

Chapter 4

**POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP AND POLITICAL CRISIS,
1863–1866**



The network of liberal political friends found themselves in a precarious position in 1863. The New Era in Prussia had ended, and the network's *kleindeutsch* reform plans had failed to take root. Worse still, the political friends had become bitterly divided over whether to seek accommodation with the new minister president of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, in their pursuit of the German nation-state. The decline of the network was slow, halting, and shaped by crises beyond the control of its members. These moderate liberals tried to the end to manage personal conflict, political disagreement, and international crisis as political friends. Their insistence on this faltering form of political organization at a time of rapid social, political, and personal change helps explain the simultaneous resilience and fragility of German liberalism at midcentury.

Network members had failed to reach a united position toward King Wilhelm I of Prussia and Bismarck's anti-constitutional government. But this failure was not theirs alone. The king's army bill divided liberals across Prussia and the German Confederation. The split in the Prussian Landtag between conciliatory liberals and members of the new German Progressive Party sowed discord among liberals for years. Yet, the animosity generated by this fracture became untenable in the network because political friendship remained their primary mode of political organization at the Confederal level. If deliberations among network liberals in the 1850s had been aimed at forging consensus under heavy state repression, the less repressive 1860s provided the space for their debates to become factional and adversarial.¹ Not content to ostracize Max Duncker for his Bismarckian sympathies, rival members of the network leveraged powerful connections to try to force him from office. Instead, they ignited an international scandal: the "Danzig Affair" of 1863. The fallout highlights the volatility of political friendship in an era marked by a more open public sphere in Central Europe.

In the same year, political friendship proved resilient as members of the liberal network won Karl Mathy an appointment as a senior official in the Grand

Duchy of Baden. His new sovereign, Friedrich I of Baden, then traveled in the summer of 1863 to Frankfurt am Main and the last peaceful meeting of Confederal leaders. There, the princely members of the network once again advanced their idea that a collective national monarchy could legally replace the “layered” sovereignty of the German Confederation and its member states.² They found, to their chagrin, that *Trias* rivals had repurposed this idea for their own ends. The results of the Frankfurt Fürstentag, or “Congress of Princes,” disillusioned non-princely members of the network. Many began to ask themselves whether national unification through the reasoned debate and peaceful agreement of Germany’s monarchs remained preferable—or even possible. Both political friendship and negotiated monarchical unification relied on mutual trust, open communication, and compromise.

Both princely and bourgeois members of the network managed a fleeting show of solidarity at the start of the Second Schleswig War in early 1864. Brian Vick has convincingly argued that the fate of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein in 1848–49 was crucial to German liberals’ vision of a future nation-state.³ The same holds true for liberals’ reaction to war in 1864. Network members shelved their differences and participated in the massive popular mobilization in Germany to support the Holstein rebels.⁴ Members of the network initially focused their efforts on the “Augustenburg candidacy” for the ducal thrones. They came to see an Augustenburg victory in Kiel as synonymous with a liberal victory in Berlin. Yet, as the fate of the Elbe duchies and the Augustenburg cause became uncertain, network members retreated into their previous camps. In the 1850s, faith in the transcendental power of both monarchy and friendship had helped German liberals temper disagreements over political practice, but by the mid-1860s, the two only exacerbated their policy disputes. Strife between members only worsened, until the Seven Weeks’ War of 1866 heralded the end of the network of political friends.

This chapter proceeds chronologically from 1863 to 1867. This period exemplifies the instability of political friendship as a form of political organization in societies defined by centralized civic associations, loosened press restrictions, and emergent party politics.⁵ I first focus on members’ fortunes in Baden, as well as their misfortunes in Prussia, in the first half of 1863. Shortly thereafter, network monarchs gathered with their fellow princes in the Confederal capital to hammer out an agreement on national consolidation. I analyze the fierce debates between Confederal leaders at the Frankfurt Fürstentag over the relationship between monarchical sovereignty and national unity. This chapter’s final section unravels the process of détente and disintegration in the network from the start of the Second Schleswig War (1864) to the formation of the North German Confederation in 1867.

From Karlsruhe to Danzig

While Max Duncker fueled controversy with his embrace of Bismarck in Berlin, other members worked to expand network influence in Karlsruhe. Franz von Roggenbach retained his position as foreign minister and Grand Duke Friedrich I's favorite in Baden's liberal government, despite the failure of his proposals in the early 1860s to reform the German Confederation. But Roggenbach faced additional problems: the head of Baden's cabinet, Anton von Stabel, and pro-Austrian diplomats rejected his *kleindeutsch* projects, while Roggenbach clashed with August Lamey, the interior minister, over laws regarding the Catholic Church.⁶ Why had the mood in Karlsruhe warmed toward Vienna?

During the Prussian constitutional crisis, Habsburg Austria's liberal reputation rose as that of Hohenzollern Prussia declined. Recovering from defeat in the Italian War of 1859, Emperor Franz Joseph's cabinet, under Anton von Schmerling and Bernhard von Rechberg, issued the "October Constitution" of 1860, followed by the "February Patent" of 1861.⁷ With these two documents, Austrian leaders turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a constitutional state.⁸ Reforms included the establishment of a Reichsrat, reduced imperial authority, and greater autonomy for the empire's constituent Crown Lands.⁹ These developments appealed to *Trias* leaders in the middle German states who favored closer economic and political cooperation with Vienna to foil Prussian hegemony in the Zollverein.¹⁰ They also believed that a moderate Austrian cabinet might eventually support a "*Doppelbund*" of unified *Trias* states within the Confederation.¹¹ Increased associational life, loosened press restrictions, and revitalized local councils fostered "a real sense of optimism" among the monarchy's liberals.¹² The Austrian reforms, particularly Schmerling's brand of state liberalism, likewise appealed to north German liberals disaffected with a Prussian government embroiled in a long-running constitutional crisis.¹³

Envoys from Baden began to participate in *Trias* meetings in Würzburg; they did so as welcome, if somewhat suspect, members of the informal coalition.¹⁴ The grand duke flirted with the *Trias* idea for two reasons. Many Baden politicians, especially those with pronounced anticlerical views, believed that Catholic Austria funded political Catholicism in Baden and obstructed the secularization of schools and civil marriages.¹⁵ Closer diplomatic relations with the Austrian emperor might curtail such interference and help Grand Duke Friedrich reach a favorable compromise with Pope Pius IX and Catholic political leaders in Baden.¹⁶ On the other hand, other network members, among them Ernst of Coburg, Karl Mathy, and Franz von Roggenbach, feared that *Trias* advocates in Baden might coax the grand duke away from Prussia in 1863, just when Bismarck was dashing hopes of Prussia's "moral conquest" of Germany. Members mobilized to help Roggenbach find Mathy a senior position in Karlsruhe, where

he could exert influence as a liberal, an advocate of *Kleindeutschland*, a Baden patriot, and an expert on the Zollverein.

Karl Mathy had served in Baden's state bureaucracy before—in the 1830s and 1840s. To punish Mathy for his service to the Reich government of 1848–49 and to Baden's liberal cabinet of 1850, Grand Duke Friedrich's predecessor had revoked his civil servant status.¹⁷ Having settled in Gotha after the death of their son, Karl and Anna Mathy moved again in 1860 to Leipzig to work in a credit bank.¹⁸ There, the Mathys became especially close to Gustav Freytag and his wife, Emilie Freytag (née Scholz). Roggenbach's influence, the easing of Confederal repression, and the current grand duke's liberal sympathies resulted in the reinstatement of Mathy's civil servant status in late 1862.¹⁹ Roggenbach and Duke Ernst then recommended Mathy to Grand Duke Friedrich, who soon asked him to join his government.²⁰ After consulting with other members, Mathy accepted a position as head of the grand ducal domains: this was an influential post that granted Mathy direct access to the monarch and an overview of his finances.²¹

Mathy arrived in Karlsruhe at the beginning of 1863 and quickly settled into his role. By all accounts, he was the most realistic and business-savvy of the network friends—perhaps because he was one of the few non-academics and non-artists.²² Mathy soon forged a personal relationship with the grand ducal family. Regularly, he strolled with the grand duke and duchess through the palace gardens and dined with their family before retiring with Grand Duke Friedrich to discuss trade and German politics.²³ On official letterhead, Mathy communicated with his political friends in Saxony, Coburg, and Prussia, joining Roggenbach and Hermann Baumgarten in keeping them aware of the popular political mood in Baden.²⁴ Mathy also moved to establish a credit bank in Mannheim, similar to his work in Coburg, but this time in competition with the Rothschild family, whose Frankfurt relatives served as bankers to the German Confederation.²⁵

Duke Ernst of Coburg was particularly pleased with Mathy's performance. It enhanced Ernst's contacts in Baden with Grand Duke Friedrich, who was a fellow in-law of the Hohenzollerns. For Ernst and Friedrich, Karl Mathy's appointment demonstrated mutual trust and friendship. Princely network members' circulation of bourgeois political friends as candidates for state office had been common in the 1850s, and the strategy worked in the larger states into the mid-1860s. However, once in office, bourgeois network members' positions were often vulnerable, as the cases of Heinrich von Sybel and Max Duncker showed in chapter 3. Network influence only reached so far into the halls of power—especially in Berlin.

Two related episodes from 1863 exemplified the network's delicate attempt to balance service to the Prussian state with appeals to the political vision of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm. These were the "Danzig Affair" and the subsequent publication of critical letters between King Wilhelm and his son. Both stemmed

from the king's attack on the constitutional role of the Landtag, his disinterest in the national project, and the crown prince's own wish to participate in the new space for public politics. In each case, Ernst of Coburg, Karl Samwer, and Gustav Freytag exploited Max Duncker's vulnerability, eventually shattering his relationship with the crown prince. The fallout then ensnared princely and non-princely network members from both camps in an international scandal.

In the summer of 1863, the crown prince and princess went to visit the Prussian port city of Danzig (Gdańsk). The crown prince inspected local naval elements and delivered a speech to the townspeople on the role of the monarchy in Prussia, reminding his listeners of the need for a free press and the legislature's right to approve the state budget.²⁶ The speech echoed the position of the Progressive Party on the matter and the voices of anti-Bismarck network members around the duke of Coburg.²⁷ Why did he engage in such a public reprimand of his father's policies? The crown prince had been collecting British newspaper clippings since March that outlined how he should act to alter the regime in Prussia. Shortly before his speech in Danzig, the crown prince had learned, not from his political advisor, Max Duncker, but from a provincial newspaper, that the king had issued an edict restricting the oppositional press.²⁸ Duncker supported the content of the speech and praised the crown prince's "manly independence"; yet, to August von Saucken he seethed that those who had pressured Friedrich Wilhelm to speak out had acted irresponsibly.²⁹

The crown prince's seemingly presumptuous speech enraged the king. Wilhelm chastised his son for disrespect before threatening to court-martial and imprison him. Bismarck intervened and managed to convince King Wilhelm that the conflict was best "blunted, ignored, and hushed up."³⁰ Bismarck then blamed Max Duncker for failing to anticipate the fallout from the speech. Duncker had surrendered the crown prince, Bismarck charged, to the influence of British diplomats and Coburg agents—namely, Robert Morier and Duncker's new rival, Ernst von Stockmar.³¹ The crown prince defended himself to king, counselor, and minister alike, accusing his father of endangering the monarchy by embroiling himself in the constitutional crisis.³² The crown prince preferred a reigning, parliamentary monarch to a ruling, semi-constitutional monarch. He also piqued the Prussian king's sense of dynastic duty with reference to legitimism: Wilhelm held the Crown as its custodian and was behaving recklessly. In this episode, the Prussian king and crown prince continued the Hohenzollern tradition of father-son conflict.³³ Yet, the enduring scandal was also a very contemporary one. The conflict was less a clash of personalities between father and son and more a dispute over the very form of the Prussian state, the meaning of a monarch's duty, and—in liberals' thinking—the future of the German nation-state.

Despite Bismarck's best efforts, the situation worsened as sensitive documents flowed between network members and into the public realm. Ernst von Stockmar sent Friedrich of Baden copies of three letters between the king and the crown

prince. Queen Augusta of Prussia had asked him to forward them to Grand Duke Friedrich with instructions to return them to the crown prince through the former New Era minister, Karl Anton von Hohenzollern.³⁴ Stockmar sent the grand duke of Baden at least four more letters and other “writings,” which he duly read and returned.³⁵ Sections of the correspondence soon appeared in the British *Times* and began to circulate in German newspapers. The relationship between the Prussian king and his heir deteriorated. The former threatened to discharge the latter from the army, but Bismarck managed to dissuade the king despite Crown Princess Victoria, even though Bismarck resented what he saw as the constant interference of Queen Augusta and Victoria’s family in London.³⁶ The crown prince complained to his friend and brother-in-law, Friedrich of Baden: “What a difficult conflict those couple of words at Danzig city hall have cost me, as did the correspondence with the king, of which you are already aware . . . My position is terribly mortifying—grave.”³⁷ The crown prince retreated into “sullen passivity” publicly, but his diaries indicate that he continued to challenge the king privately on constitutional issues.³⁸

Roggenbach, the foreign minister of Baden, believed that the crown prince’s misstep in Danzig had turned into a “blunder” that further decreased his influence in Berlin.³⁹ Roggenbach wrote to his sovereign and political friend, Grand Duke Friedrich, to express his concern that, although the letters had been published without the crown prince’s consent, the “indiscretion” had clearly been organized as part of a wider “attack plan.” Roggenbach had gathered as much from Gustav Freytag, who had detailed Stockmar and Samwer’s involvement in the plot. Charlotte Duncker and Rudolf Haym likewise held “the group of friends gagged around Duke Ernst” responsible for the convoluted plot to undermine Duncker and buttress Progressives in the legislature simultaneously.⁴⁰ Bismarck, the king, and the crown prince all accused Duncker of leaking the letters, which he denied.⁴¹

Publication of the royal letters transformed the Danzig “episode” from a family dispute into a national scandal.⁴² King Wilhelm next accused his son-in-law, Friedrich of Baden, of leaking the documents. In doing so, Wilhelm reinterpreted the boundary between private and public, dynasty and state, by translating bourgeois notions of privacy to the ruling family. He nevertheless faced the reality that the type of monarchical state that he favored rendered such distinctions moot. The persons of the king and the crown prince were indistinguishable from their dynastic roles and state functions, and that political metaphor was indispensable to “generating favorable sentiments of adhesion” toward monarchies across nineteenth-century Europe.⁴³ Members heard that dissonance.⁴⁴ Friedrich responded gravely that he had indeed read, but not copied, the letters; they were “foreign property.” Feeling that the Prussian king had maligned his monarchical dignity and his personal character, Friedrich asked to “leave the question unanswered whether I myself have contributed to this catastrophe.”⁴⁵

Dynastic networks and the European press turned what the king and Bismarck chose to consider a father-son squabble into an international incident. The embarrassing situation reflected an important struggle over the basic role of monarchy in Prussia and in a future nation-state. The crown prince championed the views of the majority of network members who favored parliamentary rule in the name of a constitutionally limited sovereign. King Wilhelm, Bismarck, and Max Duncker read “modern” monarchy differently, adapting bourgeois family norms—that family disputes should remain private—to protect the public political image of king and country.⁴⁶ The intra-network conflict had partially backfired. True, Duncker’s reputation had suffered, but rather than boosting the crown prince’s official influence, the affair left him isolated. Overall, the episode highlighted not only the disruptive power of the otherwise limited network but also its members’ tendency toward factionalism and self-sabotage after 1862. Members of the network failed to appreciate the high stakes of taking personal political feuds into a public realm that had been greatly expanded during the New Era. A few months after the Danzig Affair, in August 1863, disagreement over the role of monarchy in Germany, as well as in a potential *Kleindeutschland*, resurfaced at the last peaceful gathering of Confederal leaders at Frankfurt am Main.

The Frankfurt Fürstentag (1863)

Not only did questions about the relationship between nation and monarchy reappear in Frankfurt, but intriguing aspects of Duke Ernst’s concessions in the Prussian military convention (chapter 3) also resurfaced in debates about the foundations of sovereignty in Central Europe. This section tracks some of the disputes between princes attending the Frankfurt Fürstentag in 1863 from the perspective of princely members of the network. These disputes highlighted German princes’ divergent interpretations of their roles and their sovereignty. Opponents of the network and their plans for *kleindeutsch* unification now echoed network members’ idea that sovereignty could be collected in a central authority for the sake of national consolidation—not to form a *Kleindeutschland*, though. The final failure of the congress demonstrated the continuing divisions within the Confederation despite years of reform efforts and nearly constant threats from abroad.

Julius Fröbel, a radical ‘48er turned Austrian official, devised the original idea for the Fürstentag summit that eventually reached high officials in the Austrian government.⁴⁷ The receipt of an invitation shocked princely network members like “a bolt out of the blue.”⁴⁸ Duke Ernst II of Coburg nonetheless remembered the “fearful anxiety” over whether every state would be represented. He reported that he tried, along with Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden and Grand Duke Carl

Alexander of Weimar, to convince Prussia to send a delegation—likely headed by the crown prince, if not the king.⁴⁹ Network members worried that without a Prussian presence, conservative sovereigns would dominate the conference. Bismarck, characteristically, sensed an Austrian ploy. He also understood that, without the presence of the Prussian king, the other German princes who did answer the call would be unable to reach any major agreements. King Wilhelm I of Prussia, at Bismarck's behest, rejected the initial invitation to Frankfurt.

Shortly after the other German leaders gathered in Frankfurt am Main on 15 August 1863, disagreements arose between them concerning their notions of monarchy and nation.⁵⁰ At the opening session, Emperor Franz Joseph, sitting in a raised chair to signal his status as a first among equals, called for national consolidation and presented his Confederal reform proposal, which, in a new development, was published in the press two days later.⁵¹ The king of Bavaria immediately objected that, without Prussia, such a reform plan would be worth little. This regal exchange set off a round of bickering between Confederal rulers.⁵² The grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin proposed that a prince be sent personally to ask Wilhelm to attend. The kings of Saxony and Bavaria eagerly supported the motion, as did Friedrich of Baden.⁵³ For a moment, the goals of the *Trias* and *kleindeutsch* reformers aligned. According to Roggenbach, *Trias* rulers feared that, if the Habsburg emperor succeeded, they would be forced into a reformed Confederation and “full subjugation under Austria.”⁵⁴ The monarchs of the smaller states were afraid of mediatization by both Austria or Prussia. For his part, Friedrich of Baden wanted the Prussian king to join the congress so that it could reach major reforms. The German princes eventually dispatched King Johann of Saxony to meet personally with Wilhelm, who at that time was taking a cure in Baden-Baden. After many emotional theatrics, Bismarck managed to persuade the king to decline the second invitation.⁵⁵ Network monarchs therefore participated in the conference without their ideal leader.

Informal diplomacy surrounded the daily meetings of the German princes in Frankfurt and shared similarities with the behavior of delegates to the National Assembly of 1848–49 that suggested the diffusion of democratic norms among Confederal leaders. Factions formed early on, representing a “left” wing, a “right,” and a “cautious center,” with each holding increasingly isolated faction meetings.⁵⁶ The main scenes of conflict took place at formal sessions, however.⁵⁷ Debates were especially bitter between King Johann of Saxony, who otherwise tried to play a mediating role between the princes, and Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden, who, according to a Coburg source, refused to align with any of the princely factions—in proper moderate-liberal fashion.⁵⁸ Even so, these two monarchs were also leading representatives of competing *Trias* and *kleindeutsch* solutions; therefore, they had arrived at the Fürstentag with plenty of policy positions in their baggage. The most significant struggle occurred on 24 August, when Johann advocated for a directory of five princes to head a new Confederal

executive.⁵⁹ This directory would relegate the tens of duchies and grand duchies to a single seat.⁶⁰ So intense was the indignation in the room that the duke of Braunschweig was moved to shouting, stamping his feet, and pounding on the table.⁶¹

Liberal monarchs made a counterproposal. The grand duke of Oldenburg suggested that Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria should have permanent seats on the directorate, and that the other two positions should be elected periodically by the other princes.⁶² This arrangement would have undermined the middle-state monarchs' position in the new Confederation, and Johann's, in particular. Unsurprisingly, Johann was irate. He argued that only kings should be given precedence (the *Trias* states included the kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and occasionally Hanover). Johann's proposal would have given the monarchs of the *Trias*, based on feudal title, disproportionate representation in the new executive. Friedrich countered that the assembled sovereigns had no reason to stand on such distinctions of rank; they should all be considered equal representatives of their states.⁶³ Friedrich implicitly leveraged Confederal guarantees of monarchical sovereignty, regardless of title. But even the seating arrangements of the room reflected a longstanding debate among German princes over rank and precedence.⁶⁴ The monarchs sat around a large, round table in a large, round hall. Yet, the emperor sat on his raised chair, flanked by the kings of Bavaria and Saxony, and the other princes literally radiated outward from his seat "according to rank."⁶⁵ Friedrich of Baden's legal references to monarchical equality rang hollow within a chamber organized to obscure that very fact.

Grand Duke Friedrich's position also reflected a shift among many German liberals in considering the relationship between the monarch and state. After the shock of popular violence during the Revolutions of 1848/49, German liberals abandoned the idea of the monarch as the embodiment of the *Gesamtpersönlichkeit*, or "total personality," of the state—and thus of the future nation-state. They chose instead to portray the monarch as an emanation of the state, responsible for assuring social stability and historical continuity in the face of inevitable progress.⁶⁶ Monarchs thereby served the state in its heavily freighted mission of civilization. For most German liberals, including the political friends, this monarchical system would lead almost by necessity to national unification. Yet, progress in Frankfurt was neither natural nor easy. The assembled princes could not consider national unity without first defining their own sovereignty.

The early conflict at the congress over rank and power highlights the divergent ideas of sovereignty held by a liberal network monarch such as Friedrich, whose state had a solid parliamentary base, and a more conservative ruler, such as Johann, whose state was more reliant on dynastic tradition. The kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg formed a bloc that intended to translate their titles into real political power in a reformed Confederation. The "lower-ranking" princes sought to minimize their subordination based on accidents of

history—or Napoleonic largesse.⁶⁷ Friedrich of Baden directly criticized feudal rank in favor of monarchs' modern equality as representatives of their people—a position Johann could never endorse. Put simply: Friedrich represented the state; Johann was the state.⁶⁸

At the same time, Friedrich of Baden adapted a conservative notion of sovereignty that moderate liberals had embraced after 1848 to defend their legal safe havens in the smaller German states. Sovereignty could not be quantified by population, wealth, or land area. It was essentially qualitative—all sovereigns were equal.⁶⁹ The concept of monarchical sovereignty proved as malleable in the hands of princes as it did in those of bourgeois activists.

Considering the princes' infighting, Friedrich of Baden concluded on 25 August that there could be no reform but only the strengthening of appeals from *Trias* leaders or Austria. A final argument occurred toward the end of the conference when Emperor Franz Joseph, frustrated by what he regarded as the obstinacy of the myriad monarchs and distancing himself from his own government's reform plan, concluded that "whoever does not vote with us, is our enemy."⁷⁰ Grand Duke Friedrich rejected the emperor's dark pronouncement. He indicated that the princes needed to sacrifice their sovereignty for the "communal good," for German unity and security.⁷¹ Friedrich once again expounded on German monarchs' national duty to trade *individual* power for *collective* glory, a notion the Austrian emperor evidently found frustrating. Anything short of the complete reorganization of the Confederation, Friedrich then declared, would be a mere stopgap. Franz Joseph responded that Friedrich should have brought these ideas up beforehand. Friedrich retorted that he had, many times, in his letters. A general argument ensued, and the meeting disintegrated.⁷² The conference concluded on 1 September after this last, uncomfortable session.

The Fürstentag was a "glamorous event" that also exposed deep division within the German Confederation.⁷³ The princes of Germany attempted to deploy monarchical pageantry at the national level to convince the public of their mutual affection and capacity for compromise. They displayed neither of those qualities. Duke Ernst of Coburg believed that the failure of the Fürstentag dispelled the myth of camaraderie among the German princes (a myth, not coincidentally, that was the foundation of the Confederation). The leaders of Germany had sat together in discussion, free from the interference of advisors and state ministers, but they had still left Frankfurt empty-handed. In an aside to Franz Joseph during the conference, Duke Ernst admitted: "I very much dread that the German princes will never again see themselves assembled in Frankfurt without a sword in hand!"⁷⁴

Friedrich of Baden was cautiously optimistic. In a letter to Franz Joseph of Austria, he thanked the emperor for his invitation to the Fürstentag before reminding Franz Joseph of the need for sacrifices for German unity.⁷⁵ With this

motif of sacrifice—so prominent in network rhetoric and among European liberals—Friedrich tried to prod the emperor into concessions that would foster German unification.⁷⁶ Yet, according to Friedrich's preferred model, Franz Joseph would not be part of that unified Germany.

The Congress of Princes elicited mixed reactions in the German public sphere. The pro-Austrian Reformverein praised the event as a “patriotic deed” and as a promising foundation for constitutional reform in Germany. The pro-Prussian Nationalverein derided the results of the summit as wholly inadequate for national unity and personal freedom.⁷⁷ Bourgeois members of the network across the Confederation shared the latter sentiment. For Karl Mathy, the congress was thus a vaguely Holy Roman throwback that implied both national supremacy and the “Caesarism” of Napoleon III.⁷⁸ This viewpoint accorded with Roggenbach's idea of an “artificial” Austria and its antiquated emperor, outlined in his reform proposal of 1860. Mathy considered the Fürstentag merely a disingenuous Austrian attempt at damage control in Germany.⁷⁹ Max Duncker likewise believed that the Austrian government intended to exploit the conference to delay the renewal of the Zollverein until the smaller states voted to admit the Habsburg lands.⁸⁰ Such an expansion would loosen the Prussian grip on Confederal trade, especially north of the Main. Clearly, many northern German liberals questioned the new liberalism and nationalism of the Austrian government.

For his part, Gustav Freytag worried that the failures of the Fürstentag would directly affect his political friend and patron, Ernst of Coburg. Freytag advised the duke in December 1863 against becoming the protector of the local Thüringer Verein.⁸¹ If Ernst associated with the movement now, Freytag thought, he might appear to be its leader. Freytag warned that associating himself with the club could ultimately lead to another “fiasco” and, the novelist concluded, “I do not want Your Highness to sit himself down in a collapsing house again.”⁸² The last “fiasco” was Ernst's involvement in the “collapsing” reform movement and its culmination at the Frankfurt Fürstentag in 1863. By December of that same year, and with the renewal of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, the hopes for a collegial reform of the Confederation and the political consolidation of the German nation seemed finished. Couched in the language of friendly concern, Freytag sought to prevail upon Duke Ernst to guard his now shaky reputation in liberal Germany—a reputation that network members needed to preserve in order to ensure their own access to the duke's political connections.

Ultimately, non-princely network members were both surprised by, and suspicious of, the sudden efforts of the Austrian cabinet in the Fürstentag of 1863. They remained unsurprised, however, by its lack of tangible results. Reform based on monarchical consensus, the preferred strategy of network members since at least 1858, had failed yet again. Their hope for national unification through princely consensus dimmed further. Bourgeois members' grumblings from the

1850s about princely unreliability and ineptitude continued to reverberate after 1863. Perhaps the monarchs of Germany's smaller states would not become the framers of the nation-state after all? Tension between network members' liberalism and monarchism grew, and their belief wavered in the transcendental power of friendship and monarchy to achieve nationalist goals. Most members of the liberal network became increasingly dismissive of monarchs from the small states, while a few began to question the European consensus about the centrality of monarchy to liberalism and nation.⁸³ But "traditional" monarchy and "modern" nationalism were not so easily separated in nineteenth-century Europe. Two months later, King Frederick VII of Denmark died. The demise of the Danish king reignited the national conflict over Schleswig-Holstein and reconciled rival network members—for a time.

From Schleswig-Holstein to the North German Confederation, 1864–1867

Network members were elated over the possibilities for German national unification that they saw in the monarchical future of Schleswig-Holstein. In pursuit of these possibilities, the network paused their factional attacks on one another. Members supported the claim of a network affiliate, Friedrich von Augustenburg, to the thrones of the three Elbe duchies and campaigned to win Confederal and international recognition for the "Augustenburg candidacy." Political consensus within the network soon faltered after Austro-Prussian victories over Denmark and the occupation of the Elbe duchies in early 1864. Members disagreed about whether the duchies should be ruled by the reliably liberal Augustenburg or annexed by the autocratic Prussian king. For some, Bismarck's Prussia might finally unite Germany—perhaps by force.⁸⁴ But Augustenburg promised to rule constitutionally with a parliamentary government, to create a "Gotha on the Elbe," Bismarck quipped.⁸⁵ Questions of dynastic legitimacy mixed uncomfortably with hopes for future unification, and such questions were never swept from the table between 1864 and 1866. Faced with these challenges, the network finally collapsed in June 1866 when members found themselves on different sides of the "German Civil War."⁸⁶

A brief rehearsal of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein, discussed in chapter 1, is needed to understand how German leaders and network members behaved during the crisis in the 1860s. The three duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg had been held in personal union by Danish monarchs since the middle of the fifteenth century. With the death of King Frederick VII in November 1863, the male line of the Danish royal house ended, replaced in Denmark by Christian IX, a relative from a female line. Because the German Confederation

recognized only the rule of Salic inheritance, King Christian could not inherit the throne in Holstein or Lauenburg.⁸⁷ Complicating matters further, Schleswig, which lay outside the Confederation, was fused through a series of historical treaties to Holstein, which lay within it.⁸⁸ The Augustenburgs, next in line through a junior male branch in Holstein, had sold their claims in the London Protocol of 1852 as a means to end the First Schleswig War (1848–51). The signatories of that treaty—Russia, the UK, France, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden-Norway—had also guaranteed Danish territorial integrity.⁸⁹

The German Confederation, as a legal body, was not party to the London Protocol. Copenhagen's campaigns to promote the Danish language and Danish civil servants in Schleswig-Holstein had sown anti-Danish sentiment among its educated German populations and in the German Confederation.⁹⁰ Friedrich von Augustenburg, presenting himself as a German prince and German nationalist, argued that his father's renunciation of the ducal thrones in 1852 did not apply to him: the elder Augustenburg, he asserted, lacked the authority to alter other dynasts' divinely ordained rights to the duchies. Friedrich von Augustenburg therefore left for Kiel in December 1863.⁹¹ His appeal to the Confederal diet to recognize his claims found fertile soil, particularly among the *Trias* governments and network princes. But backing the Augustenburg candidacy meant war with Denmark and perhaps the other signatories of the London Protocol.

King Christian of Denmark decreed that he intended to retain the duchies. In response, the Confederal diet in Frankfurt am Main voted in December 1863 for an "execution"—that is, an invasion to restore Confederal law. Saxon and Hanoverian contingents were ordered to occupy Holstein and install Confederal commissioners, whereas the Prussian and Austrian armies joined the war without the request of the diet.⁹² Network members exchanged letters praising the execution and decrying Copenhagen's disregard for the ancient law of Salic descent and the German nation itself.⁹³ Their embrace of Augustenburg remained cool, however.⁹⁴ They expressed little enthusiasm for the candidate himself, though they endorsed the liberal style of government and the cause of German nationalism that he seemed to represent.⁹⁵

Friedrich von Augustenburg found his first and most ardent supporters among network monarchs in Baden, Weimar, and Coburg. He had been living with his family in Gotha since 1851. There, in November 1863, he had already recruited a small army as the Danish king's health worsened.⁹⁶ Duke Ernst of Coburg cooperated with his princely political friends, the grand dukes of Baden and Weimar, to supply the Augustenburg government with staff and materiel.⁹⁷ He virtually built Augustenburg a cabinet headed by veteran Holstein rebels and network members, Karl Samwer and Karl Francke.⁹⁸ When Augustenburg arrived in Kiel on 30 December 1863, without the consent of the German Confederation, he established a government.⁹⁹ Once installed in Kiel, Samwer led the rebel foreign office, and Francke oversaw the Holstein finances. Samwer

also used his legal training to create propaganda flyers and pamphlets conflating Augustenburg legitimism with German nationalism.¹⁰⁰ Samwer and Francke's legal authority remained unsure, however. Perhaps because of this situation and the lessons of the First Schleswig War, the Francke and Samwer families stayed behind in Coburg, and both men remained officials in Coburg service. Duke Ernst merely agreed to Samwer and Francke's secondment to Kiel.¹⁰¹ The two submitted detailed reports to Ernst on the course of the war throughout 1864, including the movements of Austro-Prussian forces and Augustenburg's moods and journeys.¹⁰²

In his enthusiasm for Augustenburg, Duke Ernst also dispatched a new confidant, Eduard von Tempelhey, to report from Schleswig-Holstein. Tempelhey relayed intelligence about Prussian military plans from one "Lt. Becker" and met with the Prussian crown prince at field command.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, Prussian gendarmes soon arrested the unaccredited Coburg courtier and expelled him from Holstein. Duke Ernst demanded that Max Duncker protest the expulsion to King Wilhelm and Adalbert von Schleinitz, the local commander.¹⁰⁴ He considered it an attack on the Augustenburg candidacy and an insult to his sovereign right to monitor a Confederal execution. Duncker did nothing except report the duke's outrage to the crown prince. It was not easy for Duke Ernst to control bourgeois members when they served in a more powerful court. For his part, Duncker was likely unwilling to tend to Ernst of Coburg's wounded pride after the latter's role in the Danzig Affair.

A few days later, to Duncker's "greatest astonishment," Tempelhey returned to Kiel—this time with accreditation as a ducal envoy. Prussian troops apprehended and deported him again.¹⁰⁵ Duncker warned the Prussian crown prince that nothing could damage the Augustenburg cause more "than this semblance of solidarity between Kiel and the 'princely member of the Progressive Party,' as our official newspaper puts it. . . . All the animosity against the duke of [Coburg] will now be transferred to [Augustenburg]."¹⁰⁶ A third Tempelhey appearance could only heighten fears of a Kiel-Coburg axis among Prussian conservatives, including Bismarck and the king, which Samwer later confirmed.¹⁰⁷ Despite their détente around the Augustenburg candidacy, network members disagreed on how best to support their candidate.

Augustenburg's claims to the Elbe duchies were welcomed unequivocally in Baden. Grand Duke Friedrich and Augustenburg shared liberal views, and Roggenbach and Samwer had close ties through the network. Baden, represented by Robert von Mohl at the Confederal diet in Frankfurt, began representing Augustenburg as well. In a letter to Friedrich of Baden, Augustenburg assured him: "I will never forget that it was you and the duke of Coburg who first backed me when I had to step out, virtually against the world, to fulfill my God-given duty."¹⁰⁸ Carl Alexander of Weimar, for his part, promised to impress on his relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg the legitimacy of Augustenburg's claims.¹⁰⁹

Max and Charlotte Duncker considered the conflict an opportunity for the Prussian crown prince to endear himself to the king after the debacle over his comments in Danzig.¹¹⁰ Max Duncker suggested that Friedrich Wilhelm join the Prussian command in Rendsburg; he would be considered a warrior-prince defending Germany, appealing to court conservatives and the liberal press alike. Combat experience would also raise the prince's standing at crown councils, particularly when negotiations began with Denmark.¹¹¹ The crown prince traveled to the Prussian field headquarters in February 1864 to assist Field Marshal Friedrich von Wrangel—who had led Prussian troops against Napoleon I, against Denmark in the First Schleswig War, and against rebels in Baden in 1848.¹¹² By most accounts, Friedrich Wilhelm outshone Wrangel, who appeared senile.¹¹³ The crown prince took over most important decisions, though the king continued to favor Wrangel.¹¹⁴ Max Duncker spent a week with the crown prince in Holstein before returning to Berlin to report on developments there and at the diet in Frankfurt. Although Duncker was the crown prince's "only trusted source" of news, Friedrich Wilhelm ignored most of his advisor's counsel.¹¹⁵

In the early months of the war, Charlotte Duncker feared that King Wilhelm and Bismarck might ultimately guarantee Danish territorial integrity, leaving the Elbe duchies under Copenhagen's control to avoid a wider war in Europe. Despite her husband's limited influence, Charlotte Duncker argued in a letter to Max Duncker that Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm should upset the traditional dynastic obedience that a prince owed the king if it served the interests of the nation.¹¹⁶ In doing so, Duncker illustrated not only network members' separation of monarchs from supreme military command after 1860, but also the accommodation of traditional family and monarchical roles to nationalist demands. She argued that the crown prince "is first crown prince, second general."¹¹⁷ Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm should, she implied, set aside the obedience he owed the king as an officer and intervene, as Wilhelm's son and heir, against Bismarck's anti-national machinations. Duncker thus argued that the crown prince should do his dynastic *and* filial duty and turn the king from the "evil" and "sin" of national betrayal.¹¹⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm's primary duty, in Duncker's view, was his national duty to incorporate Schleswig-Holstein—political error became an offense against God. He was first a German, second a Hohenzollern prince, and only then a Prussian general. Duncker imagined this hierarchy, of course, at a time when monarchs and their presence in medals, portraiture, and *Residenzstädte* were inseparable from military uniforms and soldiers.¹¹⁹

Writing to her spouse, Charlotte Duncker buttressed her position by deploying the language of family solidarity. The son owed the father unbiased counsel; he was to tell him hard truths, Duncker suggested, because Wilhelm's policy decisions in 1864 might haunt Friedrich Wilhelm in his future role as Hohenzollern *Hausvater* and Prussian *Landesvater*. This view of family obligations accorded

closely with more traditional conceptions of monarchy advanced by conservatives such as Duke Bernhard of Meiningen and King Georg V of Hanover. Echoing the crown prince's own assertions during the Danzig Affair of 1863, Duncker held that King Wilhelm was the current custodian of the Prussian Crown and could not tamper with or jeopardize it without consulting its possible heirs. Friedrich Wilhelm, as his anointed successor, had every right to intervene in the machine of state if he believed the Crown was in danger. Likewise, as a son, it was his duty to warn his father of threats to the family. The crown prince had already taken this approach in Danzig—with disastrous results.

Duncker brought together ideas about the early modern dynastic state, post-Napoleonic legitimism, and German nationalism. The Hohenzollerns' family fortunes were still tied to that of the Prussian state, as they would have been one hundred years earlier. But now, for a liberal network member such as Charlotte Duncker, the fortunes of the Hohenzollern family were synonymous not only with the Prussian state, but also with a future German nation-state. Duncker developed this language to legitimize her nationalization of the crown prince of Prussia. She combined traditional conceptions of family and monarchy for national ends: namely, wresting Schleswig-Holstein from its internationally recognized relationship with Denmark and allowing it to pass to a future German nation-state under the Prussian monarchy.

The Dunccker did not have to wait long for developments in the north. By March 1864, Prussian leaders convinced the Austrian emperor to order his contingents into Denmark proper, beyond the borders of the German Confederation and beyond the remit of its execution. Prussian troops stormed the redoubts at Dybbøl (Düppel) in April, ending Danish resistance in Jutland.¹²⁰ The battle eventually became an important episode in Prussian and German nationalist mythology. Members across the network waxed lyrical about the daring of Prussian troops fighting for the German nation under heavy fire and taking heavy casualties.¹²¹ Such victories did little to dispel the crown prince's doubts about the political ends of the war for Prussia and for Germany.¹²² He had been Augustenburg's close friend since their time together at the University of Bonn.¹²³ Bismarck and King Wilhelm had labeled Augustenburg a liberal rabble-rouser, and the Augustenburgs had few friends among other Prussian conservatives.¹²⁴ The king had also forbidden his son to meet with Friedrich von Augustenburg while fighting in Holstein, so in May 1864, the crown prince met his friend in secret in Hamburg.¹²⁵ Augustenburg's opportunity to acquire the northern duchies seemed to be fading—it was not even possible for an old friend to associate with him publicly.

Austrian and Prussian military successes caused controversy over how to exploit these victories in the German Confederation, in the network, and internationally. Some foreign signatories to the London Protocol were alarmed at the rapid

advance of Austrian and Prussian troops against Danish defenses in Schleswig. In the diplomatic tradition of the Concert of Europe, the British government convened a conference in London to resolve the conflict peacefully. As in the First Schleswig War, British leaders feared the possible loss of Danish control of the Baltic straits. Napoleon III of France, by contrast, perceived an opportunity to challenge the territorial status quo and to wring concessions from the Prussian king in the Rhineland in exchange for the Elbe duchies.

The London conference of May 1864 was the only time the Confederal diet exercised its right to send its own ambassadors instead of relying on envoys from the individual states. Leaders of the middle-sized German states, chief among them Baden, Bavaria, and Saxony, feared that the Great Powers, whose leaders questioned the German and Augustenburg causes, would sacrifice both for individual gain.¹²⁶ These critics of the Confederation, now concerned about a potential national defeat in Holstein, favored exploiting the few sovereign powers of an institution that they wished to replace. After some debate, the Confederal diet voted to accredit Friedrich von Beust, *Trias* leader and de facto minister president of Saxony, as its representative.¹²⁷ Beust's election by his traditional pro-Prussian opponents testified to the unifying power of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein among German nationalists. Nonetheless, Beust arrived late to London and largely followed positions advanced by Austrian and Prussian negotiators.¹²⁸ The delegates produced reams of partition proposals for Schleswig, which the Danish delegation rejected, confident of eventual British or Russian support.¹²⁹ Fighting resumed in June 1864. Prussian forces landed on the Danish island of Als at the end of the month, defeating the Danish troops who had been evacuated there.

These further Prussian victories caused network members to disagree further over how best to exploit them. The political friends retreated into their separate camps—around the Dunckers in Berlin and Duke Ernst in Coburg. Rudolf Haym endorsed the incorporation of the duchies into Prussia.¹³⁰ Duncker, following signals from Bismarck, advocated for the annexation of the duchies as “well-earned” rewards for the Prussian army and evidence of the king's assertion that an expanded army, free from parliamentary interference, would drive Prussian expansion and thus German political consolidation.¹³¹

Above all, Max Duncker wanted the duchies to become Prussian. The people of Schleswig and Holstein, he reported to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, would prefer a king to a duke.¹³² Instead of continuing to insist on the dynastic rights of Augustenburg—a presumptive monarch—Duncker argued to Friedrich Wilhelm—another presumptive monarch—that he and the crown prince should, for the sake of national expansion, bypass the reliably liberal Augustenburg in favor of a Prussian king embroiled in a constitutional conflict with the Landtag. This regal swap could only be justified, Duncker continued, by the “consent of the populace.”¹³³

In his next report, Max Duncker admitted that the majority of the duchies' inhabitants continued to consider Augustenburg their legitimate ruler, and he wondered how they could be convinced otherwise.¹³⁴ Duncker concluded that the people of Schleswig-Holstein would, after due consideration, vote for the Prussian king. The king was more glorious and powerful—more national—than a mere duke. Should they not, Duncker contended in a subsequent report that Prussia had already “earned” Schleswig-Holstein through “substantial sacrifices of money and men.”¹³⁵ Duncker mixed the power of feudal rank with the radical idea that the people should choose their ruler. Like *Trias* monarchs at the Fürstentag, Duncker contended that monarchical rank should correspond to national power. He differed only in his suggestion of a plebiscite to confirm the change in the status of Schleswig-Holstein.

For a German liberal such as Max Duncker, citizen-subjects in Holstein might be permitted to choose their monarch, but monarchical government was non-negotiable.¹³⁶ Should Holsteiners reject the rational choice of the Prussian king, Duncker argued that the Prussian government retained the right to incorporate the Elbe duchies as compensation for its wartime sacrifices for the German nation. Should the more liberal option of a referendum fail, Bismarck's more authoritarian option would suffice. Duncker's cynical development of monarchism resided somewhere at the intersection of the legitimist emphasis on the rootedness of monarchical dignity, monarchy by the grace of liberal constitutionalism, and monarchy by popular election. The person of the monarch became an interchangeable figure. For Duncker, the state and nation would prevail in Schleswig-Holstein, regardless of who oversaw it—better that the monarchical figure wore a more impressive crown. Impressed by the Prussian king's monarchical grandeur, Duncker ultimately advocated, in characteristically abstract terms, for plebiscitary monarchy as a strategy to ensure the ascension of compliant crowned heads and thereby the advancement of national unification—a strategy increasingly endorsed by the network's bourgeois liberals.

Max Duncker's suggestion also reflected efforts among moderate liberals to adjust to Bismarckian realpolitik by recycling aspects of left liberalism before 1848. In the 1830s, Karl von Rotteck contended in the hugely influential *Staats-Lexikon* that it was absurd to consider the state as the God-given property of one dynasty.¹³⁷ Instead, the southern German parliamentarian argued, monarchical succession was subject to law as determined by the legislature. Duncker hoped to bypass the duchies' legislatures and the Augustenburg dynasty to reach “the people” of Schleswig-Holstein with a plebiscite directly to legitimize their annexation to the Hohenzollern Crown. Duncker attempted to reconcile Bismarckian realpolitik with the more radical liberalism of his *Vormärz* youth. The former won out. Max Duncker chose to prize national unification over the monarchical *Rechtsstaat* at the core of German liberalism.¹³⁸

Unsurprisingly, the crown prince ignored Duncker's Bonapartist proposal and later lectured him on the role of the legitimate sovereign and the loyalty that he owed his friend, Augustenburg.¹³⁹ Duncker, the bourgeois counselor, was willing to sacrifice a princely political friend in Augustenburg for what he saw as national progress. Friedrich Wilhelm, the crown prince, was not.¹⁴⁰ The two diverged fundamentally over the role of monarchy and the dispensability of political friends on the road to unification. National unity now overrode political friendship for Max Duncker: not so for Friedrich Wilhelm. Such differences of outlook percolated and threatened to boil over in network relations.

The rest of the network, including Ernst of Coburg, Friedrich of Baden, Karl Samwer, Gustav Freytag, and Heinrich von Sybel, continued to back Augustenburg and his vision of a liberal, parliamentary Schleswig-Holstein. They saw as reasonable, however, the sacrifice of ducal prerogatives to Prussia—namely, rights to military roads and the Kiel naval base.¹⁴¹ After all, Prussian leaders had concluded similar arrangements with Coburg and Weimar.¹⁴² Friedrich von Augustenburg, however, was determined to defend his hypothetical prerogatives. Like most monarchs of the German Confederation, he refused to make major concessions for national ends if those ends were synonymous with Prussian ones. Augustenburg's hard line began to alienate more and more members of the *klein-deutsch* network as Austro-Prussian success mounted.

The Danish, Prussian, and Austrian parties signed a preliminary peace in August 1864. King Christian IX of Denmark renounced his claim on the duchies during final negotiations in Vienna. Although victory in the north caused euphoria among German nationalists, the peace did not ease tensions between the Augustenburg and annexationist camps of the network because the question of inheritance remained open.¹⁴³ Ernst of Coburg extended Samwer's and Francke's "leave" to serve Augustenburg in Kiel. Samwer and Francke, however, were eager to return home to Coburg, well aware of Austro-Prussian hostility to the Augustenburg candidacy. War costs for the fledgling Holstein government had exceeded sixty million talers, and Francke felt the pressure.¹⁴⁴ Augustenburg instead requested another extension of their leave from Duke Ernst in Coburg.¹⁴⁵ Francke had refused to consider a second extension before Augustenburg implored Duke Ernst to convince Francke to stay in Holstein alongside Samwer.¹⁴⁶ Without direct pressure from Ernst, the bourgeois network members working closest with Augustenburg were now unwilling to continue the fight. Once again, Duke Ernst had put his non-princely political friends at risk to advance his interests against all odds.

In the final Treaty of Vienna of October 1864, the king of Denmark transferred the three duchies to the custody of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns. The Second Schleswig War had ended, and Schleswig-Holstein became an "internal" German matter. The parties to the London Protocol accepted the secession of the duchies to Austria and Prussia, whose leaders would determine the validity of the

many, and increasingly tenuous, claims on the duchies.¹⁴⁷ Augustenburg turned to Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden, imploring them as old friends to continue their support.¹⁴⁸ Roggenbach reported that the Prussian king had suggested that Samwer leave Augustenburg's service. Wilhelm considered Samwer's constitutional proposals incompatible with the conditions under which Prussia might "return" the duchies; Bismarck distrusted both Samwer and Francke on the basis of their association with Coburg alone.¹⁴⁹

Disregarding his political friends, Duke Ernst again prioritized dynastic politics: Francke and Samwer stayed in Holstein through the winter of 1864. Alongside Bismarck, Max Duncker openly promoted annexation to the Prussian crown prince and king.¹⁵⁰ Non-princely members of the network, regardless of their camp, understood more quickly than their princely counterparts that the fate of the duchies would not be decided in Kiel and Frankfurt, but rather in Berlin and Vienna.

Meanwhile, the fortunes of network members in government remained unstable. In Baden, Karl Mathy's standing with the grand duke grew as Roggenbach's withered. By the winter of 1864, along with the setbacks for the Augustenburg candidacy, Roggenbach faced domestic challenges from political Catholicism with implications for his diplomatic portfolio. The grand duke and the Stabel cabinet were debating Catholic leaders in the legislature over such contested institutions as schools and marriage.¹⁵¹ Roggenbach rejected compromise with the Catholic Church on what he considered the state's mission to spread secular thought, respect for the Protestant ruling house, and German nationalism. Much as they did in the Italian states, poor relations with the Church in Germany in this period sowed conflict between liberal ministers and monarchs in their pursuit of national unification.¹⁵²

Roggenbach declared to his sovereign and political friend in January 1865 that he would not pursue policies against him. In a gesture of fealty, Roggenbach conceded that he could not contradict the grand duke's wishes. "To the contrary," he wrote, "I believe that the sovereign and prince always holds the right to contradict his counselors."¹⁵³ Cooperation between minister and monarch was essential—with due deference to the latter over the will of parliament. However, Roggenbach implied that he would not support misguided domestic policy touching on essentials of Enlightenment liberalism, namely, the separation of church and state and the supposed threat of Catholicism to national unification. On the one hand, Grand Duke Friedrich, who favored compromise with the Vatican, had been lauded in the pages of the *Staats-Lexikon* for his faith in representative government, devotion to national unity, and hostility toward the pope. On the other hand, Franz von Roggenbach, whose appointment the encyclopedia had praised, now rejected compromising liberal ideals for political expediency or to placate a political friend.¹⁵⁴

Friedrich did not accept Roggenbach's resignation until September 1865 after the signing of the Gastein Convention in August of that year.¹⁵⁵ He then appointed a pro-Habsburg diplomat, Ludwig von Edelsheim, as Roggenbach's replacement, signaling his displeasure with Prussia's resistance to Augustenburg.¹⁵⁶ The liberalizing Austrian government maintained its appeal to disaffected *kleindeutsch* princes, despite the bruising debates at the Fürstentag two years earlier. Grand Duke Friedrich's diplomatic maneuver also demonstrated the willingness of most network members to seek cooperation with formerly antagonistic state governments if it seemed to promote German unification—or at least counter conservative leaders in Prussia. Both princely and non-princely members of the network differed little from other German liberals. Compared to the more repressive years of the 1850s, however, the 1860s offered liberals new public venues to vent political disagreements and avenues to pursue national consolidation. They no longer needed to compromise with those who advocated accommodation with the Austrian government or Bismarck. Network members more quickly turned away from old political friends with whom they now disagreed—or actively worked against them. The political friends no longer needed the emotional, professional, and political support that the network provided in the face of official repression. The increasingly antagonistic debate among liberals over whether national unification should be pursued at any cost eventually drove the political friends and the network apart.

But for now, the network held together, and core members lamented Roggenbach's resignation.¹⁵⁷ Network influence was nevertheless preserved, in part, by the additional favor that the grand duke bestowed on Karl Mathy, who had remained relatively aloof from the network debate over Augustenburg.¹⁵⁸ Mathy and Roggenbach had become close during their time in the Baden government, so the latter maintained some access to state plans.¹⁵⁹ The grand duke, before he accepted Roggenbach's resignation, invited Mathy, head of ducal domains, to balls and audiences.¹⁶⁰ Friedrich told Mathy that he appreciated his friendship with Roggenbach and hoped that he might also earn Mathy's love.¹⁶¹ Mathy's appointment was promising because Friedrich could trust him and eventually befriend him. The grand duke appointed Mathy trade minister in 1864, a pivotal post given hopes in Baden for national unification through the Zollverein Parliament, the legislating body of the customs union.¹⁶² In mid-1865, Mathy was awarded a Baden dynastic decoration.¹⁶³ Political friendship as a foundation for political organization was crumbling, but its mechanisms continued to operate.

Emotional attachment, professional development, and political consensus—political friendship—were intertwined in the minds of the monarch and his bourgeois advisor. In the context of the mid-1860s, however, the love between Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden failed to reconcile their policy positions. Friedrich counted on political friendship to prepare the ground for an

emotionally and politically fruitful relationship with Mathy at the same time it crumbled beneath his feet with Roggenbach. The grand duke continued to rely on political friendship to facilitate political cooperation when it no longer could. In this way, he differed little from the rest of the liberal network.

At the same time, from the winter of 1864–65 onward, the Austrian and Prussian governments argued over their Elbe custodianship. The focus of this study now falls mainly on princely members of the network, reflecting the marginalization of non-princely members without government positions. Critical decisions, particularly diplomatic ones, remained largely the purview of princes and state ministers. The later relegation of smaller, network monarchs, along with the Prussian crown prince, also highlighted the decline of dynastic diplomacy in the nineteenth century as state cabinets determined the parameters of monarchs' diplomatic choices—particularly in Prussia, where Bismarck had consolidated his power over the king.

In mid-1865, the Austrian and Prussian monarchs reached a compromise on their northern condominium at Bad Gastein. Schleswig would be administered by a Prussian commissioner, Holstein by an Austrian commissioner. Austria's control of Holstein meant that the new Austrian foreign minister, Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, and the emperor exploited geography to obstruct contiguous Prussian control from Königsberg to Kiel. The Prussian king, meanwhile, purchased the oft-forgotten Duchy of Lauenburg—technically an annexation as claims still awaited arbitration.¹⁶⁴ Many liberals, including the pro-Augustenburg network members around Ernst of Coburg, considered Gastein a betrayal of liberalism and the German nation.¹⁶⁵ The increased concessions that King Wilhelm of Prussia now demanded from Augustenburg in exchange for recognizing his ascension remained similar to the prerogatives that Duke Ernst had “sacrificed” in a military convention with the king in 1861. Such concessions were also far less than the rights his *kleindeutsch* political allies wanted to trade for national unification. Augustenburg refused.¹⁶⁶

Because of the tensions exacerbated by the Gastein agreement, network members faced the likelihood of war within the Confederation. The Prussian government complained about Austrian failures to pay war costs, which Bismarck desperately needed to cover, and instigated disputes over naval installations and military roads in Holstein.¹⁶⁷ Reactions to the Austro-Prussian rivalry varied. Members close to Duke Ernst, such as Roggenbach and Freytag, decried the suggestion of a German war, criticizing Bismarck's violations of the Gastein Convention and King Wilhelm's continued disregard for the constitution.¹⁶⁸ By contrast, the Duncckers, Rudolf Haym, Karl Mathy, and even Karl Francke favored war. In their view, it would assure the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, the destruction of Austrian influence in Germany, and, they hoped, *kleindeutsch* unification.¹⁶⁹

At least since their debates at the Frankfurt Parliament, German liberals had developed a more bellicose approach to the question of national unification.¹⁷⁰ The outcome of a war between Austria and Prussia, however, was deemed by most network members to be too uncertain to risk one. Despite the aggrandizement of Prussian military power at Dybbøl and Als, it seemed unclear to most commentators whether the Prussian army—untested against another Great Power since 1815—could defeat the reformed Austrian military.¹⁷¹ Members feared that a Prussian defeat would discredit not only King Wilhelm's arguments for the army budget but also the appeal of *kleindeutsch* policy.¹⁷² After years of vilifying Austrian intentions, pro-Prussian princes Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden remained sympathetic toward the cautiously reformist cabinet in the Hofburg. Furthermore, many members of the network considered armed conflict with their Austrian confederates akin to civil war. National unification through monarchical agreement—guided by bourgeois advisors—remained some members' preferred path to the nation-state after years of disappointment in their princely political friends.

In 1865–66, therefore, network monarchs pursued closer ties to Austria in order to deter Prussian aggression. Although Roggenbach's successor, Ludwig von Edelsheim, attempted to join the *Trias* states, leaders such as Friedrich von Beust and Ludwig von der Pfordten were suspicious of advances from a long-time *kleindeutsch* rival. Karl Mathy also worked consistently to undermine Edelsheim's pro-Austrian efforts.¹⁷³ Friedrich strengthened his dynastic connections to Austria, nonetheless, by allowing a prince of Baden to serve in the Habsburg army.¹⁷⁴ On 9 April 1866, the Prussian envoy to the Confederal diet, Karl Friedrich von Savigny, called for, among other reforms, an elected Confederal parliament, something neither conservative *Trias* leaders nor the Austrian government could accept.¹⁷⁵ Bismarck understood that Beust and other middle-state leaders would not condone popular representation at the national level—it smacked of 1848.¹⁷⁶ For them, only the expansion of the existing model of the diet as a congress of state envoys was permissible. Stalemate was thus assured. At that point, Duke Ernst noted that war was the only conclusion.¹⁷⁷

In mid-May 1866, leaders from the smaller German states attempted to form a neutral bloc.¹⁷⁸ Decades of infighting precluded such a union. Duke Ernst of Coburg recalled the situation at the time: "In the circles of these statesmen, one played with fire. In Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover, and even in Baden, utter confusion reigned."¹⁷⁹ There was little hope of armed neutrality. Friedrich of Baden received mixed messages about a possible war from both Bismarck and Max Duncker. While the latter prevaricated, the former told him sarcastically that he might place himself under French protection.¹⁸⁰ Duke Ernst raced to Baden to advocate for the neutrality of the smaller German states, but he found the grand duke and his ministers despondent.¹⁸¹ In June 1866, Mathy resigned his cabinet post in protest after Friedrich of Baden joined Austria and the Confederation against Prussia.¹⁸²

Although he had placed his army under Prussian control in 1862, Duke Ernst attempted to limit his involvement in the coming fratricidal conflict. Responding to Carl Alexander of Weimar's question of whether he planned to take up his command in the Prussian army, Ernst replied that he would fulfill his office if it "came to blows"; otherwise, he planned to stay in Coburg.¹⁸³ Ernst worked to persuade Carl Alexander, who thought the war would solve no political problems whatsoever, to journey to Dresden to plead for peace.¹⁸⁴ Ernst was suspicious of King Wilhelm's belligerence and Bismarck's diplomatic intentions.¹⁸⁵ His friendly and family ties to the Austrian foreign minister, Mensdorff, further complicated Duke Ernst's role as both a Prussian officer and an independent monarch.¹⁸⁶ The duke forwarded Mensdorff letters from Berlin showing what he saw as the Prussian king's dependence on Bismarck, as well as arguing that Mensdorff should call a summit between the Prussian and Austrian monarchs, but the two did not meet.¹⁸⁷ In short, network princes failed to prevent a war that none of them wanted.

In early June, Savigny in Frankfurt announced that the Prussian king considered his obligations to the German Confederation void. The Confederation effectively collapsed, and the princely members of the fractured network found themselves on different sides of the conflict. Because of his convention with King Wilhelm of Prussia, Duke Ernst of Coburg joined the war against Austria and his political friends in Baden. Carl Alexander of Weimar was the only network monarch who remained neutral, despite his own military agreement with Prussia. He managed to avoid mobilization only after the intervention of powerful relatives in Berlin and St. Petersburg.¹⁸⁸

After months of suspense, the non-princely political friends abandoned their fates to a war over which they had no control. Freytag wrote a letter to Duke Ernst of Coburg that exemplified how individual network members continued to rely on political friends to cope with dangerous political climates. Freytag feared the worst for the Prussian army.¹⁸⁹ He comforted Duke Ernst from Leipzig, now an enemy city, with a vision sketched in Romantic-nationalist hues:

I see clearly three people sitting beneath the thorn trees of Rosenau, a bit older than now, as many long years have since passed. And I am one of these, gray haired, with a not very becoming paunch, and in a new federal state under my dear lord and lady, true steadfast friends. I lay my final novel at their feet, as I did the first one ten years before. And Your Highness once more remarks on the sunny landscape below. And the duchess says, in her affectionate way: the world has changed, but we stayed true.¹⁹⁰

The world had indeed changed, but so had the political friends.

The war that would decide the fate of Central European politics began on 14 June 1866. Historiographical naming practices regarding the conflict reflect assumptions about the Confederation and the goals of the belligerents. Calling

it the “Austro-Prussian War” overlooks the fact that the two Great Powers brought—or dragged—most of their confederates into battle. The war was formally an execution against the Prussian king; the constitution of the German Confederation prohibited secession without the unanimous approval of the diet.¹⁹¹ Downplaying the Confederation, an admittedly byzantine body, also reflects Borussian historians’ dismissal of the institution.¹⁹² The term “German Civil War” captures the national hues of the conflict—some members described the conflict as a “fratricidal war” (*Bruderkrieg*).¹⁹³ Yet *civil war* (*Bürgerkrieg*) overstates the Confederation as a national political unit. “German” in the context of the German Confederation was more a “geographic expression” than a statement of nationalism. “The German War” was the phrase Theodor Fontane used as the title of his book on the subject. It expresses the Germanization of the Confederation—its lack of non-German monarchs after 1864—as well as the national parameters in which many educated contemporaries thought. Yet, it marginalizes the Italian alliance in Bismarck’s strategy because his plans hinged on a near simultaneous attack on Austrian Venetia from the south.¹⁹⁴ The “Seven Weeks’ War” conveys little more than its relative brevity, but it has the merit of sidestepping these divisive questions.

The Seven Weeks’ War finalized the collapse of the network. Karl Mathy and Hermann Baumgarten were in Karlsruhe, Gustav Freytag had retreated to Leipzig, the Duncckers stayed in Berlin, while the crown prince led Prussian troops in Bohemia. The conflict exacerbated network divisions over the reliability of Prussian national leadership and the rightful heir to Schleswig-Holstein. It also cut lines of communication between belligerent states and slowed correspondence within them. The friends complained of waiting weeks for letters—Baumgarten and Mathy received no news from their friends in other German states during the war.

The Battle of Königgrätz (Sadová) on 3 July 1866 was a decisive defeat for Austria. Major engagements ended by late July after further Prussian victories, and Bismarck was eager to make peace before the intervention of the United Kingdom or Russia, or a possible French invasion of the Rhineland. The Peace of Prague was signed on 23 August 1866.

The armistice did not rule out a last gasp of the intrigue that had been central to network campaigns in the 1860s. Armchair geopoliticking was common among network members and German liberals in general, especially in times of military triumph—or boredom.¹⁹⁵ During the liminal period between the end of the Seven Weeks’ War, in August 1866, and the foundation of the North German Confederation, in January 1867, many German thrones seemed vulnerable.¹⁹⁶ It remained unclear in the months immediately following the Battle of Königgrätz whether Prussia would annex the Kingdom of Saxony, or whether it would tap a more pro-Prussian dynast to ascend the throne in Dresden. Advisors around Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm floated the candidacies of

Carl Alexander of Weimar, the king of Prussia himself, and apparently another eligible prince.¹⁹⁷

Gustav Freytag wrote to Duke Ernst II of Coburg with an interesting proposition. He began by explaining that, because Saxony had fought against Prussia, it now faced the choice between a major dynastic change or annexation. Ernst should, therefore, ascend the Saxon throne: “I consider this takeover a difficult and perhaps dangerous affair, as it concerns my dear lord himself, but it can nonetheless become a patriotic duty.”¹⁹⁸ Freytag reported that he had hinted at this possibility in the *Grenzboten*. He then warned Duke Ernst not to approach the Prussian government directly; rather, Ernst should wait for the Prussian government to approach him with the scheme. Freytag claimed on good authority that Bismarck had rejected the annexation of Saxony. The Prussian minister president would, therefore, have to demand the Saxon king’s abdication. The day before, Freytag had written to Albrecht von Stosch to appraise Prussian attitudes toward Saxony and told Stosch to deploy all his influence in Berlin against the Saxon ruling family: “Saxony must become Prussian.”¹⁹⁹

Duke Ernst’s dubious candidacy reflected earlier network efforts to procure better positions for members—this time a bourgeois member sought a promotion for a princely counterpart. More importantly, Freytag endeavored to replace a legitimate monarch with the barest dynastic justification for national ends. Ernst was distantly related to King Johann of Saxony, who was the head of the House of Wettin. Ernst’s own House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha belonged to the Ernestine branch of the Wettin line. Freytag believed he could exploit this dubious connection to make Duke Ernst’s royal promotion appealing even to more scrupulous leaders. This plan indicates that Freytag was willing to pay lip-service to legitimist thinking if it meant the advancement of national unification under Prussia.

Although he admitted the scheme might endanger Duke Ernst, this was a risk Freytag was willing to take. The failure of princely reform in the early 1860s seems to have encouraged bourgeois network members to consider their princely political friends as malleable expedients in their quest for the nation-state. The cooling of many political friendships with Bismarck’s ascension in late 1862 may have obliged non-princely members to try to exploit their princely counterparts—a reversal of how princely members often put their non-princely friends into risky situations. Freytag’s plan failed, however. He was unable to bend dynastic politics, or Duke Ernst, to his nationalist will.

Eduard von Tempeltey—Coburg privy councilor and repeat expellee from Holstein—felt compelled to insert a note on the topic in the relevant ducal archival folder. He claimed that Duke Ernst “attached no weight whatsoever” to Gustav Freytag’s proposal, and there was no reply to Freytag’s proposition in Ernst’s papers.²⁰⁰ Tempeltey’s claim is not airtight. As early as 1854, Karl Francke had written to J.G. Droysen and reported that Karl von Bunsen had told

Guido von Usedom—this kind of thirdhand knowledge was standard network fare—that the “duke of Coburg is said to be striving to become king of Saxony. . . .”²⁰¹ Whatever Ernst’s ambitions might have been, discussion of replacing the king of Saxony with the duke of Coburg predated 1866. So, Duke Ernst’s candidacy was not entirely a product of overheated armchair diplomacy; rather, it reflected a pattern among network members after 1862. Monarchs and monarchy could be handled differently to fit the changing political mood, as long as monarchical means served national ends. For Freytag, Ernst’s ascension to the Saxon throne was a compelling idea because it would install a liberal monarch and network member bound to the Prussian crown through the Coburg military convention. Royal Saxony would become Prussian, either through annexation or through a monarch willing to sacrifice his newly acquired prerogatives to Prussian-led unification. In September 1866, German national unity aligned uncomfortably with what remained of the network’s political friendships.

After fierce debates with the crown prince and Bismarck’s repeated warnings, King Wilhelm of Prussia disregarded the principle of legitimacy, already undermined by his rejection of Augustenburg, and annexed “only” Electoral Hesse, the Kingdom of Hanover, the Duchy of Nassau, and the Free City of Frankfurt.²⁰² The Habsburg realm escaped annexations but not indemnities. In Austria, “the severing of the institutional and political link with other German-speaking states . . . was psychologically traumatic” and led to the reorganization of the country into the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²⁰³ Freytag failed, and Saxony remained Saxon—somewhat.

More important for members of the former network was the founding of the North German Confederation. This new Confederation comprised a newly expanded Prussia and the remaining states north of the Main—including the Kingdom of Saxony and half of the Grand Duchy of Hesse. The other half of Ducal Hesse and the southern states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria were obliged to conclude secret, offensive-defensive military treaties with the new Confederation but rejected forming their own confederation that could preserve some form of Austrian influence over German affairs.²⁰⁴

Prussian leaders’ drafting of the North German constitution lasted until January 1867. King Wilhelm left the initiative to Bismarck.²⁰⁵ It granted wartime military, as well as full-time diplomatic, powers to the king of Prussia, who acted concurrently as Confederal president. The Prussian minister president—Bismarck—served concurrently as Confederal chancellor. Monarchs of the non-Prussian states kept control over most domestic matters, such as taxation, education, and justice. They also were represented by envoys in an upper house (Bundesrat) of the North German parliament. The votes allotted to an expanded Prussia and its allies meant that, effectively, any veto from the upper house had to have Prussian backing. A lower house, or Reichstag, was elected by universal male suffrage as



Map 4.1. The Creation of the German Empire. Source: *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Jonathan Sperber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Used with permission.

part of Bismarck's plan to undercut liberal opposition.²⁰⁶ Confederal ministers would not be responsible before the legislature but only before the Prussian king as president of the Confederation.²⁰⁷ For *kleindeutsch* liberals, this answer to the German Question was only a partial answer—though much of the North German Confederation's constitution was copied into its Imperial successor in 1871.²⁰⁸

In the hectic months between the Peace of Prague and passage of the constitution of the North German Confederation in April 1867, friendships between many individual members were rekindled. Yet, the network of mutual support never recovered, and the political friends found new positions largely on their own. Former members shifted their focus to the capital of the new Confederation in Berlin, away from the smaller states, where most of them had gathered since 1850. Friedrich of Baden asked Karl Mathy to form a pro-Prussian government in September 1866.²⁰⁹ He obliged. Friedrich and Mathy strove to join the North German Confederation, but Bismarck and King Wilhelm objected, arguing that Baden's membership would be seen as a provocation given its long border with Napoleon III's France.²¹⁰ Mathy served as the leading state minister in Karlsruhe until his untimely death in 1868.

Max Duncker's position as advisor to the crown prince of Prussia had not recovered from the Danzig Affair, and he exerted little influence over peace nego-

tiations.²¹¹ In recognition of Duncker's support since 1862, Bismarck appointed him civil governor of the newly annexed Electorate of Hesse, soon to be reorganized as part of the Prussian province of Hesse. He tasked Duncker with coopting the local civil service and ensuring the smooth transition of power.²¹² Duncker succeeded in maintaining order, but real power lay with the regional military commander.²¹³ Temporary appointment to the defunct electorate ultimately provided little more than a dignified exit for Duncker from the crown prince's service. Duncker was also allowed to assist the Prussian government with drafting the new Confederal constitution.²¹⁴ He then became director of the Prussian State Archives. Charlotte Duncker maintained contact with the Mathys and the Hayms, and the couples rekindled their friendship in late 1866. The Dunckers' relationship with Freytag, Ernst of Coburg, and Karl Samwer remained cool. Whereas physical distance, and mainly epistolary communication, had produced emotional intimacy and political organization during the years of official harassment in the 1850s, physical distance between scattered network members in the mid-1860s only deepened their divisions.²¹⁵

Duke Ernst, for his part, spent much of the second half of 1866 trying to convince the Prussian king to pay for his war costs.²¹⁶ Samwer and Karl Francke ended their secondments in Kiel and returned to Coburg. Gustav Freytag, whose scheme had failed to install Ernst as king of Saxony, turned his affections to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, who had offered the novelist his patronage.²¹⁷ Duke Ernst accused Freytag of abandoning him for a more powerful political friend, but their relationship recovered.²¹⁸ Heinrich von Sybel praised Bismarck's national victories after Bismarck admitted pro forma in September 1866 that he had indeed governed unconstitutionally for the last four years.²¹⁹ Most former network members, like most Prussian liberals, accepted Bismarck's contrition as expressed in this Indemnity Act.²²⁰ Many German liberals realized that, after the conflict over the army bill, the defeat of the Augustenburg candidacy, and the Prussian victory in the Seven Weeks' War, winning Landtag elections and serving as privy councilors did not necessarily translate into political power.²²¹

Feelings of vicarious accomplishment and relief pervaded network members' correspondence and diaries, and the pro-Bismarck members were magnanimous in victory toward their former political friends who had resented Bismarck—but, as the next chapter shows, not for long.²²² Although they considered the North German Confederation only a stepping stone to eventual unification with the south, they accepted its constitution, despite misgivings about parliamentary oversight and the lack of reform in its hegemonic state, Prussia. They believed, like many European liberals, that “larger political units . . . could extend freedom and civilization further and better than small ones.”²²³ The former political friends believed that a key step on the road to German unification was now complete. This belief partly explains why the complex and often uncoordinated net-

work faded: it no longer seemed necessary. Their failure in the 1860s to uphold the emotional bonds that had supported the network contributed to their lack of influence at the highest levels in 1866.

The smaller-state monarchs, whom non-princely members had striven to include in the network, were powerless to affect the course of international politics in the months before the Seven Weeks' War. The liberal network's campaign of official influence through princely political friends failed. Their primary political objective, national unification, had been appropriated by Bismarck and the Prussian state. This left the network of political friends with little choice but to acquiesce to Bismarck's vision. In turn, they were left with feelings of personal betrayal and a troubled history of selective resistance to state power and sparse successes in the pursuit of the German nation-state. Some former network members worked in subsequent decades to remake this challenging past into their own version of German national history.

The network of liberal political friends had grown brittle during the 1860s, but it took years for it to break—years in which liberals failed to rally around a specific set of policies that could offer a popular alternative to Bismarckian politics. Because these moderate German liberals, like most European liberals, eschewed collective action through centralized civic associations and organized political parties, political friendship had to bear the heavy burden of their increasingly acrimonious debates.²²⁴ In this context, friendship proved an unstable foundation for politics, much as it had in other parts of Europe.²²⁵ Faced with an expanding public sphere and an anti-constitutional government, moderate German liberals looked backward for answers—and found few.

Conclusion

The naming of Otto von Bismarck as Prussian minister president in September 1862 drove a wedge among the political friends and divided the German liberal movement. Members of the network reacted in two general ways to the ideological danger and national promise of cooperation with the Prussian government. One camp wished to continue the accommodation with conservative state power that they had begun in the 1850s with Otto von Manteuffel's cabinet. Members such as Max and Charlotte Duncker supported Bismarck's plans to strengthen the Prussian military at the expense of the Landtag—if it meant domestic liberalization and national unification. The other camp, based around Duke Ernst of Coburg, deemed engagement with the anti-constitutional Prussian government a betrayal of liberalism and the German nation.

Despite acquiring additional influence in Baden with Karl Mathy's entry into the grand duke's service, the political friends turned on one another in public, undermining their political appeal to leaders in Prussia. The factional campaign

in the summer of 1863 against Max Duncker culminated in the Danzig Affair and the publication of damning royal correspondence. The ensuing scandal highlighted disagreements over the meaning of monarchy and nation in Prussia and the explosive potential of network members' efforts to direct state policy and punish their rivals. No longer confined to censored publications and secret deliberations, the liberal political friends failed to appreciate a new media landscape in which their efforts to punish personal rivals could cause massive damage.

By the summer of 1863, the idea that the layered sovereignty of the German Confederation could be transformed into a collective national monarchy had gained new adherents, as demonstrated by the debates at the Frankfurt Fürstentag.²²⁶ Much like network members, *Trias* reformers sought to channel individual powers into a central, national executive. But *Trias* leaders hoped to create an executive that would privilege their kingly rank over the equality of all sovereigns, regardless of title—the view advanced by network princes. The *Trias* proposal undermined the already fragile basis of the Confederation, a collegial institution of equal sovereigns. It also confounded network members' *kleindeutsch* assumption that smaller monarchs would eventually disappear into a federal state. The majority of Germany's monarchs had no intention of relinquishing control.

The failure of their earlier Confederal reform proposals and the German princes' equivocations at the Fürstentag caused non-princely members of the network to question their monarchical political friends' ability to lead the way to the nation-state. Bourgeois members began to suggest how to deal with those monarchs who would not cooperate with network plans. The mechanism of collective national monarchy failed to advance the sort of peaceful unification that the liberal friends had planned. In the end, it was not the goodwill or consensus of thirty-five monarchs that answered the German Question, but the force of arms.

The death of the king of Denmark in December of 1863 threw a dynastic match into the nationalist powder keg in Schleswig-Holstein. The euphoria shared by network members, occasioned by the renewed conflict with Denmark in the Second Schleswig War, encouraged reconciliation and cooperation. The network reunited around the Augustenburg candidacy as a symbol of liberal nationalism. Yet, military victories and diplomatic wrangling soon divided the network once again and produced new thinking about the place of monarchy and loyalty in national unification. Charlotte Duncker repurposed traditional familial and legitimist language to reprioritize a crown prince's duty to the nation above dynasty and state. Max Duncker went much further a few months later: he advocated for a plebiscitary monarchy to draw the Elbe duchies into Prussia and a future German nation-state.

The Treaty of Vienna in 1864 ended the conflict, and the Gastein Convention of August 1865 divided the duchies between Austria and Prussia. At this point,

most members had become disillusioned with the Prussian state and its supposed mission to unify Germany. The Seven Weeks' War of 1866 dealt the final blow to the fractured network. The defeat of Austria and the German Confederation allowed the creation of the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Members accepted this partial realization of their *kleindeutsch* vision.

In January 1867, the political friends shifted their focus to the new seat of federal power in Berlin. The emotional, professional, and political structure of their community collapsed with the German Confederation. Political friendship could no longer support an informal network at the national level. Failing emotional bonds exacerbated the already mediated influence of both princely and non-princely members at the highest levels of German and European politics. The peculiar character of the *network* of political friends had vanished with the Confederation, although many individual relationships persisted. Almost all members of the network embraced Bismarck's plan for the North German Confederation, and later the German Empire, because by 1866 they had come to prioritize national unity over consensus, the rule of law, and old friends. This difficult reality was one of many that network members worked to overcome in their auto/biographical writings after 1867—the topic of the next and final chapter. It documents the afterlife of the network in order to demonstrate the concerted effort of network members to defend their political choices in the pre-unification period. They did so by turning memories of their deceased political friends into their own history of German national unification.

Notes

1. What Vanessa Rampton has called European liberals' "inclination to deliberate," as well as their rejection of "social collectives" as the basis for political action, served to solidify this network under state repression in the 1850s. See Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 7.
2. See Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 2, 4, 280, 285–86.
3. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 142–43, 177.
4. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 48–49, 73; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 166–67.
5. Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 3, 156–59.
6. On some of Roggenbach's disagreements with Lamey, see Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 138, 154, 297.
7. See Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 378–82.
8. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 381; Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 27–28.
9. Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 221, 257–58. See also Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, 74, 79–83, 96–98; Fillafer, "Habsburg Liberalism and the Enlightenment Past," 43; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 369–70.
10. Friedrich von Beust was less enthused about the project, however, because it threatened Saxon

- trade interests with Prussia. Flöter, *Beust*, 369, 371, 377. The admission of the Habsburg Monarchy to the Prussian-led Zollverein was paused in 1851 at the end of the “Zollverein Crisis.” See Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*, 147–48.
11. Flöter, *Beust*, 364–65.
 12. Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 27–28.
 13. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 320–21.
 14. Baden’s interest in the *Trias* generally depended on how (un)responsive Prussian leaders were. See, for example, Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 255–56; Report from *Legationsrat Zulauf*, 15 March 1866, *QdPOs*, 5: 270; Report from Zulauf, 26 October 1865, *QdPOs*, 5: 85–86.
 15. Sheehan, *German History*, 896. On the conflict over the Church laws in Baden, see also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 287–311.
 16. The chances for a favorably liberal concordant between Karlsruhe and Rome seemed small, however, given Pius’s refusal to compromise with Italian liberalism. See Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 120–21.
 17. Duncker, “Mathy,” 61; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 350.
 18. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 385.
 19. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 376.
 20. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 7–9.
 21. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 376.
 22. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 132; Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 31 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelтей, 133; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 148; Duncker, “Mathy,” 45.
 23. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 134, 166, 191, 199–200, 202–203, 212, 218, 223, 250, 265, 273, 289, 354.
 24. See, for example, Karl Samwer to Karl Mathy, 23 June 1863, BArch, N2184/52, Bl. 41–42; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 191–93, 223, 247, 257, 277, 301, 333.
 25. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 136, 144; Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 15.
 26. Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 171–72; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 70–71; Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army*, 166.
 27. See “Grundungsprogramm der deutschen Fortschrittspartei,” in *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*, ed. Treue, 3rd ed., 52–53.
 28. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 203–205; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm’s press clippings, GStAPK, BPH, Rep 52 F I. 7c [unfoliated].
 29. Max Duncker to August von Saucken, 16 June 1863, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 352–53.
 30. Quoted in Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 206.
 31. Max Duncker to Bismarck, 17 July 1863, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 22; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436–38; Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 343. Liberal leaders in the UK, for their part, considered Queen Victoria and her prince consort overly sympathetic to “autocratic continental regimes” and tried to limit their influence over foreign policy. See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 53–54.
 32. Saucken told Duncker that the crown prince and princess were upset with his reaction to the speech. See August von Saucken to Max Duncker, 19 June 1863, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 354.
 33. Clark, “Fathers and Sons,” 19, 34. See also Müller, *Royal Heirs*.
 34. Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 8 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 1.
 35. Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 12 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 2; Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 17 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 3; Ernst von Stockmar to Friedrich of Baden, 8 June 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 4.
 36. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 166; Kreklau, “Gender Anxiety,” 181–82.

37. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Friedrich of Baden, 16 June 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 349.
38. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 6. See also, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's diaries, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. 7c.
39. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 14 July 1863, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 30, Bl. 67.
40. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436; Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 301.
41. Max Duncker to Bismarck, 17 July 1863, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 22; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 436–38.
42. Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 30 July 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 354.
43. See San Narciso, Barral-Martínez, and Armenteros, introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 3.
44. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 21 June 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 351.
45. Friedrich of Baden to Wilhelm of Prussia, 5 August 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 357. Friedrich's relationship to his father-in-law remained tense until late 1863: Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 14 November 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 452.
46. On the relationship between, sexuality, power, and expectations of privacy, see Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany*.
47. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 434; Lorenz, *Staatsmänner und Geschichtsschreiber*, 253. In late 1848, the Frankfurt deputies Fröbel and Robert Blum were arrested by the Austrian army for treason. Fröbel was pardoned and sent into exile; Blum was shot. Fröbel was a complicated person with an adventurous past. Though he was also a complex thinker, he insisted fundamentally on the role of the (national) state over individual interests—not unlike many liberals. But he also believed Germans acted as “*Hauptkulturträger*” in an epic struggle against the Slavic “East” and particularly the Russian Empire. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 414–15.
48. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia to Grand Duchess Luise of Baden, 12 August 1863, GAK FA N 1563, Doc. 8. See also See Ernst's invitation, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 37–38; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 421–22.
49. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 303.
50. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 423; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351.
51. Note on the Fürstentag [likely in Tempelvey's hand], SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154. The proceedings conformed to parliamentary rules of order, without the presence of any stenographers or state officials, save Biegeleben. On the Habsburg emperor's reform proposal, see Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351–53; Flöter, *Beust*, 416.
52. Frankfurt Princes' Conference: Notes of the Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 396–97.
53. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 312.
54. Report from Austrian envoy to Baden, Josef von Pilat, 18 September 1863, in *QdPÖs*, 3: 300.
55. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 189–90. According to Christopher Clark, Bismarck's emotional outbursts were calculated performances to force the Prussian king to accept his advice. See Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 520. On Bismarck's ambiguous gender identity and emotional strategies, see Kreklaun, “Gender Anxiety.” On the political power and historical use of performative feeling, see Frevert, *Gefühlspolitik*.
56. Unidentified note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154–55.
57. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 402–405.
58. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 155.
59. Flöter, *Beust*, 416–17. This directory was a reworked version of an Austrian proposal.
60. The other seats would be held by Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony.

61. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 410.
62. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 411.
63. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 411.
64. The situation in Frankfurt was a distant reflection of the infamous feuds between Holy Roman princes over precedence—and particularly seating arrangements. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's Old Clothes*.
65. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7200, Bl. 154.
66. For example, compare Pfizer, “Liberal” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 719; Held, “Monarchie,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 174, 10: 177.
67. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 324.
68. This distinction calls into question Markus Prutsch's assertions about the conflation of personal and state authority in post-Napoleonic German monarchism. See Prutsch, *Making Sense of Constitutional Monarchism*.
69. See Held, “Souveränität,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 444–45.
70. Flöter, *Beust*, 419; Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 439.
71. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 439.
72. Notes of Grand Ducal Cabinet Secretary, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 444.
73. This is the term used in Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 441.
74. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 335.
75. Friedrich of Baden to Franz Joseph of Austria, 29 August 1863, *QdPÖs*, 3: 284.
76. Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 2, 14.
77. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 356–57; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 426. On the Reformverein, see Real, *Der Deutsche Reformverein*.
78. Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 9 August 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 32–34. See also, Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 351.
79. Karl Mathy to Julius Jolly, 17 August 1863, GAK, 52 Jolly, Nr. 41, Doc. 2.
80. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 459.
81. Note on the Fürstentag, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 157–58.
82. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 14 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 157–58.
83. San Narciso et al., introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 1–4; Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 9, 54; Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 22.
84. The Second Schleswig War (1864) was the first of Bismarck's three “wars of unification.” On the role of war in German national unification, see Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*; and Carr, *Wars of German Unification*.
85. Note, “Unterredung mit Bismarck,” 19 May 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34.
86. See Retallack, “After the ‘German Civil War,’” 200; Hewitson, *People's War*, 255, 260, 415.
87. Women could not inherit under Salic law. This provision had ended personal union between Hanover and the UK in 1837, when Queen Victoria ascended the British throne.
88. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 35–36.
89. Each state was separately obligated to defend Denmark, and they were not collectively responsible for the guarantee nor responsible to one another.
90. For anti-Danish propaganda circulated between network members, see SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 7, 35–37, 39, 41; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 207 [unfoliated].
91. Augustenburg issued a proclamation to “his” subjects in mid-November 1863, asserting his claims: see SAC, LA A 7208; Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, telegram, 1 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 43. Already in November 1863, Ernst referred to Augustenburg as duke of Schleswig-Holstein: SAC, LA A 6905. See also Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 48; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 310.

92. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 364.
93. For example, see Ernst of Coburg to Freytag, 16 December 1863, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 187; Francke to Max Duncker, 2 January 1864, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, Doc. 458; Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 4 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 59; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 142–43; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 186, 188, 191.
94. According to Andreas Biefang, disregard or dislike for Augustenburg as a candidate was common among German liberal organizations. The Nationalverein and German Progressive Party in Prussia also remained committed, he argues, not to the legitimacy of Augustenburg's claims or his personality, but to ending Danish rule in Schleswig-Holstein. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 313–14.
95. Mathy called Augustenburg “the pretender.” BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 191. Freytag did praise Ernst's trip to Paris in March 1864 to seek Napoleon III's support for Augustenburg: Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 25 March 1864, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 189; SAC, LA A 6909. Freytag soon came to see Augustenburg as a liability. See Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 5 June 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 73–75. See also Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 179. The political friends likely considered Augustenburg a mere vehicle for national liberation in Holstein and, by creating a new, liberal middle state in the north, a stepping stone to *klein-deutsch* unification.
96. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 2, Bl. 22–25. Ernst had also ordered 30,000 uniforms for an obscure purpose: Karl Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 21 December 1863, SAC, LA A 7209, Bl. 177.
97. Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 362.
98. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 26–27.
99. Augustenburg's move was illegal, but the two Confederal commissioners in Holstein ignored it, even though Austria and Prussia called for his expulsion. See Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 73; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 256.
100. See, for example, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 41.
101. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 26 September 1864, SAC, LA A 7216, Bl. 5–8.
102. See Francke to Ernst, telegram, 1 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7210, Bl. 153; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 4 April 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 30; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 5 April 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 35–36; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 44–47.
103. Eduard von Tempelty to Ernst of Coburg, 1 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 84; Tempelty to Ernst of Coburg, 7 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 101; Tempelty to Ernst, 13 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 15; GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 18, 39.
104. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 16 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 124.
105. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 20 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 138.
106. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 19 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 133–34.
107. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 182; Karl Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 116–18. On official Prussian disdain for Augustenburg, see Karl Friedrich von Savigny to Bismarck, 24 April 1864, *Karl Friedrich von Savigny*, 834–36.
108. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Friedrich of Baden, 22 November [1863], GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 15. For an edited version of the letter, see Augustenburg to Friedrich of Baden, 22 November 1863, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 456.
109. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Ernst of Coburg, 28 March 1864, SAC, LA A 7213, Bl. 14–15.

110. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 536.
111. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 February 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88 Bd. II, Bl. 150–52.
112. Crown prince's war diary, 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 6–10, 15; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 526.
113. GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 34.
114. GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 132, 148.
115. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Max Duncker, 5 May 1864, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 377; GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 9, 197–98; Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 323, 332, 335.
116. This sort of filial piety was only the ideal, of course. The Prussian royal family was particularly prone to father-son conflict. For a brief overview of the phenomenon, see Clark, "Fathers and Sons," 19–37.
117. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 317. Max Duncker had expressed a similar separation of the roles of the crown prince in 1863, but he argued that Friedrich Wilhelm had a family duty to warn his father against escalating the constitutional crisis that superseded his duty as heir to the throne. See Max Duncker, Report, 16 May 1863, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 2 III, Bl. 36–38. Freytag likewise told Ernst that military leadership was just one way for a monarch to serve the German nation: Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 24 June 1856, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 58–59.
118. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 317. Duncker's terminology reflected a form of sacralized nationalism that presented Germans as God's chosen people and infused political debates with Pietist eschatological imperatives. See Lehmann, "Pietism and Nationalism," 52–53. See also Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus*.
119. Karl Mathy, for instance, noted the strange emptiness of the *Residenzstadt* of Baden after the grand duke and most of the army had left for maneuvers. See Karl Mathy to Anna Mathy, 14 September 1865, BArch, N2184/68, Bl. 234. The presence of military men in the Prussian court and government was especially pronounced. See Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 206, 231, 468–69; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 62. On the wider historical role of monarchs in the military, see also Kantorowicz, *Götter in Uniform*.
120. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 161.
121. For example, see August von Saucken to Charlotte Duncker, [July 1864], GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 117, Bl. 54–55.
122. GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 222–27, 260; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 9 July 1864, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 174–74.
123. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337.
124. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen*, 1: 525.
125. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 May 1864, SAC, LA A 7214, Bl. 46; GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 9, Bl. 290–91.
126. Flöter, *Beust*, 448–49.
127. Beust, *Aus drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten*, 1: 353–55; Flöter, *Beust*, 448–51.
128. Flöter, *Beust*, 451, 454; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 363, 367.
129. Sheehan, *German History*, 892; Flöter, *Beust*, 452–53.
130. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 191.
131. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 June 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH, 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23. According to William Carr, Bismarck had already decided on annexation in February. See Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 70.

132. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23.
133. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 14 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 422–23.
134. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 19 May 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 424–26.
135. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 June 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.
136. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 22; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 9–10, 195.
137. Leonhard, “Formulating and Reformulating,” 81; Rotteck, “Legitimität,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 645–46.
138. Leonhard, “Formulating and Reformulating,” 82–83.
139. Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 22 July 1865, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. III, Bl. 274–80. On the long-standing friendship between Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm and Friedrich von Augustenburg, see Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337. Bonapartism, in the understanding of contemporary German liberals, meant an authoritarian monarchy ruling with the consent of the masses through regular plebiscites. For them, it implied rabble-rousing attacks on the political preeminence of educated and propertied elites, disregard for the rule of law, social instability, and, finally, a sort of tyranny of the unwashed masses—similar to liberals’ critiques of “radical” democracy. See Karl von Rotteck’s description of the monarchy of Napoleon I in Rotteck, “Legitimität,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 644–45.
140. On the idiosyncratic—and frequently exaggerated—liberalism of Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who later became Emperor Friedrich III, see especially Müller, *Our Fritz*, 10, 63–64.
141. On Freytag’s position, see Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 192.
142. See SAC, LA A 7314; HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
143. On the reality of the war versus contemporary perceptions, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 70–72.
144. Francke sent the duke of Coburg the Augustenburg government’s accounting of seized Danish assets and war costs in the Elbe duchies; see Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 61–101.
145. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 22 September 1865, SAC, LA A 7220, Bl. 35–36; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 19 November 1865, SAC, LA A 7221, Bl. 51–52.
146. Friedrich von Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 10 August 1864, SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 56–58; Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 26 September 1864, SAC LA A 7216, Bl. 5–8.
147. The Russian emperor, Grand Duke Peter of Oldenburg, and the ruler of little Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen held claim to parts or all of Schleswig-Holstein. See note to Nr. 109, 19 November 1863, *Die auswärtige Politik Preußens*, 4: 169.
148. Augustenburg to Ernst of Coburg, 11 December 1864, SAC, LA A 7217, Bl. 54–57.
149. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 11 September 1864, GAK, FA A Korr. 13, Bd. 30, Bl. 92. An edited version of the letter printed as Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 11 September 1864, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 471. Samwer had often met with Wilhelm in the 1850s. For example, see Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 13 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 37–38; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 39–40; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 14 February 1854, SAC, LA A 7177, Bl. 41–44. “Unterredung mit Bismarck, 19 May 1864,” GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34. Karl Francke had also interacted in the 1850s with Bismarck and the conservative “Camarilla”

- around King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 655–56.
150. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. II, Bl. 424–26; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J. 88, Bd. II, Bl. 453–56.
 151. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 281–87; Sheehan, *German History*, 896–97.
 152. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 114.
 153. Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 6 January 1865, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 477.
 154. See Biedermann, “Nation,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 6: 389, 6: 391.
 155. Karl Mathy, Diary Entry, BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 308; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 318–22.
 156. Roggenbach had supported Edelsheim’s career since at least 1861. See Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 5 March 1861, GAK, FA A 13 Bd. 30, Doc. 28.
 157. Duncker, “Mathy,” 65; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 399–400; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Luise of Baden, 20 October 1865, GAK, FA N 1563; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 22 April 1866, BArch, N2013/6, Bl. 27–28.
 158. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 398–99.
 159. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 395–96. See also Baumgarten to Sybel, 16 October 1864, BArch, N2013/28, Bl. 124–25; Baumgarten to Sybel, 8 October 1865, BArch, N2013/28, Bl. 147–48. See also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 179.
 160. For these court balls and private meetings, see BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 199–200, 202–203, 212, 218, 254, 265, 270, 273.
 161. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 199–200.
 162. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 254; Duncker, “Mathy,” 65. Mathy had written in 1858 that the economic development in the Confederation would lead inexorably to political unity. See Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 8.
 163. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 303.
 164. The Prussian government paid its Austrian counterpart 2.5 million Danish reichstalers for the duchy. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 65.
 165. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 518.
 166. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 165–69; “Unterredung mit Bismarck, 19 May 1864,” GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 31–34; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 2 III., Bl. 274–81.
 167. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 271, 1: 273–75; Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 44.
 168. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 16 January 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelvey, 204–205; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 June 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelvey, 209–10; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 April 1866, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 240.
 169. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 398–99; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 350–51; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, [December 1864], BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 181–82; Francke to Max Duncker, 10 May 1865, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 391. Apparently Duncker had earned Bismarck’s ire for his overly aggressive attitude toward Austria. See Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Luise of Baden, 26 May 1865, GAK, FA N 1563, Bl. 18.
 170. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 48–49, 62; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 41, 106–107; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 347.
 171. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 275; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 58.
 172. Sheehan, *German History*, 900.
 173. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 348–49.
 174. Report from *Legationsrat Zulauf*, 15 March 1866, *QdPÖs*, 5: 270.
 175. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 133–34; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*, 378; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 424.

176. There was also disagreement between the governments of the middle states over whether the Prussian proposal merited a serious consideration. See Flöter, *Beust*, 474–77.
177. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 493; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 27 February 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 5–6; Friedrich of Baden to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 April 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 46–51.
178. Flöter notes the threat Austro-Prussian dualism posed to “the sovereignty and security of the German middling and small states.” The smaller-state conference, the scene of Edelsheim’s wishful politicking, is perhaps a representation of this fear of Great Power cooperation. See Flöter, *Beust*, 313.
179. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 510.
180. Friedjung, *Struggle for Supremacy in Germany*, 192.
181. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 529; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 359–61.
182. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 361–62. Members believed that Friedrich still cherished pro-Prussian views but refused to overrule his cabinet.
183. Conversation with Ernst of Coburg, 29 May 1863, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Weimarer und Berliner Hofes*, ed. Steglich, 1: 79.
184. Carl Alexander of Weimar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 27 February 1866, GStAPK, BPH, 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 5–6.
185. Ernst of Coburg to Mensdorff, 8 October 1865, *QdPÖs*, 5: 69.
186. See SAC, LA A 7221, Bl. 7–14; SAC, LA A 7224, Bl. 24–25, 46–51.
187. Ernst of Coburg to Mensdorff, 28 March 1866, *QdPÖs*, 5: 381.
188. HStAW, NI. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
189. Ping, “Gustav Freytag,” 609.
190. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 20 June 1866, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 210.
191. See “Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815” and “Schlußakte der Wiener Ministerkonferenz vom 15. Mai 1820,” in *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, ed. Huber, vol. 1; Hewitson, *People’s War*, 255. The Duchy of Limburg, a possession of the Dutch king on the western edge of the Confederation, was the only state to withdraw legally.
192. See Siemann, ed., *Der ‘Polizeiverein’ deutscher Staaten*; Bentfeldt, *Der deutsche Bund als nationales Band*; Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*; Müller, *Deutscher Bund*; Flöter, *Beust*.
193. Retallack, “After the ‘German Civil War,’” 200; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 389; Sheehan, *German History*, 899; Hewitson, *People’s War*, 255, 260, 415; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Ernst of Coburg, 26 March 1866, SAC, LA A 7224, Bl. 38; Friedrich of Baden’s war diary of 1866, GAK, FA N 1063, S. 13.
194. Sheehan, *German History*, 905–906.
195. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 23, 26, 106–108; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 298.
196. In one instance, Grand Duchess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt asked her brother-in-law, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, to intervene on her behalf to avoid the possibility of Prussian annexation. See Alice von Hessen-Darmstadt to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 6 August 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 247–48.
197. On the complexity of the situation in royal Saxony, along with the Weimar and Wilhelmine candidacies, see Retallack, “After the ‘German Civil War,’” 206–208.
198. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 9 September 1866, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 84–85.
199. Gustav Freytag to Albrecht von Stosch, 8 September 1866, *Freytags Briefe an Albrecht von Stosch*, ed. Helmolt, 12.
200. Eduard von Tempelty, Note, SAC, LA A 7397, Bl. 82.
201. Karl Francke to Johann Gustav Droysen, 1 July 1854, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 139.

202. Gall, *Bismarck*, 301–303; Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 601; Craig, *Germany*, 11–12. Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt feared Prussian leaders might annex the section of Hesse-Darmstadt north of the Main. See Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, August 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 17, Bl. 247–48.
203. Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 52–53.
204. See Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 598–601; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 559; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 92.
205. Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 195–96.
206. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 341, 343; Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 654.
207. Mommsen, “German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century,” 423–24.
208. Craig, *Germany*, 13. The North German constitution also lacked a bill of rights and left unclear whether the source of sovereignty in the Confederation sprang from the Prussian monarch or from the legislature. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 364–65. Geoff Eley has argued that the period between 1866 and 1871 “hinged on an uneasy compromise” between liberals and the Bismarckian state—this compromise was long in the making. See Eley, “Bismarckian Germany,” 10–11.
209. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 386–87; Mathy to Friedrich of Baden, 14 September 1866, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 28, Doc. 1A; Duncker, “Mathy,” 66; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 374, 379. Lothar Gall places Mathy’s ministerial call much earlier, in late June 1866.
210. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 410, 416–17; Duncker, “Mathy,” 66–69; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 405; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 385–88.
211. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 543, 581; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 178; Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 358.
212. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 396; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 583, 591; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 212 [unfoliated].
213. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 591.
214. See Duncker’s draft constitutions in GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 211, Bl. 41–46, 57–70; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm’s copies in GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 E II. Nr. 2 [unfoliated]. See also Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 337.
215. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96. For a critique of the assumption that emotional and physical proximities are inherently linked, see Gammerl, “Felt Distances,” 199.
216. Ernst of Coburg to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 December 1866, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 E II. Nr. 2 [unfoliated]. Ernst’s efforts were part of a wider reaction among the rulers of the small states against the expensive military requirements of the incipient North German constitution. See Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 198.
217. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 90.
218. Ernst of Coburg to Gustav Freytag, 12 December 1866, SAC, LA A 7399, Bl. 3–8.
219. The Indemnity Act also retroactively legalized the Prussian government’s collection of taxes since 1862. See also Eley, “Bismarckian Germany,” 10–11.
220. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 328–30; Siemann, *Gesellschaft im Aufbruch*, 254; Craig, *Germany*, 9–10. Jörn Leonhard has argued that Prussian Landtag deputies, fearing a possible French invasion, chose national security over constitutional rights by accepting the Indemnity Bill. See Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 603.
221. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 481; Mommsen, “German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century,” 422–23.
222. BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 395–96; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 12 November 1866, BArch N2184/14, Bl. 194–95; Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 14 October 1866, BArch N2184/22, Bl. 49–50; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 5 January 1867, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 211.
223. Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 28.

224. Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 7–8; Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 143. See also Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 7.
225. See Horowitz, *Friendship and Politics*, 3, 156–59.
226. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 280.