* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).


74. For more on these traditional narratives, see T. Imlay, “‘The Policy of Social Democracy is Self-consciously Internationalist”: The SPD’s Internationalism after 1945’, *The Journal of Modern History* (forthcoming).